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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
1.1 BACKGROUND TO THE STUDY 
 
The inclusion of economic, social and cultural rights (socio-economic 
rights) in the 1996 Constitution of South Africa (the Constitution)1 is 
aimed at advancing the socio-economic needs of the poor in order to 
uplift their human dignity.2 The constitutional protection of these rights is 
an indication of the fact that the Constitution’s transformative agenda 
looks beyond merely guaranteeing abstract equality. There is a 
commitment to transform society, amongst others, from a society based 
on socio-economic deprivation to one based on equal distribution of 
resources.3 This is evidence of a commitment to establish a society based 
on equality in all respects including socio-economic wellbeing.  
 
It was not until 1994 that South Africa adopted a bill of rights. Before 
this, human rights did not enjoy constitutional protection as justiciable 
rights.4 The apartheid era was characterised by wide-spread socio-
                                                 
1
 Act 108 of 1996. 
 
2
 Liebenberg, S., ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: An 
effective tool to challenging poverty?’ (2002) 2 Law, Democracy & Development pp 159 
– 191 [Hereinafter referred to as Liebenberg: 2002], at p 160. 
 
3
 See generally Klare, K., ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 
South African Journal on Human Rights pp 147 – 188; Langa, P., ‘Transformative 
constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review pp 351 – 360, at p 352; and Van 
der Walt, AJ., ‘A South African reading of Frank Michelman’s theory of social justice’ 
(2004) 19 SA Public Law pp 253 – 307, at p 255.  
 
4
 However, this is with the exception of the homelands that had been created as 
independent states for the blacks. Most homelands had adopted their own constitutions 
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 2 
economic deprivation in all its forms. Even when provision was made for 
some socio-economic goods and services, these did not reach all the 
citizens because of the practices of racial discrimination. The white 
minority enjoyed access to better quality goods and services while the 
black majority either had access to only poor quality services or did not 
have access to services at all.5  
 
It is within this context of deprivation and discrimination that the struggle 
for human rights was conducted. The struggle against apartheid was a 
struggle for both political and socio-economic equality. As early as 1955, 
the Freedom Charter (the Charter),6 in addition to civil and political 
rights, made the call for socio-economic justice. It called for the removal 
of restrictions on land ownership, and equal access to work, housing and 
education related rights.7 The Charter was later to become the blueprint 
for a future South African constitution with a bill of rights. It recognised 
the need for people to exercise their civil and political rights while having 
their socio-economic needs met as well. I do not intend to go into the 
details of the events leading up to the inclusion of socio-economic rights 
in the Constitution. What is apparent, however, is that the inclusion of 
socio-economic rights in the Constitution was a product of much 
                                                                                                                                            
with a bill of rights. Nevertheless, these bills protected only traditional civil and political 
rights.  
 
5
 Steytler, N., ‘Local government in South Africa: Entrenching decentralised 
government’ in Steytler, N., (ed.) The place and role of local government in federal 
systems (2005) Konrad-Adenauer-Stiftung pp 183 – 212, at p 184. 
 
6
 The Freedom Charter, adopted by the Congress of the People at Kliptown on 26 June 
1955, sourced at <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/charter.html> (accessed on 17 
May 2005). The Charter was adopted by the liberation movements to exemplify what 
they considered to be the ideal bill of rights for South Africa. See generally Steytler, N., 
(ed.) The Freedom Charter and beyond: Founding the principles for a democratic South 
African legal order (1991) Community Law Centre, University of the Western Cape. 
 
7
 Education would be ‘free, compulsory, universal and equal for all children’. 
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 3 
controversy. As discussed in chapters two and three,8 socio-economic 
rights were rejected by some scholars on the basis of their conception as 
human rights and the role that the courts would play in their enforcement.9  
 
The obstacles to the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution 
as justiciable rights were surmounted during the negotiation and drafting 
of the Final Constitution. This was followed by the inclusion of a wide 
                                                 
8
 See particularly section 3.2.1 of chapter three. 
 
9
 In April 1986, the government requested the South African Law Commission (the 
SALC) to investigate the possibility of protecting human rights. Parallel to this 
development was the African National Congress (ANC)’s adoption of The Bill of Rights 
for a Democratic South Africa in 1988. Like the report of the SALC, the ANC Bill of 
Rights sketched traditional civil and political rights. The point of departure, however, 
was with respect to socio-economic rights. The ANC acknowledged various socio-
economic rights, a position reflected also in its 1991 Constitutional Principles for a 
Democratic South Africa. According to the Commission, making socio-economic rights 
justiciable would be juridically futile and plunge the country into a serious constitutional 
crisis. The Commission was concerned that socio-economic rights could undermine the 
credibility of the bill of rights as a whole because they were not rights as such. Later, the 
SALC conceded the enforcement of certain socio-economic rights by positive action. It 
contended that certain socio-economic rights had crystallised. Such crystallised rights 
were clearly definable rights and, therefore, could be directly enforced, and that those 
rights that had not yet reached a stage of clarity could not be enforced directly but would 
instead be enforced as directive principles of state policy. The ANC on the other hand 
wanted all rights to be enforced directly. This controversy explains the inclusion of very 
limited socio-economic rights in the Interim Constitution. This is because the immediate 
desire was to achieve a compromise in order to agree on a workable transitional 
document. See African National Congress, Constitutional Principles for a Democratic 
South Africa (1991), sourced at <http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/constprn.htm> 
(accessed on 18 May 2005); African National Congress, The bill of rights for a 
democratic South Africa (1988), sourced at 
<http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/policy/constprn.htm> (accessed on 18 May 2005); 
South African Law Commission Interim Report on Group and Human Rights, Project 58 
(August 1991), and South African Law Commission, Final Report on Group and Human 
Rights, Project 58 (October 1994). See also Dlamini, C., Human rights in Africa: Which 
way South Africa (1995)  Butterworths Publishers pp 110 – 113. 
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range of these rights on the same basis as civil and political rights in the 
Bill of Rights as justicaible rights. Subsequent attempts to block these 
rights in during the certification of the Constitution also failed.10  
 
The Constitution has received international acclaim for its inclusion of 
socio-economics rights as justiciable rights on the same basis as civil and 
political rights.11 The Constitution’s commitment to the protection of 
socio-economic rights is made clearer in the preamble which declares that 
the Constitution has been adopted so as to lay the foundation for a 
democracy based on social justice and fundamental rights. The preamble 
also includes a commitment to improve the quality of life of all citizens 
and to free the potential of each person.12 To achieve these values, the Bill 
of Rights protects three categories of socio-economic rights: rights with 
internal limitations, rights without internal limitations and the negative 
rights, respectively.13 As seen in chapter four,14 the obligations 
                                                 
10
 See In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (First 
Certification case) 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC). 
 
11
 Yigen, K., ‘Enforcing social justice: Economic, and social rights in South Africa’ 
(2002) 4 International Journal of Human Rights pp 13 – 29 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Yigen: 2002], at p 21. 
 
12
 In State v Mhkungu (1995) (7) BCLR 793 the CC held that the preamble was not a 
mere aspirational and throat clearing exercise of little interpretational value. Instead, it 
connects up, reinforces and underlines the text which follows; it helps to establish the 
basic design of the Constitution and indicates its fundamental purpose (para 112). 
 
13
 The first category of rights include the right of everyone to have access to adequate 
housing (section 26) and rights of everyone to have access to health care services, 
including reproductive health care; sufficient food and water; and social security, 
including, if they are unable to support themselves and their dependents, appropriate 
social assistance (section 27). What is common with these rights is that they are all 
subject to an internal limitation. By this limitation, the state is required ‘to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures, within its available resources, to achieve the 
progressive realisation of each of these rights’ (sections 26(2) and 27(2)). The second 
category of rights protects what have been crafted as basic rights not subject to any 
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engendered by these rights have been interpreted as justiciable. It is 
especially in respect of the first category that the CC has developed the 
reasonableness review approach in order to give relief to those whose 
rights have been violated. 
 
The realisation of socio-economic rights means amelioration of the 
conditions of the poor and the beginning of a generation that is free from 
socio-economic need. In this context, litigants in socio-economic rights 
litigation expect their victories to be followed by immediate amelioration 
of their socio-economic conditions. However, this may sometimes not be 
the case; court victories may either be followed by very minimal 
improvements or no improvements at all. While this state of affairs may 
be blamed on the normative construction of the rights, it has also been 
blamed on the weaknesses of the remedies ordered by the courts in socio-
economic rights litigation. Although the South African Constitutional 
Court (the CC) has been praised for confirming the justiciability of socio-
economic rights,15 it has also been admonished for issuing remedies that 
                                                                                                                                            
internal limitations. These include the children’s rights to basic nutrition, shelter, basic 
health care services and social services (section 28(1)(c)). They also include everyone’s 
right to basic education (section 29(1)), including adult education, and the rights of 
detained persons to adequate accommodation, nutrition, reading materials and medical 
treatment (section 35(2) (e)). The commonality with this category of rights is that their 
realisation is not subject to the state taking reasonable legislative and other measures 
within its available resources to progressively realise them. The third category, the 
prohibition rights, prescribe a number of prohibitions which includes everyone’s right 
not to be evicted from their home, or have their home demolished without an order of 
court made after considering all the relevant circumstances. Additional to this is the 
affirmation that no legislation may permit arbitrary evictions (section 26(3)). The other 
right in this category is prohibition of refusal of emergency medical treatment to anyone 
(section 27(3)). 
 
14
 Section 4.2.  
 
15
 Yigen: 2002, at p 21; Liebenberg: 2002, at pp 177 – 178. 
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 6 
are incapable of translating these rights into individual entitlements.16 The 
CC has been criticised for its failure to develop a jurisprudence which is 
pro-poor.17 To support these submissions, the case of Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others18 has often been used as 
a point of reference. Many commentators are of the view that even though 
the Grootboom community litigated successfully their socio-economic 
condition has not improved dramatically.19 The CC has been admonished 
for its failure to exercise supervisory jurisdiction in order to ensure that 
                                                 
16
 Bilchitz, D., ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying the 
foundations for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 South African 
Journal on Human Rights pp 1 – 26 [Hereinafter referred to as Bilchitz: 2003]; Roux, T., 
‘Understanding Grootboom – A response to Cass Sunstein’ (2002) Constitutional Forum 
pp 41 – 51 [Hereinafter referred to as Roux: 2002], at p 42. Bilchitz, D., ‘Giving socio-
economic rights teeth: The minimum core and its importance’ (2002) 119 South African 
Law Journal pp 484 – 501 [Hereinafter referred to as Bilchitz: 2002], at p 485; 
Liebenberg, S., ‘Violations of socio-economic rights: The role of the South African 
Human Rights Commission’ in Andrews, P., and Ellman, S., (eds.) The Post-apartheid 
Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa’s basic law (2001) Witwatersrand 
University Press and Ohio University Press pp 405 – 443 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Liebenberg: 2001], at p 419; and Pieterse, M., ‘Resuscitating socio-economic rights: 
Constitutional entitlement to health services’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human 
Rights pp 473 – 502 [Hereinafter referred to as Pieterse: 2006], at p 483, amongst others. 
 
17
 See Swart, M., ‘Left out in the cold? Grafting constitutional remedies for the poorest 
of the poor’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 215 – 240 
[Hereinafter referred to as Swart: 2005]; and Liebenberg, S., ‘Basic rights claims: How 
responsive is “reasonableness review”? (2005) 5 ESR Review pp 7 – 11.  
 
18
 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC). For a detailed discussion of this 
case see chapter four at section 4.2.  
 
19
 See Pillay, K., ‘Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the enforcement of 
socio-economic rights’ (2002) 2 Law, Democracy and Development pp 225 – 277 
[Hereinafter referred to as Pillay: 2002]; Swart: 2005; and Davis, D., ‘Adjudicating the 
socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution: Towards “deference lite”?’ 
(2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 301 – 327 [Hereinafter referred to 
as Davis: 2006]. 
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 7 
the government carries out the judicial orders handed down against it.20 It 
is criticisms of this nature that prompted this research.  
 
This thesis is intended to examine, in-depth, the foundations upon which 
the selection of judicial remedies is based. The thesis uses these 
foundations to critique the approach of the courts as regards remedy 
selection and enforcement mechanisms in socio-economic rights 
litigation.  However, the research takes note of the fact that finding 
effective judicial remedies for the violation of socio-economic rights is 
also influenced by deeper problems relating to their justiciability. Socio-
economic rights are perceived by some as engendering only positive 
obligations, as opposed to the negative obligations engendered by civil 
and political rights.21 Socio-economic rights are also perceived as vague 
and incapable of precise definition in terms of the obligations they 
engender.22 This is in addition to assertions that they lack the essential 
characteristics of rights per se: they lack universality and are not 
completely available on the basis of one being a human being as their 
realisation is subject to a number of conditions.23 These conditions 
                                                 
20
 See Davis, D., ‘Socio-economic rights in South Africa: The record of the 
Constitutional Court after ten years’ (2004) 5 ESR Review pp 3 – 7 [Hereinafter referred 
to as Davis: 2004]; Davis: 2006; Heywood, M., ‘Contempt or compliance? The TAC case 
after the Constitutional Court judgment’ (2003) 4 ESR Review pp 7 – 10 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Heywood: 2003]; Bilchitz: 2003; and Swart: 2005.   
 
21
 See Dlamini, C., ‘The South African Law Commission’s Working paper on group and 
human rights: Towards a bill of rights for South Africa’ (1990) S A Public Law 96; 
Didcott, J., ‘Practical workings of a Bill of Rights’ in Van der Westhuizen, J., and 
Viljoen, H., (eds.) A bill of rights for South Africa (1988) Butterworths [Hereinafter 
referred to as Didcott: 1988], at pp 59 – 60 
 
22
 See Neier, A., ‘Social and economic rights: A critique’ (2006) 13 Human Rights Brief 
pp 1 – 3 [Hereinafter referred to as Neier: 2006], at p 3. 
 
23
 See generally Bossuyt, M., ‘International human rights systems: Strengths and 
weaknesses’, in Mahoney, K., and Mahoney, P., (eds.) Human Rights in the twentieth 
century (1993) Martinus Nijhoff; Cranston, M., ‘Human rights real and supposed’ in 
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include realisation of the rights progressively and subject to the available 
resources.24  
 
Many arguments have been advanced in response to the above objections, 
and to support socio-economic rights as legally enforceable rights. 
However, most of these arguments concentrate on showing similarities 
between civil and political rights and socio-economic rights.25 It has been 
argued by some scholars that socio-economic rights, like civil and 
political rights, engender negative and positive obligations.26 In addition 
to this, both categories of rights are believed to have resources 
                                                                                                                                            
Raphael D, (ed.) Political theory and rights of man (1967) Macmillan; and Cranston, M., 
What are human rights  (1973) Bodley Head.  
 
24
 Robertson, B., ‘Economic, social and cultural rights: Time for a reappraisal’  New 
Zealand Business Roundtable September 1997. First published in 1997 by New Zealand 
Business Roundtable, Wellington, New Zealand, sourced at 
 <http://www.nzbr.org.nz/documents/publications/publications-1997/nzbr-
rights.doc.htm> (accessed on 23 January 2005). 
 
25
 Brand, D., ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution’ in 
Brand, D., and Heyns, C., (eds.) Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) Pretoria 
University Law Press pp 1 – 56 [Hereinafter referred to as Brand: 2005], at p 20. See 
also Pieterse, M., A benefit-focused analysis of constitutional health rights Ph.D thesis 
submitted to the University of Witwatersrand [December 2005], at p 3.  
 
26
 Craven, M., ‘Assessment of the progress on adjudication of economic, social and 
cultural rights’ in Squires, J., Langford, M., and Thiele, B., (eds.) The road to a remedy: 
Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural rights (2005) Australian 
Human Rights Centre and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions pp 27 – 42 
[Hereinafter referred to as Craven: 2005], at p 31; Fredman, S., ‘Providing equality: 
Substantive equality and the positive duty to provide’ (2005) 21 South African Journal 
on Human Rights pp 163 – 190, at pp 163 and 166. Rail Commuters Action Group and 
Others v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (4) BCLR 301 (CC), at paras 70 – 71; and First 
Certification case, at para 78. 
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implications and are to a certain extent vague.27 In spite of this, I submit 
in this thesis that these similarities should not be overstated with the result 
that the difficulties of enforcing socio-economic rights are 
underestimated.28 There is need for a concession that the nature of socio-
economic rights, to a certain extent, varies from that of civil and political 
rights. This notwithstanding, I demonstrate that the typology of the 
obligations to ‘respect’, ‘protect’, ‘promote’ and ‘fulfil’ the rights 
provides a mechanism for clarifying the obligations engendered by these 
rights. Yet, this mechanism is applicable to all categories of rights, 
including civil and political rights.   
 
In spite of the above, however, generally, socio-economic rights require 
more affirmative action than inaction.29 This, though, does not mean that 
civil and political rights merely require abstinence; they also require 
positive action but in varying degrees. The affirmative action necessary 
for the realisation of socio-economic rights requires more resources to 
                                                 
27
 Alston, P., and Quinn, G., ‘The nature and scope of States Parties obligations under the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 8 Human 
Rights Quarterly pp 156 – 229 [Hereinafter referred to as Alston & Quinn: 1987]; First 
Certification case, at para 78.; See also Viljoen, F., The justiciability of socio-economic 
and cultural rights: Experience and problems [Unpublished paper on file with author], at 
pp 3 and 36; and Raes, K., ‘The Philosophical basis of economic, social and cultural 
rights’ in Van der Auweraet, P., De Pelsmaeker, T., Sarkin, J. & Vande Lanotte, J. (eds.) 
Social economic rights: An appraisal of current European and international 
developments (2002) MAKLU pp 43 – 53, at p 48. 
 
28
 Chapter two, section 2.3.1.1. 
 
29
 See De Vos, P., ‘Pious wishes or directly enforceable rights?: Social and economic 
rights in South Africa’s 1996 Constitution’ (1997) South African Journal on Human 
Rights pp 67 – 101 [Hereinafter referred to as De Vos: 1997], at p 71; and Abramovich, 
V., ‘Courses of action in economic, social and cultural rights: Instruments and allies’ 
(2005) 2 SUR – International Journal on Human Rights pp 181 – 216, at p 183.  
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carry out than those of civil and political rights.30 It should, therefore, be 
conceded that, generally, the realisation of socio-economic rights requires 
significant resources.31  
 
The most controversial objection to the judicial enforcement of socio-
economic rights, however, has been based on the doctrine of separation of 
powers. It has been submitted that socio-economic rights are by their 
nature ideologically loaded, and as a result politicise constitutionalism 
and the judicial task.32 It is argued that the realisation of these rights 
involves making ideological choices, which, amongst others, impact on 
the nature of a country’s economic system. This is because these rights 
engender positive obligations and have budgetary implications which 
require making political choices.33 In contrast, civil and political rights are 
believed to be ideologically neutral and do not, therefore, politicise 
                                                 
30
 See Sepúlveda, M., The nature of the obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2003) INTERSENTIA [Hereinafter referred to as 
Sepúlveda: 2003] 
 
31
 Craven: 2005, at p 32. 
 
32
 See Haysom, N., ‘Constitutionalism, majoritarian democracy and socio-economic 
rights’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 451 – 63, at p 456; 
Horowitz, D., The courts and social policy (1977) The Brookings Institution [Hereinafter 
referred to as Horowitz: 1977], at p 9; and Fletcher, W., ‘The Discretionary Constitution: 
Institutional remedies and judicial. Legitimacy’ (1982) Yale Law Journal pp 635 – 697 
[Hereinafter referred to as Fletcher: 1982] 
 
33
 Lester, L., and O’Cinneide, C., ‘The effective protection of socio-economic rights’ in 
Cottrell, J., and Ghai, Y., (eds.) Economic, social and cultural rights in practice: The 
role of judges in implementing economic, social and cultural rights (2004) 
INTERIGHTS pp 17 – 22 [Hereinafter referred to as Lester and O’Cinneide: 2004], at p 
20; and Horowitz: 1977, at p 18. 
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constitutionalism.34 Judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights is also 
viewed as undemocratic because the judges are unelected, yet they set 
aside the decisions of the democratically elected representatives of the 
people.35 Accordingly, the courts lack not only the institutional legitimacy 
but also the institutional capacity to adjudicate socio-economic rights.36  It 
has, therefore, been contended that the role of making decisions as regards 
the realisation of these rights should, in accordance with the doctrine of 
separation of powers, be preserved for the elected organs of state.37  
                                                 
34
 Pieterse, M., ‘Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights’ 
(2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 382 – 417 [Hereinafter referred to 
as Pieterse: 2004], at p 395.  
 
35
 Neier: 2006, at p 2; Lester and O’Cinneide: 2004, at p 20; Zulman, R., ‘South African 
judges and human rights’ paper presented to the Supreme Court History Society, 
Queensland. Australia on 4 July 2001, sourced at 
<http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/publications/articles/speeches/2001/Zelman040701.pdf> 
(accessed on 8 February 2006); Sachs, A., Protecting human rights in a new South 
Africa (1990) Oxford University Press [Hereinafter referred to as Sachs: 1990], at p 20. 
See also Sachs, A., ‘A Bill of Rights for South Africa: Areas of agreement and 
disagreement’ (1989) 21 Columbia Human Rights Law Review pp 13 – 44 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Sachs: 1989], at p 25; and Didcott: 1988.  
 
36
 See Sachs, A., ‘The judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights: The Grootboom 
case’ in Peris, J., and Kristian, S., (eds.) Democratising development: The politics of 
socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers pp 131 – 152, 
at p 140; Scott, C., and Macklem, P., ‘Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable 
guarantees? Social rights in a new South African Constitution’ (1992) 141 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review pp 1 – 148 [Hereinafter referred to Scott & Macklem: 1992], 
at p 24. 
 
37
 See Cottrell, J., and Ghai, Y., ‘The role of the courts in the protection of economic, 
social and cultural rights’ in Cottrell, J., and Ghai, Y., (eds.) Economic, social and 
cultural rights in practice: The role of judges in implementing economic, social and 
cultural rights (2004) INTERIGHTS pp 58 – 89 [Hereinafter referred to as Cottrell & 
Ghai: 2004], at p 89; Mureinik, E., ‘Beyond a charter of luxuries: Economic rights in the 
constitution’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 464 – 475 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Mureinik: 1992], at pp 465 – 467; and Lester and O’Cinneide: 2004. It is, 
however, demonstrated in this thesis that civil and political rights may be as 
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Socio-economic rights are also believed to be beyond the capacity of the 
judiciary because of their polycentric nature. It is argued that a socio-
economic rights decision has many repercussions implicating a number of 
interests of persons who may not be before the court. The courts do not 
have the capacity to appreciate and attend to all these interests.38 Because 
of this lack of capacity, judicial decisions may have unintended 
consequences affecting persons not before the court.    
 
In spite of the inclusion of socio-economic rights in the Constitution the 
above objections have endured and continue to have an impact on the way 
socio-economic rights are being enforced. Chapter four shows, for 
instance, that the CC has been very careful not to construe the rights in a 
manner that imposes undue financial burdens on the state.39 It is also true 
that, to a certain extent, the approach of the CC in constructing the socio-
economic rights in the Constitution has been influenced by the doctrine of 
separation of powers.40 The Court has in some respects chosen to defer to 
                                                                                                                                            
ideologically loaded as socio-economic rights. Some of these rights touch on issues that 
relate directly to contested political space like political representation. Such ideologically 
loaded issues include, for instance, definition of such rights as the right to vote and the 
attendant understanding of the notion of democracy. There have always been many 
ideological arguments on the true meaning of the notion of democracy and whether the 
right to vote includes, for instance, the right of prisoners to vote. See August and Another 
v The Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC) and Minister of Home 
Affairs v National Institute of Crime Prevention (Nicro) and Others 2004(5) BCLR 445 
(CC). This is in addition to the true meaning of multiparty democracy, and whether it 
sanctions legislation allowing for floor crossing under a system based on proportional 
representation. See United Democratic Movement v President of the RSA and Others (2) 
2002 (11) BCLR 1213 (CC). 
 
38
 See Fuller, L., ‘The forms and limits of adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 
pp 353 – 409.  
 
39
 See chapter four, section 4.2. 
 
40
 Pieterse, M., ‘Possibilities and pitfalls in the domestic enforcement of socio-economic 
rights: Contemplating the South African experience’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 
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the executive and legislative branches of state on some issues and has 
avoided constructions that would put it in confrontation with these 
branches.41 This reason has, for instance, been advanced as an explanation 
for the CC’s rejection of the minimum core obligations approach.42 The 
CC’s approach has not only been motivated by the need to avoid 
confrontation by defining the rights as individual rights but is also 
conscious of its institutional incapacity to define the minimum core.43 In 
this regard, the reasonableness review approach has been viewed as the 
most appropriate because it accommodates separation of powers concerns. 
The reasonableness review approach is believed to embrace the notion 
that a public body should be given appropriate leeway to determine the 
best way of meeting its constitutional obligations.44  
                                                                                                                                            
pp 882 – 905 [Hereinafter referred to as Pieterse: 2004a], at p 903; Davis: 2006, at pp 
316 – 317. 
 
41
 Roux, T., ‘Legitimating transformation: Political resource allocation in the South 
African Constitutional Court’ (2003) 10 Democratization pp 92 – 111 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Roux: 2003], at p 96. See also Brand, D., ‘The proceduralisation of South 
African socio-economic rights jurisprudence, or “what are socio-economic rights for”’ in 
Botha, H., Van der Walt, A., and Van der Walt, J., (eds.) Rights and democracy in a 
transformative constitution (2003) Sun Press Stellenbosch pp 33 – 56 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Brand: 2003], at p 51. 
 
42
 Roux: 2003, at p 96. See chapter four, section 4.2.1.  
 
43
 Grootboom case, at para 32.  
 
44
 Steinberg, C., ‘Can reasonableness protect the poor? A review of South Africa’s socio-
economic rights jurisprudence’ (2006) 123 South Africa Law Journal pp 264 – 284, at p 
277. See also Sunstein, C., Designing democracy: What constitutions do (2001) Oxford 
University Press [Hereinafter referred to as Sunstein: 2001], at pp 221 – 222; Sunstein, 
C., ‘Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa’ John M. Olivin Law and 
Economic Working Paper No. 124, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 12, 
(Preliminary draft) sourced at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=269657> (accessed on 20 May 
2005); and Liebenberg, S., ‘Enforcing positive socio-economic rights claims: The South 
African model of reasonableness’ in Squires, J., Langford, M., and Thiele, B., (eds.) The 
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Separation of powers concerns could also be used to explain the CC’s 
approach to defining what are considered to be ‘appropriate, just and 
equitable’ remedies for socio-economic rights violations.45  It is especially 
at the remedial stage of litigation that concerns about the competence of 
the courts become pronounced.46 The CC has explicitly cautioned that in 
determining an appropriate remedy, regard must be paid to the roles of the 
legislature and the executive in a democracy.47 According to the CC: 
 
[A] consideration a court must keep in mind, is the principle of the 
separation of powers and, flowing therefrom, the deference it owes to the 
legislature in devising a remedy for a breach of the Constitution in any 
particular case. It is not possible to formulate in general terms what such 
deference must embrace, for this depends on the facts and circumstances 
of each case. In essence, however, it involves restraint by the courts in not 
trespassing onto that part of the legislative field which has been reserved 
by the Constitution, and for good reason, to the legislature.48 
 
The need to defer to the other organs of state explains why the Court has 
rejected remedies such as the structural injunction. In the TAC case, for 
instance, the Court declined to grant a structural injunction because, in its 
                                                                                                                                            
road to a remedy: Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural rights 
(2005) Australian Human Rights Centre and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions pp 
73 – 88 [Hereinafter referred to as Liebenberg: 2005],  at p 82. 
 
45
 Currie, I., and De Waal, J., The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) Juta & Company 
[Hereinafter referred to as Currie & De Waal: 2005], at p 197. 
 
46
 See Shane, P., ‘Rights, remedies and restraint’ (1988) 64 Chicago-Kent Law Review 
pp 531 – 571 [Hereinafter referred to as Shane: 1988] 
 
47
 Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC), 
(TAC case), at para 137. 
 
48
 National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v Minister of Home 
Affairs and Others 2000 (1) BCLR 39 (CC), at para 66. See also Van Rooyen and Others 
v S and Others 2002 (8) BCLR 810 (CC), at para 48.  
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opinion, ‘the government has always respected and executed orders of this 
Court’ and that there was ‘no reason to believe that it will not do so’.49  
 
However, this thesis posits that in addition to the nature of socio-
economic rights and the doctrine of separation of powers, the CC’s 
approach could be explained by the notion of justice to which the Court is 
inclined. In broad terms, the different remedial approaches adopted by the 
courts have been directed either by corrective or distributive forms of 
justice. On the one hand, the theory of corrective justice demands that 
victims be put in the position they would have been in but for the 
violation of their rights.50 The corrective justice theory, based on the 
philosophy of libertarianism, is not concerned with the impact of the 
remedy on third parties and other interests. Its only objective is to restore 
the position of the victim. The distributive justice theory, on the other 
hand, represents that domain of justice concerned with the distribution of 
benefits and burdens among members of a given group.51 Unlike the 
libertarian based corrective justice, distributive justice is based on the 
philosophy of utilitarianism. A court inclined toward the distributive 
justice theory takes into consideration third party and other legitimate 
interests that may be affected by a remedy.52 The tension between these 
                                                 
49
 Para 129. 
 
50
 See chapter five, at section 5.2.1. See also Modak-Truran, M., ‘Corrective justice and 
the revival of judicial virtue’ (2000) 12 Yale Journal of Law & Humanities pp 249 – 298 
[Hereinafter referred to as Modak: 2000], at p 250; and Roach, K., Constitutional 
remedies in Canada (1994) Law Book Inc [Hereinafter referred to as Roach: 1994], at p 
3-17 
 
51
 See chapter five, at section 5.2.2. 
  
52
 See Sandel, M., Liberalism and the limits of justice (1998) Cambridge University 
Press [Hereinafter referred to as Sandel: 1998], at p 16; Cooper-Stephenson, K., 
‘Principle and pragmatism in the law of remedies’ in Berryman, J., (ed.) Remedies, 
issues and perspectives (1991) Thomson Professional Publishing pp 1 – 48 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Berryman: 1991, and Cooper-Stephenson: 1991 respectively], at p 19. 
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two notions of justice is reflected not only in the remedies, but also in the 
arguments in support and those against socio-economic rights. When 
examined critically, the arguments against socio-economic rights 
represent an objection to using property in a distributive manner, and 
promote the philosophy of libertarianism, which treasures civil and 
political rights.53 In contrast, the arguments in support of socio-economic 
rights derive from the philosophy of utilitarianism. This philosophy is 
based not only on belief in an individual’s wellbeing, but also lays 
emphasis on the common good of society and the wellbeing of all its 
members.54 This philosophy supports socio-economic rights because it 
strengthens the argument that no member of society should live in 
                                                                                                                                            
Distributive and corrective forms of justice have had a great influence on a host of 
factors that determine the nature of the remedies selected by a court. These include such 
factors as the relationship attached to rights and remedies (see generally Gewirtz, P., 
‘Remedies and resistance’ (1983) 92 Yale Law Journal pp 585 – 680); the form and 
procedures of litigation (see generally Chayes, A., ‘The role of the judge in public law 
litigation’ (1979) 89 Harvard Law Review pp 1281 – 1316 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Chayes: 1979]); and the manner of implementing the remedies. In addition to this, they 
also influence the liability rules adopted to determine whether or not there is a wrong and 
whether the plaintiff has suffered as a result.  It is, therefore, important that one 
understand these forms of justice and how they have influenced the courts in determining 
what they consider to be ‘appropriate, just, and equitable’ remedies. 
 
53
 See Boaz, D., ‘The coming of libertarian age’ (1997) 19 CATO Policy Report, sourced 
at <http://www.heartland.org/pdf/63011a.pdf> (accessed on 25 June 2006); Sandel: 
1998;   Garret, J., The limits of libertarianism and the promise of a qualified care ethic 
(2004), sourced at <http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/ethics/libcrit.htm> (accessed on 25 
June 2006); and Ryan, A., ‘Liberalism’ in Goodin, E., and Pettit, P., (eds.) A companion 
to contemporary political philosophy (1995) Blackwell Publishing Ltd pp 291 – 311.   
 
54
 Rawls, J., Political liberalism (1993) Columbia University Press [Hereinafter referred 
to as Rawls: 1993], at p 16. See also Scheffler, S.,  ‘Rawls and utilitarianism’ in 
Freeman, S., (ed.) The Cambridge companion to Rawls (2003) Cambridge University 
Press pp 426 – 459; and Mulhall, S., and Swift, A., Liberals & communitarians (1996) 
Blackwell Publishers Ltd [Hereinafter referred to as Mulhall & Swift: 1996], at p 10. 
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deprivation. Society’s resources have to be employed in a manner that 
realises the happiness of all in socio-economic terms.  
 
To be able to critique the remedies granted in support of socio-economic 
rights, it is important for advocates of these rights to understand the 
philosophies of justice referred to above. Many of the criticisms of the 
remedies granted by the CC in socio-economic rights cases are based on 
the failure of the remedies to realise the rights as individual rights. These 
criticisms, however, appear to unconsciously promote the notion of 
corrective justice and are oblivious to the fact that the decisions of the CC 
are based on the ethos of distributive justice. I contend in this thesis that 
this is because of the fact that the socio-economic context demands that 
the rights be enforced in accordance with the theory of distributive 
justice.55 Criticisms based on corrective justice by advocates of socio-
economic rights may be self defeating because they fail to appreciate the 
reality as presented by the socio-economic context.56 They demand 
redistribution of resources for the benefit of all yet when it comes to 
remedies they insist on resources being used maximally for the benefit of 
selected victims who are able to litigate. 
 
This thesis uses the two forms of justice to assess the appropriateness of 
remedies such as declarations, damages and injunctions as used by the 
CC.57 As will be seen in chapter six, 58 generally, damages may be well 
                                                 
55
 Chapter six, section 6.2.  
 
56
 It is contended in chapter six (section 6.2) that the socio-economic rights context is 
represented by the widespread poverty prevalent in South Africa. The majority of South 
Africans are socio-economically deprived and cannot afford to meet such basic needs as 
housing, food and health services. While there is a constitutional commitment to 
eradicate this deprivation the state is financially constrained and cannot meet everyone’s 
needs immediately.  
 
57
 See chapters six and seven. 
 
58
 Section 6.3.1.  
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suited for corrective purposes and less appropriate to advance the notion 
of distributive justice.59 They are, however, not suited for the promotion 
of distributive justice and inappropriate for litigation that calls for a 
redistributive outcome.60 Rather than put money in the hands of one 
individual, socio-economic rights may require that such money be 
employed for the benefit of all in need of the service(s) in issue.61 This 
does not, however, mean that damages cannot be used for distributive 
purpose. They may, for instance, be awarded as preventive damages that 
go to causes that promote the enjoyment of the rights by all.62 
 
 Injunctions play a dual role: they can promote both corrective and 
distributive forms of justice as they can be used to address not only 
individual but also collective needs. The structural injunction has 
displayed itself as the most effective in promoting distributive justice. 
This is because it is always used to eliminate violations of a systemic 
nature and which affect a wide range of persons.63 In spite of its 
                                                                                                                                            
 
59
 See Wells, M., and Eaton. T., Constitutional remedies: A reference book for the 
United States Constitution (2002) Praeger Publishing [Hereinafter referred to as Wells & 
Eaton: 2002], at p 170. 
 
60
 Trengove, W., ‘Judicial Remedies for violations of socio-economic rights’ (1999) ESR 
Review pp 8 – 10 [Hereinafter referred to as Trengove: 1999], at p 8. 
 
61
 Shelton, D., Remedies in international human rights law (1999) Oxford University 
Press, at p 79. 
 
62
 See chapter six, at section 6.3.1.3. See also Varney, H., ‘Forging new tools: A note on 
Fose v Minister of Safety and Security CCT 14/96’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on 
Human Rights pp 336 – 349 [Hereinafter referred to as Varney: 1998], at p 343; and 
Trengove: 1999.  
 
63
 See chapter seven, at section 7.3. See also Chayes: 1979, at p 1298; Sturm. S., ‘A 
normative theory of public law remedies’ (1991) 79 Georgetown Law Journal pp 1355 – 
1446 [Hereinafter referred to as Sturm: 1991], at p 1357; and Fiss, O., ‘Foreword: The 
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usefulness, however, there are factors that constrain the use of the 
structural injunction as a readily available remedy. The prime factor is the 
need to uphold the separation of powers doctrine and not to overlook the 
institutional constraints of the courts. It is on the basis of this that I 
contend that the structural injunction should be used only as a remedy of 
last resort and where there is evidence of failure on the part of the other 
branches of the state.64 This thesis explains the approach of the South 
African courts in the use of the structural injunction and points out the 
absence of a set of clear norms and principles to determine the 
appropriateness of this type of remedy.65 I therefore develop a list of 
norms and principles that could be employed in the South African context 
to guide the use of the structural injunction.66 
 
 
1.2 STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM  
 
Judicial remedies are, amongst others, a vehicle through which respect, 
protection, promotion and fulfilment of human rights can be delivered to 
those who need them. A remedy is the perspective from which litigants 
judge either the success or failure of judicial decisions. Judicial remedies 
make the rights whole, they complete the justiciability of human rights 
because without them human rights remain statements of legal rhetoric. 
Judicial remedies are also the commanding voice of the courts and the 
way through which the success or failure of the judicial enforcement of 
human rights standards may be judged. Constitutional protection of socio-
                                                                                                                                            
forms of justice’ (1979) 93 Harvard Law Review pp 1 – 58 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Fiss: 1979], at p 2. 
 
64
 Chapter seven, at sections 7.4.2 and 7.6.1.  
 
65
 Chapter seven, at section 7.5 
 
66
 Chapter seven, at section 7.6. 
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economic rights is one thing and their realisation through judicial 
enforcement is another. Weak judicial remedies may weaken the 
substantive rights protected, yet improperly calculated strong remedies 
may lead to the same result.67 It is from this perspective that the nature 
and effectiveness of judicial remedies should be assessed.  
 
The problem is that assessments of judicial remedies are often parochial 
and ignore the deeper factors that influence the approaches of the courts in 
granting remedies. The nature of the remedies that the courts grant is not 
only based on the normative nature of the rights they seek to enforce. 
They are also influenced by factors such as the goals and objectives of 
judicial remedies as defined, amongst others, by the ethos of either 
corrective or distributive forms of justice. The courts are also influenced 
by demands to respect the doctrine of separation of powers and by their 
own institutional constraints.  
 
This thesis explores these factors and their impact on judicial remedies. 
The discussion is placed in the South African context and, although most 
discussions apply to human rights generally, they are addressed to socio-
economic rights specifically. Stress is put on the impact of the separation 
of powers doctrine, institutional competence concerns and on the forms of 
justice pursued by the courts. To be able to influence the remedies that the 
courts grant we must understand and influence perceptions based on these 
factors.  
  
 
1.3 SCOPE OF THE STUDY  
 
The study is based on the judicial enforcement of the socio-economic 
rights protected in the South African 1996 Constitution. The socio-
economic rights in this regard include the right to an environment that is 
                                                 
67
 Tushnet, M., ‘Enforcing socio-economic rights: Lessons from South Africa’ (2005) 6 
ESR Review pp 2 – 6 [Hereinafter referred to as Tushnet: 2005]. 
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not harmful to health and wellbeing,68 rights of access to land,69 access to 
adequate housing,70 access to health care services, sufficient food and 
water, and social security.71 This is in addition to the children’s rights to 
basic nutrition, shelter, basic health care services and social services,72 
and the right of everyone to education.73 This notwithstanding, I do refer 
to case law dealing with civil and political rights. This is because some of 
the principles that the courts have enunciated in these cases apply to all 
constitutional litigation, including litigation in the area of socio-economic 
rights. 
 
South Africa has been selected as the focus of this thesis because of its 
extensive protection and judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights. 
However, in spite of such protection and enforcement, the country still 
faces a number of challenges in the eradication of poverty through 
justiciable socio-economic rights. In this respect, South Africa offers a 
number of lessons to be learnt not only by other domestic jurisdictions but 
also by international human rights bodies. Indeed, South Africa’s socio-
economic rights jurisprudence is being referred to in scholarly literature 
all over the world and may soon be cited by domestic and international 
judicial bodies.  This means that although the study is South African 
based, I deem it relevant to international and many other domestic 
jurisdictions. Many of the challenges it addresses are not exclusive to 
South Africa. South Africa is merely presented as a ‘guinea pig’ for the 
domestic enforcement of socio-economic rights. 
                                                 
68
 Section 24.  
 
69
 Section 25(5). 
 
70
 Section 26.  
 
71
 Section 27.  
 
72
 Section 28(1)(C). 
 
73
 Section 29.  
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Comparative case-law from Canada, the United States of America and 
India is employed because these countries are considered to have a very 
rich experience with judicial enforcement of human rights standards. 
These jurisdictions have used a variety of constitutional remedies with 
varying successes, challenges and failures. It is from these that lessons are 
drawn.  
 
 
1.4 SIGNIFICANCE AND OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
 
While a lot has been written on the subject of the judicial enforcement of 
socio-economic rights, there is no comprehensive research that has been 
done on judicial remedies for these rights. The research undertaken here is 
intended to guide scholars, legal practitioners and judicial officers who 
confront socio-economic rights issues as part of their daily work. The 
study not only investigates the kinds of remedies that the courts award but 
tries to develop theories that can be used to assess the appropriateness and 
successes or failures of these remedies.  
 
The study has been guided by the following objectives: 
 
(a) To investigate the obstacles to the judicial enforcement of 
socio-economic rights and how these obstacles influence the 
crafting of judicial remedies for the violation of these rights; 
 
(b) To investigate the meaning and theoretical foundations of 
judicial remedies in constitutional litigation in general and 
human rights in particular; 
 
(c) To craft a remedial theories and foundations upon which the 
effectiveness of the remedies granted for socio-economic rights 
violations can be assessed; 
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(d) To assess the effectiveness, to socio-economic rights 
violations, of the different remedies available in constitutional 
litigation;  
 
(e) To design norms and principles that could be used by the 
courts to determine the appropriateness, to socio-economic 
rights, of the different types of remedies; and  
 
(f) To critique the remedial approach of the South African courts 
in socio-economic rights litigation.  
 
 
1.5 WORK DONE IN THIS FIELD  
 
Much has been written with regard to the recognition and enforcement of 
socio-economic rights as justiciable rights. This literature spans both 
international and domestic jurisdictions. At the international level, there is 
a plethora of literature touching on such subjects as the development of 
the ICESCR and the nature of the obligations it engenders.74 Specific 
topics of study have included the nature of the obligations engendered by 
                                                 
74
 See for example Arambulo, K., Strengthening the supervision of the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Theoretical and procedural aspects 
(1999) INTERSENTIA; Craven: 1995; Sepúlveda: 2003; Alston & Quinn: 1987; and 
Eide, A., ‘Realization of social and economic rights and the minimum threshold 
approach’ (1989) 10 Human Rights Law Journal pp 35 – 51. See also Craven, M., ‘The 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in Hanski, R., & Suksi, 
M., (eds.)  An Introduction to the international protection of human rights: A textbook 
(1997) Institute of Human Rights  Åbo Akademi University; Eide, A., ‘Economic, social 
and cultural Rights as human rights’ in Eide, A., Krause, C. and Rosas, A., (eds.) 
Economic, social and cultural rights: A textbook, (2001)  Kluwer Law International; 
Raes, K., ‘The Philosophical basis of economic, social and cultural rights’ in Van der 
Auweraet, P., De Pelsmaeker, T., Sarkin, J. & Vande Lanotte, J., (eds.) Social economic 
rights: An appraisal of current European and international developments (2002) 
MAKLU pp 43 – 53; and Chapman, A., and Russell, S., (eds.) The core obligations: 
Building a framework for economic, social and cultural rights (2002) INTERSENTIA. 
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specific rights in the ICESCR such as the right to adequate food,75 right to 
the highest attainable standard of health,76 the right to water,77 and the 
right to education.78 In the South African context, there is an excellent 
capture of the debates relating to the justiciability of socio-economic 
rights that preceded the adoption of the Interim and later Final 
Constitution.79 In addition to this, a lot has been written on the nature of 
                                                 
75
 Alston, P., and Tomasevski, K., (eds.) Right to food  (1984) Martinus Nijhoff; and 
Eide, A., (ed) Food as a human right (1984) United Nations University. See also 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 12, The right to 
adequate food  [article 11] (Twentieth session, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/5 (1999), 
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 54 (2003).  
 
76
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 14, The right 
to the highest attainable standard of health (Twenty-second session, 2000), U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2000/4 (2000), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General 
Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 85 (2003). 
 
77
 Gleick, P., ‘The human right to water’ (1998) 1 Water Policy pp 487 – 503. See also 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 15, The right to 
water (Twenty-ninth session, 2003), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002), reprinted in 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 105 (2003). 
 
78
 Coomans, F., ‘In search of the content of the right to education’ in Chapman, A., and 
Russell, S., (eds.) The core obligations: Building a framework for economic, social and 
cultural rights (2002) INTERSENTIA pp 217 – 246. 
 
79
 See Didcott: 1988; Dlamin, C., Human rights in Africa: Which way South Africa 
(1995) Butterworths; Van der Westhuizen, J., & Viljoen, H., (eds.) A bill of rights for 
South Africa (1988) Butterworths; Van Wyk, D., Dugard, D., De Villiers, J., and Davis, 
D., (eds.) Rights and Constitutionalism: The new South African legal Order (1994) Juta 
& Company; and Sachs: 1990. See also Davis, D., ‘The case against the inclusion of 
socio-economic demands in a Bill of Rights except as directive principles’ (1992) 8 
South African Journal on Human Rights pp 475 – 490 ; Davis, D., ‘Democracy – its 
influence upon the process of constitutional interpretation’ (1994) 10 South African 
Journal on Human Rights pp 103 – 121; De Wet, E., The constitutional enforceability of 
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the obligations engendered by the socio-economic rights provisions in the 
Constitution. This scholarly work has also considered and critiqued the 
CC’s reasonableness review approach in enforcing these rights.80 
                                                                                                                                            
economic and social rights: The meaning of the German constitutional model for South 
Africa, (1996) Butterworths Publishers; De Villiers, B., ‘Socio-economic rights in a new 
constitution: Critical evaluation of recommendations of the South African Law 
Commission’ (1992) 3 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg  [Journal of South African 
Law] pp 421 – 436; and Mureinik: 1992.  
 
80
 See Bilchitz, D., ‘Health’ in  Woolman, S.,  Roux, T., Klaaren, J., Stein, A., & 
Chaskalson, M., (eds.) Constitutional law of South Africa, (1996) Juta & Company and 
Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria [2nd Edition, Original Service 2005] pp 
56A-i —56A-47; Brand, D., and Russell, S., (eds.) Exploring the core content of socio-
economic rights: South African and international perspectives (2002) Protea Book 
House; Brand: 2005; Sunstein: 2001; Brand: 2003; Govender, K., ‘Assessing the 
constitutional protection of human rights in South Africa during the first decade of 
democracy’ in Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., Southall, R., & Lutchman, J., (eds.) State of the 
Nation: South Africa 2005-2006 (2005) Human Sciences Research Council (HSCR) pp 
93 – 122; Peris, J., and Kristian, S., (eds) Democratising development: The politics of 
socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers; Liebenberg, 
S., ‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in  Woolman, S.,  Roux, T., Klaaren, J., 
Stein, A., & Chaskalson, M., (eds.) Constitutional law of South Africa, [2nd Edition, 
Original Service 12-03] (2005) Juta & Company and Centre for Human Rights, 
University of Pretoria pp 33 – 1 to 33 – 64; Liebenberg: 2001; Bilchitz: 2002; Bilchitz: 
2003; Davis: 2004; Davis: 2006; De Vos: 1997; Liebenberg: 2005; De Vos, P., ‘The 
economic and social rights of children in South Africa’s transitional Constitution’ (1995) 
2 SA Public Law pp 67 – 101; Gabriel, A., ‘Socio-economic rights in the Bill of Rights: 
Comparative lessons from India’ (1997) 1 The Human Rights and Constitutional Law 
Journal of Southern Africa pp 9 – 14; Heywood, M., ‘Preventing mother-to-child HIV 
transmission in South Africa: Background, strategies and outcomes of the Treatment 
Action Campaign's case against the Minister of Health’ (2003) 19 South African Journal 
on Human Rights pp 278 – 315; Liebenberg, S., ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence 
on socio-economic rights: An effective tool in challenging poverty?’ (2002) 6 (2) Law 
Democracy and Development pp 159 – 191;  Liebenberg, S., ‘The right to Social 
Assistance: The implications of Grootboom for policy reform in South Africa’ (2001) 17 
South African Journal on Human Rights pp 232 – 257; and Liebenberg, S., ‘The value of 
human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on 
Human Rights, pp 1 – 31.  
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 In spite of this plethora of literature, only a handful of scholars have 
written on the subject of judicial remedies for the violation of socio-
economic rights.81 Though this literature has proved very useful in 
providing some insights for this study, it does not canvass the subject in a 
comprehensive manner; it is either written in a general manner or 
addresses very specific issues and not remedies in a general and 
comprehensive way. Nonetheless, reliance has been placed on general 
writings on the subject of constitutional remedies.82 This is in addition to 
writings on specific remedies such as declarations, damages and 
injunctions.83 This study is aimed at filling some of the gaps identified in 
the literature above. 
                                                 
81
 Roach, K., and Budlender, G., ‘Mandatory relief and supervisory jurisdiction: When is 
it appropriate, just and equitable’ (2005) 122 South African Law Journal  pp 325 – 351; 
Pillay: 2002; Swart: 2005; Heywood: 2003; Trengrove: 1999; at pp 8 – 10; Tushnet: 
2005; and Roach, K., ‘Crafting remedies for violations of economic, social and cultural 
rights’ in Squires, J., Langford, M., and Thiele, B., (eds.) The road to a remedy: Current 
issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural rights (2005) Australian Human 
Rights Centre and Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction pp 111 – 126 
 
82
 See Berryman: 1991; Berryman. J., The law of equitable remedies (2000) Irwin Law; 
Burrows, A., Remedies for torts and breaches of contract (1994) Butterworths; Roach: 
1994; Schuck. P., Suing government: Citizen remedies for official wrongs (1983) Yale 
University Press; Treitel, G., Remedies for breach of contract: A comparative account 
(1989) Oxford University Press; Walker, D., The law of civil remedies in Scotland, 
(1974) Green & Sons; Zakrzewski, R., Remedies reclassified (2005) Oxford University 
Press; Cooper-Stephenson: 1991; Gewirtz: 1983; Levinson, D., ‘Rights essentialism and 
remedial equilibration’ (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review pp 857 – 940; Shane: 1988; 
Sunstein, C., ‘Suing government: Citizen remedies for official wrongs. By Peter Schuck’ 
Book review (1983) 92 Yale Law Journal pp 749 – 761.  
 
83
 Borchand, E., Declaratory judgements (1941) Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing Co; 
Fiss, O., The Civil rights injunction (1978) Indiana University Press; Cassels, J., ‘An 
inconvenient balance: The injunction as a Charter remedy’ in Berryman, J., (ed) 
Remedies, issues and perspectives (1991) Thomas Professional Publishing, pp 272 – 
311; Chayes: 1979; Eisenberg, T., and Yeazell, S., ‘The ordinary and the extraordinary 
in institutional litigation’ (1980) 93 Harvard Law Review pp 465 – 517; Fletcher: 1982; 
Note, ‘Implementation problems of institutional reform litigation’ (1998) 91 Harvard 
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1.6 METHODOLOGY  
 
This research has been based on a review and analysis of literature that is 
relevant to the subject of study. Such primary sources as international law 
instruments in the area of socio-economic rights have been relied on for 
the purposes of construing the nature of the obligations that these rights 
engender and how these may be enforced by the courts. A study of 
domestic legislation including the Constitution of South Africa has also 
been done with the same objective in mind. Great reliance has been 
placed on case-law not only from South Africa but from comparative 
jurisdictions such as Canada, United States of America and India. 
Comparative law has been used to deduce lessons, experiences and 
judicial approaches that are useful in understanding the theoretical basis 
and consequences of certain types of remedies. Reliance has also been 
placed on secondary sources such as scholarly work in the area of human 
rights and socio-economic rights generally. This is in addition to scholarly 
work on the subject of judicial remedies. The author has also attended a 
number of seminars, conferences, roundtable discussions and short 
courses on the subject of socio-economic rights. 
 
 
1.7 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY  
 
The study relies heavily on case-law from the South African 
Constitutional Court and less on case-law from the lower courts, which 
some might consider a limitation. While not ignoring the important 
contribution of the lower courts, this move has been motivated by the fact 
that the CC has been the one setting the pace in terms of the approach to 
the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights. In spite of this, in some 
                                                                                                                                            
Law Review pp 428 – 463; Pilkington, M., ‘Damages as a remedy for infringement of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ (1984) Canadian Bar Review pp 517 – 576; 
Special Project, ‘The remedial process in institutional reform litigation’ (1978) Columbia 
Law Review pp 784 – 929; and Sturm: 1991.  
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respects, comparisons are drawn between the approaches of the CC and 
the various High Courts. This will, for instance, be seen in chapter seven 
on the discussion of the approaches of the courts to the structural 
injunction.  
 
I also limit myself to the study of judicial enforcement of socio-economic 
rights and do not extend to other means through which these rights may 
be realised. I am aware of the fact that the judicial enforcement of socio-
economic rights is, but one amongst many strategies, through which these 
rights may be enforced. Judicial enforcement has been chosen purely on 
the basis of the author’s personal interests motivated also by the fact that, 
amongst the different strategies, it is the most controversial.  
 
This research is also limited in the sense of not following up on cases in 
an empirical manner by ascertaining the impact that judicial remedies in 
specific cases have had on the litigants. The study is restricted to an 
assessment of the remedies themselves and their potential impact. An 
empirical study would have widened the scope of this study in such a way 
that research on the theoretical and philosophical foundations of judicial 
remedies, the primary interest of the author, would have been lost.  
 
Reliance on comparative case-law is also to a certain extent limited 
especially as regards the date of the jurisprudence I refer to. This is 
especially so in respect of the study of structural injunctions in the United 
States of America. This study is restricted to the period when the use of 
the structural injunction became most visible and controversial in the 
United States. This was during the period of the civil rights struggle in the 
area of equal education opportunities, which intensified especially 
between the 1950s and 1970s.    
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1.8 OUTLINE OF THE STUDY  
 
The study is divided into six chapters, excluding this introductory chapter 
and the conclusion. The thesis could be divided broadly into two parts: 
Part 1 [chapters 2, 3 and 4] deals with objections to the judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights and the nature of the obligations 
they engender. This is in addition to the manner in which they have been 
enforced by the courts. Part 2 [chapters 5, 6 and 7] deals with theoretical 
and philosophical foundations of judicial remedies and discusses the 
appropriateness of specific remedies. This part also analyses the approach 
of the South Africa courts on the issue of remedies.  
 
Chapter two analyses the philosophical objections to the judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights based on their inherent nature. 
Socio-economic rights are objected to because they are believed to be 
positive in nature, vague and their realisation is resource based. In this 
chapter, the author submits that some of these objections are 
misconceived as socio-economic rights are similar to civil and political 
rights in many respects. However, it is submitted that there are certain 
characteristics that are peculiar to socio-economic rights and which have 
to be appreciated in their enforcement. Although these do not depreciate 
the justiciability of socio-economic rights, it needs to be acknowledged 
that, generally, these rights call for far more affirmative action and 
resources to realise when compared to civil and political rights. 
 
Chapter three examines the objections to the judicial enforcement of 
socio-economic rights as based on the doctrine of separation of powers 
and the institutional role of the courts. Some authors have submitted that 
the courts are not suited for the enforcement of socio-economic rights 
because they are ‘countermajoritarian’. The courts also lack the 
institutional competence to adjudicate these rights. It is submitted in this 
chapter that the courts have certain characteristics that make them well 
suited for the task of enforcing socio-economic rights and merely 
complement other organs. However, this does not mean that the courts are 
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not constrained in certain respects. This is especially so if they insist on 
traditional means of adjudication. It is also submitted that appropriate 
deference be accorded to the other organs of state where this is due.  
 
Chapter four analyses the approach of the South African courts in 
construing the obligations engendered by the socio-economic rights 
provisions in the South African Constitution. The reasonableness review 
approach is critiqued and a number of shortcomings detected. Failure to 
properly apply the minimum core obligations approach, failure to give 
content to the rights and to question the reasonableness of resources 
allocated are but examples. This chapter proposes a proportionality test 
for the purposes of assessing the effectiveness of the means selected to 
realise the rights. The chapter also makes suggestions on how the 
reasonableness of resources could be interrogated.  
 
Chapter five examines two important theories of justice, corrective and 
distributive justice. These two forms of justice influence the nature of 
remedies that may be granted in constitutional litigation. Corrective 
justice insists on full correction of the wrong, the victim must be put in 
the position he/she would have been but for the violation. Distributive 
justice only promotes full correction absent special circumstances. Special 
circumstances could be interests other than those of the victim that ought 
to be considered. Chapter five showcases how these two forms of justice 
influence the approach to constitutional litigation which includes their 
impact on the liability rules and the relationship they attach to rights and 
remedies.  
 
Chapter six discusses how the remedial approach of the South African 
courts has been influenced by the theories of justice discussed in chapter 
five. The chapter demonstrates how the courts have been influenced by 
the notion of distributive justice. This influence is reflected in the courts’ 
definition of what amounts to ‘appropriate, just and equitable relief’. The 
remedies discussed are those commonly used in constitutional litigation, 
which includes declarations and damages. The injunction is preserved for 
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detailed consideration in chapter seven. The circumstances under which 
each of these remedies may be considered appropriate are discussed in 
detail in the chapter. This is in addition to a detailed description of the 
different forms that each of these remedies may take. This chapter also 
demonstrates how the South African Constitution is encrusted with ethos 
of distributive justice in its protection of collective values.   
 
Chapter seven describes the injunction as used in constitutional litigation 
and its relevance and appropriateness in socio-economic rights litigation. 
However, much of the discussion is dedicated to the structural injunction 
and some of the controversies that surround its use. The chapter goes into 
this issue in great details to show the importance of this form of relief and 
the circumstances under which it may be used. The approach of the South 
Africa courts, which contrasts between the High Courts, on one hand, and 
the CC, on the other hand, is illustrated. The most important contribution 
of this chapter is its development of a set of norms and principles that 
may be used to determine the appropriateness of the injunction and the 
form it should take once ordered. The norms and principles describe the 
factors that may militate the granting of the injunction and issues that 
ought to be considered to determine its form.  
 
 
1.9 CONCLUSIONS  
 
This thesis makes the following conclusions: 
 
(a) In spite of the fact that socio-economic rights are justiciable, they 
are not exactly the same as civil and political rights. Generally 
speaking, socio-economic rights require far more positive action 
and resources in comparison to civil and political rights.84 This is 
in addition to the fact that generally, socio-economic rights still 
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 See chapter two at sections 2.3.1.1. See also De Vos: 1997, at p 71.  
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remain a bit vague in some respects because of the fact that they 
have not been enforced by the courts to the same extent as civil 
and political rights.85 These characteristics have an impact on the 
kinds of remedies that socio-economic rights violations may 
attract. It is submitted that it will be hard to realise socio-economic 
rights fully if their inherent character as human rights is not 
appreciated.  
 
(b) Judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights should not be 
viewed by either the legislature or the executive as an intrusion on 
their domain of administration and legislating. Instead, it should be 
viewed as a complementary effort undertaken to assist them to 
identify, understand and discharge their constitutional 
obligations.86 It is also important to note that the judiciary 
possesses certain characteristics that make it an appropriate 
institution to deal with the enforcement of socio-economic rights.87 
However, this does not mean that the judiciary should override the 
legislature and the executive at all times. It is important for the 
judiciary to appreciate its institutional constraints and to defer to 
the other organs whenever appropriate. Highly intrusive 
interventions should only be justified where there is evidence that 
the other organs of state have failed to discharge their 
constitutional obligations to realise socio-economic rights. Even 
then, the courts should strive as much as possible to foster a 
                                                 
85
 See section 2.3.4.1. See also Craven: 1995, at p 128; and Chapman, A., and Russell, 
S., ‘Introduction’ in Chapman, A., and Russell, S., (eds.) The core obligations: Building 
a framework for economic, social and cultural rights (2002) INTERSENTIA pp 217 – 
246, at p 245. 
 
86
 See People’s Union for Democratic Rights and Others v Union of India and Others 
(1982) 3 SCC 235. 
 
87
 Chapter three, at section 3.2.  
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collaborative relationship between themselves and the other organs 
of state.   
 
(c) To strengthen the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights, 
there is a need for the courts to adopt and enforce a proportionality 
test. This test, similar in some respects to proportionality as used in 
South African jurisprudence under the general limitation clause, 
will enable the courts to interrogate the effectiveness of the means 
chosen to realise the rights.88 The burden would be cast on the state 
to prove that the means it has selected to realise the rights are 
capable of realising the protected right(s). It is important to note, 
however, that use of this kind of test will only be effective if the 
rights are given content. This would help to define the goals 
towards which the state is working.89  
 
(d) The notion of distributive as opposed to corrective justice is more 
suited to guide the courts to enforce socio-economic rights. 
Poverty arising from socio-economic deprivation afflicts a number 
of people and can only be tackled holistically.90 It is submitted that 
when applied to socio-economic rights violations in its strict sense, 
corrective justice may produce undesirable results. It may not be 
possible to put people in the position they would have been in but 
for the violations. This is because of such factors as the 
unavailability of resources in addition to the fact that there could 
be hordes of other people afflicted by the same deprivation. A 
court is, therefore, well advised if it looks beyond the interests of 
the individual victim(s) before it. This approach would also enable 
the court to effectively adjudicate polycentric tasks. However, this 
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 Chapter four, at section 4.2.3.2. 
 
89
 See Bilchitz: 2003, at p 10.  
 
90
 Chapter five, at section 5.2.2.  
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does not mean that there are no cases in which it is appropriate for 
the victim to be put in the position he/she would have been in but 
for the violation. This should apply in those cases that are discrete 
and without wide implications.  
 
(e) The courts should, therefore, be guided by the ethos of distributive 
justice in choosing an appropriate, just and equitable remedies for 
violations of socio-economic rights. There is a catalogue of 
remedies from which the courts can choose. These include 
declarations, damages and injunctions. However, the 
appropriateness of each of these is dependent on a number of 
factors. Declarations have proven appropriate in certain 
circumstances because of the latitude and margin of discretion they 
give to the state to determine how to eradicate a violation. 
However, declarations are only effective where government 
respects the rule of law and is in the habit of complying with court 
orders in good faith.91  
 
Damages are suitable in cases where the violation is discrete and 
the victim has suffered harm that can be associated to a specific 
defendant in liability terms. Damages are inappropriate in those 
cases where the violation is indiscrete, that if the violation is of 
such a nature that not many people have suffered as a result. 
Damages are also inappropriate in socio-economic litigation 
because, other than enhance the capacity of the state, they have the 
potential of depleting resources that would otherwise have been 
used to realise the rights. In spite of this, damages could be 
creatively used, for instance as preventive damages ordered in such 
a manner that they do not go into individual pockets but instead go 
towards structured elimination of the violation.92 
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 Chapter six. 
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 See Varney: 1998 and Trengrove: 1999. 
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(f) The structural injunction is the most dramatic and controversial of 
the remedies available in constitutional litigation today. It is 
submitted that this kind of remedy should be ordered as of last 
resort when faced with government recalcitrance.93 A number of 
norms and principles have been proposed to guide the courts in 
determining whether or not to grant this form of relief. These 
norms should also guide the courts once they have decided to use 
the structural injunction on the form it should take and the nature 
of its implementation. The norms and principles are: (1) 
intervention as of necessity; (2) participation of all interested 
persons as reasonably as possible; (3) the court should ensure as 
much as possible that there is reasoned decision-making; (4) the 
court should maintain its impartiality and independence; (5) the 
substantive norms implicated by the case should be developed as 
much as possible; and (6) the remedy should be ordered and 
applied in a flexible manner.  
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 Chapter seven, at section 7.6.1 
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CHAPTER TWO 
 
THE LEGAL NATURE OF ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND 
CULTURAL RIGHTS: ARE THEY CAPABLE OF 
JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT? THE INTERNATIONAL 
AND SOUTH AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES  
 
 
 
2.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The adoption of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (the ICESCR)1 in 1966 encountered a number of 
obstacles. These related mainly to objections as regards the legal nature of 
socio-economic rights. A number of countries, mostly from the ‘West’, 
argued that these rights were incapable of legal enforcement because they 
are imprecise in nature and their realisation is dependent on resources. 
The rights were also perceived as engendering only positive obligations as 
opposed to the negative obligations engendered by civil and political 
rights. In contrast, countries, mainly from the ‘East’, argued for the legal 
protection of socio-economic rights. They looked up to these rights to 
guarantee people’s socio-economic development and for the protection of 
the basic needs of the poor such as shelter, food, clothing, access to 
medical care and work.2   
 
                                                 
1
 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by UN 
General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 at New York, came 
into force on 3 January 1976. 
 
2
 See generally Craven, M., The International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights: A perspective on its development (1998) Oxford University Press 
[Hereinafter referred to as Craven: 1998]. 
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As a compromise position, the ICESCR was adopted separately from the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (the ICCPR).3 This 
was in spite of earlier directions from the United Nations General 
Assembly (the GA) that a single covenant incorporating both categories 
of rights be adopted.4 The perceived distinction between the two 
categories of rights is also reflected in the manner in which their 
respective obligations are defined. The rights in the ICESCR are to be 
realised progressively subject to the maximum of the available resources.5 
However, in respect of the civil and political rights, the states undertook 
to respect and ensure these rights, no express limitations were placed on 
this obligation.6 The distinction is also reflected in the enforcement 
measures provided for in the covenants. The ICCPR was adopted together 
with an optional protocol establishing an individual complaints 
mechanism.7 No such mechanism was put in place in respect of the 
                                                 
3
 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted by UN General 
Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 at New York, came into force 
on 23 March 1976. 
 
4
 See General Assembly Resolution 421 E (V), 14 December 1950, U.N. Doc. A/1775 
(1950). 
 
5
 Article 2(1) of the ICESCR provides as follows: 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to take steps, 
individually and through international assistance and co-operation 
especially economic and technical, to the maximum of its available 
resources, with a view to achieving progressively the full realization of 
the rights recognized in the present Covenant by all appropriate means, 
including particularly the adoption of legislative measures. 
 
6
 Article 2(1) of the ICCPR provides as follows: 
 
Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes to respect and to 
ensure to all individuals within its territory and subject to its 
jurisdiction the rights recognized in the present Covenant, without 
distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or 
other status. 
 
7
 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights adopted 
by UN General Assembly Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 at New York, 
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ICESCR. This was based on the misconception that the obligations 
engendered by the rights in the ICESCR were incapable of judicial 
enforcement. They would only be realised through international 
cooperation and through the work of intergovernmental organisations. 
This is because it was thought that these rights required extensive state 
action.8 
 
The objection to the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights has 
taken two dimensions. The first dimension is the legitimacy dimension, 
and the second dimension is the institutional competence dimension.9 The 
legitimacy dimension objection is rooted in the traditional conception of 
the philosophical foundations of human rights. The question posed here is 
one of whether it would be legitimate to confer constitutional status on 
socio-economic rights in light of their nature.10 In terms of this dimension, 
social justice can be viewed as illegitimate because it involves the 
redistribution of wealth and intervention of the state in the free market 
economy. It is believed that neither the redistribution of wealth, nor the 
direction of the free market, should be subjected to the discipline of the 
constitution. The market economy is based on state non-intervention and 
                                                                                                                                            
came into force on 23 March 1976. This Protocol empowers the Human Rights 
Committee, as established by the ICCPR, to receive and consider communications from 
individuals subject to its jurisdiction who claim to be victims of a violation by a State 
Party of any of the rights set forth in the Covenant (article 1).  
 
8
 Liebenberg, S., ‘The interpretation of socio-economic rights’ in  Woolman, S.,  Roux, 
T., Klaaren, J., Stein, A., & Chaskalson, M., (eds.) Constitutional law of South Africa 
(2005) Juta & Company and Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria [2nd 
Edition, Original Service 12-03] pp 33 – 1 to 33 – 64 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Liebenberg: 2005], at pp 33 -12 to 33 – 13.  
 
9
 Scott, C., & Macklem, P., ‘Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees? 
Social rights in a new South African Constitution’ (1992) 141 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review pp 1 – 148 [Hereinafter referred to Scott & Macklem: 1992], 
at p 20. 
 
10
 Scott & Macklem: 1992, at p 21. 
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endorses those aspects of human rights that protect individuals against the 
state. Socio-economic rights are believed to engender affirmative features, 
which makes them dangerous to the market economy.11  
 
In terms of the institutional competence dimension, the judiciary is 
viewed as inappropriate to deal with the complex matters of social justice. 
This dimension, among others, draws on concerns of majoritarian 
democracy. Issues of social justice are viewed as matters whose 
determination is within the jurisdiction of the representatives of the 
people and not the unelected judges. According to Scott and Macklem: 
 
The resistance to constitutionally entrenched social rights on 
grounds of institutional competence is often summarized in the 
view that social rights are said to be positive rights and therefore 
requiring governmental action; resource-intensive and therefore 
expensive to protect; progressive and therefore requiring time to 
realize; vague in terms of the obligations they mandate; and 
involving complex, polycentric, and diffuse interests in collective 
goods. Civil and political liberties, on the other hand, are said to be, 
paradigmatically, negative rights that are: cost-free; immediately 
satisfiable; precise in the obligations they generate; and 
comprehensible because they involve discrete clashes of 
identifiable individual interests. These characterizations, even 
when acknowledged to be overdrawn, support the view that civil 
and political liberties both are and ought to be seen as involving 
justiciable matters. Many of these characterizations do not go 
simply to concerns of institutional competence of the judiciary but 
also to legitimacy concerns, with conclusions relating to the lack of 
institutional competence circling back to reinforce impressions that 
a judicial role would be illegitimate.12  
 
This chapter analyses the arguments that have been advanced by the 
legitimacy dimension objection to judicial enforcement of socio-economic 
rights. Objections arising from the institutional competence dimension 
                                                 
11
 Scott & Macklem: 1992, at p 23.  
 
12
 Scott & Macklem: 1992 at p 24. See also De Vos, P., ‘Pious wishes or directly 
enforceable human rights?: Social and economic rights in South Africa's 1996 
Constitution’ (1997) South African Journal on Human Rights pp 67 – 101 [Hereinafter 
referred to as De Vos: 1997], at p 68. 
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have been reserved for detailed consideration under chapter three.13 It is 
submitted in this chapter that the objections to socio-economic rights as 
justiciable rights are based on many wrong assumptions about these 
rights. These objections overstate characteristics which have moreover 
been found not to be exclusive to socio-economic rights. This chapter 
shows similarities between civil and political rights and socio-economic 
rights. This notwithstanding, the chapter also shows that there are certain 
features that are more prominent with respect to socio-economic rights 
and which impact on their implementation.  
 
The chapter begins with an exploration of the historical origins of socio-
economic rights at the international level.14 This is because the objections 
to the judicial enforcement of these rights are historically rooted. The 
historical perspective also helps to justify socio-economic rights as it 
provides evidence of the reasons that justify recognition of these rights as 
addressing human needs. This chapter is distinguishable from chapter four 
which is premised on the acceptance of the justiciability of the socio-
economic rights in the South African Constitution. Chapter four discusses 
the approach that has been adopted by the Constitutional Court (CC) in 
defining the nature of the obligations these rights engender.  
 
                                                 
13
 The impact that the doctrine of separation of powers [and the accompanying 
institutional and democracy based concerns] has had on the judicial enforcement of 
socio-economic rights is immense. It is for this reason that I have opted to discuss the 
institutional competence dimension separately before discussing the obligations of socio-
economic rights and the remedies granted thus far. This, however, is not to suggest that 
the legitimacy and institutional dimensions are isolated from each other. What is 
apparent in the South African context is that the institutional competence dimension has 
endured constitutional protection of socio-economic rights. This dimension continues to 
present problems in the process of adjudicating socio-economic rights and finding 
appropriate, just and equitable remedies for their violation. 
 
14
 The historical origin of the rights in South Africa is detailed in chapter one, section 
1.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter two 
 41 
 
2.2 TOWARDS A HUMAN RIGHTS SYSTEM FOR SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS PROTECTION  
 
2.2.1 The French and Russian revolutions 
The struggle for socio-economic rights can be traced as far back as the 
French revolution of 1789. The French revolution, in addition to the 
tyrannical nature of the French aristocracy, was precipitated by socio-
economic exclusions and inequalities.15 One of the factors leading to the 
outbreak of this revolution was the shortage of bread in addition to socio-
economic injustices such as limited access to land. The French 
Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizens adopted on 26 August 1789 
dealt strongly with the issue of social inequality.16 The declaration 
guaranteed equality of all men and women in all circumstances, including 
social equality. It also, in effect, abolished feudalism, thereby opening up 
access to resources. The French revolution was followed by the Russian 
Revolution of 1917.  
 
One of the burning issues leading to the Russian revolution was the 
distribution of land. Access to land had previously been enjoyed by only a 
privileged few, thereby depriving the majority of livelihood. Another 
issue was the need to guarantee the rights of the workers who had 
                                                 
15
 Jeffery, H., ‘The new politics of economic and social rights’ in Karin, A., and Mihyo, 
P., (eds.) Responding to the human rights deficit: Essays in hounour of Bas de Gaay 
Fortman (2003) Kluwer Law International pp 61 – 72 [Hereinafter referred to as Jeffery: 
2003 and Karin & Mihyo: 2003 respectively], at p 64. 
 
16
 For a discussion of the effect of the French declaration see De Wet, E., The 
constitutional enforceability of economic and social rights: The meaning of the German 
constitutional model for South Africa (1996) Butterworths Publishers, at p 3. According 
to De Wet, the Declaration was aimed at the radical elimination of the feudal and social 
class system.  
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previously been exploited.17 Issues such as low wages, poor conditions of 
work and exploitation of labour called for immediate attention.  
 
2.2.2 From the ILO to the UDHR 
The Russian Revolution coincided with the creation of the International 
Labour Organization (the ILO) in 1919.18 The ILO was created to ‘abolish 
the injustices, hardships and privation’ of labourers and to guarantee ‘fair 
and humane conditions of labour’.19 By this time, the momentum for the 
recognition of socio-economic deprivation as a human rights problem was 
gaining force. In his 1944 State of the Union address, President Roosevelt 
of the United States of America while advocating the adoption of an 
“Economic Bill of Rights”, said: 
 
We have come to the realisation of the fact that true individual freedom 
cannot exist without economic security and independence. “Necessitous 
                                                 
17
 See Smith, A., The Russian Revolution: A very short introduction (2002) Oxford 
University Press [Hereinafter referred to as Smith: 2002]. According to Jeffery: 2003, at 
p 64, the idea that material equity should be a primary objective of political and social 
life received an important impetus from the Russian Revolution. 
 
18
 In spite of this, the ideals of the ILO precede its creation. According to the ILO 
website, the need for such an organization had been advocated in the nineteenth century 
by two industrialists, Robert Owen (1771-1853) of Wales and Daniel Legrand (1783-
1859) of France; see <http://www.ilo.org/public/english/about/history.htm> (accessed on 
27 April 2005). 
 
19
 Steiner, H., & Alston, P., International human rights in context: Law, politics, morals 
(2000) Oxford University Press [Hereinafter referred to as Steiner & Alston: 2000], at p 
242. According to Jeffery: 2003, at pp 64 and 65, the formation of the ILO was inspired 
by the events of the Russian revolution. It was feared that unless the needs of the 
workers were taken care of, demands for redistribution, as was the case in the Russian 
revolution, would emerge elsewhere. He also refers to the United Kingdom which rushed 
to authorise the formation of trade unions in all its colonies. This was done to avoid 
falling under the domination of disaffected people. 
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men are not free men”. People who are hungry and out of job are the stuff 
of which dictatorships are made.20  
 
Later, in 1945, the United Nations (UN) was created with one of its 
proclaimed purposes being ‘… solving international problems of an 
economic, social and cultural nature [by among others] promoting and 
encouraging the respect for human rights’.21 This commitment within the 
UN set the stage for the proclamation of human rights, including socio-
economic rights. In 1948, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 
(UDHR)22 was adopted. The UDHR does not make a distinction between 
civil and political rights and socio-economic rights. The socio-economic 
rights the UDHR proclaims include: the right to work and its related 
rights,23 the right to a standard of living adequate for health and well 
being,24 the right to education,25 the right to participate in one’s culture, 
and protection of interests resulting from scientific, literary or artistic 
production.26 However, the UDHR is not a treaty; it is a mere resolution 
of the GA not subject to ratification.27 In spite of this, the UDHR has 
                                                 
20
 As quoted by Eide, A., ‘Economic, social and cultural Rights as human rights’ in Eide, 
A., Krause, C., and Rosas, A., (eds.) Economic, social and cultural rights: A textbook 
(2001)  Kluwer Law International pp 9 – 28 [Hereinafter referred to as Eide: 2001], at p 
15. 
 
21
 Article 1(3) of the UN Charter. 
 
22
 Adopted and proclaimed by General Assembly resolution 217 A (III) of 10 December 
1948. 
 
23
 Art 23. 
 
24
 Art 25. 
 
25
 Art 26. 
 
26
 Art 27. 
 
27
 This notwithstanding, the UDHR is evidence of a political commitment on the part of 
states. Many states have incorporated its (or some of its) contents in their national 
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formed the basis for the adoption of other more binding human rights 
treaties such as the ICESCR and ICCPR.28 
 
2.2.3 The ICESCR: Emerging disagreements  
Immediately after the adoption of the UDHR, the GA deemed it necessary 
to include the rights it had proclaimed in a binding treaty.29 The GA in 
1948 requested the United Nations Commission (the Commission) to 
prepare, as a matter of priority, a draft covenant on human rights.30 In 
1950, the GA specifically asked the Commission to include in the draft 
Covenant a clear expression of economic, social and cultural rights.31 This 
marked the beginning of controversies on the nature of socio-economic 
rights. Many scholars have associated these disagreements with the 
                                                                                                                                            
constitutions. There is, however, controversy among scholars as to whether this 
Declaration has over the years gained the status of a binding instrument. Those who 
subscribe to the school of thought in support of its binding nature argue that it enjoys the 
status of customary law. In contrast, those who support the school of thought in 
opposition argue that the establishment of customary international law requires the 
existence of general, uniform and consistent practice by states, followed by the 
emergence of an opinion juris (a conviction that the practice is obligatory). These, the 
opponents say, are absent with respect to the practice of human rights. See Krysztof, D., 
‘The UN Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights’ in Hanski, R., & 
Suksi, M., (eds.) An introduction to the international protection of human rights: A 
textbook (1997) Institute of Human Rights, Åbo Akademi University pp 65 – 78 
[Hereinafter referred to as Hanski & Suksi: 1997 and  Krysztof: 1997 respectively], at p 
78.  
 
28
 Krysztof: 1997, at p 75. 
 
29
 Craven, M., ‘The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ in 
Hanski & Suksi : 1997 pp 101 – 123, at p 101. 
 
30
 GA Res 217 A, B, E (III), 10 December 1948. 
 
31
 GA Res. 421 E (V), 14 December 1950, U.N. Doc. A/1775 (1950). 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter two 
 45 
ideological split of the ‘cold war’.32 The Eastern states championed the 
cause of socio-economic rights because they associated these rights with 
socialistic ideals emphasising the fulfilment of the basic needs of all. In 
contrast, the Western states championed civil and political rights as the 
foundation of liberty in the free world.33 It is because of these differences 
that the ICCPR was adopted differently from the ICESCR. This was done 
as a compromise, so that countries opposed to socio-economic rights 
would ratify the ICCPR and those opposed to civil and political rights 
would ratify the ICESCR.34 
 
The above notwithstanding, opposition to socio-economic rights has 
continued even after the end of the ‘cold war’. In addition, states believed 
to have been socialist later joined in this opposition and the ratification 
record indicates that Eastern states have been as reluctant to ratify the 
ICESCR as are capitalist states. The record also indicates that most 
Western states were not in a rush to ratify the ICCPR.35 Indeed, the UN 
                                                 
32
 See Craven: 1998; and Kenneth, R., ‘Defending economic, social and cultural rights: 
Practical issues faced by an international human rights organisation’ (2004) 26 Human 
Rights Quarterly 63 – 73. 
 
33
 Craven: 1998, at p 9. 
 
34
 Robertson asserts that the whole structure was driven by the need for the UN to 
achieve apparent consensus and unity and was, therefore, a diplomatic decision. 
Robertson, B. ‘Economic, social and cultural rights: Time for a reappraisal’  New 
Zealand Business Roundtable September 1997, First published in 1997 by New Zealand 
Business Roundtable, Wellington, New Zealand sourced at 
<http://www.nzbr.org.nz/documents/publications/publications-1997/nzbr-
rights.doc.htm> (accessed on 23 January 2005) [Hereinafter referred to as Robertson: 
1997]. 
 
35
 For example, Denmark signed the ICESCR on 20 March 1968 and ratified it on 6 
January 1972, Germany signed it on 9 October 1968 and ratified on 17 December 1973, 
the United Kingdom signed on 16 September 1967 and ratified on 20 May 1976. Yet, 
China signed the ICESCR on 27 October 1997 and ratified it on 27 March 2001 and 
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Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the Committee) has 
stressed that the ICESCR is neutral in terms of economic and political 
systems. It neither prefers socialist, as opposed to capitalistic economies, 
nor centrally planned as opposed to laisser-faire economies.36 It appears, 
therefore, that these disagreements did not result from the ideological 
differences, though there is no denying that the ideological differences 
influenced the debate.  
 
The main reason for the split relates to differences in conception of the 
obligations engendered by the rights.37 According to Scott and Macklem, 
the split was not influenced by the view that socio-economic rights are 
somehow inferior to civil and political rights. ‘Rather, social rights were 
not viewed as justiciable because courts, or court-like bodies, were not 
thought to be competent bodies to deal with them’.38 A reporting 
mechanism, As opposed to a complaints procedure, was considered most 
suitable for enforcement of the rights.39 It is on this premise, as discussed 
                                                                                                                                            
though Russia signed the ICESCR on 18 March 1968 it only ratified it on 16 October 
1973. 
 
36
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The nature 
of States parties' obligations (Fifth session, 1990), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86 
(1991), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 14 (2003) 
(General Comment 3), at para 8. 
 
37
 Dennis, J., and Stewart, P., ‘Justiciability of economic, social and cultural rights: 
Should there be an international  complaints mechanism to adjudicate the rights to food, 
water, housing and health?’ (2004) 98 American Journal of International Law pp 462 – 
515 [Hereinafter referred to as Dennis & Stewart: 2004], at p 477. 
 
38
 Scott & Macklem: 1992, at p 89. 
 
39
 Arambulo, K., Strengthening the supervision of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Theoritical and procedural aspects (1999) 
INTERSENTIA [Hereinafter referred to as Arambulo: 1999], at p 26.  
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in the next section, that socio-economic rights have been objected to and 
viewed as lacking the prerequisites of human rights in their pure form. 
The next section also discusses the responses to these objections. 
 
 
2.3 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST SOCIO-ECONOMIC 
RIGHTS  
 
2.3.1 Human rights engender negative obligations 
The disqualification of socio-economic rights as justiciable rights has 
been based mainly on the philosophical understanding of human rights. 
Human rights are believed to derive from the inherent nature of human 
beings and, as fundamental freedoms, are universal and belong to all 
human beings.40 Humanity deserves to be treated with respect and 
accorded dignity. This creates reciprocal obligations between humans to 
treat each other with respect. Historically, human rights have been 
conceived as a negative protection of the individual from the state and its 
subjects.41  The relationship between the state and its subjects has been 
viewed from the perspective of guaranteeing the subject negative 
freedoms.42 From this perspective, human rights are believed to derive 
                                                 
40
 Piechowiak, M., ‘What are human rights? The concept of human rights and their extra-
legal justification’ in Hanski & Suksi: 1997 pp 3 – 24, at p 5.  
 
41
 Locke submits that all individuals find themselves party to two social pacts: pactum 
unionis and pactum subjectionis. The first is aimed at the establishment of civil society, 
while the second constitutes a framework in terms of which individuals agree that a 
government has a duty to protect the natural rights of everyone. Locke, J., Two treaties 
of civil government (1967), as quoted by De Villiers, B., ‘Social and economic rights’ in 
Van Wyk, D., Dugard, J., De Villiers, B., and  Davis, D., (eds.) Rights and 
constitutionalism: The new South African legal order (1995) Juta & Company pp 599 – 
628 [Hereinafter referred to as De Villiers: 1995], at p 601. 
 
42
 Raes, K., ‘The Philosophical basis of economic, social and cultural rights’ in Van der 
Auweraet, P., De Pelsmaeker, T., Sarkin, J., & Vande Lanotte, J. (eds.) Social economic 
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from a natural law history concerned with natural rights. Natural rights 
are believed to focus on individual freedom and autonomy from the state 
based on the theory of individualism.43 The state may not interfere with 
the individual’s freedom and liberty; the individual must be placed in a 
bracket beyond unjustified intrusion by the state.44 Those who believe in 
this philosophy restrict human rights to those norms that engender 
negative obligations on the state. Opposition has been directed to socio-
economic rights on the ground that they engender positive obligations.45  
                                                                                                                                            
rights: An appraisal of current European and international developments (2000) 
MAKLU pp 43 – 53 [Hereinafter referred to as Raes: 2000], at p 48. 
 
43
 See generally Macpherson, C., The political theory of possessive individualism: 
Hobbes to Locke  (1967) Oxford University Press [Hereinafter referred to as 
Macpherson: 1967]. He goes to great length to expose this philosophy and criticises it for 
its focus on the individual to the exclusion of the society as a whole.  
 
44
 See Peces-Barba, G., ‘Reflections on economic, social and cultural rights’ (1981) 2 
Human Rights Law Journal pp 281 – 294 [Hereinafter referred to as Peces-Barba: 1981], 
at pp 281 – 283. 
 
45
 This argument was also advanced in South Africa by the South African Law Reform 
Commission. The Commission endorsed the position that civil and political rights are 
negative while socio-economic rights are positive, which makes them hard to enforce. 
This view was supported by a number of legal scholars; see Dlamini, C., ‘The South 
African Law Commission’s Working paper on group and human rights: Towards a bill 
of rights for South Africa’ (1990) S A Public Law 96 [Hereinafter referred to as Dlamini: 
1990]. Didcott described a bill of rights a  follows:  
 
[It is a] protective device. It can state effectively and quite easily, what 
may not be done. It cannot stipulate with equal ease or effectiveness, 
what shall be done. The reason is not only that the courts, its enforcers, 
lack the expertise and infrastructure to get into the business of 
legislation and administration. It is also, and more tellingly, that they 
cannot raise the money. They cannot levy the taxes needed to finance 
those accomplishments they may like to see…’  
 
Didcott, J., ‘Practical workings of a Bill of Rights’ in Van der Westhuizen, J., and 
Viljoen, H., (eds.) A bill of rights for South Africa (1988) Butterworths [Hereinafter 
referred to as Didcott: 1988], at pp 59 – 60 as quoted by the South African Law 
Commission in its Interim Report on Group and Human Rights, (August 1991) Project 
58, at p 533. 
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However, there is little evidence to suggest that the modern human rights 
regime has been inspired by the natural law theory. The International Bill 
of Rights was inspired by a need for solutions to moral and political 
problems which the world faced at the time.46 The ravages of the two 
world wars and the emergence of dictatorships highlighted this need.47 
The world wars left millions dead and more millions destitute, in addition 
to the massive destruction of property and the subsequent economic 
depressions. The modern human rights movement emerged as a response 
to these ravages, humanity could only be preserved if certain of its needs 
were protected. The first step towards this was recognition of the needs 
that merit protection.48 The second step was to accord these needs 
legitimacy by accepting that it is the responsibility of the state to ensure 
that they are met. Collective agreement was necessary to achieve 
legitimacy. This prompted the signing of treaties between the states.49 
                                                                                                                                            
 
46
 Craven: 1998, at p 11. 
 
47
 The emergence of fascism, the holocaust and the human disasters resulting from it 
made it necessary for human rights protection to be provided.   
 
48
 The UN Charter and the UHDR are evidence of such recognition. Human rights are 
recognised as necessary for freedom, justice and peace in the world (UDHR preamble 
para 1). The UDHR further proclaims that a common understanding of rights and 
freedoms is of the greatest importance (para 7)). This position is also supported by 
Fortman and Goldewijik who contend that the human rights ‘project’ is ‘a global effort 
to bind the execution of power to a set of norms based on a universal belief in human 
dignity’—geared towards realising ‘the global common good’ or public interest.  
Fortman, B., and Goldewijk, K., God and the goods: global economy in a civilizational 
perspective (1998) World Council of Churches Publications [Hereinafter referred to as 
Fortman & Goldewijik: 1998], at p 4, as quoted by Opschoor, H., ‘Economic, social and 
cultural rights from an economist’s perspective’ in Karin & Miyo: 2003 pp 73 – 89, at p 
79. 
 
49
 This is what prompted the concretisation of the rights recognised in the UDHR as 
obligations proclaimed by treaties. The ICCPR and the ICESCR underwrite the rights as 
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According to Pieterse, ‘[a]rticulating claims to social goods as rights 
clothes the interests that the claims represent in a measure of political 
significance’; in his opinion, ‘[r]ights entail enforceable obligations for 
those against whom they are claimed and demand justification for their 
non-fulfilment’.50 
 
Provisions of the UN Charter acknowledge the existence and need to 
solve problems of a socio-economic nature. One of the purposes of the 
UN is to solve problems of an economic, social, cultural or humanitarian 
nature.51 Such problems include those that deny people access to socio-
economic goods and services such as food, shelter, health care services 
and employment, among others. The obligations to meet these needs may 
either be negative or positive. This, however, is irrelevant to the question 
of whether or not the needs have to be met. It only remains relevant in 
determining the means of meeting the needs. Yet it does not vitiate one 
category of needs as incapable of resolution as human rights problems. 
                                                                                                                                            
entitlements and obligate states to ensure their realisation. It is on the basis of this that 
Fortman & Goldewijik: 1998 have developed a need-based theory of human rights. They 
submit that for a need to be a right, two conditions must be satisfied. The first is general 
acceptance of the existence of a need and the second is the notion that the need should be 
met. The question that one poses then is whether socio-economic rights advance such 
needs. The answer is in the affirmative. There is no doubt that people need water, shelter, 
food and good health, which transforms them into rights. Also, Baehr believes that the 
rejection of socio-economic rights is caused by a failure to recognise phenomena such as 
poverty, malnutrition, illiteracy and unemployment as human rights problems. Using the 
example of the right to life, he demonstrates the close linkage between civil and political 
rights and human needs such as food, water, housing and health care. Baerhr, P., 
‘Controversies in the current human rights debate’ (2000) 2 Human Rights Law Review 
pp 7 – 72, at p 14. 
 
50
 Pieterse, M., A benefit-focused analysis of constitutional health rights Ph.D. thesis 
submitted to the University of Witwatersrand [December 2005], at p 2.  
 
51
 UN Charter, art. 1(3). In addition to this, the preamble expresses the determination to 
promote social progress and better standards of life. 
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Indeed, closer scrutiny reveals that civil and political rights too engender 
positive obligations. It is on the basis of this that Sepúlveda submits that 
all human rights impose a ‘continuum’ or ‘spectrum’ of obligations. On 
the one side of the spectrum is the obligation of non-interference by the 
state and on the other side is the obligation requiring positive action.52 
Both civil and political rights and socio-economic rights should, therefore, 
be viewed through this spectrum. 
 
2.3.1.1 Negative and positive obligations for all categories   
In remedial terms, it is important to understand whether an obligation is 
either negative or positive. This is because, generally speaking, negative 
violations call for negative remedies such as prohibitions, while positive 
violations call for positive remedies such as mandatory injunctions. It is 
also true that negative remedies are thought to be less intrusive into the 
executive and legislative domain while positive remedies may be far more 
intrusive. Most courts in South Africa and elsewhere have, for instance, 
had no problem granting negative or prohibitory injunctions; yet they 
have been reluctant to issue positive or mandatory injunctions. This is 
because such negative remedies do not draw the courts into the 
controversies generated by ordering government to undertake affirmative 
action.53  
 
It is, therefore, true that an order enjoining an activity by requiring the 
state to desist from doing something, is seen as less complicated when 
compared to one enjoining affirmative action requiring the state to do or 
                                                 
52
 Sepúlveda, M., The nature of the obligations under the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2003) INTERSENTIA [Hereinafter referred to as 
Sepúlveda: 2003], at p 125; quoting Shue, H., ‘The interdependence of duties’, in Alston, 
P., and Tomaševski, K., (eds.) The right to food (1984) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers pp 
83 – 96 at p 84, she concludes that attempting to classify every right either flatly 
negative or positive, is an artificial, simplistic and arid exercise. 
 
53
 See chapter seven, section 7.2.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal nature of socio-economic rights 
 52 
undo something.54 This means that wholesome acceptance of socio-
economic rights as engendering only positive obligations risks these rights 
being labelled highly intrusive and as instruments that facilitate 
interference in the way government is run. However, negative violations 
may also attract positive remedies in certain circumstances and so may 
positive obligations demand negative remedies.55 It is also true that 
sometimes negative remedies may be as intrusive as positive remedies, 
and yet, in some situations, positive remedies may not be intrusive.56 
Forbidding government action by way of a negative injunction may 
intrusively constrain government action in the same way as a mandatory 
injunction. Consider, for instance, an order that stops government from 
building a road on somebody’s land. If the government thinks the road a 
necessity, it will have to engage in positive action by getting alternative 
land and planning for the road on that land. Alternatively, government 
may have to pay compensation in order to expropriate the land, which in 
itself is an affirmative action.  
 
Socio-economic rights also engender negative obligations and civil and 
political rights engender positive obligations as well.57 The obligations 
                                                 
54
 Berryman, J., The law of equitable remedies (2000)  Irwin Law [Hereinafter referred to 
as Berryman: 2000], at p 40. See also Cooper-Stephenson, K., ‘Principle and 
pragmatism in the law of remedies’ in Berryman, J., Remedies, issues and perspectives 
(1991) Thomson Professional  Publishing Canada pp 1 – 48, at p 35; and Horowitz, D., 
The courts and social policy (1977) The Brookings Institution, at p 19.   
 
55
 Roach, K., Constitutional remedies in Canada (1994) Canada Law Book Inc 
[Hereinafter referred to as Roach: 1994], at p 3-9. See also Berryman: 2000, at p 40. 
 
56
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-10, gives the example of damages, which are considered to be a 
positive remedy, yet there is contention that they are intrusive (at p 3-12). 
 
57
 See Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (4) 
BCLR 301 (CC), at paras 70 – 71. A number of examples will show that socio-economic 
rights too have negative duties: the right to food includes the right of everyone to procure 
their own food supply without interference; the right to housing implies the right not to 
be a victim of forced evictions, the right to work encompasses the individual’s right to 
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under the ICCPR are not restricted to state abstinence but also extend to 
the obligation of the state to undertake specific activities to realise the 
rights.58 Take the right to life for example, it is not guaranteed by mere 
abstinence from unjustifiable taking of life. It is also guaranteed by 
putting in place a police force to maintain law and order and by 
establishing hospitals to treat illnesses.59 Additionally, it also requires 
                                                                                                                                            
choose his/her own work and also requires the State not to hinder a person from working 
and to abstain from measures that would increase unemployment; the right to education 
implies the freedom to establish and direct educational establishments; and the right to 
adequate health implies the obligation not to interfere with the provision of health care. 
See Sepúlveda: 2003, at pp 125 – 126. See also Davis, D., ‘Adjudicating the socio-
economic rights in the South African Constitution: Towards “deference lite”?’ (2006) 22 
South African Journal on Human Rights pp 301 – 327, at p 305. 
 
58
 In its General Comment No.3, the Human Rights Committee has said that: 
 
The Committee considers it necessary to draw the attention of States 
parties to the fact that the obligation under the Covenant is not 
confined to the respect of human rights, but that States parties have 
also undertaken to ensure the enjoyment of these rights to all 
individuals under their jurisdiction. This aspect calls for specific 
activities by the States parties to enable individuals to enjoy their 
rights. This is obvious in a number of articles (e.g. art. 3 which is dealt 
with in General Comment 4 below), but in principle this undertaking 
relates to all rights set forth in the Covenant.  
 
Para 1 of General Comment No. 03: Implementation at the national level (Art. 2), 29 
July 1981 in Compilation of general comments and general recommendations adopted by 
Human Rights Treaty Bodies, HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7. 12 May 2004. According to Alston 
and Quinn, to say that civil and political rights merely require abstention is at odds with 
reality. This is because civil and political rights heavily depend on availability of 
resources and the development of the necessary societal structures. Alston, P., and 
Quinn, G., ‘The nature and scope of States Parties obligations under the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1987) 8 Human Rights Quarterly 
pp 156 – 229 [Hereinafter referred to as Alston & Quinn: 1987], at p 172. 
 
59
  According to De Villiers, the right to life should be interpreted not only as protection 
against being arbitrarily deprived of life but should, for instance, also include the right to 
medical assistance, hospitalisation and nutrition. De Villiers: 1995, at p 605. Elsewhere, 
De Villiers argues that a dogmatic approach of classifying rights into ‘positive’ and 
‘negative’ rights should be avoided because it is not possible to distinguish between 
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building and staffing of courts and prisons to punish those who 
unjustifiably end life. To protect the rights to free speech and property 
requires a government apparatus whose construction and maintenance 
calls for a great deal of positive action.60  
 
Similarly, the right to vote, a classical civil and political right, engenders 
both negative and positive obligations. In August and Another v The 
Electoral Commission and Others,61 the CC held that the right to vote as 
guaranteed by section 19(3) ‘imposes a positive obligation upon the 
legislature and executive’.62 This is because ‘[a] date for elections has to 
be promulgated, the secrecy of the ballot secured and the machinery 
established for managing the process’.63 The CC observed that it is for 
this reason that the Electoral Commission (the Commission) is established 
with affirmative duties imposed upon it. The petition in this case was 
brought by two prisoners, on their own behalf and on behalf of other 
prisoners, to enforce their right to vote. Though the law did not exclude 
prisoners from voting, the Commission had not made any arrangements 
for the registration and voting of prisoners. The CC found this to be a 
violation of the prisoners’ right to vote and was also against the 
                                                                                                                                            
rights by means of such classification and leads to rigidity rather than flexibility. De 
Villiers, B., ‘Socio-economic rights in a new constitution: Critical evaluation of 
recommendations of the South African Law Commission’ (1992) 3 Tydskrif vir die Suid-
Afrikaanse Reg pp 421 – 436, at p 435. 
 
60
  Sunstein, C., Social and economic rights? Lessons from South Africa (May 2001). 
Public Law Working Paper No. 12, University of Chicago Law & Economics, Olin 
Working Paper No. 124 available at 
<http://paper.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=269657> (accessed on 27 July 
2004), at p 1. 
 
61
 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC). 
 
62
 Para 16. 
 
63
 As above. 
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foundational value of universal adult suffrage on a common voters roll. 
The Commission was ordered to ‘make all reasonable arrangements 
necessary to enable the applicants and other prisoners … to register as 
voters’.64 
 
The right to equality as guaranteed by section 9 also engenders negative 
and positive obligations on the part of the state. The section does not only 
impose a negative duty on the state not to discriminate on the basis of the 
listed grounds but also imposes positive obligations. The state is required 
to promote the achievement of equality by adopting ‘legislative and other 
measures designed to protect or advance persons, or categories of persons, 
disadvantaged by unfair discrimination’.65 The effect of this provision is 
that it compels the state to look beyond the notion of formal equality and 
to embrace substantive equality, which cannot be achieved without 
positive measures being undertaken. Substantive equality requires the 
state to undertake positive measures to enable those who have suffered 
discrimination in the past to surmount the obstacles that hamper their 
enjoyment of the rights. This concept of equality, therefore, challenges the 
notion that human rights provide only negative protection.66 
Understanding equality from this perspective not only justifies positive 
dimensions of civil and political rights but also those of socio-economic 
rights that are intended to uplift the socio-economic position of victims of 
past discrimination. Yet, a closer scrutiny of socio-economic rights 
reveals that they too engender negative obligations. The duty on states to 
                                                 
64
 Para 42(3.4). Yet, as is demonstrated below, making such arrangements for prisoners 
to exercise their right to vote would require resources. See Minister of Home Affairs v 
National Institute for Crime Prevention and the Re-integration of Offenders (NICRO) 
and Others, 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC) (NICRO case).  
 
65
 Section 9(2). 
 
66
 Fredman, S., ‘Providing equality: Substantive equality and the positive duty to 
provide’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 163 – 190, at pp 163 and 
166. 
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‘respect’ human rights, both civil and political, and socio-economic 
rights, as discussed below,67 engenders a negative obligation.68  
 
Nevertheless, one needs to concede that, by and large, the fulfilment of 
socio-economic rights calls for more extensive state action in comparison 
to civil and political rights.69 This is what makes judicial review of socio-
economic rights far more difficult in comparison to civil and political 
rights. As already noted, generally, negative violations call for negative 
remedies and positive violations for positive remedies. In the First 
Certification case,70 the CC held that at ‘the very minimum, socio-
economic rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion’.71 
This notwithstanding, in most cases, the state’s violation of socio-
economic rights emerges from failure to take positive steps.72 A socio-
economic right violation can occur when the state engages in prohibited 
acts, but in the majority of cases, it is always failure to act that is under 
                                                 
67
 Section 2.3.4.2. 
 
68
 Viljoen, F., The justiciability of socio-economic and cultural rights: Experience and 
problems [Unpublished paper on file with author; hereinafter referred to as Viljoen: 
2005], at pp 3 and 36; see also Liebenberg: 2005, at pp 17 – 18; De Vos: 1997, at p 80 
refers to parts of the socio-economic rights provisions in the South African Constitution 
that carry express prohibitions as evidence of the fact that these rights carry negative 
duties as well.  Examples of these provisions include section 26(3) which prohibits 
evictions without a court order and section 27(3) which prohibits denial of emergency 
medical services. 
 
69
 De Vos: 1997, at p 71. 
 
70
 In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 (10) BCLR 
1253 (CC). 
 
71
 At para 77. 
 
72
 Abramovich, V., ‘Courses of action in economic, social and cultural rights: 
Instruments and allies’ (2005) 2 SUR – International Journal on Human Rights pp 181 – 
216 [Hereinafer referred to as Abramovich: 2005], at p 183. 
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scrutiny. In contrast, in the majority of civil and political rights cases, the 
state is taken to task to explain why its action infringes a civil and 
political right. This should not be understood to mean that civil and 
political rights litigation does not challenge inaction. The issue is one of 
differences in degree as is illustrated by the examples of the right to heath 
care and the right to liberty immediately below. 73  
 
Maintenance of a health care system requires well co-ordinated action and 
community-wide participation. It also requires a great deal of resources 
and expertise. It is only the state that is well placed to meet these 
requirements.74 Whereas violation of this right may result from state 
negative interference, it mainly arises from inaction. There is a legitimate 
expectation that the state will put in place a functional health system. This 
requires the necessary expertise. The state is also expected to use its 
resources to build the necessary infrastructure. By using its expertise, the 
state will achieve co-ordination. The state will also use both its coercive 
and non-coercive means to achieve community participation where 
necessary.75 All these processes call for a great deal of state positive 
action. The same may be said of other socio-economic rights such as 
education, housing, water and food.  
 
Some civil and political rights may require similar measures but in 
varying degrees. To realise the right to personal liberty, the state needs to 
restrain it-self; which imposes a negative duty. However, the state may 
also require co-ordinated action to investigate and punish violators, which 
                                                 
73
 See Abramovich: 2005, at p 183.  
 
74
 There is no doubt that it is a human need that people enjoy good health. It is also true 
that this need should be met by the state. It cannot be left exclusively to the individual 
without state aid. This is because it requires a great deal of expertise and resources not at 
the individual’s disposal. 
 
75
 This may include laws that prohibit practices that are harmful to health, and health 
education to encourage health practices. 
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imposes a positive duty. This positive duty, however, may, generally 
speaking, not require the same level of co-ordination and community 
participation as does a health system. In terms of Sepúlveda’s ‘spectrum’ 
of obligations,76 this right will attract more negative points while the right 
to health will attract more positive points. If these points are expressed in 
terms of resources, the right to health care will be more expensive. One 
may argue that maintaining a sound police force requires the same level 
of resources as maintaining a health care system. Whereas this is true, 
there is a major difference: the cost of maintaining a police force will 
result in protection of other rights such as property, life, and protection 
from servitude. This results in spreading the costs with a high level of 
economies of scale. Maintenance of a health care system is different. It 
may protect life but not so many other rights directly, thereby restricting 
the economies of scale. This makes the right to health more expensive.77  
 
2.3.2 Universality of human rights 
Cranston submits that socio-economic rights are not human rights because 
they lack the essential characteristics of universality and absolutism.78 
Human rights are said to be universal if they accrue to every individual by 
virtue of their humanity rather than as a result of their position or role in 
society.79 Socio-economic rights are said to accrue to classes of people 
                                                 
76
 See Sepúlveda: 2003, at p 125. See also Abramovich: 2005, at pp 186 – 187. 
 
77
 Lenta submits that court orders enforcing socio-economic rights will have significant 
budgetary implications on nearly every occasion that the court finds against the state, 
whereas in the case of other rights budgetary implications will be a more occasional and 
less severe consequence of the order. Lenta, P., ‘Judicial restraint and overreach’ (2004) 
20 South Africa Journal on Human Rights pp 544 – 615, at p 567. See also Tushnet, M., 
‘Social welfare rights and the forms of judicial review’ (2004) 82 Texas Law Review pp 
1895 – 1919, at p 1895.  
 
78
 See Cranston, M., ‘Human rights real and supposed’ in Raphael, D., (ed.) Political 
theory and rights of man (1967) Macmillan. 
 
79
 Craven: 1998, at p 13.  
 
 
 
 
Chapter two 
 59 
and, therefore, lack universality. Additionally, it is submitted that socio-
economic rights are not enjoyed by virtue of one’s humanity. Cranston 
describes socio-economic rights as ‘mere utopian aspirations’. On the 
other hand, civil and political rights are said to be morally compelling; 
they belong to a human being simply because he or she is human.80  
 
Cranston’s objection could more theoretically be described as being based 
on the idea of ‘sustentative universality’ as opposed to ‘conceptual 
universality’. The theory of conceptual universality is not intended to 
prove the existence or even justiciability of certain categories of rights. It 
is merely based on the belief that by their very nature human rights once 
accepted apply to all human beings equally simply by virtue of their being 
human.81 In contrast, substantive universality is intended to prove or 
disprove certain norms as having all the qualifications that make them 
human rights.82 
 
Cranston’s use of substantive universality to discredit socio-economic 
rights, however, lacks merit. Both categories of rights have elements that 
focus on the individual as the beneficiary, but they also have elements that 
are intended to protect collective interests. A number of civil and political 
rights are only meaningfully enjoyed in groups. For instance, the 
freedoms of association and assembly become useful only when exercised 
by a group. Furthermore, groups of people can demand collective exercise 
of their civil and political rights. Members of the media profession may 
through their professional bodies demand respect for their freedom of 
speech. Academics, scientist, politicians, minority groups and artists, too, 
may make similar demands for freedoms of expression and association. 
Additionally, even the so-called collective rights empower the individual: 
                                                                                                                                            
 
80
 Cranston, M., What are human rights (1973) Bodley Head, as quoted by Arambulo: 
1999, at p 58. 
 
81
 Donnelly, J., ‘The relative universality of human rights’ (2007) 29 Human Rights 
Quarterly pp 281 – 306 [Hereinafter referred to as Donnelly: 2007, at p 283.  
 
82
 See Donnelly, as above.  
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better health, freedom from hunger, and the proceeds of employment all 
benefit the individual in as much as they are also necessary for the 
promotion of societal cohesion. In this line, Raes has submitted that: 
 
[T]he fact that human rights are the rights of individuals does not 
make these rights “individualistic rights”. To say that human rights 
discourse focuses on individuals as bearers of those rights and thus 
places individuals at the centre of the world is not to say that 
human rights discourse is intrinsically individualistic …. Although 
human rights are rights of individuals, they are not mainly meant to 
serve only individual interests. On the contrary they facilitate 
rational, non-violent change of existing communities by means of 
exercising democratic rights. 83 
 
It is also true that, to protect the common wellbeing, several restrictions 
are imposed on number of civil and political rights. The freedom of 
expression is restricted in several countries to prevent hate speech.84 It is 
also restricted to avoid outraging public morals and decency, for instance, 
by restricting the distribution of pornography in certain circumstances. 
The freedom of religion, too, cannot be exercised to promote terrorist 
activities or to use prohibited narcotic substances.85 The list is endless. All 
                                                 
83
 Raes: 2000, at p 44. Raes’s view can be likened to the African value laden concept of 
‘ubuntu’ [discussed in detail in chapter six, section 6.2]. This value views an individual 
as part of a bigger whole, who cannot live in isolation from society. It therefore calls for 
compassion, honesty, love and care in relationships between individuals. Human rights 
in South Africa have been integrated with this concept. See Justice Sachs in Dikoko v 
Mokhatla 2007 (1) BCLR 1 (CC). The views expressed by Orwin and Pangle are, 
therefore, misplaced. Orwin and Pangle argue that the introduction of socio-economic 
rights carries with it a danger of moving human rights away from the individual as the 
focal point. In their opinion, this will make it possible for the justification of 
infringements upon the individual’s freedom in the name of the common good. They 
argue that this will be detrimental to the practical achievements of the established human 
rights tradition. Orwin, C., and Pangle, T., ‘The philosophical foundation of human 
rights’ in Plattner, M., (ed.), Human Rights in our time – Essays in memory of Victor 
Baras (1984) Westview Press pp 1 – 22 [Hereinafter referred to as Orwin & Pangle: 
1984], at p 16. 
 
84
 Section 16(2) of the South African Constitution provides that the right to freedom of 
expression does not extend to propaganda for war; incitement of imminent violence; or 
advocacy of hatred that is based on race, ethnicity, gender or religion, and that 
constitutes incitement to cause harm. See Islamic Unity Convention v Independent 
Broadcasting Authority 2002 (4) SA 294. 
 
85
 See Prince v President of the Law Society of the Cape of Good Hope 2002 (3) BCLR 
231 (2002 (2) SA 794) (CC). 
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rights, therefore, in addition to protecting the individual promote 
collective interests as well.86 The individual is part of a bigger social 
entity though he or she enjoys some liberty to determine his or her fate.87 
Human rights, whether civil and political or socio-economic, are aimed at 
creating an environment in which individuals flourish and decide how 
they want to live. Nevertheless, in doing this, human rights do not isolate 
the individual from his society because such an environment can only be 
created through collective effort. It is in line with this that the notion of 
distributive justice, as discussed in chapter five,88 becomes relevant and 
useful in human rights litigation. In finding remedies for the violation of 
human rights, a court basing its decision on distributive justice will focus 
beyond the needs of the individual victim. Consideration will also be had 
on the needs of other individuals and on the needs of society as a whole. 
 
 
                                                 
86
 Macpherson: 1967, at p 3, submits that the individual is not a moral whole but part of a 
larger social whole—and not owner of himself. The individual is part of a bigger social 
entity. The establishment of smooth interactions and the protection of all members of this 
social setting call for a degree of collectivism. 
 
87
 According to Macpherson: 1967, at p 3, society becomes a lot of free individuals 
related to each other as proprietors of their own capacities and of what they have 
acquired by their exercise. This notwithstanding,  it consists of relations of exchange 
between proprietors and political society becomes a calculated device for the 
maintenance of orderly relations of exchange. In the same line, Freeden submits that a 
crucial dimension of human nature is its dependence on social, historical and behavioural 
contexts and that this negative understanding of the obligations adheres to a further 
assumption about human rights as axiomatic, when it is merely optional. It presents 
individuals as self-determining, as best capable of preserving their own interest, as 
indeed self-developing. This evokes a theory of human nature as self-sufficient, 
independent and capable of rational pursuit of enlightened self-interest. It encourages an 
overly formal and abstract discussion of human rights. Freeden, M., ‘Human rights and 
welfare: A communitarian view’ (1990) Ethics pp 489 – 502, at p 490 as quoted by De 
Villiers: 1995, ft 21 at p 603.   
 
88
 Section 5.2.2. 
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2.3.3 Absolutism and resources limitations 
Absolutism is the notion that a right is available to all human beings on 
the ground of their humanity without any pre-requisite conditions. Socio-
economic rights are said not to be absolute. Instead, their realisation is 
subjected to conditions; unlike civil and political rights, their realisation is 
dependent on resources.89 Bossuyt goes as far as submitting that civil and 
political rights can be realised immediately because their realisation does 
not require resources; all the state has to do is to abstain from infringing 
them.90  
 
This opinion, however, is misconceived. Implementation of civil and 
political rights, just like the socio-economic rights, requires resources.91 
For the right to life to be protected, a police force and army have to be 
trained. They have to be equipped with the necessary logistics and require 
regular and adequate funding. For the right to a fair trial to be enjoyed, 
courts have to be built and staffed. The judges and members of the legal 
profession have to be trained. Legal aid has to be provided to the indigent; 
                                                 
89
 See Bossuyt, M., ‘La distinction juridique entre les droits civil et politiques et les droit 
economiques, sociaux et culturels’ [The legal distinction between civil and political 
rights and economic, social and cultural rights]: Revue des Droits de l’Homme [Human 
Rights Journal] (1975) 8 pp 783 – 820. 
 
90
 Bossuyt, M., ‘International human rights systems: Strengths and weaknesses’ in 
Mahoney, K., and Mahoney, P., (eds.) Human rights in the twentieth century (1993) 
Martinus Nijhoff pp 47 – 55, at p 52. 
 
91
 Alston & Quinn: 1987, at p 172. Eide has submitted that the argument that socio-
economic rights require resources yet civil and political do not is only tenable in 
situations where the focus on socio-economic rights is on the tertiary level (duty to 
fulfil), while civil and political rights are observed on the primary level (duty to respect). 
In Eide’s opinion, socio-economic rights can, in many cases, best be safeguarded by non-
interference; Eide, A., ‘Realization of social and economic rights and the minimum 
threshold approach’ (1989) 10 Human Rights Law Journal pp 35 – 51 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Eide: 1989], at p 41. 
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all this is done at state expense.92 The NICRO case clearly demonstrates 
the concerns that the State has in relation to realising some civil and 
political rights on the ground that they require redistribution of scarce 
resources. In this case, a group of prisoners, with the backing of NICRO, 
challenged legislation that excluded convicted prisoners from exercising 
the right to vote. In defence, the State, amongst others, argued that the 
exclusion was justified on the ground that [r]ather than putting the scarce 
resources of the State at the disposal of convicted prisoners, such 
resources should ... be used for the provision of facilities to enable law-
abiding citizens to register and vote’.93 While the Court declined to deal 
with this issue, since facilities for voting already existed at prisons,94 the 
case goes to prove the redistributive effect, in resource terms, of realising 
some civil and political rights.  
 
It is also true that not all levels of socio-economic rights require resources 
to be realised. The right to join and belong to a trade union may only 
require state non-interference. So also is a person’s freedom to seek 
employment or provide for his/her means of survival. This imposes on the 
state an obligation to respect the right; all that this obligation requires is 
state non-interference with the enjoyment of the right.95  
                                                 
92
 Yigen, K., ‘Enforcing social justice: Economic, and social rights in South Africa’ 
(2002) 4 International Journal of Human Rights pp 13 – 29, at p 18. According to 
Robertson: 1997: 
 
[T]he distinction does not therefore depend upon the fact of 
government expenditure. Since all governmental activity costs money, 
a claim that civil and political rights can be implemented cost free is 
equivalent to a claim that there should be no government. Nor does the 
distinction depend upon the amount of money spent. There is no magic 
figure, whether in absolute terms or as a percentage of GDP, that 
crosses the line from the implementation of the one kind of right to the 
other. 
 
93
 Para 44. 
 
94
 Para 49.  
95
 See section 2.3.4.2 below for discussion on this typology. 
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According to Wells and Eaton, using the constitution in a defensive 
manner is not controversial as it imposes no cost: ‘when someone raises 
the constitution defensively … no issue arises as to why he/she is allowed 
to do so; no legitimate cost is inflicted by such a remedy’.96 This 
submission may convince those who associate civil and political rights 
with negativity and socio-economic rights with positive obligations. 
However, even if one were to assume this to be correct, it is not true that 
negative remedies do not have budgetary implications. Consider a case in 
which a litigant successfully asserts his/her right not to be detained under 
inhumane conditions. While the court may not expressly compel the state 
to improve the conditions of detention, this may be the ultimate action 
that the state must undertake. This is because, considering the public 
interest, release of the detainee may not be an option. Improving the 
conditions of detention, from inhumane to humane, may require a 
considerable amount of financial and other resources. Meaning that 
though the right in its assertion was defensive, its vindication has become 
offensive and requiring resources. 
 
A distinction is always made on the basis of differences in the quality or 
type of government expenditure.97 Robertson asserts that positive rights 
require rationing and a compulsory transfer of resources and that negative 
rights on the other hand require only the provision of services equally to 
all at all times.98 On this basis, he criticises redistributive expenditure as 
counter-productive because, rather than enhance the standard of living, it 
reduces it. Robert submits that:  
 
                                                 
96
 Wells, M., and Eaton. T., Constitutional remedies: A reference book for the United 
States Constitution (2002) Praeger Publishing, at p xxv 
 
97
 Robertson: 1997. 
 
98
 Robertson: 1997. 
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[R]esources taken by the state through taxation and expended on 
realising the rights in the … [ICESCR] are merely redistributed. No 
wealth is created directly by this process. The process itself, 
however, has costs, both in terms of the expenditure required to 
administer the system and in the deadweight costs from alteration 
of behaviour to reduce tax liability. Such redistribution therefore 
reduces the general welfare and reduces national income below 
what it might have been. The more resources are redistributed in 
this way, the greater will be these effects. The redistribution of 
resources in pursuit of the goals in the Covenant therefore 
inevitably has the effect of reducing the ability of the inhabitants of 
the state to achieve core goals, such as the continuous improvement 
of living conditions.99 
 
 
It appears that by positive rights Robertson is referring to socio-economic 
rights and by negative rights he means civil and political rights. As stated 
above,100 this is a skewed understanding of human rights as both 
categories of rights engender both positive and negative obligations. All 
government expenditure has a redistributive effect which is irrespective of 
the nature of the right upon which it is being spent. Expenditures on civil 
and political rights too have redistributive implications. As Robertson 
concedes, the state does not create wealth through taxation.101 This 
applies to expenditure on socio-economic rights as well as civil and 
political rights. A few examples will demonstrate that expenditure on civil 
and political rights also entails resources redistribution. Expenditure to 
feed and maintain prisoners is taken from the taxes raised from everyone. 
In order to ensure speedy and fair trials, expenditure is incurred on the 
transporting of suspects and witnesses to court. State expenditure from 
taxes may be used on structures to regulate trade unions. The same may 
                                                 
99
 Robertson: 1997. 
 
100
 Section 2.3.1.1. 
 
101
 It should be noted, however, that there are certain exceptional circumstances where 
the state may create resources. For instance, the state may engage in exploitation of the 
country’s natural resources. Many African countries depend on export of minerals such 
as gold and diamonds. Additionally, a state may raise revenue from external sources 
through seeking donor funding not subject to repayment. This, however, is not to ignore 
the fact that most states, by and large, depend on taxation as the source of funding. 
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be done for other professional bodies. Such expenditure will include taxes 
raised from persons who are not criminals themselves, or members of the 
unions or of the professional bodies. This in effect is redistribution.102 
 
It should also be noted that the objection to socio-economic rights on the 
basis of resources confuses two things: justiciability and implementation 
or enforcement.103 While enforcement may require resources, recognition 
of socio-economic rights as inherently justiciable does not. It is also true, 
as indicated above, that not all levels of implementation of all socio-
economic rights require resources. In addition to this, as seen in chapter 
four,104 the state is only expected to act within the available resources to 
progressively realise socio-economic rights. 
 
Robertson contends that the limitations imposed on the two categories of 
rights are different. He submits that ‘[h]owever encrusted with exceptions 
civil and political rights may be, those exceptions are set down 
prospectively and become part of the definition of the right’. He goes on: 
‘what is thus defined is thereafter, within its limits, absolute’. n his 
opinion, the same cannot be said of socio-economic rights; ‘[socio-
economic rights] require to be rationed and no principle can tell us in 
advance what the appropriate degree of rationing is’.105 However, in my 
                                                 
102
 Mark Tushnet contends that some elements of free speech law in the United States of 
America call into the question of distribution of wealth. These are the requirements that 
some public property be made available for political activity subject only to reasonable 
time, place, and manner regulations, and the problem of the heckler's veto. For instance, 
where the police is deployed and logistics consumed to protect speakers at a political 
rally; Tushnet, M., Enforcing social and economic rights [Unpublished paper on file 
with author], at p 4. A summarised version of this paper has been published under the 
title ‘Enforcing socio-economic rights: Lessons from South Africa’ (2005) 6 ESR Review 
pp 2 – 6 [Hereinafter referred to as Tushnet: 2005] 
 
103
 Viljoen: 2005, at p 13. 
 
104
 Section 4.2. 
 
105
 Robertson: 1997. 
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opinion, this is not true because civil and political rights too have 
limitations that are not part of their definition. Most constitutions now 
have a limitation clause which restricts the exercise of all the rights it 
protects.  
 
The South African Constitution contains such a limitation clause. Section 
36(1) allows the state to limit the rights if ‘the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on humanity dignity, 
equality and freedom’. This provision has, as a matter of fact, been used 
mostly in adjudicating civil and political rights.106 Contrary to 
Robertson’s supposition, this limitation is open-ended and the inquiry as 
to whether an infringement is justifiable is a factual one.107 Though there 
are fixed rules for determining this question, the result is dependent on the 
circumstances of every case. The list of factors that the court must 
consider to determine reasonableness is inclusive and not exclusive. This 
means that the results have an element of uncertainty. Every case, in 
addition to the nature of the right, will depend on its own peculiar 
circumstances.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
106
 This clause has been included as one of the steps of adjudicating a violation of a right 
in the Bill of Rights. After determining that a right has been infringed, the court then has 
to apply section 36 in order to determine whether or not the infringement is justified. 
Some of the reasons that may justify such infringement include maintenance of public 
order, safety, health and democratic values. See Currie, I., and De Waal, J., The new 
constitutional and administrative law Volume 1 (2001) Juta & Company [Hereinafter 
referred to as Currie & De Waal: 2001], at p 339.  
 
107
 Currie & De Waal: 2001, at p 339. 
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2.3.4 Vagueness of socio-economic rights 
The other objection to the enforcement of socio-economic rights is their 
vagueness. In some circles socio-economic ‘rights are seen as more 
controversial and, therefore, more indeterminate’.108 The provisions of the 
ICESCR are said to be vague to the extent that a judge cannot determine 
the precise scope of the right,109 whereas the ICCPR provisions are said to 
be precise.110 Similarly, it has been submitted by some scholars, even very 
                                                 
108
 Scott & Macklem: 1992, at p 45. See also Andreassen, B., Skålnes, T., Smith, G., and 
Stokke, H., ‘Assessing human rights performance in developing countries: The case for a 
minimum threshold approach to economic and social rights’ in Andreassen, B., and Eide. 
A., (eds.) Human rights in developing countries 1987/88: A Yearbook on human rights in 
countries receiving Nordic aid (1988) Chr. Michelsen Institute, Danish Center for 
Human Rights and Norwegian Institute of Human Rights pp 333 – 355 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Andreassen et al: 1988], at p 335. They argue that such phrases as ‘just and 
favourable conditions of work’, ‘fair wages’, ‘decent standard of living’, ‘safe and 
healthy working conditions’, ‘adequate standard of living’ and ‘adequate food, clothing, 
and housing’ as used in the ICESCR do not greatly help analysts in determining the 
substantive contents of these rights, or measuring empirically the degrees of 
implementation of specific rights (pp 335 – 336). 
 
109
 Robertson: 1997 gives the example of the right to housing. The right to housing could 
mean that ‘the state must not interfere with the tenure of householders’ or ‘the state must 
provide everyone with a house of a certain standard’ or ‘the state must ensure that 
everyone can afford access to adequate housing’. Orwin and Pangle: 1994, at p 15 
describe the rights as open-ended and containing unclear standards. To them, these are 
merely things that the poor wish they could persuade the rich to do for them, they are 
utopian endeavours and ideals which cannot be given the status of rights. What these 
authors ignore, however, is the fact that the Committee has been able to define the 
content of each of these rights. See, for instance, Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights General Comment 4 The right to adequate housing (article 11 (1)) Sixth 
session, 1991) U.N. Doc E/1992/23 [Hereinafter referred to as General Comment No. 4], 
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 14 (2003). 
 
110
 This objection has been maintained even presently. This is seen at the first session of 
the Open-ended Working Group to consider options regarding the elaboration of an 
optional protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
(Open-ended working group). Some delegates argued that some of the provisions of the 
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recently, that socio-economic rights are merely broad assertions, which 
puts them in unmanageable territory for the courts.111 The most immediate 
response to this objection has been that civil and political rights are no 
different.112 It is not true, as has been suggested, that civil and political 
rights mean exactly the same thing everywhere.113 Some civil and 
political rights such as freedom of speech, and right to protection of 
human dignity or protection from inhuman and degrading treatment are 
also vague. The question as to what amounts to inhuman or degrading 
treatment cannot be answered with precision. It may mean what right-
thinking members of society consider as being inhuman or degrading114 
which is in itself vague. The same can be said of free speech.115 In most 
cases it is limited by the interests of those in power. Whilst to a certain 
extent the vagueness of civil and political rights has partly been cleared 
up through many years of adjudication, socio-economic rights have not 
                                                                                                                                            
Covenant are drafted in imprecise terms, which gives rise to a lack of predictability on 
the part of the Committee. See para 53 of the Report of the working group, UN Doc 
E/CN.4/2004/44, dated 15 March 2004. 
 
111
  See for instance Neier, A., ‘Social and economic rights: A critique’ (2006) 13 Human 
Rights Brief pp 1 – 3 [Hereinafter referred to as Neier: 2006], at p 3.  
 
112
 Some of the delegates at the session of the Open-ended working group argued that the 
ICESCR differs from the ICCPR in this respect; that it was for the interpreters of the 
treaty to apply a particular provision of the Covenant to concrete cases as is the practice 
of the Committee in considering state reports; UN Doc E/CN.4/2004/44, at para 53. 
 
113
 Neier: 2006, at p 2 has suggested that the right to free speech, right to assemble and 
right not to be tortured mean the same thing in every place of the world. 
 
114
 Robertson: 1997. 
 
115
 Raes: 2000, at p 48 elaborates the vague nature of the freedom of speech; that the 
right is silent about the content of free speech and that acts that are protected are both 
moral and immoral.  
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had a similar advantage.116 This is one of the reasons why the adoption of 
a complaints procedure to the ICESCR has been proposed.117 To deny the 
justiciability of socio-economic rights is to limit the opportunities of 
elaboration of the obligations they engender. According to Scott: 
 
As national courts and institutions expand their attention to alleged 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights and as similar 
advancement occurs within regional human rights systems, further 
clarity will emerge, both with respect to what is prohibited and 
what behavior is considered conducive or mandatory to ensure the 
full realization of these rights.118  
 
Like civil and political rights, socio-economic rights are also capable of 
clarification using the multilayered obligations structure generated by all 
rights.119 This structure has successfully been used within the UN to 
                                                 
116
 Sepúlveda: 2003, at p 132, submits that the sharp contour of a right and the 
obligations that it imposes are the result of repeated years of application and that socio-
economic rights have not had such an advantage, which explains their vagueness. In a 
similar regard, Scott & Macklem: 1992, at p 72 – 73, contend that ‘[t]he specific shape 
and contour of a right is the result of years of repeated applications of practical reasoning 
to facts at hand’. They add that ‘[t]he lack of precision associated with many socio-
economic rights should not be held up as a justification for their nonentrenchment’; that: 
 
On the contrary, nonentrenchment is to a very large extent the reason 
for the lack of precision. Historical, ideological, and philosophical 
exclusions of social rights from adjudicative experience have resulted 
in a failure to accumulate experience that would render the imprecision 
of social rights less and less true as time goes on. 
 
117
 See Alston, P., ‘No right to complain about being poor: The need for an optional 
protocol to the economic rights Covenant’ in Eide, A., & Helgesen, J., (eds.) The future 
of human rights protection in a changing world: Fifty years since the four freedoms 
address: Essays in honour of Torkel Opsahl (1991) Norwegian University Press, at p 88. 
See also Chenwi, L., and Mbazira., C., ‘The Draft Optional Protocol to the International 
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2006) ESR Review pp 9 – 12.  
 
118
 Scott, L., ‘Another step towards indivisibility: Identifying the key features of 
violations of economic, social and cultural rights’ (1998) 20 Human Rights Quarterly pp 
81 – 124  [Hereinafter referred to as Scott: 1998], at p 88.  
 
119
 Scott & Macklem: 1992, at p 73.  
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clarify the obligations engendered by the rights as has been done by the 
Committee with regard to the different socio-economic rights protected by 
the ICESCR. This has been in the form of General Comments, which 
have extensively defined the scope of most of the rights. The multilayered 
structure imposes on the state the obligations to respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil the protected socio-economic rights.120 These duties, as is 
discussed below,121 define, in precise terms, the nature of the negative and 
positive obligations imposed on the state by each right. Yet, they apply to 
both civil and political rights and, to a certain extent, blur the differences 
between civil and political rights and socio-economic rights. Additionally, 
as is seen in chapter four,122 the South African courts have, through the 
reasonableness review approach demonstrated that the obligations 
engendered by socio-economic rights are capable of judicial clarification. 
This, though, as is seen in the next subsection, is not to suggest that the 
formulation of socio-economic rights is flawless. Some of the 
phraseology that the provisions entrenching these rights carry is, to some 
extent, problematic.123  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
120
 See Eide, A., ‘Universalisation of human rights versus globalisation of economic 
power’, in Coomans, F., Westendorp, I., and Willems, J., (eds.), Rendering justice to the 
vulnerable: Liber amicorum in honour of Theo van Boven (2000) Kluwer Law 
International pp 99 – 120. 
 
121
 Section 2.3.4.2  
 
122
 Section 4.2.  
 
123
 See Andreassen et al: 1988, at pp 333 – 335. 
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2.3.4.1 Clarifying the obligations engendered by the rights 
It is true that the content of most of the rights in the ICESCR has not been 
given judicial clarification, but this is not linked only to the absence of a 
complaints procedure. One would also not go as far as attributing the 
vagueness to their nature as rights. Rather, their vagueness is related to 
the manner in which the obligations they engender are formulated. What 
amounts to ‘progressive realisation’ remains hard to define precisely, as 
does what amounts to acting within ‘available resources’. ‘[C]ertain 
provisions [such as] “an adequate standard of living” or “adequate food, 
clothing, and housing” are somewhat vague and general[ly] word[ed]’.124 
In this chapter I do not object to the judicial enforcement of socio-
economic rights. However, I submit that there is still need for the 
clarification of the obligations that these rights engender.125 This is an 
essential step for the realisation of socio-economic rights.126 Unless this is 
done, it will be impossible to predict, with accuracy, whether or not a 
state has acted in conformity with the obligations.127 The Committee 
should be commended for the steps it has taken to clarify several of the 
                                                 
124
 Craven : 1998, at pp 118 and 129. See also Eide: 1989, at p 49. In his first report, the 
Independent Expert, appointed by the United Nations Commission on Human Rights to 
examine the possibility of adopting a complaints procedure under the ICESCR, 
cautioned on the vagueness of some of the rights in the ICESCR. However, while he 
called for further study of the rights, he said that this did not affect their intrinsic value as 
human rights. See Report of the independent expert on the question of a draft optional 
protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
Commission on Human Rights Fifty-eighth session, E/CN.4/2002/57, 12 February 2002. 
 
125
 A similar view is held by Sepúlveda: 2003; Arambulo: 1999; Scott: 1998 at pp 87 – 8. 
See also Eide: 1989, at p 51; and Andreassen et al: 1988.  
 
126
 Craven: 1998, at p 118. 
 
127
 Craven: 1998, at p 128. See also Coomans, F., ‘In search of the content of the right to 
education’ in Chapman, A., and Russell, S., (eds.) The core obligations: Building a 
framework for economic, social and cultural rights (2002) INTERSENTIA pp 217 – 
246, at 245.  
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rights in the ICESCR. The CESCR has done this by adopting a number of 
General Comments defining elements of specific rights.128 In spite of this, 
the Committee still faces a number of challenges in measuring 
compliance with the Covenant. 
 
Attempts have been made by the Committee to determine formulae for 
measuring resource allocation. One such formula is the measurement of 
the proportion of the Gross National Product (GNP) committed to socio-
economic services. The second one is by comparing the resource 
allocations of different states. This has been done by considering the 
proportion of the GNP spent on a specific service by countries in the same 
region and with the same development index as the country in issue.129 
These approaches, though innovative, have a number of weaknesses.130 
The committee lacks the necessary expertise to verify and analyse the 
amounts of the resources allocated to the rights. Reliance is placed on the 
information provided by the states without independent verification. In 
addition, the figures may be deceptive since GNP does not adequately 
reflect the income inequalities that exist in all societies. The poor are 
always the majority in many countries yet they only benefit from the 
smallest proportion of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP). Similarly, the 
                                                 
128
 See General Comment 4, General Comment 13, The right to education (Twenty-first 
session, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/10 (1999); Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment 14, The right to the highest attainable standard of 
health (Twenty-second session, 2000), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000) [Hereinafter 
referred to as General Comment No. 14]; and General Comment 15, The right to water 
(Twenty-ninth session, 2003), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) [Hereinafter referred to 
as General Comment No. 15]; all reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and 
General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003). 
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 See Sepúlveda: 2003, at pp 317 – 319.  
 
130
 See generally Robertson, E., ‘Measuring state compliance with the obligation to 
devote the “maximum available resources” to realizing economic, social and cultural 
rights’ (1994) 16 Human Rights Quarterly, pp 693 – 714. 
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figures will also not reflect the accurate position of the marginalised 
groups in society.131  This is in addition to the fact that the Committee has 
not been consistent in applying the above criteria. 
 
The same problems are prevalent at the domestic level. The South African 
courts have yet to devise formulae for measuring the reasonableness of 
resources allocated to a right. So far, the CC has engaged with resources 
allocation only indirectly, viz when the government’s programme is 
criticised under the reasonableness test. However, unless this test 
incorporates an element testing appropriateness of resources, it will 
remain incomplete. This issue is discussed in detail in chapter four.132 
 
2.3.4.2 Duties to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the rights133 
Section 7 of the South African Constitution requires the state to respect, 
protect, promote and fulfil the rights in the Bill of Rights. This typology 
of obligations, as approved by international human rights law, has been 
adopted not only to clarify the nature of human rights obligations but also 
their varied intensity.134 The typology has also made it possible to 
establish accountability and to identify violations of socio-economic 
rights.135 Originally articulated by Shue,136 this typology defines human 
                                                 
131
 Craven: 1998, at pp 118 and 138. 
 
132
 Chapter four at section 4.2.4.  
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 The material in this section has recently been published under my name in the East 
African Journal of Peace and Human Rights. See Mbazira, C., ‘Translating 
socioeconomic rights from abstract paper rights to fully fledged individual rights: 
Lessons from South Africa’ (2006) 12 East African Journal of Peace and Human Rights 
pp 183 – 231. This paper also includes excerpts from chapter four of this thesis.  
 
134
 Scott: 1998, at pp 90 – 91. See also The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted by a group of experts at Maastricht, 22 – 
26 January 1997 [Hereinafter referred to as the Maastricht Guidelines] , para 6. 
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 Scott: 1998, at p 91 – 92.  
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rights obligations at three levels: the primary level, duty to respect; the 
secondary level, duty to protect; and the tertiary level, duties to promote 
and fulfil. 
 
I. Duty to respect 
According to the Maastricht Guidelines, the obligation to respect requires 
states to refrain from interfering with the enjoyment of socio-economic 
rights.137 Such interference may either be direct or indirect and may 
include conduct that erects obstacles to the enjoyment of the rights. The 
state must respect the free use of resources by individuals or groups for 
the purpose of satisfying human needs.138 However, in South Africa the 
duty to respect has been broadened. In the case of Government of the 
Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others,139 the Court held that at 
the very least there is ‘a negative obligation placed upon the state and all 
other entities and persons to desist from preventing or impairing the right 
of access to adequate housing’.140 The use of the phrase ‘preventing or 
impairing’ places this duty beyond the international standards which 
                                                                                                                                            
136
 See Shue, H., Basic rights: Subsistence, affluence, and U.S. foreign policy (1980) 
Princeton University Press.  
 
137
 Maastricht Guidelines, para 6. 
 
138
 The Social and Economic Rights Action Center and the Center for Economic and 
Social Rights v Nigeria, Communication No. 155/96 of the African Commission on 
Human and Peoples’ Rights, in the Fifteenth Annual Report of the African Commission 
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 2001 – 2002 pp 47 – 73, para 45 [Hereinafter referred to 
as SERAC case]. 
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 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (Grootboom case). 
 
140
 Para 34 [Emphasis mine]. 
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engage only with direct or indirect interference with the enjoyment of the 
rights.141 
 
The duty to respect is a negative duty, which makes it easy to grasp 
because it corresponds to the traditional conservative view of the nature of 
human rights as a shield against state interference.142 Because of its 
negativity, the duty to respect may not require resources to fulfil and in 
the context of the South African Constitution is, therefore, not subjected 
to the internal limitations in sections 26(2) and 27(2).143  In spite of this, 
there are certain instances in which the duty to respect may invoke 
positive obligations as well. For instance, in certain circumstances the 
state may have no option but to carry out an eviction in the public interest. 
The public interest may include the necessity to use occupied land for 
public works such as construction of a hospital, school or road. But in this 
case, however, the state must take positive steps to mitigate the 
interference with the people’s rights of access to adequate housing. The 
state may for instance have to provide alternative accommodation for the 
people to be displaced.144  
 
                                                 
141
 Liebenberg: 2005, at p 33-18. Liebenberg has argued that ‘preventing or impairing’ 
access to socio-economic rights could well cover policies that constitute a barrier to an 
individual or a mere interference with their existing access to rights.  
 
142
 De Vos: 1997, at p 80 See discussion at section 2.3.1.  
 
143
 Liebenberg: 2005, at pp 33-18 – 33-19; De Vos: 1997, at pp 93 – 94; Viljoen,: 2005, 
at p 3.  
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 Brand, D., ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution’ 
in Brand, D., and Heyns, C., (eds.) Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) Pretoria 
University Law Press pp 1 – 56 [Hereinafter referred to as Brand: 2005], at pp 9 – 10 see 
also Hunt, P., Reclaiming social rights: International and comparative perspectives 
(1996) Ashgate Publishing Limited [Hereinafter referred to as Hunt: 1996], at p 31.  
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The case of Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action 
Campaign,145 provides a good example of a case in which the duty to 
respect may invoke negative as well as positive obligations.146 This case 
arose from a government programme intended to reduce mother to child 
transmission (MTCT) of HIV by HIV positive mothers during child 
birth.147 The programme involved the provision of nevirapine, a drug 
believed to reduce MTCT, at selected research sites consisting of two 
public hospitals in every province. Only doctors at these hospitals, with 
the exception of doctors in private practice, would prescribe this drug. 
The department of health argued that the efficacy of the drug was still 
being tested and it was, therefore, not yet safe to roll it out to all public 
hospitals.148 The state also argued that the effective use of the drug 
demanded provision of breast substitutes to avoid transmission during 
breast feeding. It was submitted that this required infrastructure to provide 
advice and counselling to the mothers to ensure that the substitute and 
supplements were used properly and to monitor progress to determine the 
effectiveness of the treatment.149 
 
                                                 
145
 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (TAC case). 
 
146
 See also case of Residents of Bon Vista v Southern Metropolitan Council 2002 (6) 
BCLR 625 (W), as example of a case in which the duty to respect is enforced in a purely 
negative sense. The Court held that the disconnection of the applicants’ water by the 
Council without justification amounted to violation of the duty to respect the right of 
access to sufficient water. 
 
147
 For review of this case, see Mizikenge, D., ‘Minister of Health and Others v. 
Treatment Action Campaign: Its implications for the combat of HIV/AIDS and the 
protection of economic, social and cultural rights’ (2003) 19 East African Journal of 
Peace and Human Rights pp 174 – 193.  
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 In their challenge, the applicants argued, amongst others, that the 
government programme was defective because it prohibited the 
administration of the drug outside the research sites.150 The applicants 
were here arguing for enforcement on the state of a negative duty to 
refrain from preventing or impairing the enjoyment of the right to 
health.151 However, one finds that the effective discharge of this negative 
duty still required some positive steps to be taken. While the drug was 
available to the state at no cost, it was not disputed that there was need for 
counselling infrastructure if the treatment was to be effective. 
Establishment of this infrastructure is a positive element; this is in 
addition to training the counsellors and transporting the drug to the 
hospitals. Thus, the effect of the Court’s order was that the state should, 
without delay, remove restrictions that prevent the drug being made 
available and prescribed at hospitals other than the research sites. 
 
II. Duty to protect  
The duty to protect requires the state to prevent third parties from 
violating the rights of individuals or groups.152 This requires the state to 
take measures, either by way of legislation or regulations, to prohibit third 
parties from interfering with the enjoyment of socio-economic rights. 
Such legislation and regulations should also grant individuals the legal 
status and privileges required to enable them to effectively protect their 
rights.153 In addition, the state should put in place an effective framework 
through which those whose rights have been violated can seek redress 
from the guilty third party.154 The enforcement of human rights against 
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151
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154
 SERAC case, para 46. 
 
 
 
 
Chapter two 
 79 
third parties, either individuals or juristic persons, has been made more 
effective in the South African Constitution. The Constitution makes 
provision for the application of the Bill of Rights to ‘a natural or juristic 
person if and to the extent that, it is applicable taking into account the 
nature of the right and the nature of the duty imposed’.155 In addition to 
this, there are a number of provisions in the Constitution that compel the 
state to undertake specific action to prevent violation of some rights.156  
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
155
 Section 8(2); this provision has challenged the traditional perceptions that a bill of 
rights applies only vertically between the state and the individual so as to protect the 
latter from the former. This traditional perception of the application of the bill rights was 
approved in Du Plessis v De Klerk 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC), 1996 (5) BCLR 658 (CC) in 
which the CC held that the substantive provisions of the Interim Bill of Rights were 
generally not capable of being applied to any legal relationship other than that between 
legislative and executive organs and the individual or natural persons. From 
contemporary perspectives, it is clear that human rights violations may take place at the 
horizontal level of relations in addition to the vertical level. Individuals or juristic 
persons may violate the rights of other individuals or juristic persons. This makes it 
necessary that provision for horizontal application of human rights standards be made. 
See Currie, I., and De Waal, J., The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) Juta & Company, at 
p 43 [Hereinafter referred to as Currie & De Waal: 2005]; see also Woolman, S., (2004) 
‘Application’ in Woolman, S.,  Roux, T., Klaaren, J., Stein, A., & Chaskalson, M., (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa, [2nd Edition, Original Service] Juta & Company and 
Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, pp 31-1 — 31-158. See also Chirwa, 
D., Towards binding economic, social and cultural rights obligations of non-state actors 
in international and domestic law: A critical survey of emerging norms (2005) [LLD, 
University of the Western Cape]. According to Craven, though there is no evidence in 
the ICESCR to suggest that it was intended to apply horizontally there is equally no 
evidence to suggest that it was not supposed to. Craven believes that it is this 
horizontally upon which we should assume that the drafters of the Covenant intended to 
ensure that the state protects rights of individual against violation by others; Craven: 
1998, at 112. 
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 For instance, section 24(b) compels government to adopt legislation to prevent 
environmental pollution, degradation and to secure ecologically sustainable 
development.  
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The case of Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge 
Environmental Association and Another157 presents a good example of 
how vigorously the state may protect socio-economic rights. The facts of 
the case are briefly as follows: a group of residents of Alexandra 
Township had had their homes destroyed by flooding following heavy 
rains. As an immediate relief the government had moved them to a safe 
piece of land where they stayed in tents and later huts constructed to 
accommodate them. However, the conditions at this site were not 
favourable; there was poor sanitation and overcrowding amongst others. 
In order to ameliorate the condition of the victims, government decided to 
set up a Camp in another location with better houses and sanitation 
facilities. This move was, however, resisted by a group of residents 
adjoining the prison farm on which the camp was to be established. The 
resident argued that the process of establishing the camp had not followed 
the processes prescribed by town planning and environmental protection 
laws, and that they had not been given a hearing to air their objections. 
However, their biggest concern appears to have been that the choice of a 
prison farm in the neighbourhood as the site of the transit camp would 
affect the character of the neighbourhood and reduce the value of their 
properties.158  
 
One could read the residents as having argued that their right to property 
should in the circumstances trample the flood victims’ right of access to 
adequate housing. The government in order to protect the rights of the 
flood victims vigorously defended its decision. The CC held that in a case 
like this, where conflicting interests have to be reconciled and choices 
made, proportionality, which is  inherent in the Bill of Rights, is relevant 
to determining what fairness requires.159 In the circumstances, the Court 
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weighed up the right of the flood victims to adequate housing against the 
residents’ rights to property and a clean and healthy environment.160 In 
this case, both the government and the Court discharged their 
constitutional duty to protect the right of access to adequate housing. The 
state would have failed in its duty had it not effectively defended its 
decision and merely conceded the arguments of the applicants. Similarly, 
the Court would have failed to discharge its duty to protect the rights had 
it ruled otherwise.  
 
III. Duty to promote 
This is the least discussed of the duties; the Committee itself did not 
include the duty to promote in its initial General Comments.161 Recently, 
however, the Committee has defined this duty as a component of the duty 
to fulfil. In its General Comment on the right to water, the Committee has 
said that the ‘obligation to fulfil can be disaggregated into the obligations 
to facilitate, promote and provide’.162 It is notable that while some authors 
have set out to discuss the typology of the obligations in section 7(2) of 
the South African Constitution they have not touched on the meaning of 
the duty to promote at all. What is most common is lumping of the duty to 
promote with the duty to fulfil. For instance, De Vos in elaborate terms 
                                                 
160
 Para 105. 
 
161
 For instance, in elaborating the obligations and content of the right to adequate food, 
the Committee says that the right imposes three types or levels of obligations on the 
state: respect, protect, and fulfil; General Comment 12, The right to adequate food  
[article 11] (Twentieth session, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1998/5 (1999), reprinted in 
Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted by Human 
Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 54 (2003), para 15, [Hereinafter 
referred to as General Comment No. 12]. Even such internationally renowned 
discussions on the nature of the obligations engendered by socio-economic rights do not 
discuss the duty to promote; see Craven: 1995, at pp 109 – 114; and Eide: 2001, at pp 23 
– 25. 
 
162
 General Comment 15. 
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discusses the nature of the duties to respect and protect socio-economic 
rights separately but immediately lumps promotion and fulfilment 
together.163 What is evident in his subsequent discussion, however, is that 
De Vos discusses the duty to fulfil without mention of the duty to 
promote, either independently or as a component of the duty to fulfil.164 
Brand has argued that the duty to promote is difficult to distinguish from 
the duty to fulfil.165 But Brand does not give any reasons to back his 
conclusion. Some authors immediately after the duty to protect instead 
discuss the duty to facilitate as requiring the state to facilitate 
opportunities by which the rights are enjoyed.166 This is even more 
confusing since elsewhere, as I have indicated above; the duty to facilitate 
has been discussed as a component of the duty to fulfil.167  
 
It could never have been the intention of the drafters of the Constitution 
that section 7(2) is read as if the duty to promote was non-existent. Yet, if 
it had been their intention to read the duty to promote as a component of 
the duty to fulfil, then there would have been no need spelling it out 
besides the duty to fulfil. I am of the view that the duty to promote can be 
read separately from the duty to fulfil. It imposes an obligation on the 
state, amongst others, to ensure awareness of the existence of the rights 
                                                 
163
 De Vos: 1997, at p 86. Viljoen: 2005, at p 3. does not mention the duty to promote at 
all. 
 
164
 De Vos; 1997, at pp 86 – 91; see also Liebenberg, S., ‘Socio-economic rights’ in 
Chaskalson, M., Kentridge, J., Klaaren, J., Marcus, G., Spitz, D. & Woolman, S., (eds) 
Constitutional law of South Africa (1999) Juta & Company, pp 41-1 — 41-56, at p 41-
33. 
 
165
 Brand: 2005, at p 14. 
 
166
 Sepúlveda: 2003, at p 162.  
 
167
 According to the Committee, the obligation to fulfil incorporates both an obligation to 
facilitate and an obligation to provide; General comment No. 12, para 15. See also Eide: 
2001, at p 24.  
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through public education campaigns.168 In this respect, the state must not 
only educate the public but also its officials on the existence and the 
nature of the various rights. All public officials should be informed of the 
Constitutional obligations and the nature of their administrative duties 
with regard to these rights.169 The CC has given effect to the duty to 
promote by holding that for a programme to pass the test of 
reasonableness its contents must be made known.170 This requires the 
state not only to promote awareness about the existence of the rights in a 
cursory manner but to detail the criteria and steps of accessing the rights 
in the programme. In the case of Soobramoney v Minister of Health 
(KwaZulu-Natal),171 Madala J observed that perhaps the solution in that 
case was for the state to embark on a massive education campaign to 
inform citizens generally about the causes of renal failure, hypertension 
and diabetes.172 The duty also requires the state to create an enabling 
environment to allow people to exercise their rights.173 This requires 
adoption of appropriate legislation and regulations for that purpose.  
                                                 
168
 Otto, D., and Wiseman, D., ‘In search of “effective remedies”: Applying the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights to Australia’ (2001) 
Faculty of Law, the University of Melbourne, Public Law and Legal Theory Working 
Paper No.15, [Hereinafter referred to as Otto & Wiseman: 2001].at p 8, sourced at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=270908> (accessed on 10 April 2006).  
 
169
 Budlender, G., ‘Justiciability of socio-economic rights: Some African experiences’ in 
Ghai, Y., and Cottrell, J., (eds.) Economic, social & cultural rights: The role of judges in 
implementing economic, social and cultural rights (2004) INTERIGHTS pp 33 – 
41[Hereinafter referred to as Budlender: 2004], at p 37.   
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 TAC case, para 123. 
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 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC). For a detailed discussion of this case, see chapter four, section 
4.2.  
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 See Budlender: 2004, at p 37; and Grootboom case para 35.  
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IV. Duty to fulfil  
This is the most controversial of the four duties because of its positive 
nature and heavy reliance on resources to discharge. This duty requires 
the state to adopt legislative, administrative, budgetary, judicial and other 
measures towards the full realisation of the rights.174 The state must make 
provision of socio-economic goods and services to those persons who 
currently lack access to them and are unable to access them using their 
own means.175 Within the South African Constitution, the extent to which 
the state may be found to have violated this obligation is dependent on 
whether the state has acted within the internal limitations in sections 26(2) 
and 27(2). However, this does not apply to the duty to fulfil the basic 
rights in sections 28(1)(c), 29(1)(a), and 35(2)(e). As already 
demonstrated in chapter one,176 these rights are crafted without any 
internal limitations. To understand the manner in which the duty to fulfil 
has been implemented in South Africa one needs to understand how the 
courts have interpreted the internal limitations in sections 26(2) and 27(2). 
One needs also to understand how the courts have interpreted the basic 
rights, especially the children’s rights as have been enforced in the 
Grootboom and TAC cases. These issues form the bulk of the discussion 
in chapter four.  
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 General Comment 14, para 33. See also Maastricht Guidelines, para 6; and SERAC 
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 Liebenberg: 2005, at 33-6. 
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2.4 CONCLUSION 
 
Though this chapter grounds the objections to socio-economic rights on 
legal notions, in South Africa these objections also had political 
dimensions. The divergence was between those that advocated for limited 
state powers; this would only call for state non-interference. Those who 
supported this philosophy discouraged the inclusion of socio-economic 
rights in the South African constitution. On the other hand, those who 
believed in the philosophy of extensive state power saw great relevance of 
socio-economic rights.177 However, contemporary problems and needs 
have led to a redefinition of the role of the modern state. New social and 
economic demands and the interaction of the people and the state in this 
sphere call for a more active state.178 This is only made effective if the 
state is placed under a justiciable and legal obligation to do so through 
recognition of socio-economic rights. Excluding socio-economic rights 
from the constitution would exclude the interests they protect from the 
process of social, economic, and political interchange and will foreclose 
the forums for redressing socio-economic injustices.179 
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 De Villiers: 1995, at p 599. The National Party was bent towards avoiding an activist 
and interventionist state. 
 
178
 De Villiers: 1995, at p 599. Cappelletti argued that to exclude social rights from a Bill 
of Rights would be to stop history at the time of laissez-faire and to forget that the 
modern state has greatly enlarged its reach and responsibilities into the economy and the 
welfare of people. Capelletti, M. ‘The future of legal education. A comparative 
perspective’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights 1, at p 10.  
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 Scott & Macklem: 1992, at p 28. Scott and Macklem argue that in the absence of 
entrenched social rights, it would be unwise to expect that values left 
unconstitutionalised could hold their own in wider political discourse. That such rights 
will be marginalised and categorised as second-class arguments and those most 
dependent on them for basic survival and for integration into society at large will become 
or remain second-class citizens (at p 36). 
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Socio-economic rights are capable of judicial enforcement. In many 
respects, they are similar to civil and political rights. Civil and political 
rights, like socio-economic rights, engender positive obligations in 
addition to negative obligations. Additionally, civil and political rights 
have resource implications. It is, therefore, not proper for one to argue 
that socio-economic rights are not justiciable because they are resource 
dependent. Socio-economic rights cannot also be discredited on the 
ground of their vagueness. Many elements of civil and political rights 
remain vague though they have benefited from so many years of judicial 
enforcement. 
 
In spite of this, it must be admitted that socio-economic rights present 
difficulties for courts that have to enforce them. These are difficulties that 
may not be as strongly associated with the judicial enforcement of civil 
and political rights. Though the realisation of civil and political rights also 
requires resources, it is true that the realisation of socio-economic rights 
requires far more resources. For instance, the right to free speech, a civil 
and political right, cannot by its nature require rationing as is with the 
right to vote, though problems may arise in putting in place structures to 
exercise these rights. Sachs explains this point by using the following 
analogy: 
 
If A expresses him or herself or votes in a certain way, this does not 
prevent B from expressing him or herself or from voting in the same or 
different way. The progressive realisation of socio-economic rights within 
available resources, on the other hand, indicates that a system of 
apportionment is fundamental to their very being … I am convinced that 
the exercise of a right that by its nature is shared, often competitively, with 
other holders of the right, must have different legal characteristics from 
the exercise of a classical individual right that is autonomous and complete 
in itself. 180 
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 Sachs, A., ‘The judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights: The Grootboom case’ 
in Peris, J., and Kristian, S., (eds.) Democratising development: The politics of socio-
economic rights in South Africa (2005) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers pp 131 – 152, at p 
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 In a country with wide-spread socio-economic inequality, the realisation 
of socio-economic rights calls for a great deal of positive action. Again, 
this is not to say that civil and political rights do not call for positive 
action; they too call for such action but in varying degrees. Unlike socio-
economic rights, civil and political rights litigation seldom challenges 
government inaction. Even when civil and political rights litigation 
challenges inaction, it is not always wide-spread inaction affecting a wide 
range of people. 
 
There is a need for a further understanding of the nature of the obligations 
engendered by socio-economic rights and how to apply them to concrete 
cases. The meaning of the terms ‘progressive realisation’ and ‘available 
resources’ should be explored further.181 It is only then that successful 
socio-economic rights litigation will attract meaningful remedies. The 
rights have been defined only as programmatic without any individual 
entitlements. However, even with the programmatic definition, the rights 
are yet to be realised even by groups of people. Socio-economic rights are 
to be realised progressively subject to available resources. But what 
amounts to progressive realisation remains hard to apply to concrete 
cases. So is what is meant by the phrase available resources. The courts 
are yet to devise, and apply consistently, indicators to measure 
appropriateness of resources allocated to specific rights. In addition to 
their institutional incompetence, the courts lack the necessary expertise to 
assess such resources. Furthermore, this places the courts at the deep-end 
of enforcing socio-economic rights, because resource determination and 
budgetary allocation matters are believed to be within the executive and 
legislative domain. The effective implementation of these rights has, 
therefore, been affected by the courts’ own institutional competence 
which has also been looked at from the perspective of the doctrine of 
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 See generally Dennis & Stewart: 2004. They contend that the question for all human 
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separation of powers. This has been used as a ground to object to the 
judicial review of socio-economic rights in what has been referred to as 
the institutional competence dimension. This dimension is discussed in 
the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER THREE 
 
THE JUDICIAL ENFORCEMENT OF SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS AND THE INSTITUTIONAL 
COMPETENCE CONCERNS 
 
 
3.1             INTRODUCTION 
 
In the previous chapter I have discussed the legitimacy concern dimension 
as relates to the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights. This 
chapter deals with the institutional competence dimension. It has been 
fairly easy for advocates of judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights 
to overcome legitimacy dimension objections. The same cannot be said in 
respect of the institutional competence dimension. This dimension has 
been more controversial and presents more obstacles in comparison to the 
legitimacy dimension. The institutional competence dimension of 
justiciability is concerned with the nature of the judiciary as an 
institution.1 The question posed by those who advance objections based 
on this dimension is one of whether or not the judiciary possesses the 
institutional capacity and competence to adjudicate socio-economic 
rights. This dimension is a product of what Scott and Macklem refer to as 
‘a progressive vision of social justice’.2 This vision, unlike its counterpart, 
the conservative vision, does not have objections to the protection of 
                                                 
1
 Scott, C., and Macklem, P., ‘Constitutional ropes of sand or justiciable guarantees? 
Social rights in a new South African Constitution’ (1992) 141 University of 
Pennsylvania Law Review pp 1 – 148 [Hereinafter referred to as Scott & Macklem: 
1992], at p 20. 
 
2
 Scott & Macklem: 1992, at pp 22 – 23. 
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socio-economic rights in a constitution.3 It is, however, opposed to 
empowering the judiciary to overrule the decisions of the elected 
representatives of the people.4 Judicial enforcement of socio-economic 
rights is viewed as undemocratic because courts, whose judges are 
unelected and not accountable, are empowered to set aside the decisions 
of the democratically elected representatives of the people. In addition to 
being undemocratic, the judiciary is viewed by some as lacking the 
institutional capacity to enforce socio-economic rights. This is because 
these rights are believed to be positive in nature and have budgetary 
implications. This is a matter of practical technical deficiency on the part 
of the courts to enforce these rights. Socio-economic rights are also 
believed to be beyond the capacity of the judiciary because litigation of 
these rights has polycentric consequences. It is submitted that a socio-
economic rights decision has many repercussions implicating a number of 
interests of persons who may not be before the court. The courts do not 
                                                 
3
 The conservative vision, discussed in chapter two, is opposed to the 
constitutionalisation of socio-economic rights because the rights by their nature deal with 
redistribution of wealth and intervention in market. This conservative view is reflected in 
philosophical objections to socio-economic rights mainly on grounds that unlike the 
human rights so-called, these rights engender positive obligations, are vague in nature 
and call for positive state action which makes their judicial enforcement a problem. 
Jeffery Harrod associates these objections to the movement of neo-liberalism, which is 
opposed to the attainment of material equity. This movement distinguishes socio-
economic rights from human rights because they are considered to be inimical to 
political and economic freedoms derived from the market and the construction of a 
society characterised by diversity. See Jeffery, H., ‘The new politics of economic and 
social rights’ in Karin, A., and Mihyo, P., (eds.) Responding to the human rights deficit, 
essays in hounour of Bas de Gaay Fortman (2003) Kluwer Law International pp 61 – 72, 
at p 67.  
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 See Schauer, F., ‘The calculus of distrust’ (1991) 77 Virginia Law Review 653, at pp 
664 – 67. See also Haysom, N., ‘Constitutionalism, majoritarian democracy and socio-
economic rights’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 451 –  463. 
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have the capacity, so it is submitted, to appreciate and attend to all these 
interests.5    
 
It is submitted in this chapter that the institutional competence objections 
are based on a misconception of both democracy and the separation of 
powers doctrine. The separation of powers doctrine has evolved since its 
conception; it is not possible to strictly apply the doctrine as initially 
conceived. And democracy should be understood beyond the notion of 
majoritarian democracy. The chapter begins by highlighting the relevance 
of the institutional competence concerns to the process of determining 
remedies for socio-economic rights violations. It then sets out the nature 
of the objection and its implications. As a preface to the response to the 
objections, the evolving nature of the doctrine of separation of powers and 
its implications are discussed. The chapter then discusses the nature of the 
notion of democracy and the important role of the courts in a 
constitutional democracy. This is followed by a discussion of the issue of 
the court’s institutional capacity to enforce socio-economic rights and to 
respond to polycentric issues.  
 
 
3.2   RELEVANCE OF INSTITUTIONAL COMPETENCE   
CONCERNS 
 
Any discussion of judicial remedies in constitutional law would be 
incomplete without a discussion of the institutional competence 
objections. It is especially at the remedial stage of litigation that the 
concern about the competence of the courts and their place as dictated by 
the doctrine of separation of powers becomes more pronounced.6 
                                                 
5
 See Fuller, L. ‘The forms and limits of adjudication’ (1978) 92 Harvard Law Review 
pp 353 – 409 [Hereinafter referred to as Fuller: 1978]. 
 
6
 See generally Shane, P., ‘Rights, remedies and restraint’ (1988) 64 Chicago-Kent Law 
Review pp 531 – 571. 
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Disagreements about the appropriate role of the judiciary, therefore, lie at 
the heart of the debate about remedial purposes and constraints.7 In 
designing an ‘appropriate, just and equitable relief’, one of the factors that 
the courts have always taken into consideration, though sometimes 
implicitly, is the need to defer to the other organs of state.8 A court’s 
understanding of its institutional competence may dictate the kind of 
remedies that it is prepared to grant. The lack of technical expertise in 
certain matters may not only prevent courts from awarding certain 
remedies, such as injunctions, but may also dictate the scope of the 
selected remedy. As chapter seven shows,9 this consideration has played a 
very important role in determining the circumstances under which a court 
may consider injunctive relief, especially of a structural nature, 
appropriate. Sometimes, courts consider themselves better suited to make 
declaratory orders than when they engage in on-going supervision of their 
orders. This, in some cases, is because of the technical expertise that the 
task of monitoring administrative functions may require.  
 
However, it is not only the lack of expertise that may militate against 
certain remedies, but also the need to maintain the boundaries between 
organs of state and to avoid countermajoritarian tensions. The Canadian 
case of Doucet-Boudreau and Others v Attorney General of Nova Scotia10 
provides evidence of how strongly some judges believe their remedial 
powers to be constrained by the separation of power doctrine. Four out of 
nine judges of the Supreme Court of Canada, in a dissenting judgment, 
dismissed a trial judge’s retention of supervisory jurisdiction on the 
                                                 
7
 Roach, K., Constitutional remedies in Canada (1994) Canada Law Books Inc 
[Hereinafter referred to as Roach: 1994], at p 3-2. 
 
8
 Currie, I., and De Waal, J., The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) Juta & Company 
[Hereinafter referred to as Currie & De Waal: 2005], at p 197. 
 
9
 Section 7.4.  
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 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, 2003 SCC 62. 
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ground that it violated the doctrine of separation of powers. The 
dissenting judges held, amongst others, that:   
 
A court purporting to retain jurisdiction to oversee the implementation of a 
remedy, after a final order has been issued, will likely be acting 
inappropriately on two levels.  First, by attempting to extend the court’s 
jurisdiction beyond its proper role, it will breach the separation of powers 
principle. Second, by acting after exhausting its jurisdiction, it will breach 
the functus officio doctrine.11  
 
The minority also held that by purporting to assume a managerial role: 
 
[The trial judge] undermined the norm of co-operation and mutual respect 
that not only describes the relationship between the various actors in the 
constitutional order, but defines its particularly Canadian nature, and 
invests each branch with legitimacy.12 
 
Although the majority held that the boundaries of separation of powers 
are not demarcated by bright lines, they also warned courts against 
assumption of functions which their institutional design and expertise 
prevent them from leaping into.13 In South Africa, the Constitutional 
Court (CC) has rejected the doctrine of separation of powers as a 
constraint to its powers to make mandatory and structural injunctions and 
has, indeed, awarded this form of relief in some cases.14 However, in 
practice, the Court in socio-economic rights cases has, without elaborate 
justification, refused to exercise supervisory jurisdiction. This could be 
linked to the CC’s expression of concerns about its institutional capacity 
                                                 
11
 Para 105. 
 
12
 Para 121. 
 
13
 Para 56. For a detailed discussion of this case see McAllister, D., ‘Doucet-Boudreau 
and the development of effective section 24(1) remedies: Confrontation or cooperation?’ 
(2004) 16 National Journal of Constitutional Law pp 153 – 173.  
 
14
 See August and Another v The Electoral Commission and Others 1999 (3) SA 1 (CC); 
Walker v Pretoria City Council 1998 (3) BCLR 257 (CC), 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC); and 
Sibiya and Others v DPP, Johannesburg High Court and Others, 2006 (2) BCLR 293 
(CC). 
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to redirect policy choices and the need to defer to the executive organs of 
the state. This point is discussed in detail in chapter seven.15 
 
 It is, therefore, important that we explore the submissions that have been 
advanced to object to the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights 
on the basis of the doctrine of separation of powers and institutional 
competency. It should be noted, however, that by and large there is 
agreement on the need for the courts to have powers to enforce 
constitutional norms. The disagreements boil down to the question of how 
far the courts may go in exercising this power and at what point they will 
encroach on the functions preserved for other branches of government.16 
According to Chayes, though judges should not ‘be thrust directly into 
political battles’ this is a consideration that ‘should be undertaken as 
cautionary, not decisive; for despite its well rehearsed inadequacies, the 
judiciary may have some important institutional advantages’.17    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
15
 Section 7.5. 
 
16
 Sturm, S., ‘A normative theory of public law remedies’ (1991) 79 Georgetown Law 
Journal pp 1355 – 1446 [Hereinafter referred to as Sturm: 1991], at p 1405.   
 
17
 Chayes, A., ‘The role of the judge in public law litigation’ (1976) Harvard Law 
Review pp 1281 – 1316 [Hereinafter referred to as Chayes: 1976], at p 1307.  
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3.3          SEPARATION OF POWERS AND 
COUNTERMAJORITARIANISM   
 
3.3.1 Statement of the objection 
The objection to the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights has 
a political but also legal dimension. The political dimension, which is 
the most predominant, finds its place in the notion of democracy. As 
stated above,18 it has been submitted that decisions regarding the 
allocation of resources and the prioritisation of needs should be left for 
the democratically elected representatives of the people. This is because 
of the political accountability that such representatives owe their 
constituencies.  The courts are considered to be undemocratic because 
they set aside decisions reached through a democratic process, and they, 
therefore, act in a countermajoritrian manner:  
 
The root difficulty is that judicial review is a counter-majoritarian force in 
our system … [;] when the Supreme Court declares unconstitutional a 
legislative act or the action of an elected executive, it thwarts the will of 
representatives of the actual people of the here and now; it exercises 
control, not on behalf of the prevailing majority, but against it. That, 
without mystic overtones, is what actually happens.19 
                                                 
18
 Section 3.1.  
 
19
 Bickel, A., The least dangerous branch: The Supreme Court at the bar of politics 
(1962) Bobbs-Merrill [Hereinafter referred to as Bickel: 1962], at pp 16 – 7. This 
objection has received support from other scholars such as Ely, J., Democracy and 
distrust (1980) Harvard University Press [Hereafter referred to as Ely: 1980]. Ely 
perceives the effect of judicial review as amounting to the courts telling the people’s 
representatives that they cannot govern as they would like (at pp 4 – 5). Bogart has 
submitted that in socio-economic welfare terms, the legislature and the executive have 
done more than the judiciary in ensuring poor people’s welfare services, which should 
justify support for democratic institutions. In contrast, Bogart submits that history 
reveals that rather than protect the poor, the courts have been uncaring to them. This, in 
his opinion, is because state regulation and programmes designed to be responsive to the 
concerns of the poor have often been cut back by courts under the guise of interpretation. 
Bogart W., ‘“And the courts which govern their lives”: The judges and legitimacy’ in 
Berryman, J., (ed.) Remedies: Issues and perspectives (1991) Thomas Professional 
Publishing Canada pp 49 – 67, at p 56. 
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However, those that pursue the objection from a political dimension 
could still find refuge in the legal dimension as based on the doctrine of 
separation of powers. Crudely put, following legal principles, every 
organ of government should only discharge those functions designated 
to it by the doctrine of separation of powers. It is at this stage that an 
intersection between objections based on separation of powers and 
those based on the notion of democracy becomes evident. The objectors 
use the doctrine of separation of powers to submit that by their 
institutional character it is only the executive and legislature that are 
well suited to deal with socio-economic matters.20 
 
Although the objections present themselves as objections to judicial 
review generally, they are more pronounced with judicial enforcement 
of socio-economic rights because of the perceived nature of the 
obligations engendered by these rights. It has been submitted that the 
questions that these rights give rise to, by their very nature, need to be 
resolved by debate through the established democratic systems.21 The 
enforcement of socio-economic rights is believed to have budgetary 
implications and raises questions regarding the prioritisation of socio-
economic needs.  
 
                                                 
20
 See generally Horowitz, D., The courts and social policy (1977) The Brookings 
Institution [Hereinafter referred to as Horowitz: 1977] 
 
21
 According to Neier, to withdraw these rights from the democratic process is to carve 
the heart out of that process, this is because everybody has an opinion on what should be 
done to protect the public safety, and everybody has a view as to what is appropriate in 
the allocation of resources and economic burdens. In Neier’s opinion, such questions 
should not be settled by some person exercising superior wisdom and who comes along 
as a sort of Platonic guardian and decides that this is the way it ought to be. Neier, A., 
‘Social and economic rights: A critique’ (2006) 13 Human Rights Brief pp 1 – 3, at p 2.  
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In South Africa, this objection was put forward by some legal scholars 
at the eve of transformation to the new legal order.22 During the 
negotiations leading to the new legal order, it was contended that what 
South Africa needed was strengthening of its democracy. This required 
that the powers of enforcing the constitution be conferred on 
democratically elected institutions.23 While consensus emerged that 
South Africa needed a bill of rights that also contained socio-economic 
rights, there was intense disagreement on the manner the enforcement 
of these rights should take. 24 As seen in chapter one,25 it was 
                                                 
22
 See, for instance, Davis, D., ‘Democracy: its influence upon the process of 
constitutional interpretation’ (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 103 – 
121 [Hereinafter referred to as Davis: 1994], at p 104. See also Forsyth, C., and Elliot, 
M., ‘The legitimacy of judicial review’ (2003) SA Public Law pp 286 – 307 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Forsyth & Elliot: 2003], at p 286. 
 
23
 One of the factors leading to this suggestion could be found in South Africa’s history 
of political struggles. These struggles were launched mainly on the political front with 
little reliance on the courts to advance equality rights. Those fighting apartheid had very 
little faith in the judicial process as it was viewed by many as an accomplice to 
promotion of racial discrimination. See Klug, H., Constituting democracy: Law, 
globalism, and South Africa’s political reconstruction (2000) Cambridge University 
Press [Hereinafter referred to as Klug: 2000], at pp 30 and 47; Dugard, J., Human Rights 
and the South African legal order (1978) Princeton University Press [Hereinafter 
referred to as Dugard: 1978]; Corbett, M., ‘Representations to the Truth and 
Reconciliation commission’ (1998) 115 South African Law Journal pp 17 – 21; Zulman, 
R., ‘South African judges and human rights’ paper presented to the Supreme Court 
History Society, Queensland. Australia on 4 July 2001 sourced at  
<http://www.courts.qld.gov.au/publications/articles/speeches/2001/Zelman040701.pdf> 
(accessed on 8 February 2006); Corder, H., ‘Seeking social justice: Judicial 
independence and responsiveness in a changing South Africa’ in Russell, P., and 
O’Brien, M., (eds.) Judicial independence in the age of democracy: Critical perspectives 
from around the world (2001) University Press of Virginia pp 194 – 206, at p 201; and 
Motala, Z., and Ramaphosa, C., Constitutional law: Analysis and cases (2002) Oxford 
University Press [Hereinafter referred to as Motala & Ramaphosa: 2002], at pp 75 – 78. 
 
24
 See Sachs, A., Protecting human rights in a new South Africa (1990) Oxford 
University Press [Hereinafter referred to as Sachs: 1990], at p 20. See also Sachs, A., ‘A 
Bill of Rights for South Africa: Areas of agreement and disagreement’ (1989) 21 
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contended, among others, that making socio-economic rights justiciable 
would be juridically futile and would plunge the country into a serious 
constitutional crisis.26 It was suggested that socio-economic rights be 
included in the constitution as directive principles of state policy 
enforceable not by the courts but by the Human Rights Commission.27 
However, some scholars objected to this on the basis that it would have 
subjected the rights to the wishes of transient majorities as the 
principles would only serve as presumptions of statutory 
interpretation.28 On the other hand, subjecting these rights to the wishes 
of the majority is exactly what the objectors were advocating.  
                                                                                                                                            
Columbia Human Rights Law Review pp 13 – 44 [Hereinafter referred to as Sachs: 
1989], at p 25; and Didcott,  J., ‘Practical workings of a bill of rights’ in Van der 
Westhuizen, (ed) A bill of rights for South Africa (1988) Butterworths [Hereinafter 
referred to as Didcott: 1988].  
 
25
 Section 1.1.  
 
26
 See South African Law Commission, Interim Report on Group and Human Rights, 
Project 58, August 1991 [Hereinafter referred to as SALC Interim Report: 1991], at p 
664.  
 
27
 South African Law Commission (SALC), Final Report on Group and Human Rights, 
Project 58, October 1994 [Hereinafter referred to as SALC Final Report: 1994] at p 195. 
See also Davis, D. ‘The case against the inclusion of socio-economic demands in a Bill 
of Rights except as directive principles’ (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human 
Rights pp 475 – 490. 
 
28
 See Mureinik, E., ‘Beyond a charter of luxuries: Economic rights in the constitution’ 
in (1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 464 – 475 [Hereinafter referred 
to as Mureinik: 1992]. Scott & Macklem: 1992, at pp 39 – 40, warned that if social rights 
are phrased merely as directive principles of state policy or as state responsibilities or 
obligations, a political discourse may emerge that avoids notions of individual need and 
entitlement and instead remains at the level of generalised policy considerations. This 
would carry the risk of treating individuals as abstract, passive units of policy and not as 
active agents suffering hardship with legitimate claims of constitutional right. Sunstein 
warned that directive principles would be mere ‘parchment barriers’, meaningless, empty 
and could not protect human rights. Sunstein, C., ‘Social and economic rights? Lessons 
from South Africa’ John M. Olivin Law and Economic Working Paper No. 124, Public 
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This objection was fuelled especially by the nature of the legal system 
that had been in place for many years. Before 1994, the state adhered to 
the doctrine of parliamentary supremacy which upheld the legislature 
above all other organs. This doctrine, within legal circles, nurtured and 
sustained a culture of legal positivism. Lawyers and judges became 
‘mechanics’ of the law and applied it in a manner that adhered to its 
letter and the strict intention of Parliament.29 What this meant was that 
the capacity of the courts to develop the law in order to advance human 
rights was limited, which was also exacerbated by the absence of a Bill 
of Rights in the Constitution. For those who opposed the judicial 
                                                                                                                                            
Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No 12, (Preliminary draft) sourced at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=269657> (accessed on 20 May 
2005) [Hereinafter referred to as Sunstein: 2001], at p 3. See also De Villiers, B. ‘Socio-
economic rights in a new constitution: Critical evaluation of recommendations of the 
South African Law Commission’ (1992) 3 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg [Journal 
of South African Law] pp 421 – 436. 
 
29
 See Sarkin, J., ‘The political role of the South African Constitutional Court’ (1997) 
114 South African Law Journal pp 134 – 150 [Hereinafter referred to as Sarkin: 1997], at 
p 134; and Chaskalson, A., Mohamed, I., Langa, P., Van Heerden, H., & Corbett, M., 
‘The legal system in South Africa 1960 – 1994’ Representations to the Truth and 
Reconciliation Commission, published in (1998) 15 South African Law Journal pp 21 – 
36 [Hereinafter referred to as Chaskalson et al: 1998], at p 32. See also Moseneke, D., 
‘Transformative adjudication’ paper presented at the Fourth Bram Fischer Memorial 
lecture at Nelson Mandela Civic Theatre, Johannesburg, 25 April 2002, reproduced in 
(2002) 18 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 309 – 319 [Hereinafter referred to 
as Moseneke: 2002], at p 316; Dugard: 1978, at pp 19 and 35; Klare, K. ‘Legal culture 
and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights 
pp 147 – 188, at p 151; Gready, P., and Kgalema, L., ‘Magistrates under apartheid: A 
case study of the politicisation of justice and complicity in human rights abuse’ (2003) 
19 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 141 – 188; and Chaskalson, A., ‘Law in a 
changing society’ (1989) 5 South African Journal on Human Rights 293 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Chaskalson: 1989]. For case law in this direction see Mpangele & Another 
v. Botha 1982 (3) SA 638 (C); In re Dube 1979 (3) SA 820 (N); and Sachs v Minister of 
Justice 1934 AD 11. 
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enforcement of socio-economic rights, such a legal background 
provided very fertile ground for their objections to flourish.  
 
In spite of the adoption of a constitution containing justiciable socio-
economic rights, scholars have continued to object to the judicial 
enforcement of these rights.30    Cottrell and Ghai conclude that: 
 
ESCR require a process of balancing, trade-off and negotiation. If human 
rights, especially ESCR, are a framework, then there are acute and 
difficult policy choices to be made within that framework. There are no 
simple notions of certainty or fixity. If the political process is excluded 
from the negotiation, and it is left to the judiciary, then respect for human 
rights will decline. And this is a two-way street: the judiciary does not 
have to live with the consequences of its decision in the way other 
branches have to…. If [the judiciary] becomes heavily involved in 
essentially political decisions, yet is not accountable as political bodies are 
normally, a sense of irresponsibility can emerge. The primary decision-
making framework must be the political process.31     
 
This objection has become even more pronounced because of the 
increasing involvement of the judiciary in ending systemic violations in 
structural or organisational settings.  Such problems have forced courts to 
make orders that require extensive administrative action to carry out. The 
courts have also been forced to monitor the implementation of their orders 
                                                 
30
 See Lester, L., and O’Cinneide, C., ‘The effective protection of socio-economic rights’ 
in Cottrell, J., and Ghai, Y., (eds.) Economic, social and cultural rights in practice: The 
role of judges in implementing economic, social and cultural rights (2004) 
INTERIGHTS pp 17 – 22 [Hereinafter referred to as Lester & O’Cinneide: 2004], at p 
20.  
 
31
 Cottrell, J., and Ghai, Y., ‘The role of the courts in the protection of economic, social 
and cultural rights’ in Cottrell, J., and Ghai, Y., (eds.) Economic, social and cultural 
rights in practice: The role of judges in implementing economic, social and cultural 
rights (2004) INTERIGHTS pp 58 – 89 [Hereinafter referred to as Cottrell & Ghai: 
2004], at p 89. Though these authors do not rule out the possibility of the court playing a 
role in the enforcement of socio-economic rights, they suggest that court enforcement 
should be the last resort when all else fails. In their view, the mere fact that courts may 
be enthusiastic to be involved in human rights does not mean that it is right that they 
should be (at p 88). 
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in the structural suits.32 This approach has been criticised for allowing the 
courts to intrude on subject matter that forms the very foundation of the 
discretionary powers enjoyed by executive and legislative branches of the 
state.33 It has been submitted that though court orders may not expressly 
require that resources be allocated and reprioritised, it is what happens in 
effect. According to Frug, the court is in fact allocating the budget away 
from some items to others, probably without even knowing what they are. 
This is because ‘the court's allocation decision is simply that every 
element of the court decree takes precedence over every other competing 
element in the budget, whatever they may be’. He adds that ‘the value of 
legislative decision-making on budget allocation is undermined, to a 
greater or lesser degree, depending on the size of the court's demands and 
the amount of money available’.34 
 
Before responding to these objections, it is important to preface the 
response with an understanding of the doctrine of separation of powers. 
This is because some of the controversy appears to emerge from a lack of 
appreciation of the evolving nature of this doctrine. However, and as is 
submitted in this chapter, this does not mean that the evolving nature of 
the doctrine provides the answers to the objection in all its forms. The 
judiciary must appreciate its institutional constraints and needs to defer to 
the other organs of the state on certain decisions where it is necessary to 
do so.35  As regards the political dimension, one needs to understand the 
                                                 
32
 Discussed in detail in chapter seven. 
 
33
 Frug, E., ‘The judicial power of the purse’ (1978) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review pp 715 – 794 [Hereinafter referred to as Frug: 1978], at pp 734 – 735.  
 
34
 Frug: 1978, at p 741. 
 
35
 It is submitted in chapter seven that where there is failure on the part of the other 
organs to exercise their discretion to protect the rights, the judiciary may be justified in 
assuming the functions of these organs. Even then, however, the judicial intrusion should 
be graduated and should intensify depending on the demands of each case and the 
attitude and response of the state. See chapter seven at section 7.5.1.  
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notion of democracy and its influence on the judicial enforcement of 
socio-economic rights. Democracy does not mean that the wishes of the 
majority are not subject to any restrictions. This point is discussed later 
below.36  
 
3.3.2 Evolving nature of the doctrine of separation of powers  
As regards the doctrine of separation of powers, traditionally, a formal 
distinction is made between the legislative, executive and judicial 
functions of the state. This is what is referred to as the principle of trias 
politica37 which is followed by the principle of separation of personnel. 
These principles require that the powers of making legislation, 
administration and adjudication respectively, be vested in three distinct 
organs of state. Each one of these organs should be staffed by different 
officials and employees. A person serving in one organ is disqualified 
from serving in any of the others. The third principle is separation of 
functions. This principle demands that every organ of state authority be 
entrusted with its appropriate functions only. The legislature ought only to 
legislate, the executive to confine its activities to administering the affairs 
of the state, and the judiciary to the function of adjudication. These three 
principles together establish the ‘pure’ as opposed to the ‘partial’ version 
of the doctrine.38   
 
The ‘partial’ version instead emphasises the significance of checks and 
balances.39 Checks and balances, now a fourth principle, represents the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
36
 Section 3.3.3. 
 
37
 See Vile, M., Constitutionalism and Separation of Powers (1967) 1998 edition by 
Liberty Fund. 
 
38
 Barber, N., ‘Prelude to the separation of powers’ (2001) 60 Cambridge Law Journal 
pp 59 – 88 [Hereinafter referred to as Barber: 2001], at p 60.  
 
39
 Barber: 2001, at p 60. 
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special contribution of the United States of America (USA) to the 
doctrine.40 In the USA, checks and balances allow one organ to intervene 
in the area of another. Congress’s legislative power is subject to executive 
and judicial checks;41 the executive and judicial functions are also 
checked by the other branches. The executive may exercise checks and 
balances in respect of the legislature through the veto powers of the 
President;42 though vetoed, bills may be presented to Congress again, but 
they will require a two-thirds majority to become law.43 The judiciary 
exercises checks and balances in respect of the legislature through the 
power of procedural and substantive review.44 Congress too exercises 
checks and balances on the executive by approving the appointment of 
judges of the Supreme Court and ambassadors to take up diplomatic 
posts. Congress may circumscribe the judiciary by passing legislation that 
undermines the decisions of the courts.  
 
                                                 
40
 Van der Vyver, J., ‘The separation of powers’ (1993) 8 SA Public Law 177 
[Hereinafter referred to as Van der Vyver: 1993], at p 178. 
 
41
 Judicial review of legislative and executive action has been described as the most 
common and dramatic instance of checks and balances. This is because it has allowed 
courts to exercise very strict control over the other organs by issuing orders which these 
organs are legally bound to abide by. See Pieterse, M., ‘Coming to terms with judicial 
enforcement of socio-economic rights’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human 
Rights pp 383 – 418 [Hereinafter referred to as Pieterse: 2004], at p 386. 
 
42
 The recent veto by President George Bush of a proposed law linking to a timetable the 
withdraw of troops from Iraq as condition for funding is an example of this. See BBC 
News ‘Bush and democrats locked on Iraq’. Sourced at 
<http://news.bbc.co.uk//2/hi/americas/6616361.stm> (accessed on 3 May 2007).  
 
43
 Constitution of the United States of America, Article I section 7. 
 
44
 Van der Vyver: 1993, at p 180. 
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During the certification of South Africa’s Final Constitution,45 the 
objectors contended that the Draft Constitution had offended the doctrine 
of separation of powers by allowing members of the executive to be 
members of the legislature at all three levels of government. It was 
submitted that by virtue of their positions, members of the executive 
would be able to exercise powerful influence over the decisions of the 
legislature.46 The objection appears to have been founded on the ‘pure’ 
version as opposed to the ‘partial’ version of the doctrine. Indeed, the CC 
rejected this objection, holding that there is no universal model and 
absolute separation of powers.47 According to the CC, the principle of 
checks and balances mandates necessary intrusion of one branch into the 
terrain of another. This prevents branches of government from usurping 
power from one another.48 The Court went on to hold that the South 
African model of the doctrine promotes executive accountability because 
it makes the executive directly answerable to the elected legislature 
thereby upholding the principle of collective accountability.49  
                                                 
45
 In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa (First 
Certification case) 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) 
 
46
 Para 107. 
 
47
 Para 108. According to Van Bueren, the doctrine only requires that powers be 
separated. It does not state where the dividing line should be drawn. Van Bueren, G., 
‘Alleviating poverty through the Constitutional Court’ (1999) 15 South African Journal 
on Human Rights pp 52 – 74 [Hereinafter referred to as Van Bueren: 1999], at p 65. 
Deviation from the doctrine may also be necessary for administrative expediency to 
allow effective discharge of the functions of administering a state.  
 
48
 Para 109. In spite of this, in Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge 
Environmental Association and Another 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC), the CC held that 
though the separation prescribed by the Constitution is not absolute, and on occasions 
some overlapping of functions is permissible, action  that is inconsistent with the 
separation demanded is invalid (para 35). 
 
49
 Para 111. See also Liebenberg, S., ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-
economic rights’  (2002) Socio-Economic Rights Project, Community Law Centre, 
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The CC has, in subsequent cases, followed its ruling in the First 
Certification case and avoided setting down any rigid boundaries between 
the organs of state. The Court is alive to the fact that the boundaries as 
traditionally defined by the doctrine are shifting in order to reflect 
contemporary problems and challenges. The doctrine, as conceptualised 
by Montesquieu during the 17th century, was merely reflective of the then 
existing problems.50 It cannot, therefore, be used in the same way as it 
was in the 17th century. In De Lange v Smuts NO and others51 the Court 
noted that: 
 
[C]ourts will develop a distinctively South Africa model of separation 
of powers, one that fits the particular system of government provided 
for in the Constitution and reflects a delicate balancing, informed by 
South Africa’s history and its new dispensation, between the need on 
the one hand, to control government by separating powers  and 
enforcing checks and balances and, on the other hand, to avoid 
diffusing powers so completely that the government is unable to take 
timely measures in the public interest.52 
 
The judiciary is, therefore, justified in holding the other organs 
accountable to the constitution and ensuring respect for fundamental 
rights and liberties. This is a function that does not offend the doctrine of 
separation of powers but upholds the supremacy of the constitution. This 
does not, however, mean that the court operates without any boundaries as 
regards the kind of functions it may discharge. The courts must show 
deference to the legislature and executive where this is required by the 
circumstances. This is especially so whenever the other organs are 
institutionally more equipped to undertake certain functions.53 From this, 
                                                                                                                                            
University of the Western Cape, sourced at 
<http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/docs_2002/evolving_jurisprudence.pdf> 
(accessed on 11 February 2006), at p 2. 
 
50
 Pieterse: 2004, at p 387. 
 
51
 1998 (3) SA 785 (CC). 
 
52
 Para 60. 
 
53
 See generally Ghai & Cottrell: 2004. 
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it remains clear that the judiciary should not only vindicate the rights but 
should also be sensitive to the fact that as an institution it has its own 
weaknesses. These weaknesses should in some circumstances dictate that 
the judiciary shows due deference to the other branches.54 In spite of this, 
deference should not be adopted as a general rule; the degree of deference 
should be determinable on a case by case basis.55  
 
In socio-economic rights litigation, as is seen in the next chapter, while it 
is not the function of the courts to set priorities, the courts should be able 
to enforce the rights as protected.56 The courts should also be able to 
scrutinise government policies and programmes to ensure that they are 
designed to ultimately lead to the realisation of the rights.57 In remedial 
terms, the courts should not have a problem to implement remedies that 
are intended to vindicate the rights and should intervene intrusively where 
it is necessary to do so. The courts should aim at protecting all interests 
implicated by a case and, using the ethos of distributive justice, should 
engage in a balancing process which considers the impact of the decision 
on the state as well as parties and non-parties.58  
 
3.3.3 Restrictive understanding of democracy  
The aim of this section is to demonstrate that the institutional competence 
objection in addition to misconceiving the doctrine of separation of 
powers is also based on a very restrictive understanding of the notion of 
democracy. In this section I demonstrate that democracy does not mean 
that the wishes of the majority are beyond reproach. Democracy is not just 
                                                                                                                                            
 
54
 Pieterse: 2004, at p 405. 
 
55
 See Pieterse: 2005, at p 125.  
 
 
56
 See section 4.2 of chapter four.  
 
57
 See discussion in chapter four, section 4.2.3. 
 
58
 See chapter five at section 5.2.2.  
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about the vote but also encompasses such notions as constitutionalism and 
the rule of law. This is because of the need to protect the rights of 
minorities and the values they believe in. It is also submitted that both the 
rule of law and constitutionalism impose many restrictions on the manner 
in which government, and the majority for that case, conduct their 
business. It is the responsibility of the courts to enforce these restrictions 
when an infraction is brought to their attention. 
 
According to Devenish, constitutional democracy is a complex 
phenomenon of political morality in which the majority, the minority and 
individuals have rights and obligations.59 Constitutional democracy, in as 
much as it should preserve the wishes of the majority, should also protect 
minority rights by obligating the majority to respect the values and 
interests of minorities.60 In such a setting, judicial review will protect the 
interests and rights of the minority by checking those missteps of the 
majority with the potential of violating minority rights.61 Minority groups 
must be protected and afforded the opportunity to enjoy the benefits 
                                                 
59
 Devenish, G., A Commentary on the South African Bill of Rights (1999) Butterworths 
[Hereinafter referred to as Devenish: 1999], at p 4.  See also Kateb, G., ‘Remarks on the 
procedures of constitutional democracy’ in Roland, J., and Chapman, J., (eds.) 
Constitutionalism : Nomos XX  (1979) New York University Press, at p 148 
 
60
 See Larbi-Odam and Others v MEC for Education (North West Province) and Another 
1997 (12) BCLR 1655 (CC), at para 28. 
 
61
 See Hamilton, A., The Federalist No. 78, in Rossiter, C., (ed.) The Federalist Paper 
(1961) Penguin Books pp 464 – 472 [Hereinafter referred to as Hamilton: 78]. See also 
Kentridge, J. & Spitz, D., ‘Interpretation’ in Chaskalson, M., Kentridge, J., Klaaren, J., 
Marcus, G., Spitz, D., & Woolman, S., (eds.) Constitutional law of South Africa (1995) 
Juta & Company pp 11-1 to 11-46 [Hereinafter referred to as Kentridge & Spitz: 1995], 
at p 11-21. This theory finds its source in the famous footnote 4 to the United States case 
of United State v Carolene Products Company, 304 US 144 at 152, 58 SCt 778 (1938). 
In this footnote, the court said that the appropriateness of statutes that are directed at 
curtailing the operation of particular religious or national or racial minorities may be 
questioned by the Court.  
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provided by the democratic process.62 Majoritarian democracy has the 
danger that once the majority have assumed power, if not checked, they 
‘tend to marginalise minorities in such a way that minorities are 
effectively unable to express their views’.63  In State v Makwanyane,64 the 
CC observed that: 
 
The very reason for establishing the new legal order, and for vesting 
the power of judicial review of all legislation in the courts, was to 
protect the rights of minorities and others who cannot protect their 
rights adequately through the democratic process. Those who are 
entitled to claim this protection include the social outcasts and 
marginalised people in our society. It is only if there is a willingness to 
protect the worst and weakest among us that all of us can be secure 
that our rights will be protected.65 
 
 
Furthermore, those who support majoritarian democracy sometimes turn a 
blind eye to some of its inherent weaknesses. Majoritarian democracy is, 
for instance, seldom exercised directly but is instead exercised through 
representatives, with a few individuals chosen to represent the majority. 
                                                 
62
 Davis, D., Chaskalson, M., and De Waal, J., ‘Democracy and Constitutional 
Interpretation’ in Van Wyk, D., Dugard, D., De Villiers, J,. and Davis, D., (eds.) Rights 
and Constitutionalism: The new South African Legal Order (1994) Juta & Company 
[Hereinafter referred to as Davis et al: 1994], at p 2. Van Bueren: 1999, at p 65, is of the 
view that judicial review of socio-economic rights rather than undermine increases 
democracy because it increases the participation of the impoverished people in the 
decision making processes. 
 
63
 Bilchitz, D., Poverty and fundamental rights: The justification and enforcement of 
socio-economic rights (2007) Oxford University Press [Hereinafter referred to as 
Bilchitz: 2007], at p 104. 
 
64
 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC); 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC). 
 
65
 Para 88. See also Christian Education South Africa v Minister of Education 2000 (4) 
SA 757 (CC). The CC observed that it might well be that pluralistic society members of 
large groups can easily rely on the legislative process than those belonging to small 
groups. The Court went on to hold that the minorities may have to rely on constitutional 
protection, particularly if they express their beliefs in a way that the majority regard as 
bizarre or even threatening (para 25).  
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However, it is not always the case that, in all situations, the 
representatives will represent and be responsive to the wishes of their 
constituencies. Instead, their decisions are usually influenced by other 
factors such as selfishness, political manoeuvring and political party 
interests in multi-party democracies like South Africa. Indeed, some times 
elected representatives have much more power than citizens to determine 
political decisions.66 In such situations, both the majority and the minority 
will be better protected by relying on the courts to force their 
representatives to account to them.67 Unlike the politicians, the judges are 
insulated from the political pressures and their professional ideals allow 
them to decide matters in a more dispassionate and impartial manner.68 
They will, therefore, be able to entertain and consider in a more or less 
impartial manner the complaints of aggrieved members of society who 
may consider themselves to have been let down by the political process. 
Such persons may have been prevented from participating in the political 
                                                 
66
 Bilchitz: 2007, at p 106. 
 
67
 Abramovich, V., ‘Courses of action in economic, social and cultural rights: 
Instruments and allies’ (2005) 2 SUR – International Journal on Human Rights pp 181 – 
216 [Hereinafter referred to as Abramovich: 2005], at p 197. South Africa offers a good 
example of the deficiencies of representative democracy. By the South African system of 
proportional representation, the voters cast their votes for political parties with the hope 
that the political parties will represent their wishes. However, the system does not 
establish clear legal processes through which the voters can hold the political parties to 
their promises. Instead, the voters will have to wait for another election to remove those 
parties that did not fulfil their election promises. Many irremediable wrongs may have 
occurred during this waiting period. This problem is made worse by the fact that the 
political parties have a highly centralised decision making system. Decisions are taken 
by the political mantle of the party consisting of the elitist leadership. While decisions 
may be influenced by such pressure groups as labour unions, these pressure groups are 
highly patronised by the leadership. 
 
68
 Chayes: 1976, at pp 1307 – 1308. See also Sachs: 2005, at pp 139 – 140.  
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process by weaknesses such as lack of political power or economic 
disadvantage. 69    
 
It should also be noted that simply because a government has been 
constituted by the majority does not mean that it exercises its powers 
without restrictions. A constitution, while giving adequate powers to the 
elected representatives of the people, should also structure political power 
in a manner that prevents abuse.70 This is the essence of the doctrine of 
constitutionalism. This doctrine requires that government powers be 
limited to those set out in the constitution.71 This limitation takes two 
                                                 
69
 Davis et al: 1994 at p 2. 
 
70
 Govender, K., ‘Assessing the constitutional protection of human rights in South Africa 
during the first decade of democracy’ in Buhlungu, S., Daniel, J., Southall, R., and 
Lutchman, J., (eds.), State of the Nation: South Africa 2005-2006 (2005) Human 
Sciences Research Council (HSCR) pp 93 – 122 [Hereinafter referred to as Govender: 
2005], at p 97. Limitation of political powers is made more pertinent by the history of 
South Africa. South Africa experienced decades of dictatorial and discriminatory rule, 
which had been sustained, among others, by the constitutional system of parliamentary 
supremacy. This constitutional system had produced a government that enjoyed a clear 
majority in the legislature in spite of the fact that it comprised of the minority white 
group. The constitutional system did not produce any real restrictions of power to 
forestall abuse. Generally, the judiciary was controlled by the executive and did not have 
powers to review the activities of the other organs and to test them against established 
constitutional standards. To turn this page in history, South Africa needed a supreme 
constitution that effectively provides protection against abuse of power. This is exactly 
what the 1996 Constitution does. For a detailed discussion of South Africa’s 
constitutional history, see Dugard: 1978; and Hassen, E., The soul of a nation: 
constitution-making in South Africa (1998) Oxford University Press [Hereinafter referred 
to as Hassen: 1998], at pp 5 – 27. 
 
71
 Currie, I., and De Waal, J., The new constitutional and administrative law Volume 1 
(2001) Juta & Company [Hereinafter referred to as Currie & De Waal: 2001], at p 10. 
These authors contrast constitutionalism with arbitrary rule of an aristocracy or 
dictatorship. Such leadership is not subjected to any rules but is instead directed by the 
personal whims of the leader. See also Currie & De Waal: 2005, at p 8; and Motala & 
Ramaphosa: 2002, at p 176 who define constitutionalism as standing for limited 
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forms; first, it restricts the range of things which the different organs of 
government can do, thereby defining their competence. Second, it 
prescribes the procedures that must be followed in exercising the 
competences.72   
 
Constitutionalism forestalls abuse of power by guaranteeing fundamental 
rights and liberties and protecting them in a bill of rights. The bill of 
rights plays a very important role in promoting constitutionalism by 
excluding power excesses that would violate the rights and liberties of the 
individual.73 As noted in chapter two,74 Locke contends that the individual 
finds him/herself party to a social pact, which binds him/her and the state. 
This pact constitutes framework in terms of which a government is 
instituted with the duty to protect the natural rights of every individual.75 
                                                                                                                                            
government and seeks to introduce certain substantive and institutional limits to 
restrict the scope of governmental power. 
 
72
 Currie & De Waal: 2001, at p 10.  
 
73
 See Sachs: 1990, at pp 9 – 10, he gives the example of the Magna Carter, the United 
States Bill of Rights and the French Declaration of the Rights of Man as having been 
adopted by the oppressed as a means of controlling the power of the former oppressors 
and guaranteeing freedom from future oppression. Elsewhere, Sachs has submitted that 
the very notion of entrenching rights is to provide a basic framework of constitutional 
regard for every human being and that it is incumbent on the courts to see to it that basic 
respect for every person is maintained at all times. In Sachs’s opinion, this is the reason 
we have fundamental rights. Sachs, A., ‘The judicial enforcement of socio-economic 
rights: The Grootboom case’ in Peris, J., and Kristian, S., (eds.) Democratising 
development: The politics of socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) Martinus 
Nijhoff Publishers pp 131 – 152 [Hereinafter referred to as Sachs: 2005], at p 139.  
 
74
 Chapter two, section 2.3.1. 
 
75
 Locke, J., Two treaties of government (1967) Cambridge, at p 135, as referred to by De 
Villiers, B., ‘Social and economic rights’ in Van Wyk, D., Dugard, D., De Villiers, J., 
and Davis, D., (eds.) Rights and constitutionalism: The new South African legal order 
(1994) Juta & Company pp 599 – 628 [Hereinafter referred to as De Villiers: 1994], at p 
60. For a discussion on the concept of civil society and control of government as 
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By this social pact, the government is prohibited from using its powers in 
a manner that encroaches on the individual rights.76 As seen in chapter 
two,77 however, this is a very restrictive understanding of human rights as 
it conceives them only as negative protections. Human rights embrace 
both negative and positive freedoms and both civil and political rights and 
socio-economic rights engender negative and positive obligations. A bill 
of rights may require the state to fulfil positive aspects of rights and 
proactively to safeguard the environment in which these rights are 
enjoyed.78 The state may be compelled to pass legislation that elaborates 
these rights and sets up administrative mechanisms through which they 
can be implemented and enforced. 
 
The judiciary’s role becomes one of upholding the constitution and 
reminding the other branches of government of the limitations on their 
powers. This is necessary for the protection of the rights and liberties of 
individuals.79 The judiciary will demand that the other branches justify 
their policy choices, programmes and legislation,80 and where these 
                                                                                                                                            
conceptualised by Locke, see Curie, M., ‘Civil society – conceptual history from Hobbes 
to Marx’ (2001) International Politics Working Paper, sourced at 
<http://www.aber.ac.uk/interpol/phD/Dorota.pdf> (accessed on 22 January 2006).  
 
76
 De Villiers: 1994, at p 601. 
 
77
 At section 2.3.1.  
 
78
 According to Devenish: 1999, at p 9, the positive obligations engendered by the South 
African Bill of Rights are of demonstrable significance for the process of democratic and 
egalitarian transformation from exclusive white privilege to the economic and social 
rehabilitation of disadvantaged communities. 
  
79
 Sullivan, S., ‘The role of the independent judiciary’ in Freedom Paper No. 4, sourced 
at <htt://usinfo.state.gov/products/pubs/archive/freedom/freedom4.htm> (accessed on 19 
January 2006) [Hereinafter referred to as Sullivan: 2006], at p 2  
 
80
 Mureinik described the new South African constitutional order as a bridge away from 
the culture of authority that accompanied the apartheid era to as culture of justification. 
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cannot be justified, to rule them out of order.  Policy and legislation must 
be justified as ultimately leading to the promotion of the fundamental 
values, and the realisation of the rights in the Bill of Rights. The judiciary 
will stand out as the guardian of the constitution and the system of 
democratic values which involves the protection of the individual and the 
rights of minority groups.81 This becomes particularly relevant because of 
the powerful nature of the state vis-à-vis its subjects. Countering this 
                                                                                                                                            
Mureinik, E., ‘A bridge to where? Introduction to the Interim Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 
South African Journal on Human Rights pp 31 – 48. In Mureinik’s opinion: 
[The Constitution] must lead to a culture of justification — a culture in 
which every exercise of power is expected to be justified; in which the 
leadership given by government rests on cogency of the case offered in 
defence of its decisions, not the fear inspired by the force at its 
command [at p 31] 
 
Indeed the 1996 Constitution envisions a society based on accountability, responsiveness 
and openness as one of the fundamental values (section 1). Pieterse has added that this 
culture of justification should extend to exercise of power in the socio-economic realm, 
where government power may impact on the enjoyment of several fundamental rights. 
This would demand that government justifies its choice of policy options and any 
limitations or negations from socio-economic rights. Pieterse: 2004, at pp 385 and 409 
adds that failure of the government to adequately justify a chosen policy as respecting, 
protecting, promoting and fulfilling socio-economic rights should lead to a finding of 
unconstitutionality. Similarly, Fredman submits that respect for the democratic process 
requires greater attention to the duty to account and explain. In Fredman’s opinion, the 
duty to account exposes decisions-makers to justifiable public scrutiny in addition to 
improving deliberative dimensions of decision-making; it also prevents polarised 
decision making. Fredman, S., ‘Providing equality: Substantive equality and the positive 
duty to provide’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 163 – 190, at p 
175. 
 
81
 Devenish: 1999, at p 4. See also Davis, D., Cheadle, H., and Haysom, N., 
Fundamental rights in the Constitution: Commentary and cases (1997) Juta & Company 
[Hereinafter referred to as Davis et al: 1997], at p 3; and Cachalia, A., Cheadle, H., 
Davis, D., Haysom, N., Maduna., P., and Marcus, G., Fundamental rights in the New 
Constitution (1994) Juta & Company and Centre for Applied Legal Studies. This is what 
Bilchitz: 2007, at p 105 calls rights based justifications of judicial review which involves 
the view that there are fundamental rights that must be guaranteed to all individuals in 
any just society, whether or not the majority agrees or wishes to recognise these rights. 
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power requires an independent branch with powers to hold the other 
branches accountable.82 The subjects will look to the judiciary to ensure 
accountability and protection of their interests.83 The judiciary should be 
able to uphold the constitution and to set aside any law or conduct 
inconsistent with the constitution.84  It is on this basis that Sachs submits 
that:  
The key question, then is not whether unelected judges should ever take 
positions on controversial political questions. It is to define in a principled 
way the limited and functionally manageable circumstances in which the 
judicial responsibility for being the ultimate protector of human dignity 
compels them to enter what might be politically contested terrain. It is 
precisely in situations where political leaders may have difficulty 
withstanding populist pressures, and where human dignity is most at risk, 
that it becomes an advantage that judges are not accountable. It is at these 
moments that the judicial function expresses itself in its purest form. The 
judges, able to rely on the independence guaranteed to them by the 
                                                 
82
 Cappelletti, M., ‘Judicial review of the constitutionality of state action: Its expansion 
and legitimacy’ (1992) 2 Tydskrif vir die Suid-Afrikaanse Reg  [Journal of South African 
Law] pp 256 – 266 [Hereinafter referred to as Cappelletti: 1992], at p 257.  While 
Locke’s theory presupposes existence of a social pact, there is an unbalance of power 
between the parties to this pact. The government remains far much stronger than its 
citizens. Though government is bound by the social pact to respect the rights, the 
subjects by themselves lack the means to enforce this pact. Empowering the subjects to 
enforce their rights requires the presence of a strong institution like the judiciary, which 
lies at a horizontal level with the government in the vertical relationship of the subjects 
and the government. This will enable the citizens to assume a position of derivative 
horizontality at the level of the state. It should also be noted that even within the 
horizontal interactions of the subjects themselves, violations of rights do occur. This is 
because society is not egalitarian; some individuals are more powerful than the others, 
and the weak need protection by the same institution that protects them against the 
government.  
 
83
 Pieterse: 2004, at p 388. See also Liebenberg, S., ‘Needs rights and transformation: 
Adjudicating social rights’ Center for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper 
No. 8, 2005, at p 10, sourced at <http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/wp/Liebenberg%20-
%20Needs,%20Rights%20and%20Transformation.pdf> (accessed on 23 March 2006). 
 
84
 See Marbury v Madison 5 US 137, 2 LED 60 (1803), sourced at 
<http://www.lectlaw.com/files/case14.htm> (accessed on 12 November 2005) 
[Hereinafter referred to as the Madison case]. 
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Constitution, ensure that justice is done to all without fear, favour or 
prejudice.85  
 
 
It is important to note, however, that for the courts to successfully 
discharge their functions they also require a great deal of support from the 
other organs of state. If the executive receives court directions with 
hostility and unwarranted criticism, the mutual respect between it and the 
judiciary will be destroyed.86 Such hostility makes it hard for the judiciary 
to effectively and freely discharge its functions. This is because the courts 
are highly dependent on the executive for survival and enforcement of 
their orders as they have neither the power of the sword nor the purse. 
Lack of support or hostility from the executive will erode the legitimacy 
of the judiciary and deepen the counter-majoritarian dilemma.87  
 
The doctrine of constitutionalism is complemented by the long established 
principle of the rule of law. According to Dicey, the rule of law comprises 
three fundamental tenets. The regular law of the land is supreme, so that 
individuals should not be subjected to arbitrary power; state officials are 
subject to the jurisdiction of the ordinary courts of the land in the same 
                                                 
85
 Sachs: 2005, at p 139.  
 
86
 See generally Kanyeihamba, G., ‘The culture of constitutionalism and the doctrine of 
separation of powers’ Paper presented at the Public Lecture on State of Separation of 
Powers in Uganda, organised by the Human Rights and Peace Centre, Faculty of Law, 
Makerere University [Unpublished, on file with author].  
 
87
 See Corbett, M., ‘Human rights: The road ahead’ in Forsyth, C., and Schiller, J., (eds.) 
Human rights: The Cape Town conference (1979) Juta & Company pp 1 – 9, at p 6. 
Corbett cautions that should a court in the pursuit of protecting individual rights 
overreach itself and go beyond what is considered to be the legitimate limits of its 
jurisdiction, it will lose popular support and ultimately its legitimacy (at p 7). In 
Corbett’s opinion, ‘it is essential that the court maintains a fine balance between, on the 
one hand, the need to protect constitutional rights and liberties and, on the other hand, 
the danger of too great an interference in the affairs of the executive and legislative 
branches of government’ (at p 6). 
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manner as individuals; and the constitution is a result of the ordinary law 
of the land so that courts should determine the position of the executive 
and bureaucracy by principles of private law.88 In its most elementary 
form, the rule of law demands that everything that government does must 
be authorised by the law.  
 
However, over the years, this principle has seen tremendous development. 
It will not allow government conduct to pass simply because it has been 
authorised by law if it violates fundamental rights and liberties. Even in 
those countries without written constitutions like the United Kingdom, the 
principle of the rule of law has led to the development of certain 
restrictions to the exercise of public power akin to those imposed by 
constitutions. In contrast, countries with written constitutions such as 
South Africa have merely co-opted the principle of the rule of law by 
applying it simultaneously with the doctrine of constitutionalism.89 The 
principle of rule of law, therefore, strongly compliments the doctrine of 
constitutionalism to ensure that the exercise of government powers is 
within legally defined parameters.  This is important because it is within 
these parameters that human rights are protected. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
88
 Dicey, A., Introduction to the study of the law of the constitution [1885], (1982) 
Liberty Fund, at p 1. See also Brewer, R., Judicial review in comparative law (1989) 
Cambridge University Press, at p 90. 
 
89
 See Fedsure Life Assurance Ltd v Greater Johannesburg Transitional Metropolitan 
Council 1998 (2) SA 374 (CC); Speaker of the National Assembly v De Lille 1999 (4) SA 
863 (SCA); and New National Party v Government of the Republic of South Africa 1999 
(3) SA 191.  
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3.4   TECHNICAL DEFICIENCIES AND INCOMPETENCE  
OBJECTIONS  
 
3.4.1 Statement of the objection 
There is a second kind of objection to the judicial enforcement of socio-
economic rights. This objection shifts from questions about the 
democratic nature of the courts to whether they have technical capacity to 
perform certain tasks. This dimension of the objection should be 
distinguished from the one based on democracy as discussed above. The 
question raised by the technical deficiency objection is very practical; it is 
not whether the courts should perform certain tasks but whether they can 
perform those tasks competently.90  It should be noted, however, that 
there is a point where these two objections may intersect; the objection 
based on democracy is partly based on the fact that questions arising from 
socio-economic rights issues can by their nature only be decided by 
democratically elected institutions. This is because, as seen above,91 these 
institutions are believed, unlike the courts, to be accountable to the 
electorate.  
 
On the other hand, while the technical deficiency objection also invokes 
the questions raised by the nature of socio-economic rights, it is based not 
on democratic accountability but on the fact that the courts just lack the 
                                                 
90
 Horowitz: 1977, at p 18. See also Steinberg, C., ‘Can reasonableness protect the poor? 
A review of South Africa’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2006) 123 South 
African Law Journal pp 264 – 284 [Hereinafter referred to as Steinberg: 2006], at p 270. 
Steinberg submits that the primary issue is not whether the judiciary may legitimately 
engage in evaluations of socio-economic rights as it is already constitutionally obliged to 
do so. Instead the task is to define the most effective and appropriate role of the 
judiciary, taking into account both pragmatic and principled considerations, including the 
inherent limitations of the process of adjudication and the place of other institutions.  
 
91
 Section 3.3.1 above.  
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technical skills to answer these questions.92 The objectors trust that both 
the legislature and the executive have such skills and in accordance with 
the principles of separation of functions, should exercise the powers to 
answer these questions. This is because social justice gives rise to such 
issues as the prioritisation of objectives, distributing of resources and 
balancing of opposing interests.93 The courts are considered to be ill-
suited to make strategic choices among means and, therefore, lack the 
necessary technical capacity to determine issues of social justice. Their 
capacity to determine the scale of preference of needs in the context of 
scarce resources is doubted. Additionally, realisation of socio-economic 
rights is believed to require special expertise because of their budgetary 
implications.94    
 
As is subtly expressed by Sachs, the objection is based on the inherent 
characteristics of the judiciary: 
 
The objection from radical quarters to judges enforcing social and 
economic rights suggests that we are likely to get it all wrong. They point 
                                                 
92
 Tushnet, M. ‘Enforcing social and economic rights’ (unpublished paper on file with 
author [Hereinafter referred to as Tushnet: 2005], at p 122. See also Tushnet, M., 
‘Enforcing socio-economic rights: Lessons from South Africa’ (2005) 6 ESR Review pp 
3 – 6; and Tushnet, M, ‘Social welfare rights and the forms of judicial review’ (2004) 82 
Texas Law Review pp 1895 – 1919. See also Sunstein, C., ‘Against positive rights’ 
(1993) East Europe Constitutional Review 35, excerpt in Steiner, H., and Alston, P., 
International Human Rights in Context: Law, politics, morals (2000) Oxford University 
Press pp 280 – 282, at p 281. 
 
93
 Abramovich: 2005, at p 183. 
 
94
 Pieterse: 2004, at p 394. See also Scott & Macklem: 1992, at p 24. Mureinik: 1992, at 
p 465, has summarised the essence of this argument as relating to judges’ capacity to 
evaluate budgets. He writes that judges do not have a budget and they are not qualified to 
evaluate how much it is necessary to spend, nor how much society can afford, nor what 
its priorities are, or ought to be. In his opinion, answering questions such as these is 
essential for the decision maker to have both expertise and political accountability and 
that this is why these tasks are assigned to the legislature and executive. 
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to the social class from which we judges traditionally have been drawn, 
and the nature of our legal thinking which tends to look at questions in 
abstract and in formulaic ways that end up favouring the status quo. But 
even where our background and modes of thought might predispose us 
differently, there can be little doubt that it is inappropriate for judges who 
in general know very little about the practicalities of housing, land and 
other social realities, to pronounce on these issues. That is what Parliament 
is there for.95  
 
It is for the above reason that some scholars object to remedies that 
require courts to make decision on issues that require making socio-
economic related choices.96 This is in addition to a greater involvement in 
making what appear to be policy choices. It is indeed because of the fear 
of getting involved in administrative and policy issues that courts are 
reluctant to retain remedial jurisdiction and continued supervision of their 
orders.97 Courts are more comfortable making final determinations of 
disputes and to avoid a multiplicity of suits touching on the same subject 
matter and parties. This is because this would make it inevitable for them 
to intrude deeply into functions that are considered the preserve of other 
organs of state.98  
 
Arising from the objection as based on technical competence is also the 
assertion that socio-economic rights disputes have polycentric 
                                                 
95
 Sachs: 2005, at p 140. 
 
96
 Cassels, J., ‘An inconvenient balance: The injunction as a Charter remedy’ in 
Berryman, J., (ed.) Remedies, issues and perspectives (1991) Thomas Professional 
Publishing pp 272 – 311 [Hereinafter referred to as Cassels: 1991], at p 289.    
 
97
 See chapter seven, section 7.3. 
 
98
 The courts fear to lose the support and legitimacy they enjoy from the other organs of 
state. They fear that should they intrude deeply into the functions of the other organs, 
these organs may respond by reducing the powers of the judiciary or squeezing their 
purse. It is, therefore, correct that the issuance by courts of orders whose compliance 
they cannot secure is a threat to the court’s legitimacy. This is because of the fact that the 
courts have ‘the power “neither of the sword nor the purse” which makes it necessary to 
be sensitive to the maintenance of … [their] own authority and legitimacy’. Cassels: 
1991, at p 289. 
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repercussions which makes them unfit for judicial adjudication. This 
objection garners backing from the writings of Lon Fuller,99 who sets out 
to answer two broad questions. The first question is ‘what kinds of social 
tasks can properly be assigned to courts and other adjudicative 
agencies?’100 The second question is what the forms of adjudication are 
and whether such forms can be deviated from.101 Before answering these 
questions, Fuller begins by defining adjudication.  
 
In Fuller’s opinion, adjudication means more than settling of disputes or 
controversies. Instead, ‘adjudication should be viewed as a form of social 
ordering, as a way in which the relations of men to one another are 
governed and regulated’.102 Fuller submits that what distinguishes 
adjudication from other forms of decision making processes is the form of 
participation allowed the parties. He views adjudication as guaranteeing 
the parties a right to formal and institutional participation in the decision 
making process. This is because the parties are assured the right of 
audience to present proofs and reasoned arguments.103 While Fuller 
                                                 
99
 Fuller: 1978. 
 
100
 Fuller: 1978, at p 354. Specifically, he asks the question as to what the lines of 
division that separate social tasks from those that require an exercise of executive power 
are. Additionally, he asks what assumptions underlie the conviction that certain problems 
are inherently unsuited for adjudicative disposition and should be left to the legislature.  
 
101
 Fuller: 1978, at p 354. Specifically, he asks and answers questions such as what 
would be the use and dangers of deviating from the ordinary forms of adjudication; are 
there permissible variations beyond which one would speak of abuse or perversion. 
 
102
 Fuller: 1978, at pp 357 and 380. According to Fuller, even in the absence of 
formalised doctrines such as res judicata or stare decisis, an adjudicative determination 
will always enter in some degree into the litigant’s future relations and into the relations 
of other parties who see themselves as possible litigants before the same tribunal. Such 
parties will conduct themselves in a way that avoids such litigation. This is the nature of 
the social ordering influence that adjudication gives rise to (at p 357). 
 
103
 Fuller: 1978, at p 365. 
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acknowledges the fact that other forms of decision making processes may 
also allow for such participation, this is not guaranteed as a right. The 
decision maker is not obliged to listen to the parties and may ignore their 
arguments whether or not they are reasoned.104 On the other hand, the 
adjudicator is obliged to listen to the proofs and reasoned arguments of 
the parties and to take them into account in making his/her decisions. The 
duty to consider the arguments of the parties places a demand of 
rationality on the adjudicator, which is not expected of other decision 
makers.105  
 
The absence of meaningful participation due to impossibility, in Fuller’s 
opinion, may place some tasks beyond the limits of adjudication. He cites 
polycentric tasks as an example of tasks in which meaningful 
participation may be impossible.106 A polycentric matter is one in respect 
of which a decision would have unforeseen and wide repercussions 
affecting a multitude of parties, sometimes not before the court. Fuller 
contends that the range of people affected by a decision of a court may 
not be seen easily. As a result, the participation of such people with 
diverse interests cannot be organised. The adjudicator is inadequately 
informed and cannot determine the repercussions of the proposed 
solution.107 The courts, unlike administrative authorities, may not have in 
                                                                                                                                            
 
104
 Fuller: 1978, at p 366. Fuller gives the example of a political speech during an 
election. There is no affirmative right that the campaigner will have the opportunity to 
give a reasoned speech. And even when this right is guaranteed, there is no formal 
assurance that anyone will listen to the speech, let alone act on its reasoned arguments. 
In Fuller’s opinion, a party in the process of bargaining the terms of a contract is in no 
better position.  
  
105
 Fuller: 1978, at pp 366 – 367. 
 
106
 Fuller: 1978, at p 364. 
 
107
 Fuller: 1978, at p 395. He gives the example of the tasks of players in a football team. 
Each shift of position by one player has a different repercussion for the other players. He 
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their possession large amounts of information to guide their decisions.108 
The courts, either due to the limited resources of the parties or as a result 
of their own rules, may be limited to the information provided in 
evidence.109 Such evidence may not adequately reflect the many 
competing interests implicated by the case. Consequently, many complex 
policy issues remain unaddressed by the court, resulting in unexpected 
repercussions making the decision unworkable. In Fuller’s opinion, the 
unworkable decision is either ignored, withdrawn or modified, sometimes 
repeatedly, making it hard to enforce and observe.110  
 
                                                                                                                                            
also compares polycentric tasks to a spider web. A pull on one strand will distribute 
tensions after a complicated pattern throughout the web as a whole. Doubling the 
original pull will not simply double each of the resulting tensions but will rather create a 
complicated pattern of tensions. He describes this as a polycentric situation because it is 
many centred with each crossing of strands being a distinct centre for distributing 
tensions (at p 394). Currie & De Waal: 2005, at p 569, define polycentric tasks as those 
matters which entail the co-ordination of mutually interacting variables and a change in 
one variable will produce changes for other valuables. Allison advises that, to avoid the 
limits of its own competence, the court, confronted with a significantly polycentric 
dispute must refrain from two kinds of activism. First, in so far as the court has a choice 
under existing law, it must avoid choosing a legal solution which necessitates an 
appreciation of complex repercussions. Secondly, the court must not change the law 
where an appreciation of repercussions is required for sensible legal development. 
Allison, J., ‘Fuller’s analysis of polycentric disputes and the limits of adjudication’ 
(1994) 53 Cambridge Law Journal pp 367 – 383, at p 367. 
 
108
 Abramovich: 2005, at p 183. 
 
109
 Pieterse: 2004, at p 393. See also Lenta, P., ‘Judicial restraint and overreach’ (2004) 
20 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 544 – 615 [Hereinafter referred to a 
Lenta: 2004], at p 545. According to Pieterse: 2004, at p 393, one of the reasons why all 
affected parties cannot be made party to the litigation is because of inadequacies in 
logistics. This could mean not only logistics available to the parties but also the 
resources placed at the disposal of the court for that purpose.  
 
110
 Fuller: 1978, at p 401. 
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In Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign111 the CC 
indicated that it is alive to the problem of polycentric interests implicated 
by socio-economic rights litigation. It held that courts are ill-suited to 
adjudicate upon issues where court orders could have multiple social and 
economic consequences for the community.112 As can be deduced from 
the discussion in chapter four,113 polycentricism and institutional capacity 
of the courts is one of the factors that influenced the CC’s reluctance to 
define a minimum core for the right of access to adequate housing.114 In 
Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others,115 
the Court said that determination of a minimum core in the context of ‘the 
right to have access to adequate housing’ presents difficult questions 
because the needs are diverse: there are those who need land; others need 
both land and houses; yet others need financial assistance. According to 
the Court, it is not possible to determine the minimum threshold without 
first identifying the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of such a 
right. The Court said that these will vary according to factors such as 
income, unemployment, availability of land and poverty. The differences 
between city and rural communities will also determine the needs and 
opportunities for the enjoyment of this right. Variations ultimately depend 
on the economic and social history and circumstances of a country. The 
Court said that, unlike the United Nations Committee on Economic, 
                                                 
111
 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (TAC case). 
 
112
 Para 38. 
 
113
 Chapter four at section 4.2.1.2. 
 
114
 See also Steinberg: 2006, at p 271. He submits that definition of a minimum core by 
the CC would have amounted to involvement in a utilitarian calculus of social and 
economic advantage of a decision in a context of a myriad of competing claims which 
are not before the Court.  
 
115
 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (Grootboom case). 
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Social and Cultural Rights, it did not have access to the information that 
would enable it to define the minimum core.116 
 
3.4.2 Responding to the objection 
The question that ought to be considered, however, is whether the 
executive and legislature are institutionally more equipped, in terms of 
expertise, to make decisions relating to socio-economic rights. In 
technically specialist areas, the executive is the only branch that can 
regularly lay claim to expertise necessary to give effect to all the rights.117 
The same expertise may be called on by the legislature which, in most 
cases, considers draft legislation and policy that has gone through the 
executive and to which expertise has been applied. In addition, 
legislatures usually harness the expertise of their members by directing 
them to serve on portfolio committees that fall in their areas of technical 
expertise.118 As a matter of fact, most legislative decisions take place in 
these committees after technical expertise has been applied. The same, or 
                                                 
116
 Paras 32 – 33. 
 
117
 Liebenberg, S., ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ 
(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 1 – 31, at p 22 See also Pieterse: 
2004, at p 388. Pieterse is, however, quick to caution that the executive members are 
usually only indirectly accountable to the citizenry. In his opinion, this is especially so 
with the members of the bureaucracy who are only tenuously linked to the popular 
mandate. As a result of this, Pieterse contends that there is a need to develop 
mechanisms according to which the bureaucracy may be held accountable to the 
citizenry for its decisions that affect human rights; which can be done through the 
judiciary (at p 388). See also Sachs: 2005, at p 140. 
 
118
 Horowitz: 1977, at pp 28 – 29, contrasts the legislature with the courts and submits 
that the random assignment of cases to judges makes it hard for expertise to be harnessed 
and yet no member of the legislature will live in fear that an issue outside his sphere of 
competence will be thrust upon him or her (at pp 29 – 30).  
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even a higher degree of specialisation, can be attributed to career 
administrators in the executive branch of the state.119  
 
It is, therefore, important that in designing remedies for violation of 
rights, courts should not ignore the special expertise in the hands of the 
executive or legislative branches of government.120 In spite of this, it is 
also important to note that, sometimes, though the executive and 
legislature have at their disposal expertise and information, the solutions 
that they come up with may not be ones tested against real conflicts. The 
solutions may fail to address some problems that may not have been 
anticipated when, for instance, legislation was adopted.121 It is when such 
problems arise that the courts’ expertise kicks in. It is on this basis that it 
is submitted that in structural reform litigation, the circumstances 
compelling the courts to intervene do not arise from a desire to take action 
in conflict with affirmative legislative and executive programmes. Rather, 
                                                 
119
 See Horowitz: 1977, at p 30, he submits that although the political appointees may not 
be as specialised as the career administrators, the difference between them and the judges 
is that they have information resources close at hand. 
 
120
 See Bilchitz: 2007, at p 132. It is submitted in chapter seven that the courts should 
strive as much as possible when they order structural injunctions to harness the 
knowledge and skills that may be at the disposal of the parties including the state. The 
initial response should, therefore, be to defer to the parties, especially the defendant, the 
responsibility of coming up with a remedial plan. In institutional cases, the defendant 
knows better how the administrative mechanisms of the institution function, this 
expertise should be exploited. See chapter seven at section 7.6.1 
 
121
 See Scott & Macklem: 1992, at p 37; they submitted that petitions have the effect of 
drawing attention to personal circumstances that reveal failures and problems unknown 
to or avoided by those responsible for drafting legislation. According to Scott and 
Macklem, such failures and problems may not have been predicted by, or may remain 
hidden from the view of, legislators or bureaucrats who live a more privileged life than 
those claiming the benefit of constitutionally entrenched social rights, and who are not 
institutionally required to listen to individual stories to produce a bridge between life 
experiences. In their opinion, this applies whether the body is the government, a 
legislative committee, or an international monitoring institution. 
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the circumstances are created by the deficit brought about by legislative 
and executive inaction or neglect.122 The legislature and executive could 
have come up with and stuck on solutions that in practice do not realise 
the rights protected.  
 
In such case, the courts may redirect policy, legislation or conduct in 
order to align them with the constitution and to solve real life problems.123 
When the courts do this, they will not be intruding on the territory of 
either the legislature or the executive. Instead, the courts will be 
establishing a dialogue between themselves and the other branches in 
terms of which each branch is expected to contribute its special skills in 
solving the problem.124 Additionally, there is nothing that stops the courts 
from availing themselves of technical expertise through expert evidence. 
The courts could summon witnesses to testify whenever technical 
questions arise in the course of the proceedings.125  
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 Eisenberg, T., and Yeazell, S., ‘The ordinary and the extraordinary in institutional 
litigation’ (1980) 93 Harvard Law Review pp 465 – 517 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Eisenberg & Yeazell: 1980], at pp 495 – 496. Eisenberg and Yeazell submit that there is 
nothing that suggests that regulating public institutions is a task so clearly and 
exclusively allocated to the legislative and executive branches that judicial action is 
unwarranted even in the face of recalcitrance by other government actors. Horowitz: 
1977, at p 24, however, submits that there is no institution that can do everything and, 
that while this may be justification for intervention by the courts into policy matters, 
there is no guarantee that the judiciary’s action will proceed from proper diagnosis or 
that it will not be deflected in the course of executing the functions. 
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 Sturm: 1991 at pp 1387 – 1388.  
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 Wesson, M., ‘Grootboom and beyond: Reassessing the socio-economic jurisprudence 
of the South African Constitutional Court’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human 
Rights pp 284 – 308, at pp 295 and 307.  
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It is also important to note that although the courts may not have access to 
as many sources of information as other organs do, the litigation process 
allows for distilled presentation of information in the form of evidence. 
Sometimes the adversarial nature of litigation compels parties to search 
and bring before the courts all information relevant to the dispute.126 The 
courts’ problem solving procedures also offer a number of advantages not 
found in the processes of other organs. Within the judicial processes, 
interested parties are given an opportunity to make submissions in 
accordance with a settled procedure and the courts are under duty to give 
reasoned judgements. Scott and Macklem submit that: 
 
A court provides a forum for relating debates over fundamental values to 
individual concrete cases. It is an opportunity to have personal narratives 
heard and rights put in living context in a way that is virtually impossible 
for modern legislatures.127 
 
 Additionally, the court processes provide for avenues of reviewing 
decisions if they are contested. This is done through procedures that 
guarantee parties rights of appeal and review. The political processes may 
not have the advantage of revisiting decisions as of right. Mistakes and 
oversights may, therefore, go un-noticed, and when noticed, remedial 
measures may require involvement in protracted and inaccessible political 
processes.  
 
The judiciary is also always keen to tap into outside energies and 
resources in search of appropriate remedies that vindicate the rights. As is 
seen in chapter seven,128 the courts have particularly been most effective 
in this endeavour through the use of structural remedies that take the 
                                                                                                                                            
through popularised written versions of the information. In his opinion, the expert 
witnesses are paid by the respective parties and they are almost invariably partisan.  
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 Chayes: 1976, at p 1308. 
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courts outside the traditional constraints of adjudication.129 The courts 
have successfully used court appointed experts, commissions of inquiry, 
public hearings and negotiation committees to find solutions to structural 
problems.130  
 
In spite of some technical deficiencies, therefore, the courts have a 
number of advantages that enhance their capacity to adjudicate socio-
economic rights. It is important that the judicial function should be 
assessed not in terms of its weaknesses, but in terms of its strengths. It is 
also important to note that when courts adjudicate socio-economic rights, 
they are not doing so in competition with the other organs of state. Rather, 
they are engaging in a dialogue which requires that all the institutions of 
the state play a role in the constitutional enterprise of actualising the 
rights. In such a dialogue, it is important that all institutions put to use, in 
a collaborative manner, their skills and capabilities as regards the 
enforcement of the rights. The power of the courts of giving the last word 
on the meaning of the constitution cannot, therefore, be exercised 
effectively without the co-operation of other branches of the state.131  
 
The courts may not have the technical expertise to decide socio-economic 
questions from a political perspective. They do, however, know about 
human dignity and oppression. The courts know ‘about things that reduce 
a human being to a status below that which a democratic society would 
regard as intolerable’.132 The judiciary should, however, where necessary, 
rely on other organs of the state for technical capacity which those organs 
should provide in good faith with the intention of advancing the rights in 
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 Currie, I ‘Judicious avoidance’ (1999) 15 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 
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the constitution.  Such collaborative problem solving processes also have 
the potential of making it much easier to respond to polycentric tasks.  
 
It is necessary for courts enforcing socio-economic rights to confront the 
problem of polycentricism. As is contended in chapter six,133 appreciation 
of the extent of the polycentric nature of a socio-economic rights case will 
be a factor to consider when designing an ‘appropriate just and equitable 
relief’. This is important because ‘[t]he harm caused by violating 
constitutional rights is not merely a harm to an individual applicant, but a 
harm to society as a whole’.134 Constitutional litigation against the state in 
most cases arises from violations of a structural nature implicating a 
number of interests. Addressing such structural violations calls for 
significant structural and institutional changes not only involving, but also 
affecting persons other than the parties.135 As a result of this, the 
appropriateness of a remedy will be affected unless the court considers all 
the interests implicated by a case.  
 
Socio-economic rights cases are believed to be polycentric in nature, 
firstly, because of the conception that they have budgetary 
consequences.136 It is submitted that each decision to allocate a particular 
sum of money for a specified purpose implies less money for other 
                                                 
133
 See chapter six at section 6.3. 
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 Currie & De Waal: 2005, at p 196. 
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 Sturm: 1991, at p 1364. Fiss gives the example of a structural decree to reform the 
practises of a police department as having an effect upon all the individual police 
officers, present and future. Fiss, O., ‘Foreword: The forms of justice’ (1979) 93 
Harvard Law Review pp  1 – 58 [Hereinafter referred to as Fiss: 1979], at p 49. 
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 Budgets, it is believed, are finite in nature and have a multitude of ways in which to 
be distributed. See Pieterse: 2004, at p 393.  
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purposes.137 According to Davis, a case involving a person’s right to a 
house would not only impact on that person and the state, but also on 
interests of other citizens. The interests of other citizens would raise 
questions such as whether the money should be used to build a crèche, a 
hospital or sporting stadium.138  
 
Secondly, it is submitted that socio-economic rights are logically linked to 
collective rather than individual claims. Yet the courts are ill-suited to 
adjudicate collective claims because they give rise to a multiplicity of 
interests.139 However, this submission may be challenged on the ground 
that the problem of polycentricism is alive in all forms of constitutional 
litigation. As conceded by Fuller, all disputes that come before the courts 
have either explicit or concealed polycentric effects.140 This is not limited 
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 O'Regan, K. ‘Introducing socio-economic rights’ (1999) 1 ESR Review pp 2 – 3 
[Hereinafter referred to as O’Regan: 1999], at p 2. Currie & De Waal: 2005, at p 570, 
give Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC) 
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 Davis: 1992, at 478. 
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 See Viljoen, F. ‘The justiciability of socio-economic and cultural rights: Experience 
and problems’ [Unpublished paper on file with author] [Hereinafter referred to as 
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(2006) 7 ESR Review pp 2 – 6. 
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 Fuller: 1978, at p 401. However, he adds that what is required by the adjudicator is to 
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to socio-economic rights but extends to civil and political rights as 
well.141 It is true that a petitioner in a constitutional case, whether 
involving civil and political rights or socio-economic rights, may be 
motivated by personal or private interest. In spite of this, the decision of 
the court usually has a wide impact and may affect so many people.142  
Examples of civil and political rights disputes will make this clearer. 
Consider a case in which the issue is the extent to which an attorney’s 
right to privacy may be limited. The case will have repercussions not only 
for the particular attorney and his clients, but for hundreds, or even 
thousands, of other attorneys and their clients. This because the case may 
establish a precedent that binds future disputes. Another example is a case 
involving the freedom of association or trade union rights; such a case 
may have multi repercussions for parties other than the litigating union 
and specific employer. The decision will have implications for all 
members of the particular union, members of other unions and employers 
in the same or similar industries. The same could be said of an order in a 
criminal trial, which may also force the prosecuting authorities to employ 
and pay more investigators which may lead to budgetary adjustments. 
This may have multiple repercussions. However, simply because the 
                                                                                                                                            
the proper limits of adjudication have been reached. Fuller submits that socio-economic 
rights take the courts to such limit, which requires them to abstain from adjudicating 
such rights. But this view has been contradicted by Sturm: 1991, at pp 1355 – 1446. 
According to Sturm Fuller’s view of the limits of adjudication renders illegitimate much 
of what the courts do today; this is because courts are already involved in adjudicating 
polycentric tasks. Sturm also criticises Fuller’s ideas on the ground that his theories are 
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 O’Regan: 1999, at p 2. 
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multitudes of affected persons are not in court will not stop adjudication 
of the dispute. The mere fact that a court cannot deal with many or all of 
the aspects of a case does not mean that it deals with none.143  
 
Furthermore, it is submitted that policy formulation and legislative 
processes are not immune from polycentric repercussions.144 In the first 
place, one cannot assert, too strongly, that the legislative or executive 
processes are representative of all the interests particularly on issues of 
policy formulation and implementation.145  Those who are not politically 
organised, and in most cases the impoverished, may find it hard to make 
their voices heard in the political processes. In addition, usually 
legislation and policy are designed and adopted in the abstract, and 
implemented without first having been tested on practical problems. The 
courts, on the other hand, stand in an advantageous position. While their 
decisions may have polycentric repercussions, they deal with real 
problems, sometimes not even contemplated either by the policy makers 
or by the legislators.146 Such cases before the courts will alert the 
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 Pieterse: 2004, at p 394. See also Epstein, A., ‘Judicial review: Beckoning on two 
kinds of error’ (1985) 4 Cato Journal pp 711 – 718, at p 716. Epstein uses the analogy of 
an auditor—simply because an auditor cannot correct every abuse in a department’s 
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authorities to the widespread nature of socio-economic problems which 
may either have been ignored or not contemplated.147  
 
The Grootboom case is a good example of a case alerting the authorities 
to the widespread nature of the problem of accessing adequate housing by 
many desperate people. The CC indicated that it was aware of the 
intolerable conditions under which many people are still living and that 
the respondents were but a fraction of them.148 The declaration of the CC 
that the government’s housing programme was unreasonable has since 
inspired litigation and policy revision in the area of housing rights.149 The 
CC’s ruling that government’s housing policy was unreasonable for 
failure to provide for the needs of those in desperate need prompted 
government to, for instance, adopt an emergency housing policy.150 When 
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 Abramovich: 2005, at p 195. See also Viljoen: 2005, at p 41. 
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 National Department of Housing, Part 3: National Housing Programme: Housing 
Assistance in Emergency Circumstances April 2004; sourced at 
<http://www.housing.gov.za/Content/legislation_policies/_Emergency%20%20Housing
%20Policy.pdf> (accessed on 29 November 2005). The policy acknowledges the fact 
that it has been adopted as a direct response to the CC’s ruling that the existing 
programme was unreasonable (see at p 5). See also Centre for Study of Social Policy 
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such policies are adopted, they will have wide application and benefit all 
people in situations similar to that of the litigant(s). This, as will be seen 
in chapter five, is the essence of the notion of distributive justice which is 
presented as the best response to polycentric tasks in the enforcement of 
socio-economic rights.151 
 
Fuller’s theory is also deficient to the extent that it does not develop a 
remedial theory. Fuller does not extend his analysis to the determination 
of the kinds of remedies that may be suitable in what he considers proper 
forms of adjudication. This omission is, however, deliberate. It naturally 
arises from the relationship that Fuller and other theorists like him assign 
to rights and remedies. As is demonstrated in chapter five,152 a sizeable 
number of scholars believe that rights and remedies are closely related.153 
This is because the latter are deduced from the former. In this 
relationship, since the remedy comes logically from the right, there is no 
need to develop an independent remedial theory. The purpose of the 
remedy is one of addressing the right that has been violated.  
 
It is demonstrated in chapter five that this theory uses the notion of 
corrective justice as its basis. The corrective justice theory emphasises the 
                                                                                                                                            
troubled jurisdictions. It can force agencies to acknowledge the magnitude of the 
problem and pay attention to resolving it (p 3).  
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Cooper-Stephenson, K., ‘Principle and pragmatism in the law of remedies’ in Berryman, 
J., (ed.) Remedies, issues and perspectives (1991) Thomson Professional Publishing, pp 
1 – 48, at p 6; Cassels: 1991, at p 288; and Levinson, D., ‘Rights essentialism and 
remedial equilibration’ (1999) Working paper No. 99-5, Legal Studies Working Paper 
Series, University of Virginia School of Law, at p 3, sourced at SSRN: 
<http://ssrn.com/abstract=155564> (accessed on 25 June 2006), also published in (1999) 
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fact that remedies are granted against a defendant only when liability for 
violation of a right has been found.154 While this may be the case in 
private law litigation, it is not true in public law litigation which 
implicates interests not necessarily connected to a defendant’s wrong. 
Such litigation also exposes systemic problems not necessarily linked to 
the wrong but which need to be addressed.  Rather than restrict oneself to 
the interests of the parties and establishment of liability, structural 
litigation confronts exterior interests and is geared more towards problem 
solving rather than fault finding. To achieve this, the development of a 
remedial theory that is not dictated by the rights itself becomes 
necessary.155 However, the theoretical considerations that affect both 
rights and remedies must be kept separate.156 This, again, is where 
distributive justice becomes most relevant. This is something that Fuller 
overlooks; he ignores the fact that in order to consider third party interests 
implicated by a case, the court may separate the rights from the remedy. 
This will enable the court to consider third party interests without being 
unnecessarily constrained by the impact which this would have on the 
right.  
 
3.4.2.1 New forms of adjudication as a response to polycentric concerns  
Though polycentricism does not disqualify socio-economic rights from 
judicial protection, it presents a problem that needs to be tackled. To 
resolve polycentric tasks, Fuller proposes a new form of adjudication 
which he refers to as ‘mixed form adjudication’.157 By ‘mixed form 
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adjudication’ Fuller means ‘a mixture of adjudication and negotiation’.158 
To drive home his point, Fuller uses the example of a labour dispute 
arising from an agreement to make salary adjustments with multiple 
variables which would not only benefit but affect all employees and the 
employer. To resolve this dispute, Fuller proposes the use of a ‘tripartite’ 
arbitration board. Such an arbitration board would be constituted by an 
impartial chairman who is flanked by two fellow arbitrators. One of the 
two arbitrators would be selected by the employer and the other by the 
labour union. The arbitration board would reach its decision unanimously 
after mutual consultation not only amongst its members but also with the 
parties.159  
 
In my opinion, this form of mixed adjudication will enable the arbitration 
body to be informed of interests that would have not been brought to light 
had the process not had a tripartite character. This will educate the 
tribunal on all the repercussions that the decision is likely to have on the 
parties and all directly implicated interests. In addition, it will produce a 
result that is acceptable to all the parties.160 This is because of the degree 
of participation by the parties that takes place at the remedial stage. 
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 Fuller (as above). 
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 The two arbitrators appointed by the union and the employer respectively will be 
alive to the interests of the party they present and will bring this experience as 
dimensions to the decision. However, to counter the problem of extending the failed 
negotiations into the arbitration process, the objectivity and neutrality of the chairman 
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has taken into account all the interests and is likely to be accepted by all the parties. This 
will immunise the decision from repercussions that would otherwise have not been 
foreseen by the arbitrators.  
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 Currie & De Waal : 2005, at p 569, contend that They reckon that the winner-takes-all 
styles of adjudication may not be suited for the resolution of such matters. This is 
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Participation will bring to light the obstacles likely to be encountered and, 
without surprise, clarify the remedial obligations of the parties in a 
cooperative manner. This makes implementation of the decision easy and 
forestalls resistance when the time comes to assume the remedial 
obligations.  
 
Adversarial litigation on the other hand may not provide the opportunity 
for consideration of all interests implicated by a case. The process of 
adversarial litigation usually restricts itself to hearing the interests and 
arguments of the parties before it.161 As a result, the ruling emanating 
from such ‘winner-takes-all’ litigation will not take into consideration 
interests and arguments not presented before the court.162 Difficulties may 
be experienced in the process of implementing the court’s remedies 
because of the unforeseen repercussions.  
 
To avoid grappling with the problem of unforeseen repercussions when 
implementing remedies in socio-economic rights litigation, one would 
advocate for non-adversarial litigation. However, this is not to suggest 
that adversarial litigation should not play any role in the adjudication 
process. Fuller goes to great lengths to demonstrate the advantages of 
adversarial litigation. In Fuller’s opinion, ‘an adversary presentation 
seems the only means for combating [the] human tendency to judge too 
swiftly in terms of the familiar, that which is not yet fully known’.163 
Fuller is of the view that judicial decision makers are susceptible to 
making quick conclusions about situations and then later applying these 
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 Sturm: 1991, at p 1394. Sturm submits that lawyers’ control over the process in 
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conclusions consistently to seemingly similar situations. He states as 
follows: 
 
What generally occurs in practice is that at some early point a familiar 
pattern will seem to emerge from the evidence; an accustomed label is 
wanting for the case and, without awaiting further proofs, this label is 
promptly assigned to it. It is a mistake to suppose that this premature 
cataloguing must necessarily result from impatience, prejudice or 
mental sloth. Often it proceeds from a very understandable desire to 
bring the hearing into some order and coherence … But what starts as 
a preliminary diagnosis makes a strong imprint on the mind, while all 
that runs counter to it is received with diverted attention.164 
 
Fuller contends that the arguments of counsel and the preparations that 
they put in makes it possible to explore all the peculiarities and nuances of 
the case. Additionally, the preparation process leads to a preliminary 
analysis of issues which gives the hearing form and direction.165 
Similarly, Shaibani submits that some forms of litigation, including 
constitutional law cases, ‘are likely to stir emotional and idiosyncratic 
reactions in the participants’.166 However, through adversarial litigation 
the parties will be able to resolve their disputes in an environment where 
emotions can be controlled, which reduces the chances of undesirable 
confrontation. The parties will, therefore, be able to express their 
aggression without physical fights.167  
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In spite of its advantages, however, adversarial litigation also has its 
disadvantages. Adversarial litigation is not only time consuming and 
expensive but it emphasises the differences between the parties with the 
effect that conflict is maximised instead of being minimised.168 
Adversarial litigation is also individualistic, in the sense that evidence is 
gathered to support the respective parties’ arguments and interests.169 
 
It is my submission that a non-adversarial style of litigation would, while 
maintaining the advantages of adversarial litigation, minimise its 
disadvantages. Such non-adversarial style would be akin to what Fuller 
has described above as ‘mixed adjudication’ combining both adjudication 
and negotiation. This form of adjudication would be aimed at ensuring 
maximum participation of all the parties in decision-making, and design 
and implementation of remedies.170 Indeed, the use of this form of 
litigation in socio-economic rights litigation is gaining increasing 
                                                 
168
 Moore, B., ‘Community conferencing as transformative problem solving’ (2000) 24 
SPIDER NEWS pp 1 – 4, at p 1.  
 
169
 Brent, K., Marshall, J., Picou, J., and Schlichtman, R., ‘Technological disasters, 
litigation stress and the use of Alternative Dispute Resolution mechanisms’ (2002) 26 
Law & Policy pp 289 – 307 [Hereinafter referred to as Brent et al: 2002], at p 290. See 
also generally Chayes: 1979; and Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) Issue 
paper 22 Review of the adversarial system of litigation: Rethinking family law 
proceedings. The ACLRC takes note of the fact that an adversarial system means that the 
court has to rely on the parties providing all relevant information. This means that there 
are many unanswered or unexplored issues and questions because the parties will be 
selective in the information they present. The ALRC takes the view that a more 
inquisitorial approach might allow decision makers to satisfy themselves that they have 
all the relevant information to make decisions (para 5.4).  
  
170
 According to Scott & Alston: 2000, at p 224, it is especially at the level of remedies 
where the greatest potential lies for forging inter-institutional relations, which will help 
bring about relief that is both effective and legitimate in the eyes both of litigants and of 
society at large. 
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support.171 It has been promoted especially within the context of 
promotion of institutional dialogue as discussed by Scott.172 In Port 
Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers Case,173 Sachs J, for instance, 
emphasised the benefits that mediation would bring in constitutional 
litigation. He said that: 
 
Not only can mediation reduce the expenses of litigation, it can help 
avoid the exacerbation of tensions that forensic combat produces. By 
bringing the parties together, narrowing the areas of dispute between 
them and facilitating mutual give-and-take, mediators can find way 
around sticking-points in a manner that the adversarial process might 
not be able to do. Money that otherwise might be spent on unpleasant 
and polarising litigation can better be used to facilitate an outcome that 
ends a stand-off, promotes respect for human dignity and underlines 
the fact that we live in a shared society.174 
 
It should also be noted that non-adversarial forms of litigation not only 
make it possible to tackle polycentric tasks, they reduce the tensions 
between the court and other organs. The court will not be perceived by the 
other organs as imposing obligations on them, instead it will be seen as 
                                                 
171
 See for example Abramovich: 2005. See also Sabel, F., and Simon, H., 
‘Destablization rights: How public interest litigation succeeds’ (1999) 113 Harvard Law 
Review pp 1 – 83, [Hereinafter referred to as Sable & Simon: 1999]; Scott, C. ‘Towards 
a principled, pragmatic judicial role’ (1999) 1 ESR Review pp 4 – 6 [Hereinafter referred 
to as Scott: 1999]; Vikas, J., ‘Social change and public interest litigation in India’ (2005) 
Independent Media Centre, India, sourced at 
<htt://www.india.indymedia.org/en/2005/03/210205.shtml> (accessed on 30 November 
2005); Brent et al: 2002; Scott & Alston: 2000; Van Bueren: 1999; and Pieterse: 2004, at 
p 396; Pieterse views adjudication as a manner of building a pragmatic notion of inter-
institutional cooperative interaction (at pp 406 and 411 – 2). Sachs: 2005, at p 151, has 
emphasised the need for dialogue between the different branches of government to be 
civil in tone and reasonable in substance. In Sachs’ view, courts view themselves as 
being not in a contestentionary relationship with government, but in a constitutional 
conversation.  
 
172
 Scott: 1999. See also Scott and Alston: 2000, at pp 223 – 224. 
 
173
 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC). 
 
174
 Para 42. 
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facilitating dialogue between the parties. It should be noted, however, that 
the successful use of this form of litigation is very much dependent on 
whether the parties are willing to participate in it in good faith. Its success 
is, therefore, not entirely dependent on the court but also on the attitude of 
the parties. Dialogue, cooperation and collaboration are voluntary and 
cannot be imposed upon a person with a negative attitude.  
 
3.4.2.2 Widened ‘locus standi’ to accommodate polycentric interests   
Fuller’s theory of polycentricism was conceived with reference to private 
law litigation and is based on the notion of corrective justice. The notion 
of corrective justice, as discussed in chapter five,175 makes a suit 
individualistic, bipolar in nature and involving very limited interests. 
Fuller’s objection to polycentric litigation has no place in modern public 
law litigation. This form of litigation has become very complex and often 
involves a number of interests meriting legal protection. Under a legal 
duty to protect human rights, modern courts have resorted to distributive 
justice methods of litigation that deviate substantially from the traditional 
forms.176 As seen above,177 Fuller’s main concern with public law 
litigation is that it does not guarantee participation by all the interests 
concerned. However, Fuller fails to explore ways to bring on board the 
participation, as much as is reasonably possible, of all those affected by a 
case.178  
 
                                                 
175
 Section 5.2.1. 
 
176
 See Sturm: 1991, at p 1387 – 1388. Sturm contends that the social realities are that 
our social existence is now defined by large-scale organisations, particularly government 
bureaucracies and that to insist on adjudicative methods that ignore these realities is a 
mistake. 
 
177
 Section 3.4.1. 
 
178
 Sturm: 1991, at p 1391. 
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In constitutional litigation, a court may confront polycentric challenges by 
involving a wide range of parties in the resolution of a dispute.179 In fact, 
at the disposal of the courts are several procedures that allow judges to 
invite participation by all persons affected by a case. A judge could order 
the issuance of third party notices to people he/she thinks may be affected 
by a decision. In addition to this, the judge may appoint a guardian ad 
litem to represent absentee interests.180 In modern constitutional states, 
constitutional litigation is often complemented by provisions widening 
locus standi, which opens up the process of litigation to a greater number 
of interested parties. This is the spirit of section 38 of the South African 
Constitution,181 which widens locus beyond the confines of the common 
law.182 The CC has embraced the spirit of this section fully by allowing 
access to the courts to a variety of people who in traditional terms would 
not have had audience.183 
 
                                                 
179
 See Fiss: 1979, at p 40. 
 
180
 Chayes: 1976, at 1312. 
 
181
 Section 38 allows the following people to approach the courts in constitutional 
matters: anyone acting in their own interest; anyone acting on behalf of another person 
who cannot act in their own name; anyone acting as a member of, or in the interest of, a 
group or class of persons; anyone acting in the public interest; and an association acting 
in the interest of its members.  
 
182
 The common law is very strict on the question of who may approach the court to 
enforce a right. It is only those with a direct interest in the case or deriving interest from 
the parties that may be joined in litigation.  
 
183
 Chaskalson J in Ferreira v Levin NO, (1996) 1 SA 984 (CC), at paragraph 165 held 
that the Court should rather adopt a broader approach to standing. This would be 
consistent with the mandate given to the Court to uphold the Constitution and would 
serve to ensure that constitutional rights enjoy the full measure of protection to which 
they are entitled.  
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The Court has also used section 38 to entrench the use of class actions to 
pursue claims based on the Constitution. In Ngxuza and others v 
Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape,184 the 
applicants’ disability grants had been suspended without due process of 
law. They brought an action on their own behalf and on behalf of others in 
a similar position that numbered over 100,000. Relying on section 38, the 
Court rejected the objection that the applicants did not have standing. The 
Court said that the practical difficulties associated with representative and 
class actions could not justify denial of such action when the Constitution 
made specific provision for it. According to the Court, a flexible and 
generous approach was called for to make it easier for disadvantaged and 
poor people to approach the courts on public issues and to ensure that the 
public administration adhered to the fundamental constitutional principle 
of legality in the exercise of public power. This decision was confirmed 
by the Supreme Court of Appeal in Permanent Secretary, Department of 
Welfare, Eastern Cape Provincial Government and Another v Ngxuza and 
Others.185 
 
Additionally, the Rules of the CC allow any person who is entitled to join 
the proceedings to apply for leave to intervene at any stage of the 
proceedings.186 The Rules also allow for the participation as amici curiae: 
‘any person interested in any matter before the Court’.187 The involvement 
                                                 
184
 2001(2) SA 609 (E). 
 
185
 2001 (10) BCLR 1039 (A) 
 
186
 Rules of the Constitutional Court, promulgated under Government Notice R1675 in 
Government Gazette 25726 of 31 October 2003 [Hereinafter referred to as Rules of 
Court] , rule 8(1). 
 
187
 Rules of Court, rule 10. This rule has been used mainly by public interest groups, 
human rights advocates and academic research institutions in order to promote the 
interests of marginalised groups and to suggest interpretations of the human rights 
provisions in the Constitution. Examples of such groups in socio-economic rights 
litigation include the Legal Resource Centre, Treatment Action Campaign and the 
 
 
 
 
Chapter three 
 144 
of a number of parties in the litigation will bring into perspective interests 
which the main parties have not considered. This will put the court in a 
position to make decisions that do not adversely affect such other 
interests. This does not, however, mean that all interests will be brought to 
light;188 rather it plays a very important minimising role and may provoke 
inquiry into the impact of the decision on interests not directly implicated. 
 
 
3.5  CONCLUSION  
 
The objections to the judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights based 
on the institutional competence dimension are more complicated to deal 
with in comparison to those based on the legitimacy dimension. As is seen 
in chapter two, it is much easier to prove that by their nature socio-
economic rights are no different from civil and political rights. It is, 
however, not possible to prove with similar ease that the courts are 
institutionally equipped to adjudicate and answer all questions relating to 
the realisation of socio-economic rights. This is a more controversial issue 
because of the kind of questions that it raises. Unlike the legitimacy 
dimension, which raises legal questions, some of the questions raised by 
the institutional competence objections are political and practical in 
nature. The political nature of these questions is premised on the assertion 
that the judiciary being an unelected body is disqualified from making 
decisions on such controversial issues as allocation of resources and needs 
                                                                                                                                            
Community Law Centre at the University of the Western Cape. See Heywood, M., 
‘Shaping, making and breaking the law in the campaign for National HIV/AIDS 
Treatment Plan’ in Jones, P., and Stokke, K., (eds.) Democratising development: The 
politics of socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) Nijhoff Law Specials, Vol 64  
pp 181 – 212 [Hereinafter referred to as Heywood: 2005]. 
 
188
 Though the judge must be certain that the full range of interests is represented he/she 
should not fail in his/her duty to protect a right simply because every affected individual 
cannot meaningfully be represented. See Fiss: 1979, at p 40. 
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prioritisation.189 Those who pursue this objection are quick to find refuge 
in the doctrine of separation of powers. They contend that the division of 
functions between the different organs of state by this doctrine puts socio-
economic rights issues beyond the jurisdiction of the courts.  
 
It has, however, been demonstrated in this chapter that the doctrine of 
separation of powers has gone through an evolution since its inception. 
The principle of checks and balances has made it possible for organs of 
state to discharge functions that on their face fall outside the terrain of 
such organs.190 The judiciary has particularly been empowered through 
the doctrine of constitutionalism and the rule of law to check the power 
excesses of the legislature and the executive.191 This is in addition to 
protecting the rights of all, including those of minorities.192 The doctrine 
of constitutionalism as complemented by the principle of the rule of law 
from this perspective also helps in understanding the notion of 
democracy. The objectors have skewed democracy to mean only 
majoritarian democracy. However, this chapter has demonstrated that 
democracy means more than majoritarian democracy; it embraces the 
protection of the values and interests of minorities.193 It is incumbent 
                                                 
189
 See chapter four, section 4.2.4 for a detailed discussion of the questions that resource 
allocation gives rise to and the difficulties that courts confront when faced with such 
questions. 
 
190
 First Certification case, para 108.  
 
191
 Currie & De Waal: 2001, at p 10. See also Currie & De Waal: 2005, at 8; Hamilton: 
78, at p 467 and TAC case, paras 98 – 99. 
 
192
 Bork: 1990, at p 61. Forsyth & Elliot: 2003, at p 294. See also Moseneke: 2002, at p 
315. 
 
193
 See Devenish: 1999, at p 4. See also Whittington, E., ‘An “indispensable feature”? 
Constitutionalism and judicial review’ (2002) 6 Legislation and Public Policy pp 21 – 
33, at pp 24 – 6; and Davis et al: 1994, at p 2. 
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upon the judiciary to protect these interests against majoritarian 
infraction. 
 
This chapter has also demonstrated that all rights, including civil and 
political rights and all cases that come to court have polycentric 
repercussions.194 Though it may be conceded that socio-economic rights 
litigation is far more polycentric, this does not make it any easier for 
legislative and executive organs to deal with these rights. The executive 
and legislature usually adopt policy and legislation, respectively, without 
having tested them against real life problems. These organs may, 
therefore, not be in any better position to appreciate the polycentric effects 
of their decisions. In contrast, courts deal with real life problems 
sometimes not contemplated by either the legislature or the executive. The 
courts will, therefore, be better placed to appreciate the polycentric effects 
of their decisions. Additionally, court orders usually have positive 
polycentric effects. They always highlight the authorities to the presence 
of widespread problems which may inspire adoption of policy and 
legislation to tackle the problem.195 It is also safe to assume that the 
realisation of constitutional guarantees cannot be expected solely through 
judicial adjudication. Indeed, ‘it is fruitless and even dangerous to look to 
the courts for the first and last word on any matter concerning the 
vindication of fundamental societal values’.196 Realisation of the 
constitutional guarantees should combine judicial adjudication with 
efforts within political, economical and social circles.197  
 
                                                 
194
 Fuller: 1978, at p 401. See also O’Regan: 1999, at p 2. 
 
195
 Abramovich: 2005, at p 195.   
 
196
 Scott & Macklem: 1992, at pp 6 – 7 and 42. 
 
197
 See Heywood: 2005, at p 186. 
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Additionally, the institutional based objections expressed against judicial 
power are at best exaggerated.198 The judiciary still stands in a very weak 
position and it is unlikely that it will displace the other branches of 
government and usurp political power.199 In fact, the growth of judicial 
power has been propelled by the failure of the other agencies, and as long 
as these failures continue, judicial power will continue to blossom. 
However, it should be noted that the contemporary judiciary has assumed 
new roles, rather than stand in a position of rivalry with the other 
branches, the judiciary is a complementary force. It stands out clearly as a 
partner in the enterprise of realisation of a society in which respect for all 
human beings and the realisation of social justice is a reality.200 It is on 
the basis of these roles that the CC has defined the obligations engendered 
by the socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution as seen in 
the next chapter.  
 
                                                 
198
 Pieterse: 2005, at p 132. 
 
199
 Chayes: 1976, at p 1313.  
 
200
 Chapters seven will show how judiciaries have played important roles in tackling 
structural problems and achieving structural changes in society. Judicial decisions have 
initiated a continuous and tentative process of dialogue between itself and all sectors of 
society on the structural problems prevalent in many communities. Chayes: 1976, at p 
1316. All sectors of South African society should accordingly allow the judiciary to 
exercise these important roles. It is also true that judicial decisions are not final as they 
may be overruled by majoritarian forces if the proper procedures are followed. See Fiss: 
1979, at p 15. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
TRANSLATING SOCIO-ECONOMIC RIGHTS FROM 
ABSTRACT PAPER RIGHTS TO FULLY FLEDGED 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF THE 
CURRENT SOUTH AFRICAN APPROACH  
 
 
 
4.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
This chapter explores the nature of the obligations engendered by the 
different categories of socio-economic rights protected by the 1996 South 
African Constitution and the extent to which they have been implemented. 
The chapter is premised on the acceptance of the socio-economic rights in 
the Constitution as justiciable. It is distinguishable from chapter two and 
three which discuss the objections in support of rejection of socio-
economic rights as justiciable rights. The purpose of the current chapter is 
to discuss the precise nature of the obligations that socio-economic rights 
give rise to and the manner in which they have been enforced by the 
courts. This discussion is prerequisite to understanding the nature of the 
remedies that violation of socio-economic rights should attract. One 
cannot determine the most appropriate remedy to vindicate a right, which 
is the secondary theory, without an understanding of the nature of the 
obligations the right engenders, which is the primary theory.1 The only 
                                                 
1
 Dinah Shelton refers to rights and remedies as two theories, the primary and secondary 
respectively. The primary theory addresses the obligations engendered by the rights and 
the secondary theory address the question of what ought to be done when the rights are 
violated. Both theories have to be addressed in the litigation process. Shelton, D., 
Remedies in international human rights law (1999) Oxford University Press, at pp 37 – 
38. See also Cooper-Stephenson, K., ‘Principle and pragmatism in the law of remedies’ 
in Berryman, J., (ed.) Remedies, issues and perspectives (1991) Thomson Professional 
Publishing pp 1 – 48 [Hereinafter referred to as Cooper-Stephenson: 1991]. Cooper 
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reason remedies exist is to give effect to the rights that are protected by 
the law. Actually, in procedural terms, the remedial process begins only 
after a finding of liability has been made.2 There is, therefore, a need to 
establish the relationship between the obligations engendered by the rights 
and the remedial obligations that their violation imposes.3  
 
There is ample evidence to suggest that the drafters of the Constitution 
were greatly inspired by the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights (the ICESCR),4 which explains why most socio-
economic rights provisions are drafted along the same lines as those of the 
ICESCR.5 Article 2(1), the linchpin of the ICESCR, obligates states to 
                                                                                                                                            
contends that rights and remedies are inextricably linked, that determination neither of 
right nor remedy can be made in isolation of the other (at p 6).  
 
2
 Sturm, P., ‘A normative theory of public law remedies’ (1991) 79 Georgetown Law 
Journal pp 1355 – 1446 [Hereinafter referred to as Sturm: 1991], at p 1360. 
 
3
 Cassels, J., ‘An inconvenient balance: The injunction as a Charter remedy’ in 
Berryman, J., (ed.) Remedies, issues and perspectives (1991) Thomas Professional 
Publishing pp 272 – 311 [Hereinafter referred to as Cassels: 1991], at p 291. However, as 
seen in chapter five (sections 5.2.1 and 5.3), while the theory of corrective justice 
dictates that remedies flow naturally from rights, this theory is not appropriate for 
constitutional remedial litigation. In choosing appropriate remedies that address systemic 
violations, it may be necessary to disengage remedies from the rights. See Berryman, J., 
The law of equitable remedies (2000) Irwin Law, at p 9. Sometimes the choice of a 
remedy in public law litigation need not be determined by the outcome of the trial on the 
merits (Sturm: 1991, at p 1364). This, however, does not mean that the nature of the 
obligations engendered by the rights do not play any role at the remedial level. The 
remedies should, to the extent possible, be directed at effecting these obligations though 
some times not with the immediacy that corrective justice demands. 
 
4
 Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by GA Resolution 2200A 
(XXI) of 16 December 1966, entered into force 3 January 1976. 
 
5
 See Constitutional Assembly Constitutional Committee, Draft Bill of Rights, Volume 
1, Explanatory Memoranda of Technical Committee to Theme Committee IV of the 
Constitutional Assembly (9 October 1995), [on file with author]. 
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undertake steps to the maximum of their resources, with a view to 
progressively realising the rights by all appropriate means. Similarly, the 
Constitution compels the state to take reasonable legislative and other 
measures, within its available resources, to progressively realise the 
rights.6 The differences between the Constitution and the ICESCR are at 
best nomenclatural; a closer scrutiny shows that the obligations 
engendered by the two instruments are similar in many respects. Both are 
subject to limitations defined by the available resources and the need to 
realise the rights progressively. ‘By all appropriate means’ as used in the 
ICESCR could be equated to ‘reasonable legislative and other measures’ 
used in the Constitution.7  In spite of the similarities, the Constitutional 
Court (CC) has endorsed some and rejected other of the international law 
constructions of the ICESCR. At best, the Court’s approach can be 
described as ambivalent.  
 
While South Africa has signed, but not yet ratified, the ICESCR, this does 
not appear to be the reason why the CC has rejected some aspects of the 
                                                                                                                                            
 
6
 Sections 26(2) and 27(2); the right to further education in 29(1)(b) is also to be realised 
progressively by the state taking reasonable measures, but no mention is made of acting 
within available resources. 
 
7
 The United Nations Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (the 
Committee) has said that while countries are free to choose what they consider to be the 
most appropriate means, it is important that the basis of such means be given. In spite of 
this, the Committee has said that the ultimate determination as to whether all appropriate 
measures have been taken remains one for the Committee itself to make. General 
Comment No. 3, The nature of States Parties' obligations (Fifth session, 1990), U.N. 
Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86 (1991), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments 
and General Recommendations Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. 
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at p 14 (2003), para 10 [Hereinafter referred to as General Comment 
No. 3]. There is no doubt that an element of the reasonableness of the measures chosen 
will feature in the determination of appropriateness. 
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jurisprudence generated by this Covenant.8 Instead, the rejection is 
informed by the CC’s normative conception of the nature of the 
obligations that socio-economic rights engender.9 This is in addition to the 
Court’s understanding of its role in enforcing the Bill of Rights against 
the elected branches of the state.10 The CC has been caught between the 
                                                 
8
 In fact the South African courts are compelled by the Constitution to consider 
international law when interpreting any legislation and to prefer any reasonable 
interpretation that is consistent with international law over any alternative interpretation 
that is inconsistent with international law (sections 39(1) and 233). Indeed, the CC has 
held that both binding and non-binding international law may be used as a tool of 
interpretation of the Constitution. See S v Makwanyane (Makwanyane case) 1995 (3) SA 
391 (CC), para 35. This means that although South Africa has not ratified the ICESCR, 
the Covenant may still be used as a tool for interpreting the socio-economic rights 
provisions in the Constitution. It should be noted, however, that South Africa in support 
of its membership to the Human Rights Council has pledged to ratify the ICESCR. See 
Note no. 143/06 made by South Africa to the President of the United Nations General 
Assembly 2 May 2006 annexed to document detailing the list of candidates for election 
to the Human Rights Council, UN General Assembly 60th Session: Election and 
Appointments. Subsidiary Organs and other elections, available at 
<http://www.un.org/ga/60/elect/hrc/>  
 
9
 Pieterse, M., A benefit-focused analysis of constitutional health rights Ph.D thesis 
submitted to the University of Witwatersrand [December 2005] [Hereinafter referred to 
as Pieterse: 2005], at p 121.  
 
10
 Pieterse, M., ‘Possibilities and pitfalls in the domestic enforcement of socio-economic 
rights: Contemplating the South African experience’ (2004) 26 Human Rights Quarterly 
pp 882 – 905 [Hereinafter referred to as Pieterse: 2004a], at p 903. Pieterse submits 
further that the CC simultaneously affirms its institutional competence to award relief for 
violations of socio-economic rights and declines to exercise this competence where such 
exercise requires it to depart from adjudicative practices to which courts are accustomed: 
‘it simultaneously proclaims the interdependence and indivisibility of human rights and 
refuses to translate such proclamation into tangible permeation of norms associated with 
the vindication of social and civil rights respectively’. In his opinion, this is because the 
Court's jurisprudence is but in its infancy and it is, therefore, perhaps wise for it to 
approach the relatively novel task of reviewing state compliance with socio-economic 
duties with tentative pragmatism. According to Davis, the CC is well aware of 
international jurisprudence and its ambitious reach but is reluctant to cross the judicial 
boundary which it has established for itself by employing an administrative law model to 
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need to translate the paper rights into tangible rights, on the one hand and, 
on the other hand, the need to maintain the separation of powers by 
deferring to the legislative and executive branches of government.11 This 
is why it has rejected international human rights law interpretations that 
would put it in direct confrontation with the other branches of the state.12 
                                                                                                                                            
justify its cautious approach. Davis, D., ‘Adjudicating the socio-economic rights in the 
South African Constitution: Towards “deference lite”?’ (2006) 22 South African Journal 
on Human Rights pp 301 – 327 [Hereinafter referred to as Davis: 2006], at pp 304 and 
323.  
 
11
 Davis: 2006, at pp 316 – 317, submits that the Court’s approach does not reflect 
ignorance of international jurisprudence nor a lack of cognisance of the implications of 
sections 26(1) [right of access to adequate housing] and 27(1) [right of access to health 
care services, sufficient food and water, and social security and social assistance] of the 
text, but rather the knowledge that the text itself holds out a promise of a kind of society 
predicated on a very different approach from that which currently prevails in the 
Ministry of Finance. Davis contends that the government has retreated from its 
Reconstruction and Development Policy (RDP) promises, which emphasised a more 
interventionist state, to the Growth and Redistribution Policy (GEAR), which promotes a 
minimalist state intervention role.  
   
12
 Roux submits, for instance, that the adoption of the minimum core approach would 
have brought the CC into direct confrontation with the political branches since it would 
have required the Court to substitute its own views of the needs that ought to be 
prioritised for that of the legislature and executive. This is why the Court has used South 
Africa’s non-ratification of the ICESCR, which he refers to as a ‘discretionary gap’, to 
avoid interpretations that would lead to confrontation. Roux, T., ‘Legitimating 
transformation: Political resource allocation in the South African Constitutional Court’ 
(2003) 10 Democratization pp 92 – 111 [Hereinafter referred to as Roux: 2003], at p 96. 
See also Brand, D., ‘The proceduralisation of South African socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence, or “what are socio-economic rights for”’ in Botha, H., Van der Walt, A., 
and Van der Walt, J., (eds.) Rights and democracy in a transformative constitution 
(2003)  Sun Press Stellenbosch pp 33 – 56 [Hereinafter referred to as Brand: 2003], at p 
51. Nevertheless, the CC’s confirmation that socio-economic rights are justiciable and 
the development of its reasonableness review approach as a means of assessing the 
state’s obligations has strengthened the position of the advocates of socio-economic 
rights in both domestic and international arenas. This approach not only has confirmed 
that socio-economic rights are capable of constitutional protection but also that they are 
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Some scholars have described the CC’s approach as ‘minimalist’ in the 
sense that it only decides what is necessary in a particular case and avoids 
laying down any abstract rules and theories. This approach is considered 
ideal in protecting democracy because it leaves contentious issues open 
for democratic deliberation.13 The Court’s approach is, therefore, 
perceived as capable of both respecting the separation of powers and 
realising the transformative vision of the Constitution.14 
 
The CC has rejected the notion of minimum core obligations and has 
instead adopted a reasonableness review approach. This chapter evaluates 
the CC’s approach against the principles of international human rights 
law, most especially the jurisprudence of the Committee.15 The CC has 
been criticised for construing socio-economic rights as abstract rights, 
whose beneficiaries are only entitled to reasonable programmes instead of 
                                                                                                                                            
amenable to judicial enforcement. See In re Certification of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa 1996 (10) BCLR 1253 (CC) (First Certification case). 
 
13
 Steinberg, C., ‘Can reasonableness protect the poor? A review of South Africa’s socio-
economic rights jurisprudence’ (2006) 123 South African Law Journal pp 264 – 284 
[Hereinafter referred to as Steinberg: 2006], at p 269 quoting from Sunstein, C., One 
case at a time: Judicial minimalism on the Supreme Court (1999) President and Fellows 
of Harvard College, at p 9.  
  
14
 Steinberg: 2006, at p 276.  
 
15
 This is the Committee monitoring the implementation of the ICESCR. While this 
Committee has greatly contributed to the understanding of the obligations engendered by 
the rights in the Covenant, its jurisprudence still lacks a judicial component. This is 
because, as  has been mentioned in chapter two (at section 2.2.) the Committee, unlike its 
counterpart the Human Rights Committee, does not have a mandate to entertain and to 
consider, in a judicious manner, complaints from victims. Though the process of giving 
the Committee such a mandate through the adoption of an optional protocol to the 
ICESCR began way back, it has been riddled with a number of obstacles and has moved 
at a considerably slow pace. See Chenwi, L., and Mbazira., C., ‘The Draft Optional 
Protocol to the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (2006) 
ESR Review pp 9 – 12.  
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concrete goods and services. The CC not only has failed to give content to 
these rights but has also failed to interrogate the effectiveness of the 
means chosen to realise them. This is in addition to the failure to 
interrogate the reasonableness of the resources deployed for the purpose 
of realising the rights and to question whether there are efforts to raise and 
allocate more resources to the rights. 
 
This chapter demonstrates, however, that the reasonableness review 
approach could be strengthened to give normative content to the rights. A 
proportionality test, equivalent to the one used in the general limitations 
clause inquiry, is proposed. This would enable the court to interrogate the 
reasonableness of the means chosen on the basis of their ability to realise 
the right(s) in issue. The chapter also advocates interrogation of the 
reasonableness of the resources allocated to the realisation of the rights. 
The burden should be cast on the state to prove that it has allocated 
reasonable resources to the rights. In case of resource limitations, the state 
should prove its plans of improving on the resources in addition to 
proving that it is employing the available resources maximally.  
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4.2 AN APPRAISAL  OF THE CC’S REASONABLENESS 
REVIEW APPROACH  
 
The CC has held that in socio-economic rights litigation the question 
should not always be one of whether or not these rights are justiciable but 
how to enforce them in a given case.16 The CC has dismissed submissions 
that socio-economic rights cannot be justiciable because they have 
budgetary implications.  In the CC’s opinion, when the courts enforce 
socio-economic rights, the task conferred upon them is no different from 
the one conferred on them when they enforce civil and political rights. 
According to the Court, this is because, just like socio-economic rights, 
orders to enforce civil and political rights may have budgetary 
implications.17 The CC has also said that the inclusion of socio-economic 
rights in the Constitution does not result in the violation of the doctrine of 
separation of powers and that, at the very minimum, socio-economic 
rights can be negatively protected from improper invasion.18  
 
On the basis of the above, the CC has had no problem enforcing the socio-
economic rights in the Constitution. The first case to engage directly with 
the enforcement of these rights was Soobramoney v Minister of Health, 
Kwazulu-Natal.19 This case was instituted by a patient who had been 
denied access to dialysis treatment under a policy that excluded patients 
of his status because of the limited resources at the disposal of the 
hospital.20 The Court found that while the state was under a duty to 
                                                 
16
 Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others, 2000 (11) BCLR 
1169 (CC) 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (Grootboom case), para 20. 
 
17
 First Certification case, para 77. 
 
18
 First Certification case, para 78. 
 
19
 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), 1997 (12) BCLR 1696 (CC) (Soobramoney case). 
 
20
 Mr. Soobramoney relied on the section 27(3) right not to be denied emergency medical 
care and the section 11 right to life. The Court found that Mr. Soobramoney could not 
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provide Mr. Soobramoney with access to health care services, it had been 
established that it did not have sufficient resources to provide dialysis 
treatment to all those in need.21 The Court emphasised that:  
 
[The] guarantees of the Constitution are not absolute but may be limited in 
one way or another. In some instances, the Constitution states in so many 
words that the state must take reasonable legislative and other measures, 
within its available resources “to achieve the progressive realisation of 
each of these rights.” In its language, the Constitution accepts that it 
cannot solve all of our society’s woes overnight, but must go on trying to 
resolve these problems. One of the limiting factors to the attainment of the 
Constitution’s guarantees is that of limited or scarce resources. In the 
present case the limited haemodialysis facilities, inclusive of 
haemodialysis machines, beds and trained staff constitute the limited or 
scarce facilities.22  
 
In the Court’s view, it would only interfere with the decision of the 
hospital if it was irrational and taken in bad faith: ‘A court will be slow to 
interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs 
and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such 
matters’.23 The Court added that unlike the political organs it did not have 
the institutional capacity to engage with the agonising problems of 
making choices.24  
 
                                                                                                                                            
base his case on section 27(3) because his case was not an emergency. In the CC’s 
opinion, an emergency occurs when ‘[a] person suffers a sudden catastrophe which calls 
for immediate medical attention’ (para 20). Mr. Soobramoney’s case was not an 
emergency; it was ‘an ongoing state of affairs resulting from a deterioration of … [his] 
renal function which is incurable’ (para 21). Having failed to be treated as an emergency 
under section 27(3), Mr. Soobramoney’s case could be dealt with only in terms of 
sections 27(1) and (2) of the Constitution. 
 
21
 See paras 24 – 26.  
 
22
 Para 44. 
 
23
 Para 29 [Emphasis mine]. 
 
24
 Para 58. 
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The Soobramoney case was followed by the Grootboom case, a case in 
which the Court moved away from the rationality test set out in 
Soobramoney to a reasonableness test. This case was instituted under 
sections 26(1) and 28(1) (c) to enforce everyone’s right of access to 
adequate housing and the children’s rights to shelter, basic nutrition and 
health care respectively. In setting aside the decision of the Cape High 
Court,25 the CC held that the Constitution requires the state to put in place 
a comprehensive and workable plan in order to meet its socio-economic 
rights obligations. The Court held further that this obligation is defined by 
three key elements that have to be considered separately: (a) ‘to take 
reasonable legislative and other measures’; (b) ‘to achieve the progressive 
realisation’ of the right; and (c) to act ‘within available resources’.26 A 
reasonable programme, according to the CC, must clearly allocate 
responsibilities and tasks to the different spheres of government and 
ensure that the appropriate financial and human resources are available.27 
Each sphere of government must accept responsibility for the 
implementation of particular parts of a comprehensive and well 
coordinated programme.28  
                                                 
25
 See Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) in 
which Davis J held that the right in section 26(1) was subject to section 26(2), meaning 
that all the state could do was to undertake reasonable measures to realise the rights 
progressively. According to Davis, the state’s progressive measures, intended to achieve 
long term benefits, could not be interfered with by those seeking to jump the queue to get 
short term benefits. However, as for children’s rights in section 28(1)(c), the Judge held 
that they were not subject to the same limitations as section 26(1); the state was under an 
immediate obligation to provide shelter for the children. The Court held that because of 
the right to be cared for by one’s parents, every child would be accompanied by his/her 
parents to the shelter provided by the state. The Judge went on to hold that this did not 
mean that the parents were the bearers of the right to shelter.   
 
26
 Para 38. 
 
27
 Para 39. 
 
28
 Para 40. 
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The CC took a deferential approach by holding that the contours of this 
programme will be left to the state to decide.29 The programme must, 
however, be balanced and flexible and must make appropriate provision 
for attention to short, medium and long term needs. ‘A programme that 
excludes a significant segment of society cannot be said to be 
reasonable’.30 Those whose needs are the most urgent and whose ability 
to enjoy all rights is most in peril must not be ignored by measures aimed 
at achieving realisation of the right.31 Later, in Minister of Health and 
Others v Treatment Action Campaign,32 the CC added that for a public 
programme to meet the constitutional requirements of reasonableness, its 
contents must be made known appropriately.33  
 
The CC’s approach has received more criticism than praise. The first 
major criticism stems from the CC’s rejection of the notion of minimum 
core obligations as adopted by the Committee.34 The second criticism is 
                                                 
29
 Para 41. 
 
30
 Para 43. 
 
31
 Para 44. The CC also held that the programme must be reasonable both in conception 
and implementation:  
[T]he formulation of a programme is only the first stage in meeting the 
state’s obligations. The programme must also be reasonably implemented. 
An otherwise reasonable programme but which is not implemented 
reasonably will not constitute compliance with the state’s obligations’ 
[para 42]. 
 
32
 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC) (TAC case).  
 
33
 Para 123. For an illustration of the facts of this case, see chapter two, at section 
2.3.4.2.  
 
34
 See Bilchitz, D., ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying the 
foundations for future socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 South African 
Journal on Human Rights pp 1 – 26 [Hereinafter referred to as Bilchitz: 2003a]. See also 
Bilchitz, D., Poverty and fundamental rights: The justification and enforcement of socio-
economic rights (2007) Oxford University Press [Hereinafter referred to as Bilchitz: 
2007], at pp 144 – 148,  
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based on the failure to give content to the rights in sections 26(1) and 
27(1). The court has also failed to interrogate not only the effectiveness of 
the means chosen by the state to realise the rights but also the sufficiency 
of resources. This is in addition to the failure to adequately question the 
appropriateness of budgetary allocations and the development of 
standards for examining the adequacy of resources allocated to a specific 
programme. All these criticisms are discussed in the following sub-
sections.35  
                                                                                                                                            
 
35
 Though it is not within the scope of this thesis, it is important to note that the Court 
has also been criticised for its approach to the children’s rights in section 28(1)(c). As 
can be deduced from the express terms of this section, the rights it proclaims are not 
subject to the internal limitations as those enlisted in sections 26(2) and 27(2). However, 
the CC held that the children’s socio-economic rights are no different from the rights of 
everyone else in sections 26 and 27, which are subject to internal limitations. It held 
further that prioritising children’s rights as immediate would produce anomalous results 
as children would be used as stepping stones for adults who would otherwise not qualify 
for the rights. According to the CC, at best, section 28(1)(c) only obligates the state to 
provide immediately for those children who have been removed from the care of their 
parents. This reading of the CC is problematic; it avoids giving the children’s rights any 
meaningful substantive content. One would endorse the view that section 28(1)(c) is an 
express manifestation of the minimum core obligations and is intended to ensure that 
children are provided for without delay. See Liebenberg, S., ‘The interpretation of socio-
economic rights’ in  Woolman, S.,  Roux, T., Klaaren, J., Stein, A., & Chaskalson, M., 
(eds.) Constitutional law of South Africa [2nd Edition, Original Service 12-03] (2005) 
Juta & Company and Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria, pp 33 – 1 to 33 – 
64 [Hereinafter referred to as Liebenberg: 2005a], at pp 33-48 – 33-49; Scott, C., and 
Alston, P., ‘Adjudicating constitutional priorities in a transitional context: A comment on 
Soobramoney’s legacy and Grootboom’s promise’ (2000) 16 South African Journal on 
Human Rights pp 206 – 268 [Hereinafter referred to as Scott & Alston: 2000], at p 260; 
Van Bueren, G., ‘Alleviating poverty through the Constitutional Court’ (1999) 15 South 
African Journal on Human Rights pp 52 – 73, [Hereinafter referred to as Van Bueren: 
1999], at pp 57 – 58; De Vos, P., ‘The economic and social rights of children in South 
Africa’s transitional Constitution’ (1995) 2 SA Public Law pp 233 – 259; De Vos, P., 
‘Pious wishes or directly enforceable rights?: Social and economic rights in South 
Africa’s 1996 Constitution’ (1997) South African Journal on Human Rights pp 67 – 101 
[Hereinafter referred to as De Vos: 1997], at p 88; Bekink, B., and Brand, D., ‘Children’s 
constitutional rights’ in Davel, J., (ed.) Introduction to child law in South Africa (2000) 
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4.2.1 Rejection of the minimum core approach  
 
4.2.1.1 Description of the minimum core obligations approach 
The Committee has construed the provisions of the ICESCR as 
engendering a minimum core obligation incumbent upon all state parties.  
The Committee ‘is of the view that a minimum core obligation to ensure 
the satisfaction of, at the very least, minimum essential levels of each of 
the rights is incumbent upon every State party’.36 The Committee has 
given as an example of a prima facie violation a state party in which any 
significant numbers of individuals are deprived of essential foodstuffs, of 
essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most 
basic forms of education.37 The minimum core content of a right is its 
essential elements, without which the right risks losing its substantive 
significance as a right.38 It is the level below which standards should not 
                                                                                                                                            
Juta & Company p 169;  and Sloth-Nielsen, J., ‘Too little? Too late? The implications of 
the Grootboom case for state response to child headed households’ 2003 (1) Law, 
Democracy and Development pp 113 – 136. Though in the TAC case the CC softens its 
stance by holding that the state bears an obligation to care for children even when they 
are under the care of their parents, when the parents are unable to care for them, the 
Court does not go as far as accepting that the children’s rights are immediate and a 
manifestation of the minimum core obligations. See Mbazira, C., and Sloth-Nielsen, J., 
‘Incy wincey spider went climbing up again.... (Re) assessing children's socio-economic 
rights and section 28 (1)(c) of the Constitution’, paper presented at Conference on Law 
and Transformative Justice in Post-Apartheid South Africa: 04 – 06 October 2006, 
Hosted by the Nelson R Mandela School of Law, University of Fort Hare. 
  
36
 General Comment 3, at para 10.  
 
37
 As above. 
 
38
 Van Bueren: 1999, at p 58 has submitted that the minimum core provides socio-
economic rights with a determinacy and certainty. She submits further that for a right to 
be justiciable, there must be at least a minimum core of certainty; otherwise, it would be 
pointless to incorporate socio-economic rights in a justiciable Bill of Rights.   
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter four 
 161 
fall.39 The minimum core approach does not require the division of rights 
according to their priority, rather it requires that each right be realised to 
the extent that provides for the basic needs of everyone.40 The notion 
emphasises the fact that it is simply unacceptable for any human being to 
live without sufficient resources to maintain his or her survival.41 The 
Committee has thus defined the minimum core obligations that attach to a 
significant number of rights in the ICESCR.42   
                                                 
39
 Russell, S., ‘Minimum state obligations: International dimensions’ in Brand, D., and 
Russell, S., (eds.) Exploring the core content of socio-economic rights: South African 
and international perspectives (2002) Protea Book House pp 11 – 21 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Russell: 2002], at p 15. According to Russell, the purpose of the minimum 
core is not to give the state an escape hatch for avoiding its responsibilities under the 
ICESCR; instead it is the opposite, it is a way to take into account the fact that many 
socio-economic rights require resources that are simply not available in poor countries. 
Even in highly strained circumstances, such state has an irreducible obligation to fulfil 
what it is assumed to be able to meet. The burden is on the state to prove otherwise (at p 
16).  
 
40
 Craven, M., The International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: A 
perspective on its development (1995) Oxford University Press [Hereinafter referred to 
as Craven: 1995], at p 141. 
 
41
  Bilchitz: 2003a, at p 15. 
 
42
 The Committee has strengthened the application of this notion by elaborating on what 
it considers to be the minimum core content of several of the rights guaranteed by the 
ICESCR; see General Comment No. 4, The right to adequate housing (Sixth session, 
1991), U.N. Doc. E/1992/23, annex III at 114 (1991); General Comment No. 12, Right to 
adequate food (Twentieth session, 1999), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/1999/5 (1999); General 
Comment No. 13, The right to education (Twenty-first session, 1999), U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/1999/10 (1999); General Comment No. 14 The right to the highest attainable 
standard of health (Twenty-second session, 2000), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000); and 
General Comment No. 15, The right to water (Twenty-ninth session, 2003), U.N. Doc. 
E/C.12/2002/11 (2002) [Hereinafter referred to as General Comment No. 14]; all 
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 (2003). In addition to the 
Committee, the notion of minimum core obligations has received support elsewhere. The 
Maastricht Guidelines cite as a violation, a state’s failure to meet the minimum core 
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The minimum core obligations approach averts the danger of states 
relying on the concepts of ‘progressive realisation’ and ‘to the maximum 
of [their] available resources’ to render the rights in the ICESCR 
meaningless. While states may take steps only to realise the rights 
progressively, certain obligations are immediate.43 The notion challenges 
the conception of socio-economic rights as being programmatic and 
incapable of enforcement. It translates the rights from abstract 
entitlements to concrete rights that guarantee concrete individual goods 
and services. Additionally, the notion of minimum core obligations 
reduces inequality by playing a redistributive role. It ensures that 
                                                                                                                                            
obligation as defined by the Committee (para 2); The United Nations Commission on 
Human Rights has given credence to the minimum core when it says that states are urged 
to consider benchmarks designed to give effect to the minimum core obligation to ensure 
respect for minimum levels of living for everyone; U.N. ESCOR, Commission on 
Human Rights, Res. 1993/14. The Inter-American Commission on Human Rights has 
said that the most vulnerable members of society should not be denied access to the basic 
needs for survival. That without satisfaction of these basic needs, an individual's survival 
is directly threatened, which obviously diminishes the individual's rights to life, personal 
security, and the right to participate in the political and economic processes. See Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights Annual Report, 1993 OEA/Ser.L/V.85, Feb 
1994, Chapter IV. See also para 9 of The Maastricht Guidelines on Violations of 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, text in Ramcharan, B., (ed.) Judicial protection of 
economic, social and cultural rights (2005) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers pp 553 – 562.  
 
43
 Chapman, A., and Russell, S., ‘Introduction’ in Chapman, A., and Russell, S., (eds.) 
The core obligations: Building a framework for economic, social and cultural rights 
(2002) INTERSENTIA pp 1 – 18 [Hereinafter referred to as Chapman & Russell: 2002], 
at pp 6 and 16. The notion emphasises that in spite of the fact that the obligations in the 
ICESCR may be fulfilled progressively; there are those obligations which are immediate. 
In this respect, the notion compliments articles 2(2) and (3) which put the need to realise 
the rights without discrimination above the conditions of progressive realisation and 
available resources. It is not surprising therefore that non-discrimination in extending the 
rights has been subsumed as one of the elements of the minimum core of every right. It 
also complements the interpretation of the Committee to the effect that the phrase 
‘progressive realisation’ imposes an obligation on states to move as expeditiously and 
effectively as possible towards full realisation of the rights (General Comment No. 3, 
para 9). 
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resources are directed towards those who cannot meet their basic needs 
using their own means.  
 
Nonetheless, in spite of the overwhelming support that the notion of the 
minimum core has received, its implementation still poses a number of 
challenges. For instance, it remains unclear as to whether the minimum 
standards refer to individual enjoyment of a right or to society-wide levels 
of enjoyment.44 The Committee has said that a state in which ‘a 
significant number of people is deprived of essential [needs] is, prima 
facie, failing to discharge its obligations.’45 This might be taken to mean 
that the minimum core does not establish individual rights but looks at 
society as a whole from a relative perspective.46 However, in several of its 
General Comments, the Committee has indicated that the minimum core 
refers to individual levels of enjoyment. For instance, in General 
Comment No. 15, the Committee has said that ‘[t]he water supply for 
each person must be sufficient and continuous for personal and domestic 
uses’.47 The Committee has also said that ‘water facilities and services 
have to be accessible to everyone without discrimination’.48  
                                                 
44
 Scott: 1998, at p 101. 
 
45
 General Comment No. 3, para 10. 
 
46
 Wesson, M., ‘Grootboom and beyond: Reassessing the socio-economic jurisprudence 
of the South African Constitutional Court’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human 
Rights pp 284 – 308 [Hereinafter referred to as Wesson: 2004], at p 298.  
 
47
 Para 12(a). 
 
48
 Para 12(c) [Emphasis mine]. One of the main reasons why the reasonableness review 
approach, as stands now, cannot lead to the realisation of the minimum core is because 
of its failure to focus on the individual. Instead, the reasonableness review approach 
emphasises society-wide levels of enjoyment by requiring a comprehensive and inclusive 
programme that takes care of short, medium and long term needs. Although the CC’s 
approach requires that those in desperate need should be taken care of, it neither 
guarantees them individual entitlements nor hold that their needs should take priority 
over all other needs. 
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Additionally, at the international level, it remains unclear as to whether 
the minimum core standards are international or state specific.49 The 
socio-economic contexts and needs of countries differ from country to 
country. Socio-economic variations between countries depend on factors 
such as economic and social history, the nature of the economic system 
and the resources at the disposal of a state. These variations will dictate 
that every country adopts that approach that best realises the socio-
economic needs of its people within the prevalent circumstances.50 The 
most viable option, therefore, is to develop state specific standards, the 
‘relative core minimums’, as opposed to ‘absolute core minimums’.51 This 
is because it would be inappropriate for poor states to be judged by the 
same standards as their rich counterparts. Yet, on the other hand, it would 
                                                                                                                                            
 
49
 Craven: 1995, at pp 141 – 2. 
 
50
 Eide, A., ‘Realization of social and economic rights and the minimum threshold 
approach’ (1989) 10 Human Rights Law Journal pp 35 – 51 at p 46. He submits that 
because of this, as a minimum, all governments should establish a nation-wide system of 
identifying local needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of socio-economic rights. In 
doing this, the focus should be placed on identifying, in particular, the needs of groups 
which have the greatest difficulties in the enjoyment of these rights. See also 
Andreassen, B., Skålnes, T., Smith, G., and Stokke, H., ‘Assessing human rights 
performance in developing countries: The case for a minimum threshold approach to 
economic and social rights’ in Andreassen, B., and Eide. A., (eds.) Human rights in 
developing countries 1987/88: A Yearbook on human rights in countries receiving 
Nordic aid (1988) Chr. Michelsen Institute, Danish Center for Human Rights and 
Norwegian Institute of Human Rights pp 333 – 355 [Hereinafter referred to Andreassen 
et al: 1988], at pp 335 and 340 – 341.  
 
51
 Scott & Alston: 2000, at p 250. According to Craven: 1995, at p 142, the current 
practice of the Committee that requires states to establish bench-marks of poverty 
eradication and to identify disadvantaged sectors of the population suggests that state 
specific minima are the only viable option. 
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be inappropriate for the residents of rich countries if their states were 
judged by the same standards as the poor countries.52 
 
4.2.1.2 The CC’s reluctance to adopt  the minimum core approach   
In addition to the reluctance to construct socio-economic rights as 
conferring individual entitlements, the rejection of the minimum core by 
the CC has, amongst others, been based on the lack of the institutional 
capacity to assess what the minimum core would be for each right. 
According to the Court:  
 
It is not possible to determine the minimum threshold for the progressive 
realisation of the right of access to adequate housing without first 
identifying the needs and opportunities for the enjoyment of such a right. 
These will vary according to factors such as income, unemployment, 
availability of land and poverty. The differences between city and rural 
communities will also determine the needs and opportunities for the 
enjoyment of this right. Variations ultimately depend on the economic and 
social history and circumstances of a country. All this illustrates the 
complexity of the task of determining a minimum core obligation for the 
progressive realisation of the right[s]...53 
 
                                                 
52
 See Otto, D., and Wiseman, D., ‘In search of “Effective Remedies”: Applying the 
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights in Australia’ (2001) 7 
Australian Journal of Human Rights pp 5 – 46 [Hereinafter referred to as Otto & 
Wiseman: 2000], at p 9. Socio-economic rights obligations can be operationalised by the 
use of country specific indicators. These indicators could be used to measure the 
provision of identified minimal needs of the people such as nutrition, housing and health 
care needs. Andreassen et al: 1988, at p 341 have suggested that, by using these 
indicators, the scope of violation of socio-economic rights would be measured, for 
instance, by referring to the percentage of the population not assured of the minimal 
threshold. 
 
53
 Grootboom case, at para 32. In respect of the right of access to adequate housing, the 
CC said that the determination of a minimum core for this right presents difficult 
questions. This is because the needs of people in the context of access to adequate 
housing are diverse: there are those who need land; others need both land and houses; yet 
others need financial assistance. There are also difficult questions relating to the 
definition of the minimum core in the context of a right to have access to adequate 
housing; in particular, whether the minimum core obligation should be defined generally 
or with regard to specific groups of people. 
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However, the quotation above suggests that the Court left the possibility 
of adopting the minimum core approach open.54 It seems as if it declined 
to define it simply because it did not have adequate information to enable 
it to do so.55 This meant that in future, should the CC muster sufficient 
experience and have adequate information before it, just like the 
Committee, it would be prepared to define the minimum core.56 This 
notwithstanding, the approach of the CC subsequently pours cold water 
on this possibility. The Court later held that imposing a minimum core 
obligation on the state is imposing an impossible duty: 
 
It is impossible to give everyone access even to a “core” service 
immediately. All that is possible, and all that can be expected of the state, 
is that it acts reasonably to provide access to the socio-economic rights 
identified in sections 26 and 27 on a progressive basis.57  
 
                                                 
54
 Bilchitz, D., ‘Giving socio-economic rights teeth: The minimum core and its 
importance’ (2002) 119 South African Law Journal pp 484 – 501 [Hereinafter referred to 
as Bilchitz: 2002], at p 485. 
 
55
 See paras 31 – 33. It has been suggested by Chapman & Russell: 2002, at p 18 – 19, 
that the minimum core obligations approach is woven through the Grootboom judgment, 
both explicitly and implicitly. They base this view on the statement in the judgment to 
the effect that a society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided 
for all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and equality (Grootboom 
case, para 44). In my opinion, however, it is clear from the rest of the judgment that, at 
best, the CC only applied the minimum core obligations approach in a pseudo manner. 
This is when it emphasised that a reasonable programme must make provision for those 
in desperate need. While this is an element of the minimum core of the right of access to 
housing and all other rights as based on non-discrimination, the manner in which it was 
applied by the CC is incomplete. The court does not define the needs of such desperate 
people as taking priority over all other needs. Yet the Court does not define, in precise 
terms, what the needs of the vulnerable are in relation to the right of access to adequate 
housing. 
 
56
 See TAC case, at para 33. 
 
57
 TAC case, at para 35. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter four 
 167 
This quotation suggests that the CC considers immediate realisation of the 
minimum core to be impossible because the state cannot afford it.58 It is, 
however, evident that the Court’s conclusion is not based on any evidence 
adduced by the state to prove that it is impossible on its part to satisfy the 
minimum core. Contrary to the assertion in the Grootboom case that the 
court cannot define the minimum core without sufficient information 
before it, the CC in the TAC case, without any evidence, closes the 
possibility of the minimum core by describing it as something that is 
impossible to realise.  
 
The CC ignores the fact that there is an evidential burden on the state not 
only to prove that the resources are inadequate but also that it is striving 
to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the rights in the 
circumstances.59  The CC ignores the need for this evidential burden and 
                                                 
58
 During the hearing of the case, one of the judges, Justice Sachs, engaged counsel in 
questions that sent the message that the minimum core was impossible. Justice Sachs 
asked counsel whether the minimum core meant that somebody living in the mountains 
could come to court and say that he wants water from a tap, even if the money spent on 
this demand would furnish water for 10,000 people on the lower plain. See Sachs, A., 
‘The judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights: The Grootboom case’ in Peris, J., 
and Kristian, S., (eds.) Democratising development: The politics of socio-economic 
rights in South Africa (2005) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers pp 131 – 152 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Sachs: 2005], at p 150. However, this is a total disregard of the views of 
the Committee that ‘resources play [a role] in assessing whether or not a country has 
discharged its minimum core obligations and that a state could attribute its failure to 
discharge the obligation to inadequacy of resources’. 
 
59
 The Committee has said that the availability of resources plays a role in determining 
whether a state has violated its minimum core obligations. However, a state must 
‘demonstrate that every effort has been made to use all resources that are at its 
disposition in an effort to satisfy, as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations’. 
General Comment No. 3, at para 10. The Committee has added that ‘even where the 
available resources are demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for the State 
Party to strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the 
prevailing circumstances’. General Comment No.3, para 11. The Committee goes on to 
state that, moreover, the obligations to monitor the extent of the realisation, or more 
especially of the non-realisation, of socio-economic rights and to devise strategies and 
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makes its own assumptions, unsupported by evidence, that the state does 
not have the resources to satisfy the minimum core. The state should also 
have been required to show that every effort is being exhausted towards 
meeting the basic needs in the circumstances.60 This is because the notion 
of minimum core does not require that minimum levels of goods and 
services be provided irrespective of circumstances that may make this 
impossible.61 Provision of a minimum core, therefore, can be justified 
only in circumstances where non-provision cannot be ‘justified by the 
state and where it is appropriate in the circumstances to order that the 
claimant be provided with the benefit’.62 The state could still argue that it 
does not have the resources to meet the minimum core immediately. This, 
however, would not mean that the state is completely exculpated; it has to 
ensure maximum protection of the rights in the circumstances. This point 
is discussed in more detail later.     
 
                                                                                                                                            
programmes for their promotion, are not in any way eliminated as a result of resource 
constraints (at para 11). See also Liebenberg, S., ‘Violations of socio-economic rights: 
The role of the South African Human Rights Commission’ in Andrews, P., and Ellman, 
S., (eds.) The Post-apartheid Constitutions: Perspectives on South Africa’s basic law 
(2001) Witwatersrand University Press and Ohio University Press pp 405 – 443 
[Hereinafter referred to as Liebenberg: 2001], at p 419. 
 
60
 Wesson: 2004, at p 302. According to Pieterse: 2004a, at p 898, the CC’s rejection of 
the minimum core on the assumption that it would always lead to immediately 
enforceable entitlements against the state seems to indicate ignorance of the function of 
the minimum core in international law, which expressly situates the concept within an 
overarching framework of progressive realisation and indicates that there may be 
circumstances in which non-compliance with the core obligations may be justified. 
 
61
 Pieterse: 2005, at p 142. 
 
62
 Pieterse, M., ‘Resuscitating socio-economic rights: Constitutional entitlement to health 
services’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 473 – 502 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Pieterse: 2006], at p 483.  
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In addition to the problem of resources, one of the reasons why the CC 
has declined to define the minimum core obligation is because of a 
conviction that people’s needs vary. This links to the problem of 
polycentricism as discussed in chapter three.63 The Court has, for 
instance, observed that:  
 
The determination of a minimum core in the context of “the right to have 
access to adequate housing” presents difficult questions. This is so because 
the needs in the context of access to adequate housing are diverse: there 
are those who need land; others need both land and houses; yet others need 
financial assistance.64 
 
This means that the minimum core is oblivious to context and the 
diversified needs that context gives rise to. The CC’s concerns have been 
broadened and endorsed by Liebenberg. She submits that the minimum 
core closes down debate and artificially curtails the evolution of standards 
of defining social needs as struggles around them unfold.65 Liebenberg 
perceives the minimum core as setting rigid standards as to what the basic 
needs are; these standards ‘would be insensitive to the varying 
circumstances of differently situated groups in society’.66 This is what has 
motivated Liebenberg to retract her support for the minimum core 
obligations approach and to give backing to the reasonableness review 
approach. She submits that the reasonableness review approach is more 
suited for contextual application because of its flexibility arising from its 
                                                 
63
 Section 3.4.1. 
 
64
 Para 33. 
 
65
 Liebenberg, S., Needs rights and transformation: Adjudicating social rights (2005) 
Center for Human Rights and Global Justice Working Paper No. 8, at p 27. Sourced at 
<http://www.nyuhr.org/docs/wp/Liebenberg%20%20Needs,%20Rights%20and%20Tran
sformation.pdf> (accessed on 23 March 2006) [Hereinafter referred to as Liebenberg: 
2005b]. Also published in (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review pp 5 – 36. 
 
66
 Liebenberg, S., ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ 
(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 1 – 31 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Liebenberg: 2005c], at p 24. See also Pieterse: 2006, at p 491. 
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refusal to impose an absolute standard of performance.67 Similar 
sentiments have been expressed by Steinberg who submits that the 
minimum core approach would result in actual and perceived restrictions 
on the legislature. He endorses the reasonableness review approach as 
being standard based rather than rule based as the minimum core would 
be. Steinberg submits that the minimum core closes down the space to 
argue, for example, that to postpone other interests like promoting 
economic growth and job creation is not the most legitimate interpretation 
of the Constitution.68 
 
However, in my opinion, these concerns about the rigidity of the 
minimum core approach are taken care of by Liebenberg’s suggestions in 
earlier writings. She has suggested elsewhere that acceptance of the 
minimum core does not require the court to define, in the abstract, the 
basket of goods and services that must be provided. Instead, the court 
could define the general principles underlying the concept of minimum 
core obligations in relation to socio-economic rights. These principles, so 
she argues, would then be applied by the courts on a case-by-case basis to 
define the content of the rights in the circumstances.69 The court would 
                                                 
67
 Liebenberg: 2005c, at p 24. See also Liebenberg, S., ‘Enforcing positive socio-
economic rights claims: The South African model of reasonableness’ in Squires, J., 
Langford, M., and Thiele, B., (eds.) The road to a remedy: Current issues in the 
litigation of economic, social and cultural rights (2005) Australian Human Rights Centre 
and Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction pp 73 – 88 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Liebenberg: 2005d], at p 81.  
 
68
 Steinberg: 2006, at pp 273 – 274 and 275. 
 
69
 Liebenberg, S., ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: An 
effective tool in challenging poverty’ (2002) 6 Law, Democracy and Development pp 
159 – 191 [Hereinafter referred to as Liebenberg: 2002], at p 175. See also Liebenberg: 
2005a, at p 33-31. Liebenberg: 2005a, at p 33-31. Bilchitz: 2002, at p 487, has suggested 
that the duty of the courts is to identify general principles that specify the obligations of 
government or individuals which apply beyond the facts of each case. Bilchitz also 
contends that, in giving content to these socio-economic rights, a court engages in a 
process of specifying general principles that define the obligations placed upon the state 
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indicate the general principles of what is required to remedy the breach 
while leaving a margin of discretion to the state to decide the most 
appropriate means of fulfilling the minimum core.70 Liebenberg has given 
as an example a community suffering from starvation. It would be for the 
state to decide whether it fulfils their minimum core by cash grants, food 
vouchers or direct delivery of foodstuffs.71 Indeed, ‘the recognition and 
enforcement of socio-economic entitlements need not take the form of a 
once-off and comprehensive determination of need, coupled with a rigid 
insistence on adherence to acontextual standards’.72 Actually, ‘[n]othing 
prohibits courts from incrementally awarding context-sensitive and need-
specific, enforceable minimum content to section 27(1)(a) on a case-by-
case basis’.73  
                                                                                                                                            
by the right. One could submit that this would give chance to those with the ‘sharpest 
elbows’ who make it to the courts to have their minimum core met at the expense of 
those who cannot access the courts. However, it is submitted in chapter five that this 
depends on the form of justice that the court adopts. If the court adopts distributive, as 
opposed to corrective justice, it will be able to address the interests of similarly situated 
people as the applicants in a specific case (see section 5.2.2 of chapter five). 
 
70
 Bilchitz: 2002, at p 488 has given as an example the minimum core of the right of 
access to adequate housing. The court, for instance, would hold that every South African 
must have access to accommodation that involves, at least, protection from the elements 
in a sanitary condition with access to basic services, such as toilets and running water. 
According to Bilchitz, the setting of this general standard, however, still raises 
significant questions as to the measures that will be adopted in particular cases. In 
Bilchitz’s view, protection from the elements could involve the provision of tents or the 
provision of corrugated, galvanized iron such that people build their own shacks; but that 
whatever method is adopted would be for the legislature and executive to decide. 
Bilchitz adds that, even with such deference, the reasonableness of particular measures 
must be assessed against the general principles that the court interprets as defining the 
content of the right. 
 
71
 Liebenberg: 2002, at p 175. 
 
72
 Pieterse: 2006, at p 491. 
 
73
 As above. 
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For instance, the courts could define the minimum core of the right to 
water as, among others, requiring the state ‘[t]o ensure access to the 
minimum essential amount of water … that is sufficient and safe for 
personal and domestic uses to prevent disease’.74 But the courts would not 
define the exact quantity of water since people differently placed may 
require different quantities for personal and domestic use and prevention 
of disease. It would be left to the state to decide what is sufficient in every 
circumstance. This though does not mean that the state’s discretion is 
without constraint; any quantities chosen must be justified, either by 
scientific evidence or actual research addressed to a specific context. If 
the court thinks the quantities inadequate, it could step in and become 
prescriptive. In being prescriptive, however, the court should still rely on 
scientific and other evidence which defines the quantities either as 
adequate or inadequate.      
 
It is submitted here that the deferential nature of this approach gives 
socio-economic rights content and also allows for contextual application 
of the minimum core. The contextual application of the minimum core is 
also enhanced by the discretion given to the state to choose the most 
appropriate way to realise the rights in every context. Of course, it cannot 
be ruled out that there could be those cases in which the courts may have 
to be prescriptive as to the precise means needed to realise a right in the 
circumstances.75 However, the approach also has a potentially negative 
impact that needs to be guarded against. Definition of the core content of 
the rights using general principles may deprive the rights of their meaning 
and portray them as vague in nature. In spite of this, the strength of this 
                                                                                                                                            
 
74
 General Comment No. 15, para 37(a). 
 
75
 If, for instance, after being given reasonable time and opportunity to exercise its 
discretion and choose the most appropriate means, the state fails to do so, the court may 
decide to choose the means and order the state to carry them out. There also may be 
circumstances in which there is only one way of realising the rights, as was the case in 
the TAC case. 
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approach lies in the fact that it gives the government leeway in choosing 
the most appropriate means and allows for their contextual application. 
This is because it does not present the minimum core as requiring any 
rigid standards or particular means by which it is to be realised. Yet 
though broad standards are used here, the rights could still be made 
meaningful by defining them in an open-ended manner but which takes 
into account the purpose of each right.76 Only when the rights are defined 
in this manner can one proclaim the existence of general standards upon 
which the state is evaluated in a variety of contexts.77   
 
In addition to the above, the minimum core does not demand that a 
minimum level of goods and services be provided to everyone 
immediately. Indeed, the state may not have the resources needed for this 
to happen. This explains why the CC has found that even when all 
available resources are deployed, the state cannot afford a minimum core 
for everyone: ‘It is impossible to give everyone access even to a “core” 
                                                 
76
 This is an exercise which does not require a lot of information on the part of the court. 
As has been shown in chapter three (section 3.3.2), courts have expertise and experience 
in interpreting legal texts and subjecting policy, legislation and conduct to defined legal 
standards. Defining the minimum core would not present tasks different from this. 
According to Bilchitz: 2002, at p 488, in order to specify the standard that government 
must meet to comply with its obligations, it is not necessary for the court to have wide 
sources of information such as that available to the Committee. Such information may be 
necessary in order to decide on particular actions that the state is required to take in 
particular circumstances. However, it is not necessary in order for us to understand what 
the basic needs of people are. In Bilchitz’s view, what the Grootboom community 
wanted was protection from the elements, and an environment that would not be 
injurious to their health. He adds that very few people would have difficulty in 
specifying the nature of their most basic needs and the CC overstates the matter when it 
depicts this as involving enormous complexity. 
 
77
 Bilchitz, D., ‘Health’ in  Woolman, S.,  Roux, T., Klaaren, J., Stein, A., & Chaskalson, 
M., (eds.) Constitutional law of South Africa, (2005) [2nd Edition, Original Service: 
2005] Juta & Company and Centre for Human Rights, University of Pretoria pp 56A-i —
56A-47 [Hereinafter referred to as Bilchitz: 2005], at p 56A-23.  
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service immediately’.78 As a matter of fact, it would be straining a 
country’s resources for the minimum core to be provided to all. Indeed, 
the minimum core obligation does not require that minimum levels of 
threshold be provided to all, including those who do not need it.79 Most 
countries, including South Africa, have a substantial portion of their 
population living above minimal basic levels of living without direct 
dependence on the state.80 With constrained resources, it would only be 
reasonable that the state provides the minimum core only to those who 
need it. All that the state has to do is to ensure minimum basic needs for 
those unable to provide for themselves without state support. This should 
be done simultaneously with efforts to enable those that are able to 
provide for themselves using their means to do so in a sustainable manner 
                                                 
78
 TAC case, para 35. 
 
79
 Roux has criticised the Grootboom case for not going far enough to constrain the state 
from spending scarce resources on relatively privileged groups for whom such assistance 
is an added advantage rather than a need. In Roux’s opinion, this is because the 
interpretation in the case falls short of obliging government to order its spending 
priorities in a particular way. Rather, the decision is a statement for the proposition that 
the Constitution requires diversification of social and economic policy to cater for 
vulnerable groups. Roux, T., ‘Understanding Grootboom – A response to Cass Sunstein’ 
(2002) Constitutional Forum pp 41 – 51 [Hereinafter referred to as Roux: 2002], at p 42.  
 
80
 Andreassen et al: 1988, at p 344. Though he uses it in a different context, Bilchitz: 
2002, at p 489, illustrates this point by the example of the right of access to adequate 
housing in South Africa. He is of the view that the mere fact that people’s needs are 
varied in relation to accessing the minimum core of housing does not affect the 
obligation of the state. According to Bilchitz, the fact that some people need access to 
land, some need land and houses, and others need financial assistance is not relevant to 
the determination of the minimum core. In Bilchitz’s opinion, each person is entitled to 
the same level of provision and the differential needs people have will determine in what 
way the government, if at all, is required to assist them: for instance, if the minimum 
core is provision of shelter, those who have land and shelter will have no claim, those 
with land but with no shelter will have a claim to shelter, and those who have neither 
land nor shelter will have a claim to both land and shelter. 
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in the future.81 This would require the state to identify those persons or 
categories of persons who are in need of the minimum core. The 
beginning point is to identify different sectors and groups in society and, 
thereafter, to identify the most vulnerable who need a minimum threshold 
in each sector.82 The sectors and groups could, for instance, include the 
rural and urban and the formal and informal. The state would then ensure 
that a minimum level of goods and services is extended to the vulnerable 
in each sector or group. On the basis of this approach, one could submit 
that by holding that a programme that does not include those in desperate 
need is unreasonable the CC has applied the minimum core.83 The CC has 
said that:  
 
A society must seek to ensure that the basic necessities of life are provided 
to all if it is to be a society based on human dignity, freedom and equality. 
To be reasonable, measures cannot leave out of account the degree and 
extent of the denial of the right they endeavour to realise. Those whose 
needs are the most urgent and whose ability to enjoy all rights therefore is 
most in peril, must not be ignored by the measures aimed at achieving 
realisation of the right. It may not be sufficient to meet the test of 
reasonableness to show that the measures are capable of achieving a 
statistical advance in the realisation of the right. Furthermore, the 
Constitution requires that everyone must be treated with care and concern. 
If the measures, though statistically successful, fail to respond to the needs 
of those most desperate, they may not pass the test.84 [Emphasis mine] 
 
The problem with the position of the Court is that it still fails to define 
any substantive entitlements for the vulnerable.85 All it emphasises is that 
                                                 
81
 As more and more people cross into the ‘able group’ so is the reduction in pressure on 
the resources to provide for those who cannot provide for themselves. 
 
82
 Anreassen et al: 1988, at p 337. 
 
83
 Chapman & Russell: 2002, at p 18 – 19. 
 
84
 Para 44. In the same judgment, the CC said that the minimum core obligation is 
determined generally by having regard to the needs of the most vulnerable group that is 
entitled to the protection of the right in question. According to the Court, it is in this 
context that the concept of minimum core must be understood in international law (para 
31). 
 
85
 Pieterse: 2006, at p 493.  
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the programme should be inclusive and not disregard the most vulnerable. 
However, even when the state does not have the resources to provide the 
minimum core immediately, it should be able to provide some tangible 
goods and services to the most vulnerable as an interim measure. The 
Committee has stated that even where the available resources are 
demonstrably inadequate the obligation remains for the State Party to 
strive to ensure the widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under 
the prevailing circumstances’.86 While the reasonableness review 
approach comes very close to this approach it is deficient to the extent 
that it does not describe, in terms of content, what would have been due to 
the vulnerable had resources been adequate. Such description is important 
as it guides the state on the levels of goods and services that ought to be 
realised as soon as resources become available. The state must also 
demonstrate its commitment to maintaining progressive realisation of the 
rights for all and improving the condition of the vulnerable over time. 
  
4.2.1.3 How to prioritise the needs of the most vulnerable  
The issue that one has to confront, however, is whether prioritising the 
needs of the most vulnerable has a negative effect on the capacity to 
progressively realise the rights of everyone else. ‘Progressive realisation’ 
could mean that the quality of life of all, including those living above the 
minimum threshold, improves. But this is not what the minimum core 
approach appears to require; the notion calls on states to accord a high 
level of priority to the basic needs of all and especially of those who are in 
dire need.87 Progressive improvement for those who already have a 
                                                                                                                                            
 
86
 General Comment No.3, para 11. 
 
87
 According to Bilchitz: 2003a, at pp 15 – 16, the minimum core is a means of 
specifying priorities, it involves an injunction that priority must be given to those in a 
condition where their survival is threatened. He adds that any government programme 
must consider the needs of people in such a situation and assist them as a matter of 
priority. Blichitz adds further that the state cannot treat such people as representing one 
problem to be dealt with amongst others.  
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minimum level has to wait until everyone has had access to the basic 
needs.88 But this does not mean that the state does not have any 
obligations towards those living above the minimum level. The state 
should avoid creating conditions that cripple the ability of those living 
above minimum levels to meet their needs on their own. The creation of 
such negative conditions would amount to retrogressive measures which 
are in themselves prima facie violations.89  
                                                                                                                                            
 
88
 According to Liebenberg: 2005a, the best approach would be one that in the first place 
requires the state to ensure that everyone has access to the minimum core and then, in the 
second place, the state must over time improve the quality of socio-economic rights to 
which individuals have access. However, Wesson: 2004, at p 303 has expressed doubts 
about an approach that prioritises minimum core needs by requiring redistribution of 
resources from ‘non core’ needs to the ‘core needs’ and only back to ‘non core’ needs 
when the core is met for everyone. In Wesson’s opinion, this may be counterproductive. 
This is because the minimum core would not allow for a multi-layered approach to the 
realisation of socio-economic rights. She uses the Grootboom case to show that the 
multi-layered approach allows the state to employ a variety of measures to realise the 
right such as emergency relief, low-cost housing and provision of subsidies. Wesson also 
uses the example of the right to health to question the wisdom of diverting resources to 
‘non core’ needs, such as care for the chronically ill, to the ‘core needs’ of the right to 
health. In Wesson’s opinion, this is not a course that society would be prepared to 
embark on, and she advocates an approach that would prioritise all needs. Wesson views 
as most promising an approach that only entails limited distribution; certain allocations, 
but not all, may be compromised to satisfy the core needs. What Wesson does not 
realise, however, is that the prioritisation submission is not based on the assumption that 
the state will begin from scratch. Those services that are already being provided, though 
they do not constitute a minimum core, should continue to be provided. Their reduction 
would amount to retrogressive measures anyway. What is being advocated is that 
resources that would have otherwise been expended on improving non-core needs be 
directed to core needs. And as soon as the core is fully provided, then improvements to 
all will be made. 
 
89
 The Committee has said that any deliberate retrogressive measures would require the 
most careful consideration and would need to be fully justified by reference to the 
totality of the rights provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the 
maximum available resources. General Comment No. 3 (para 3). 
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The problem with the Grootboom case is that while it requires protection 
of the needs of the most vulnerable, it does not require that such needs 
should be high on the agenda.90 All the CC says is that the needs of such 
people should not be ignored by measures intended to realise the right. 
The Court demands that there should be a programme which is inclusive 
and possibly spreads resources to meet the short, medium and long term 
needs simultaneously. This approach, therefore, is about inclusiveness 
without compulsion that the state gives high priority to the needs of the 
most vulnerable. Indeed, in a recent paper, Liebenberg has described the 
reasonableness approach as a formalistic and abstract approach which 
equates the needs of the wealthy with those of the poor by requiring 
government to be even-handed in attending to both.91  
 
I am not submitting here that all other forms of expenditure should be 
suspended until the minimum core of those who are in need of it is met. 
Instead, I am submitting that more efforts should be directed to meet dire 
                                                 
90
 See Roux: 2002, at pp 42 and 47. Roux has said that even if the South African 
government takes the Grootboom order seriously, this will only have an impact on the 
state’s budget but will not have an impact on the temporal order in which competing 
needs are met. In Roux’s opinion, it is only the wholesome adoption of paragraph 10 of 
General Comment No. 3 that would have required the government to devote all available 
resources to meet the needs of those without any kind of shelter before moving on to 
improving the life condition of everyone (at p 47). See also Pieterse: 2004a, at p 896. 
Roux has argued in another paper that had the Court required the government to 
prioritise the needs of those who need a minimum core over those who do not, it would 
have put itself in direct confrontation with the political branches whose duty it is to make 
budgetary allocations. That this is because the Court would have been substituting its 
views on resource allocation for those of the political branches (Roux: 2003, at pp 97 – 
98). But it is submitted in this chapter that the minimum core could still be implemented 
in a manner that gives appropriate deference to the political branches. As mentioned 
above (section 4.2.1.2) the Court would have to define the minimum core using broad 
parameters and leave it to the state to choose the most appropriate means for its 
realisation.  
 
91
 Liebenberg: 2005b, at 19.  
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needs and less on needs that may not be necessary for survival. 
Expenditure on already established non-core needs should be sustained as 
any withdrawal would amount to retrogressive measures. The state 
should, however, only enhance the quality of non-core needs only after it 
has met the core needs. All needs would then be progressively improved. 
 
 It also should be noted that the minimum core itself does not remain 
static; people’s needs within every country should be commensurate with 
the level of resources. As a country’s resource levels increase, so does the 
level of the minimum needs of people. The state should at all times strive 
to see to it that people’s standards of life improve. This will be reflected 
not only in the quantity but also in the quality of the basic goods and 
services available for disposal to the people.92 However, the state should 
only strive to improve the quality of life for all after bringing everyone 
above the minimum levels of life. Failure to do this only entrenches the 
wide-spread inequalities and social exclusion of the vulnerable. This 
though, does not mean that the provision of services for those living 
above the minimum core should be suspended. All it means is that the 
needs of those living below the minimum core be prioritised by increased 
expenditure in their favour. It is true that the courts may not have the 
institutional capacity to ration resources to ensure such prioritisation.  
However, they have the capacity to evaluate the evidence before them and 
                                                 
92
 I have, for instance, submitted elsewhere that the people’s minimum levels of water 
supply for domestic use increase as the service gets closer to them. A resident using a 
yard water tap uses less water as compared to a resident that has multiple taps in the 
house. It is on this ground that I have criticised the adequacy of the basic water supply 
that is supplied to all households in the same quantities irrespective of the levels of 
access. In this regard, the author have suggested that the quantities of basic water should 
improve as access improves. But this is not to suggest that improvement should be 
effected before everyone has access to a core. See Mbazira, C., ‘Privatisation and the 
right of access to sufficient water in South Africa: The case of Lukhanji and Amahlati’ in 
De Visser, J., and Mbazira, C., (eds.) Water delivery: Public or private (2006) Centre for 
Environmental Law and Policy pp 57 – 86, at p 67.   
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to determine whether priority is being accorded to the basic needs of the 
poor. How best the court can do this is discussed later in this chapter.93  
 
In order to steer the CC towards prioritising basic needs, it has been 
suggested that sections 26 and 27 should be read as giving rise to two 
types of duties that are delineated in the first and second subsections of 
each section. It has been submitted that in the first place, subsection (1) 
requires the state to ensure that everyone has access to essential levels of 
goods and services and that, at the second stage, subsection (2) requires 
the state to improve the quality of the goods and services to which people 
already have access.94 Bilchitz has contended that this approach ‘avoids 
the creation of two self standing rights, whilst retaining the important idea 
of progressive realisation and making reference to the purpose behind the 
protection of human rights’.95 This approach realises socio-economic 
rights and gives them content as individual rights. But situating the 
minimum core solely in subsection (1) fails to integrate the inadequacy of 
                                                 
93
 Section 4.2.4 below. 
 
94
 Liebenberg: 2005a, at p 33-42. According to Liebenberg, the mere fact that the CC has 
rejected the notion of a minimum core does not mean that it escapes the interpretative 
difficulties of clarifying the state’s obligations (at p 33-40). See also Bilchitz: 2003a at p 
11; and Van Bueren: 1999, at p 60. Elsewhere, Van Bueren has argued that the minimum 
core must never be used as a reason for inertia; instead its adoption should be viewed as 
a springboard for further action by the state. Van Bueren, G., ‘The minimum core 
obligations of states under article 10(3) of the International Covenant on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights’ in Chapman, A., and Russell, S., (eds.) The core obligations: 
Building a framework for economic, social and cultural rights  (2002) INTERSENTIA 
pp 147 – 160, at p 160. 
 
95
 Bilchitz: 2003a, at p 12. Bilchitz contends further that sections 26 and 27 protect two 
kinds of interests which are linked by the notion of progressive realisation. The first is 
that, at a minimum level, people need to survive and for this they require basic goods and 
services; the second is the interest that people have in being provided with the conditions 
that enable them to pursue their own projects and live a good life by their own rights (at 
pp 10 – 11). 
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resources as a possible defence for failure to satisfy the minimum core 
obligations.96  
 
As indicated above,97 a country can rely on inadequacy of resources to 
justify its failure to meet the minimum core obligations.98 Reading the 
sections as proposed above suggests that the limitations in subsection (2), 
including inadequacy of resources, would only apply at the second level 
of progressive improvements from the minimum core. This means that if 
resource limitations are to be invoked as a defence, then this has to be 
derived from the notion of minimum core itself and not subsection (2). 
However, this is problematic; since inadequacy of resources is expressly 
integrated in the Constitution, it would only be logical for this defence to 
derive from subsection (2). One would argue though, that interpreting 
subsections (1) and (2) holistically would subject the minimum core to the 
notion of progressive realisation thereby denying it meaning. However, 
this argument does not stand since the minimum core itself derives from 
the notion of progressive realisation.99 The minimum core approach 
stresses the point that in spite of the fact that countries may realise the 
rights progressively, certain obligations have to be met immediately as a 
matter of priority.100 It also emphasises the point that if the core content is 
                                                 
96
 As discussed in the next section, this reading was rejected by the CC in the TAC case. 
 
97
 Section 4.2.1.2. 
 
98
 See also Pieterse: 2006, at p 480. 
 
99
 Though not expressly, Bilchitz: 2005, at p 56A-36, appears to have abandoned his 
initial suggestions that the two subsections be read as giving rise to two different and 
self-standing obligations. He has submitted that the notion of progressive realisation 
should be read as involving two components: the first component is a minimum core, to 
realise, as a matter of priority, the minimally adequate provision required to meet basic 
needs; the second component is the duty to take steps to improve the adequacy of the 
provisions of resources over time. 
 
100
 Chapman & Russell: 2002, at p 6.  
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not provided, irrespective of progressive realisation and acting within 
available resources, the rights would be rendered useless. On the basis of 
this, therefore, the minimum core can only be derived from reading 
subsection (1) together with (2), and not to isolate one from another.101 
Subsection (2) should be used as the starting point to justify the minimum 
core obligation as deriving from the notion of progressive realisation. 
Subsection (1) would define the minimum core content of the specific 
rights. A finding that an individual is entitled to a minimum core of goods 
and services under subsection (1) could still be vitiated under subsection 
(2). Sub-section (1) would also be used to give normative content to the 
right.  
 
4.2.2 Giving the rights normative content  
Connected to rejection of the minimum core obligations approach is the 
CC’s failure to give content to the socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution.102 In all three decisions, Soobramoney, Grootboom and 
TAC, socio-economic rights have been interpreted in a manner that only 
entitles the beneficiaries of the rights granted in sections 26 and 27 to 
reasonable state action undertaken to progressively realise these rights 
subject to the available resources.103 It is clear from subsection (2) of both 
sections 26 and 27 that what is required of the state is to realise the right 
mentioned in subsection (1). To this extent, one agrees with the CC’s 
decision in the TAC case that the two subsections must be read together. 
What the CC ignores, however, is the fact that these sections establish a 
                                                 
101
 While the Committee has read the minimum core into a number of substantive rights 
in its General Comments, the notion itself has been derived from article 2(1), which 
defines the obligations almost in the same manner as sections 26(2) and 27(2) of the 
South African Constitution. This means that the notion uses article 2 as its basis for 
spreading out into the other articles of the ICESCR.  
 
102
 See Pieterse: 2005, at pp 96 – 111. 
 
 
103
 Brand: 2003, at p 38. 
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goal as well as the means to achieve that goal.104 The goal is that the 
rights in subsection (1) have to be realised but only through the means 
stated in subsection (2). If we take this further on the basis of what the CC 
says—viz that the two subsections have to be read together—it means that 
the means have to be understood in the context of the goal. We cannot test 
the efficacy, or even reasonableness, of the means used in realising the 
goal unless we know precisely what the goal entails.105 The CC should 
have begun by getting to grips with the content of the right; and only then 
would it have been able to determine whether the measures adopted are 
reasonable methods of realising the right.106 The failure of the CC to 
adopt this approach has serious implications for the efficacy of the 
remedies the court may have chosen to address a violation.107 As is seen 
in chapter five,108 although rights and remedies can be de-linked, the goals 
that rights aim to achieve are a factor to consider at the remedial stage in 
litigation.  According to Bilchitz: 
                                                 
104
 Bilchitz: 2007, at p 143.  
105
 Brand: 2003, at p 44. See also Bilchitz: 2003a, at p 8; and Bilchitz, D., ‘Placing basic 
needs at the centre of socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 4 ESR Review pp 2 – 
4 [Hereinafter referred to as Bilchitz: 2003b], at p 3.  
 
106
 Bilchitz: 2003a, at p 9; Bilchitz: 2002, at p 496; and Pieterse, M., ‘Coming to terms 
with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on 
Human Rights pp 383 – 418 [Hereinafter referred to as Pieterse: 2004b], at p 407. 
Pieterse has submitted that where the reasonableness analysis is undertaken separately 
from an understanding of the content of various socio-economic rights and the 
obligations they impose, it may fail to develop a sound socio-economic rights 
jurisprudence (at p 410). 
 
107
 Wells and Eaton have argued that in order to resolve issues related to constitutional 
remedies, courts need to identify the goals they seek to achieve in this area of law. They 
add that in this way, a court can evaluate the alternatives by asking which of them will 
better achieve the policies at stake. Wells, M., and Eaton, E., Constitutional remedies: A 
reference book for the United States Constitution (2002) Praeger Publishing, at p xxv. 
 
108
 Section 5.3.  
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In order to work out which considerations are relevant to a determination 
of reasonableness in each context, it is necessary to have a prior 
understanding of the general obligations government is under by virtue of 
having to realise the rights in question. The context-bound nature of a 
determination of reasonableness requires that we have at least some 
specification of standards we wish to be met such that we can appraise the 
government's actions in a variety of contexts in terms of their potential to 
meet these standards. A contextual determination of the reasonableness of 
the government's conduct thus presupposes … contextual standards that 
guide our appraisal of its actions in different contexts.109  
 
It should be noted further that the failure of the Court to give content to 
the rights leaves the government without guidance as to what is expected 
of it in implementing the rights.110 It is not enough for the state to be told 
that it has to put in place an all inclusive programme, without being told 
what that programme should set as its goal. It also makes it difficult for 
the court in its remedial orders to prescribe in precise terms what the 
government should do to remedy a violation. This lack of precision makes 
the task of enforcing court orders very difficult, since enforcers cannot 
point precisely to what needs to be done to remedy the violation. In this 
regard, Davis has submitted that if the Constitutional Court does not 
define these rights with any precision, the burden placed upon the 
executive by the courts is significantly increased.111   
 
                                                 
109
 Bilchitz: 2003a, at p 10 In Bilchitz’s opinion, at present, the reasonableness review 
approach lacks a principled basis upon which decisions on socio-economic rights cases 
can be based. He submits that this heightens the attack on the legitimacy of the decisions 
of the Court since it has not set out any principled standards upon which its decisions are 
based (at p 10). See also Pieterse: 2004b, at p 410. Elsewhere, Bilchitz: 2003b, at p 3, 
has argued that one of the advantages of an approach that gives content to a right is that 
it places the interests that are affected under the spotlight and also questions the extent to 
which government policy detrimentally impacts upon these interests. 
 
110
 Iles, K., ‘Limiting socio-economic rights: Beyond the internal limitation clauses’ 
(2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 448 – 465 [Hereinafter referred to 
as Iles: 2004], at p 454. 
 
111
 Davis: 2006, at pp 304 – 305. 
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The CC has emphasised that the rights in the Constitution must be 
understood in their contextual setting. According to the CC, this requires 
consideration of chapter two (the Bill of Rights) and the Constitution as a 
whole.112 In respect of the right of access to adequate housing, the CC has 
held that section 26 must be understood in its context; the first subsection 
confers a general right of access to adequate housing and the second 
subsection establishes and delimits the scope of the positive obligations to 
realise that right.113 The CC has also held that subsections (1) and (2) are 
related and must be read together. It is not very clear what the CC means 
by the subsections being read together. What is clear from the CC’s 
approach, however, is that it concentrates its interpretation efforts on 
subsection (2). In this, the Court has not read the two subsections 
together; it has instead conflated them in such a manner that subsection 
(1) becomes redundant. In all three cases: Soobramoney, Grootboom and 
TAC, the CC after casually referring to subsection (1), concentrates its 
interpretative efforts on subsection (2). This explains why in the TAC 
case, the CC dismissed the submissions of the amici to the effect that 
section 27 should be read as establishing two self standing and 
independent rights:  
 
[O]ne an obligation to give effect to the [sections] 26(1) and 27(1) rights; 
the other a limited obligation to do so progressively through “reasonable 
legislative and other measures, within its available resources”. Implicit in 
that contention is that the content of the right in subsection (1) differs from 
the content of the obligation in subsection (2).114 
                                                 
112
 Grootboom case, para 22. 
 
113
 Para 21. 
 
114
 Para 29. The amici argued that the right to health care in section 27(1)(a) is one of the 
rights in the Bill of Rights and accordingly attracts the duties imposed on the state by 
section 7(2) and that there is nothing in section 27(2) to suggest that the duties it imposes 
replace any of the duties imposed on the state by section 7(2). The amici went on to 
submit that to give meaningful content to the constitutional right of every person to have 
access to the goods and services described in section 27(1), there must be some 
concomitant duty on the state to make those goods and services accessible to ‘everyone’.  
According to the amici, section 27(2) does not do so because it is a ‘macro’ duty and not 
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The CC held that the two subsections cannot be separated from each 
other; reference to ‘the right’ in subsection (2) is clearly also reference to 
the subsection (1) right.115 The Court thus concluded that: 
 
[S]ection 27(1) of the Constitution does not give rise to a self-standing and 
independent positive right enforceable irrespective of the considerations 
mentioned in section 27(2). Sections 27(1) and 27(2) must be read 
together as defining the scope of the positive rights that everyone has and 
the corresponding obligations on the state to “respect, protect, promote 
and fulfil” such rights. The rights conferred by sections 26(1) and 27(1) 
are to have “access” to the services that the state is obliged to provide in 
terms of sections 26(2) and 27(2).116 
 
The approach of the CC in conflating the two subsections has also 
rendered section 7(2) redundant. This is in as far as the section obligates 
the state to respect and protect the rights. Generally, these two obligations 
are not dependent on resources and, therefore, may not be subjected to 
progressive realisation.117 Reading the two subsections holistically means 
that the duties to respect and protect the rights in sections 26(1) and 27(1) 
are also subject to progressive realisation and available resources. Yet, as 
long as the content of the rights is not defined, it will be hard to determine 
whether the means chosen to realise them are effective. Nonetheless, even 
when the content has been defined, the courts have to develop a sound 
                                                                                                                                            
one that obliges the state to make the goods and services accessible to every person or 
any particular person.  It accordingly can not be exhaustive of the positive duties 
imposed on the state. See Submissions of the Community Law Centre and the Institute 
for Democracy in South Africa (IDASA) in Minister of Health and Others v Treatment 
Action Campaign and Others, sourced at 
<http://www.communitylawcentre.org.za/ser/docs_2002/TAC_MTCT_Case_Heads_of_
Arguments.doc> (accessed on 22 February 2006) [Hereinafter referred to as TAC amici 
submissions], at paras 15 – 27. 
 
115
 Para 30. 
 
116
 Para 39. 
 
117
 See chapter two, section 2.3.4.2. 
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approach for testing effectiveness of the means chosen. Thus far, the 
reasonableness review approach has failed to do so, as is discussed in the 
next section. 
 
4.2.3 Interrogating the means and end: A proportionality test 
The CC has been criticised for having adopted a weak administrative 
law approach to interpreting socio-economic rights instead of a full 
blown proportionality test.118 Some scholars, however, contend that the 
administrative law approach of the CC is the most appropriate for the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights. This is because the 
administrative law approach allows courts to strike a balance between 
judicial activism and judicial deference. It has thus been submitted that 
by retreating to the comfort zone of administrative law the Court has 
‘made an important conceptual gain—it has mapped out a (what it 
considers appropriate) role for the judiciary in adjudicating the often 
polycentric issues raised by social rights claims’.119  
                                                 
118
 Bilchitz: 2003b, at p 2; see also Pieterse: 2004a at p 863 and Roux: 2003, at p 97. 
 
119
 Pieterse: 2004b, at 893; see also Sunstein, C., Social and economic rights? Lessons 
from South Africa (May 2001), Public Law Working Paper No. 12; University of 
Chicago Law & Economics, Olin Working Paper No. 124. Sourced at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=269657> (accessed on 27 July 2004) 
[Hereinafter referred to as Sunstein: 2001a]. However, Pieterse: 2004a, at p 896, has 
endorsed criticism to the effect that the CC’s approach neither serves to prioritise certain 
forms of social expenditure over others nor to treat the social deprivation of citizens as 
anything more than ancillary concerns to an inquiry that in essence amounts to an 
insistence on coherence, flexibility, fairness, inclusiveness, and rationality in social 
policy formulation and implementation. Pieterse is of the view that the CC’s approach 
does not offer South Africans any socio-economic entitlements other than those they 
have always enjoyed under administrative law, which have proved useless in alleviating 
poverty.    
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The question, however, is whether the reasonableness review approach is 
an administrative law approach as has been suggested.120 As is 
demonstrated later,121 the reasonableness review approach has established 
standards of scrutiny that are quite different from those established by 
administrative law.122  
 
According to Fredman, in an administrative law case an agency has a duty 
of accountability, which means that it must explain why it has adopted a 
particular allocation of resources and not another.123 In such a case, the 
duty of the court becomes one of guarding against arbitrariness in 
resource allocation.124 The burden imposed on the state in this case would 
be one of justification. In the context of sections 26 and 27, the state 
would have to justify its programmes as reasonable and undertaken 
‘within the available resources’. This approach is akin to what was 
suggested by Mureinik as to how the bill of rights could be reviewed to 
quell fears that judicial review is countermajoritarian.125 Mureinik’s 
suggested approach was intended to ensure that government decisions are 
rational, while at the same time restricting the court’s intrusiveness by 
                                                 
120
 See Sunstein, C., Designing democracy: What constitutions do (2001) Oxford 
University Press pp 224 – 237 [Hereinafter referred to as Sunstein: 2001b]. See also 
Bilchitz: 2005, at p 56A-11. 
 
121
 Section 4.2.3.1 below.   
 
122
 See Wesson: 2001, at pp 287 – 297; and Steinberg: 2006, at p 277. 
 
123
 Fredman, S., ‘Providing equality: Substantive equality and the positive duty to 
provide’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 163 – 190 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Fredman: 2005], at 176. See also Davis: 2006, at p 304. 
 
124
 Sunstein: 2001b, at pp 224 – 37. 
 
125
 Mureinik, E., ‘Beyond a charter of luxuries: Economic rights in the Constitution’ 
(1992) 8 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 464 – 490 [Hereinafter referred to 
as Mureinik: 1992]. 
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allowing the state a wide margin of discretion. Mureinik suggested that all 
that the state would have to do was to justify its decisions; such decisions 
would only be struck down by the court if the state ‘could not offer a 
plausible justification for the programme it has chosen’.126 Mureinik 
contended that ‘any decision maker who is aware … of the risk of being 
required to justify a decision will always consider it more closely than if 
there was no risk’.127 
 
Mureinik’s form of constitutional review fares very well in the 
Soobramoney case. In this case, the CC held that it ‘will be slow to 
interfere with rational decisions taken in good faith by the political organs 
and medical authorities whose responsibility it is to deal with such 
matters’.128 As a result, the Court endorsed as rational a decision that 
scarce medical resources need not be expended on chronically ill patients 
at the expense of patients with a hope of recovery. The CC has gone a 
step further by invoking, not rationality as the basis of justification, but 
reasonableness. This is a standard expressly proclaimed by the relevant 
provisions of the Constitution. The problem with the approach of the CC, 
however, is that it does not require the state to justify its programme as 
reasonable. Instead, the burden is on whoever is contesting the state’s 
programme to demonstrate its unreasonableness. The question, therefore, 
                                                 
126
 Mureinik: 1992, at p 471. In a subsequent article Mureinik describes the new 
constitutional order as a bridge from a culture of authoritarianism, that characterised 
apartheid, to a culture of justification; a culture in which every exercise of public power 
is supposed to be justified. Mureinik, E., ‘A bridge to where? Introduction to the Interim 
Bill of Rights’ (1994) 10 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 31 – 48, at p 31. 
See also generally Karl, K., ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 
14 South African Journal of Human Rights pp 147 – 188. 
 
127
 Mureinik: 1992, at p 471. He submits that such decision maker is put under pressure 
consciously to consider and meet all the objections and thoughtfully to discard all the 
alternatives to the decision contemplated. 
 
128
 Para 58. 
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remains whether the administrative law standard of judicial review takes 
the same approach. 
 
4.2.3.1 Does the CC’s approach use an administrative law standard?  
The use of the ‘reasonableness’ concept in administrative law differs from 
the way in which it has been used by the CC in socio-economic rights 
litigation. Most notable is the fact that reasonableness in socio-economic 
rights litigation considers such values as human dignity, equality and 
freedom in its assessment. These values do not feature in the 
administrative law scrutiny.129 It cannot be denied though that there are 
some areas of commonality. The first area of commonality is the principle 
that the state should be given leeway to choose the most appropriate way 
of discharging its legal obligations. The second is the contextual 
definition and application of reasonableness.130   
 
The reasonableness test now used in administrative law originates in 
English common law as first set out in Associated Provincial Picture 
Houses, Limited v Wednesbury Corporation.131 In this case, it was held 
that a court is entitled to interfere with the decision of an administrative 
body only if the decision is so unreasonable that no reasonable body 
would have taken such a decision.132 The Court held further that, even in 
such case, it is not the duty of the court to decide whether a decision is or 
is not reasonable. The Court said that this kind of decision is an executive 
function, which requires that deference be shown to the administrative 
                                                 
129
 Steinberg: 2006, at p 277. See also Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers 
2005 (1) SA 217 (CC), at para 29. 
 
130
 Steinberg: 2006, at p 277. 
 
131
 [1947] 2 All ER 680 (Wednesbury case). 
 
132
 At p 683 E. 
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authorities. The Court’s duty is only to determine whether the decision is 
of a kind that a reasonable authority could not have taken.133  
 
The Wednesbury case principles have become part of South African 
administrative law and are endorsed by a string of judicial decisions. For 
instance, in Union Government v Union Steel Corporation, 134 it was held 
that no judgment has accepted that unreasonableness is a sufficient 
ground for interference with an administrative decision. Interference is 
only necessary if the unreasonableness is so gross that something else is 
inferred from it.135 The provisions of the 1996 Constitution have not 
altered these principles in any fundamental manner. What is new, 
however, is that the right to just administrative action is no longer merely 
a common law right.136 Instead, it is now a constitutional guarantee that 
‘[e]veryone has the right to administrative action that is lawful, reasonable 
                                                 
133
 At p 683, E – G. Of course, one finds it hard to see a clear distinction between 
determining whether a decision is reasonable, on the one hand, and whether it is a 
decision that could not have been taken by a reasonable authority on the other hand. Both 
appear to lead to an inquiry as to whether the decision is reasonable. The principles in 
the Wednesbury case have been followed by English courts in subsequent cases and have 
informed the approach to judicial review on the ground of unreasonableness; though in 
some cases, the courts have used irrationality in the place of unreasonableness. However, 
within English law, these two principles mean the same. See Wheeler v Leicester City 
Council [1985] AC 1054. 
 
134
 1928 AD 220.   
 
135
 At pp 236 – 237. See also Shidiack v Union Government, 1912 AD 746, and National 
Transport Commission v Chetty’s Motor Transport (Pty) Ltd 1972 (3) SA 726 (A). For a 
discussion of these cases see Hoexter, C., and Lyster, R., The new constitutional and 
administrative law Vol. 2. (2002) Juta Law [Hereinafter referred to as Hoexter & Lyster: 
2002], at pp 171 – 176. 
 
136
 See President of the RSA and Others v SARFU and Others 
1999 (10) BCLR 1059 (CC), at para 135.  
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and procedurally fair’.137 This section is implemented by the Promotion of 
Administrative Justice Act (PAJA),138 which retains unreasonableness as a 
ground of judicial review in the same way as used in the Wednesbury 
case. The Act provides that a court may review administrative action 
which ‘is so unreasonable that no reasonable person could have … carried 
out the function [in that manner]’.139  
 
‘Reasonableness’ in socio-economic rights litigation has not been used in 
the above manner. In socio-economic rights litigation, the court requires 
that there be a reasonable programme, which must be comprehensive, 
well coordinated and capable of providing for short, medium and long 
term needs simultaneously. It must be reasonably conceived as well as 
implemented and made known appropriately.140 The CC’s finding in the 
Grootboom case that the state’s housing programme was unreasonable 
was not based on any finding that the programme could not have been 
adopted by any reasonable authority. If this had been the test, the 
programme would have passed with flying colours.141 Instead, the Court 
found the housing programme unreasonable because of its failure to make 
                                                 
137
 Section 33. The CC in Pharmaceutical Manufacturers of SA; In Re: Ex parte 
Application of the President of the Republic of South Africa 2000 (3) BCLR 241 (CC) 
held that though the common law principles of judicial review in administrative law are 
still relevant to the development of public law, judicial review is now subject to the 
prescriptions of the Constitution. The Court said that the principles of common law have 
been subsumed by the Constitution and are applicable as long as they are consistent with 
the Constitution (paras 45 and 51). 
 
138
 Act No. 3 of 2000. 
 
139
 Section 6(2)(h). 
 
140
 See section 4.2.1 above.  
 
141
 Wesson: 2004, at p 291. 
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provision for short term needs.142 But this is the farthest that the CC has 
gone with its reasonableness review approach thus far.  
 
In another twist, the PAJA has introduced, among others, a test of rational 
connectivity by empowering the courts to review administrative action 
which is not rationally connected to the purpose for which it was taken.143 
There is no similar test in the CC’s reasonableness review approach. The 
CC has not enquired whether the means chosen by the government are 
rationally connected to the purpose of realising the rights. While the 
reasonableness review approach may result in the court questioning the 
connection between the policy, which is the means, and the right, which is 
the goal, the inquiry has not yet been carried out as a prerequisite under 
the reasonableness review approach.144 This is because there is no 
principle that imposes a burden on the state to prove this connection.145  
 
                                                 
142
 Para 66. 
 
143
 Section 6(2)(f)(i). 
 
144
 Brand: 2003, at pp 39 – 40. Roux: 2003, at p 97, submits that the CC’s reasonableness 
review standard is clearly stricter than the rational basis standard applied under section 
9(1) of the Constitution. The requirement that a programme be comprehensive, balanced 
and flexible means that the court must do more than inquire whether the legislation or 
policy at issue is rationally related to a legitimate government purpose; the court has to 
assess whether the social programme unreasonably excludes the segment of society to 
which the claimant belongs. However, Roux’s position rests on shaky ground; in the first 
place there is no evidence in the judgments to suggest that exclusion of certain segments 
of society may be reasonable in some circumstances. Most importantly, this approach 
still fails to interrogate the effectiveness of the means chosen to realise the rights. It only 
supports the Soobramoney case rationality test by insisting that a court, in determining 
whether an action is justified, will have to consider whether the exclusion of a group is 
justified.      
 
145
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The most viable approach would be one that questions the effectiveness of 
the means chosen by the state. In addition to PAJA, this approach has also 
been used effectively in the general limitation clause inquiry set out in 
section 36 of the Constitution.146 As is demonstrated below,147 it is for this 
                                                 
146
 Section 36 provides as follows: 
36 Limitation of rights 
 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of law of 
general application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including— 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation;  
(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and less 
restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
The drafters of this section were greatly influenced by the provisions of the Canadian 
Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Schedule B of Constitution Act, 1982 (Charter), and 
the jurisprudence of the Canadian courts. Section 1 of this Charter provides that: ‘The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in 
it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society’. This provision has been dealt with by the 
Canadian courts in a number of cases. The most prominent of these decisions is the 
Supreme Court case of R v Oakes, [1986] 1 SCR 103, 26 DLR (4th) 200 [Hereinafter 
referred to as the Oakes case]. The Court held that the rights and freedoms guaranteed by 
the Charter are not absolute; they may be limited in circumstances where their exercise 
would be inimical to the realisation of collective goals of fundamental importance. It was 
for this reason that section 1 provides criteria to be used in deciding whether a limitation 
on the rights and freedoms guaranteed by the Charter is justified, which imposes a 
stringent standard of justification (at p 136). The Court went on to hold that the onus of 
proving that a limitation on a right or freedom guaranteed by the Charter is reasonable 
and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society rests upon the party seeking 
to uphold the limitation (at pp 136 – 137). According to the Court, to establish that a 
limitation is reasonable and demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society, two 
central criteria must be satisfied. First, the objective, which the measures responsible for 
a limit on a Charter right or freedom are designed to serve, must be of sufficient 
importance to warrant overriding a constitutionally protected right or freedom. Secondly, 
once a sufficiently significant objective is recognised, then the party invoking section 1 
must show that the means chosen are reasonable and demonstrably justified, which 
involves a form of proportionality test. The Court goes on to hold that although the 
nature of the proportionality test will vary depending on the circumstances, in each case 
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reason that the section 36(1) approach could play an important role in 
socio-economic rights litigation. While it is not appropriate to apply 
section 36 directly when dealing with sections 26 and 27, some of the 
principles underlying section 36 may be of assistance.148 The limitations 
imposed on the socio-economic rights in sections 26(1) and 27(1) are 
expressly prescribed in sections 26(2) and 27(2).149 The rights in sections 
                                                                                                                                            
courts will be required to balance the interests of society with those of individuals and 
groups. And, there must be a rational connection between the objective and the means 
chosen and also as little as possible impairment of the right (pp 138 – 139). For the most 
recent discussion of the manner in which the limitation clause applies, see Iles, K., ‘A 
fresh look at limitations: Unpacking section 36’ (2007) 23 South African Journal on 
Human Rights pp 68 – 92 [Hereinafter referred to as Iles: 2007].  
 
147
 Section 4.2.3.2 below.  
 
148
 The manner in which section 36 is crafted and has been applied suggests that it is 
more suited for negative obligations and is of limited application to positive obligations. 
By its very nature, the section requires the state to justify restrictions imposed on a 
particular right. Though violations of socio-economic rights may occur when restrictions 
are placed on them, enjoyment of these rights in most cases the state’s violation would 
arise from its failure to provide. The other reason why the general limitation clause 
cannot be applied to all violations of socio-economic rights is because section 36(1) 
envisages limitations resulting from a law of general application. See Currie, I., & De 
Waal, J., The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) Juta & Company [Hereinafter referred to as 
Currie & De Waal: 2005], at p 594.  While socio-economic rights may be limited by 
legislation, in some cases, they are limited by policy measures or sheer administrative 
decisions. Such form of limitation is not excluded by the internal limitation clause. See 
Liebenberg: 2005c, at p 28. This is an issue which those who advocate the application of 
section 36(1) to socio-economic rights litigation have ignored in their discussion. See, 
for instance, Iles: 2004; Pieterse: 2003; and Liebenberg: 2001, at pp 423 – 424. 
 
149
 In Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule and Another v 
Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) BCLR 596 (CC) (Khosa case), the 
CC held that there is a difficulty in applying section 36(1) of the Constitution to the 
socio-economic rights entrenched in sections 26 and 27 because these sections contain an 
internal limitation which qualifies the rights. According to the Court, the state’s 
obligation in respect of these rights goes further than to take reasonable legislative and 
other measures within its available resources to achieve the progressive realisation of the 
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26(1) and 27(1) are expressed as being subject to progressive realisation 
within the available resources by the state taking reasonable legislative 
and other measures. It is only appropriate that the sections 26(2) and 27(2) 
limitations be used instead of the section 36 general limitation clause 
when adjudicating the sections 26 and 27 rights. What needs to be done, 
however, is to read a proportionality test into sections 26(2) and 27(2). 
This is where some principles used under the general limitation clause 
analysis process may become relevant.  
 
4.2.3.2 Proportionality and rational connectivity   
To heighten the level of scrutiny under the general limitation clause, a 
proportionality test, as inspired by Canadian jurisprudence150 and as is 
implicit in section 36(1) has been employed by the CC.151 The 
proportionality test has been applied in the section 36 enquiry to 
                                                                                                                                            
rights. The Court was of the view that section 36 can only have relevance if what is 
‘reasonable’ for the purposes of section 36(1) is different from what is ‘reasonable’ for 
purposes of sections 26 and 27. (para 83, see also para 105). 
 
150
 See the Oakes case as discussed above. 
 
151
 In the Makwanyane case, the CC held that the limitation of constitutional rights for a 
purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing 
up of competing values and ultimately an assessment based on proportionality. The fact 
that the different rights have different implications for democracy and, in the case of the 
Constitution, for ‘an open and democratic society based on freedom and equality’, means 
that there is no absolute standard which can be laid down for determining reasonableness 
and necessity. The Court said that principles can be established, but the application of 
these principles to particular circumstances can only be done on a case-by-case basis. 
The Court went on to hold that this is inherent in the requirement of proportionality, 
which calls for the balancing of different interests. In the balancing process, according to 
the Court, the relevant considerations will include the nature of the right that is limited 
and its importance to an open and democratic society; the purpose for which the right is 
limited and the importance of that purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, 
its efficacy and, particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, and whether the 
desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less damaging to the 
right (para 104). See also S v Bhulwana 1996 (1) SA 388 (CC) (Bhulwana case), para 18. 
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determine whether a limitation is reasonable and justifiable in an open and 
democratic society. The CC has held that this test requires a weighing up 
of competing interests in order to determine whether the values intended 
to be protected by a limitation outweigh the right being limited. 
According to the Court: 
 
In sum, therefore, the Court places the purpose, effects and importance of 
the infringing legislation on one side of the scales and the nature and effect 
of the infringement caused by the legislation on the other. The more 
substantial the inroad into fundamental rights, the more persuasive the 
grounds for justification must be.152 
  
There is room for application of a similar proportionality test in socio-
economic rights litigation. This is especially in those cases where the state 
has failed to provide socio-economic goods and services on the ground 
that their provision would affect certain interests. An example of such 
case is the Khosa case. One could, however, submit that the Khosa case is 
not a good example since it was based on a negative violation under 
section 9 of the Constitution arising from exclusion of the applicants from 
the social assistance scheme. Nevertheless, the case also invoked positive 
obligations; the state argued that including the applicants in the social 
assistance scheme would impose financial burdens on the state and 
discourage self sufficiency amongst non-citizens.153 In effect, the state 
was arguing that even if there was an obligation to provide for the 
applicants it just did not have the resources to discharge this obligation. 
Indeed, enforcing the applicant’s rights would not only entail their 
inclusion in the programme but also a commitment of resources to meet 
their social assistance needs. The state was also arguing in effect that 
provision of the benefits requested would have had a negative impact on 
such interests as the need to promote self-sufficiency of non-citizens. 
 
                                                 
152
 Bhulwana case, para 18. 
 
153
 Paras, 60 and 63. 
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The Court held that once those not self-sufficient are granted permanent 
resident status, then the state has a duty to provide for them. This is 
irrespective of the financial burden that may be imposed on the state.154 
The application of the proportionality test in this case is seen in the 
finding that providing social assistance to the applicants outweighed the 
financial and immigration concerns of the state.155 The values embedded 
in the protection of the survival interests of non-citizens were considered 
by the CC to outweigh the financial and other considerations raised by the 
state. The Court said that: 
 
The importance of providing access to social assistance to all who live in 
South Africa and the impact upon life and dignity that a denial of such 
access far outweighs the financial and immigration considerations on 
which the State relies. For the same reasons, I am satisfied that the denial 
of access to social grants to permanent residents who, but for their 
citizenship, would qualify for such assistance does not constitute a 
reasonable legislative measure as contemplated by section 27(2) of the 
Constitution.156 [Emphasis mine] 
 
The CC in this passage appears to suggest that proportionality has a role 
to play in considering whether or not the measures adopted by the state 
are reasonable. The Court appears to have been inspired to apply this test 
because of the direct invocation by the applicants of the right to equality 
in section 9.157 
                                                 
154
 Para 68. 
 
155
 Liebenberg: 2005b, at pp 21 – 22. 
 
156
 Para 82. 
 
157
 The proportionality test has featured strongly in the approach that the CC has adopted 
in considering equality cases. This is most especially at the stage of considering whether 
discrimination amounts to unfair discrimination. See Harksen v Lane NO 1998 (1) SA 
300 (CC); para 53. At this stage of the equality inquiry, the court has to consider the 
impact of the discrimination on the victim. If the discrimination burdens people who 
have in the past been victims of discrimination, then it will be unfair unless the purpose 
it intends to achieve outweighs the burdens imposed. This requires a proportionality test 
which requires, amongst others, an examination of whether there are less burdensome 
means that could have been adopted. See President of the Republic of South Africa v 
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Another case where the Court has applied the proportionality test is 
Minister of Public Works and Others v Kyalami Ridge Environmental 
Association and Another (Kyalami).158 In this case,159 the Court applied 
the proportionality test to uphold the right of access to adequate housing 
against the right to property. The Court held that although the property 
interests of the Kyalami residents was a factor to consider, it was not only 
the only factor, the interests of the flood victims and their constitutional 
right of access to adequate housing was also a factor.160 According to the 
Court: 
 
The fact that property values may be affected by low cost housing 
development on neighbouring land is a fact that is relevant … it is only a 
factor and cannot in the circumstances of the present case stand in the way 
of the constitutional obligation that government has to address the needs of 
homeless people.161    
  
The test, as applied above, is very important because it strengths the 
remedies granted in socio-economic rights litigation. The Kyalami case 
also shows how the proportionality test can be applied to cases that 
invoke purely positive obligations. One cannot, therefore, use the Khosa 
case to argue that the test is only applicable to cases invoking negative 
violations. It should be noted that use of this test is the only way through 
which the undue burden imposed on litigants in socio-economic rights 
cases to prove the unreasonableness of the state’s measures can be shifted 
to the state. This test compels the state to put before the courts adequate 
evidence, which will allow them to make informed decisions. Indeed, as 
                                                                                                                                            
Hugo 1997 (4) SA 1 (CC); Pretoria City Council v Walker 1998 (2) SA 363 (CC); and 
National Coalition for Gay & Lesbians Equality v Minister of Home Affairs 2000 (2) SA 
1 (CC). 
 
158
 2001 (3) SA 1151 (CC). For a detailed discussion of the facts and issue in this case 
see chapter two, section 2.3.4.2.II. 
 
159
 For a detailed discussion of the facts and issue in this case see chapter two, section 
2.3.4.2.II. 
160
 Para 106. 
 
161
 Para 107. 
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will be seen in the next section, the CC in the Khosa case held that the 
state had an evidential burden to put all relevant information before the 
court. This is especially so in cases where court orders would have 
budgetary implications. Such evidence may be necessary for the purpose 
of determining the most appropriate remedy. A finding that the means are 
not proportionate could be used by the court to determine the degree of 
intervention required at the remedial stage.  
 
Also part of the section 36 enquiry is a set of factors that have to be 
considered in determining whether a limitation is reasonable and 
justifiable in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, 
equality and freedom. One such factor is whether there is a rational 
connection between the means chosen to limit the rights and the objective 
to be served by the limitation.162 As already stated, a similar test is 
provided for by PAJA as basis for reviewing administrative action. 
Another factor is whether there are less restrictive means of realising the 
rights.163 The court must assess the selected means to determine whether 
they could have been used in a manner that is less restrictive to the 
right(s) to realise the same object.164 ‘A court will … need to know what 
                                                 
162
 Currie & De Waal: 2005, at p 182. See also Minister of Home Affairs v National 
Institute for Crime Prevention (Nicro) and Others 2004 (5) BCLR 445 (CC). Indeed, the 
rational connection test is being used in enforcing such positive provisions of the Bill of 
Rights as affirmative action under section 9(2). The CC has held that, amongst others, it 
has to be proved that the affirmative action is reasonably capable of realising the 
intended goal of advancing persons disadvantaged by discrimination in the past. See 
Minister of Finance v Van Heerden 2004 (11)  BCLR 1125 (CC). 
 
163
 In the Makwanyane case, the state argued that the objects to be achieved by the 
imposition of the death penalty were to prevent and deter commission of violent crime. 
The CC held that while the death penalty may effectively prevent criminals from 
committing crime again (since the criminal is dead) the state had not adduced sufficient 
evidence to prove that the penalty actually deterred commission of crime (para 184). In 
this latter respect, therefore, there was no relation between the means and the object. 
 
164
 Criticism has been directed at this approach on the ground that it allows courts to 
strike down legislation under the guise of there being less restrictive means of limitation. 
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alternative measures for implementing the objective were available to the 
legislators when they made their decisions’.165 In doing this the court 
must not, however, ‘second-guess the wisdom of policy choices made by 
legislators’.166 Instead, the court must leave a margin of discretion to the 
state in selecting the most effective means.167   
 
A similar standard could be employed by the courts in sections 26 and 27 
litigation to question the effectiveness of the means chosen to realise the 
rights. The court would have to enquire whether the means chosen by the 
state are capable of realising the socio-economic right or rights in issue. 
This rational connection standard would be applied as part of the 
reasonableness test.  For a programme or policy to be reasonable, the state 
would have to convince the court that the programme or policy is capable 
of realising the targeted socio-economic right(s). Where the programme 
or policy restricts the rights in one way or another, the court would 
enquire whether there are less restrictive means of achieving the purpose 
of the programme or policy without restricting enjoyment of the socio-
economic right(s).168 However, the court in this process would be alive to 
the fact that there are several ways of effectively realising socio-economic 
rights. Deference would be shown to the state in choosing from amongst 
                                                                                                                                            
The task of determining the means of restricting rights, so goes the argument, is not one 
that the courts are qualified to discharge because this is either a legislative or executive 
function. See Woolman, S., ‘Limitation’ in Chaskalson, M., Kentridge, J., Klaaren, J., 
Marcus, G., Spitz, D., & Woolman, S., (eds.) Constitutional law of South Africa (1996) 
Juta & Company [Revised Service 2, 1998] pp 12-i — 12-64 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Woolman: 1996], at p 12-8.  
 
165
 Oakes case, at p 138. 
 
166
 Makwanyane case, para 104.  
 
167
 Currie & De Waal: 2005, at p 184. 
 
168
 Liebenberg: 2005c, at p 27. 
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those means; the state would, therefore, have the discretion to determine 
what it considers to be the best way of realising the right(s).169 All that the 
court would do is to ensure that the means selected by the state are 
capable of realising the right(s). However, where the means chosen by the 
state are demonstrably inadequate and incapable of reasonably realising 
the right(s), then the court should intervene. At this stage, the court should 
be entitled to be prescriptive by detailing what in its opinion is the best 
way of realising the right(s).  
 
The above approach would not only allow enquiry into the effectiveness 
of the means chosen but would also compel the court to give content to 
the rights. This is because there would be no way the court could assess 
the effectiveness of the means chosen without an understanding of the 
goal to be achieved, which is the realisation of the right. This approach 
would also promote the constitutional values of accountability, 
responsiveness and openness as it demands for justification from the state. 
Similar standards of justification could also be used in the available 
resources inquiry as discussed in the next section. The conclusion of the 
court after interrogating the effectiveness of the means chosen to realise 
the rights is relevant at the stage of determining the most appropriate 
remedy. The court would be able to determine the kind of remedy that 
effectively compels the state to adopt measures that realise the rights.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
169
 This would quell fears that the courts are going to hide under the cloak of choosing 
the most effective means to carry out functions that are reserved for the executive and 
legislative organs of the state. See Woolman: 1996, at p 12-8.  
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4.2.4 Available resources and a justification inquiry  
At both the international and South African levels, in realising socio-
economic rights, the state can only do as much as its resources permit. 
While the ICESCR uses the phrase ‘to the maximum of … [a state’s] 
available resources’170 and the South African Constitution uses the phrase 
‘within … [a state’s] available resources’,171 as already noted,172 the 
differences between these two are, at best, nomenclatural. In this section, 
the phrase ‘within the state’s available resources’ is used because it is the 
one used in the South African Constitution, but at the same time, 
reference is made to ‘the maximum of the states’ available resources’, 
where necessary, to illustrate standards at the international level.  
 
The phrase ‘within available resources’ has mostly been used in a 
rhetorical manner, without any meaningful attempts to define it and to 
understand the precise nature of the obligations it imposes.173 Unless we 
                                                 
170
 Article 2(1). 
 
171
 Sections 26(2) and 27(2). 
 
172
 Section 4.1. 
 
173
 According to Chapman, we cannot effectively use the standard of progressive 
realisation as a tool of assessing compliance with the standards established by the 
ICESCR unless we understand what is meant by the phrase ‘maximum of its available 
resources’. Chapman, A., ‘A new approach to monitoring the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ (1995) 55 International Commission of Jurists: 
The Review pp 23 – 37, at p 26. All that the Committee has said in General Comment 
No. 3 about the meaning of the phrase ‘the maximum of the available resources’ is that it 
was ‘intended by the drafters of the Covenant to refer to both the resources existing 
within a State and those available from the international community through 
international cooperation and assistance’ (para 13). In my opinion, this is very narrow; 
surely, the drafters must have meant more than this in this phrase. The CESCR, besides 
elaborating the obligations of international cooperation, does not elucidate on what states 
have to do within the domestic arena to ensure that sufficient resources are allocated for 
the purpose of realising the rights. Yet, as argued in chapter two, section 2.3.4.1, the 
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come to grips with the nature of the obligations that the requirement to act 
within the available gives rise to, it may be difficult to translate socio-
economic rights from mere abstract paper rights to concrete individualised 
rights.174 This is because the concept of available resources presents an 
obstacle to the realisation of these rights. However, the concept also 
represents the world of scarcity in which we live, which makes it 
impossible for the state to fully realise all the rights protected. Yet, at the 
same time, scarcity imposes an obligation on the state to ensure more 
efficient use of the scarce resources in order to realise the rights to the 
extent attainable in the circumstances.  
 
Looked at narrowly, the concept of acting ‘within available resources’ is 
available to the state as a defence to justify its failure to fully realise 
socio-economic rights or even to provide a minimum level of goods and 
services. Indeed, in the majority of socio-economic rights cases, the state 
is always quick to demonstrate that it lacks the resources needed to fully 
realise the right(s).175 Nonetheless, the concept also gives rise to a number 
of positive obligations that can be enforced against the state.176 In this 
respect, the concept may be used, for instance, to force the state to 
                                                                                                                                            
various methods employed by the Committee to determine the appropriateness amounts 
of resources dedicated to realisation of the rights are flawed in a number of respects.  
 
174
 Robertson, E., ‘Measuring state compliance with the obligation to devote the 
“maximum available resources” to realizing economic, social and cultural rights’ (1994) 
16 Human Rights Quarterly pp 693 – 714 [Hereinafter referred to as Robertson: 1994], 
at p 694. 
 
175
 See, for instance, Soobramoney, Grootboom and Khosa cases. 
 
176
 Liebenberg: 2005a, at p 33-44. According to Moellendorf, the phrase ‘available 
resources’, however ambiguous, has both narrow and broad senses. It may mean those 
resources that a ministry or department has been allotted for the protection of a right; but 
it may also mean any resources that the state can marshal to protect a right. Moellendorf, 
D., ‘Reasoning about resources: Soobramoney and the future of socio-economic rights 
claims’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 327 – 333, at p 330. 
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undertake positive measures to ensure that resources are made available or 
efficiently employed.177 This latter dimension begins from the premise 
that the state does not have sufficient resources to realise the rights. It, 
however, emphasises the point that the state should not resign itself to 
fate, but should exhaust all efforts to enhance its resource pool and to 
employ the resources in the most efficient way. To enforce these 
obligations, a court would first establish whether, indeed, the state does or 
does not have all the resources required to fully realise the right(s) in 
contest.178 However, where the state contends that it has actually allocated 
the requisite resources towards the realisation of the right or rights, the 
role of the court here becomes very difficult. This is because the court 
would have to determine whether the allocated resources are capable of 
realising the right(s) and whether they have been employed efficiently. 
The question at this stage, however, is whether the courts have the skill 
and tools, let alone the institutional legitimacy, to determine whether the 
resources are capable of achieving the intended purpose and whether they 
have been employed efficiently. 
 
Determining whether the state has undertaken reasonable measures to 
provide sufficient resources to realise the right(s) and whether it has used 
the available resources effectively involve very difficult questions.179 The 
                                                 
177
 This meaning can be supported by the views of the Committee to the effect that a 
state that raises the defence of resources as the reason for not being able to realise the 
minimum core has a burden to demonstrate that it has used its resources in a manner that 
ensures maximum realisation of the rights. General Comment No. 3 (paras 10 and 11). 
 
178
 Robertson: 1994 at pp 694 – 695 and 705 – 708, has defined resources to include just 
more than financial resources. Other elements of resources, in his opinion, include 
human resources, technological resources, information resources and natural resources. 
He also contends that resources go beyond those that are controlled by the state. In his 
opinion, the question becomes one of the extent to which these can be considered 
resources (at p 695).  
 
179
 In this regard, Alexander Hamilton argued in the 78th Federalist, Paper that: 
Because it will be least in capacity to annoy or injure them.... the judiciary 
... has no influence over either the sword or the purse; no direction either 
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courts may not be institutionally capable of answering these questions. 
Such questions, for instance, include: is the state’s economic strategy the 
most appropriate to achieve its goal? Should the state engage in mining 
and not agriculture? Should it increase the levels of taxation and borrow 
less? Or should it rely more on donor funding? Additional questions 
include the following: should the state allocate less towards other sectors 
such as defence and more towards health care, education, food and water? 
What would the court do if the state contends that resources not being 
used for education are being used for health care or other purposes such as 
realising economic growth?180 It has been submitted that a court cannot 
weigh the competing demands for government resources to determine 
how much can be raised for the institutions, nor should it try to force the 
legislature to raise the necessary money regardless of competing 
considerations.181 
 
Resolution of the above questions is the biggest hurdle faced by tribunals 
engaged in the enforcement of socio-economic rights both at the 
international and domestic levels. No substantial progress has thus far 
been made to devise standards that can be employed to measure the 
resources and to determine whether they are appropriate or are being 
employed effectively.182  
 
                                                                                                                                            
of the strength or of the wealth of the society; and can take no active 
resolution whatever. 
 
The Federalist No. 78 (A. Hamilton) (B. Wright ed. 1961), at p 490. 
 
180
 Sunstein: 2001a, at p 14. 
 
181
 Frug, E., ‘The judicial power of the purse’ (1978) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review pp 715 – 794 [Herein after referred to as Frug: 1978], at pp 787 – 788.  
 
182
 Robertson: 1994, at p 703. See chapter two, section 2.3.4.1. 
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However, as is demonstrated later in this section, the courts may seek 
counsel by requiring the state to discharge certain evidential burdens and 
to justify its use of resources. The courts, then, only would use a standard 
such as reasonableness to determine whether the state has made out a case 
to justify its use or non-use of available resources. This approach saves 
the courts from being entangled in complex budgetary issues and 
answering the complex resource related questions as outlined above.183 
The problem with the reasonableness review approach is that there is no 
principle that establishes a mechanism for determining whether the 
resources allocated for a particular programme are reasonable in the 
circumstances. Neither has the CC in its reasonableness review approach 
come up with any meaningful approach to determining whether 
reasonable measures are being undertaken to enhance the resources and 
whether the allocated resources are being used efficiently.184  
 
Generally, the CC has shown an inclination towards giving deference to 
the other organs of the state in cases involving allocation of resources. 
This is because the CC believes that resource allocation involves difficult 
decisions to be taken at the political level in deciding upon the priorities 
to be met. In the CC’s opinion, a court should not interfere with resources 
allocation decisions taken in good faith by the political organs whose 
responsibility it is to deal with such matters.185 The Court has been quick 
to assert that the socio-economic rights themselves are limited by lack of 
                                                 
183
 See Fredman: 2005, at p 176. 
 
184
 According to Bilchitz: 2005, at p 56A-10, the CC’s approach to the issue of resources 
can be summarised as follows: firstly the Court will focus its enquiry  upon current 
allocations of resources within a particular department; secondly, the Court will more 
readily order allocations within existing budgets  rather than require an increased budget 
in a particular area; and the Court will not readily accept a defence of lack of resources 
where the exclusion of individuals constitutes unlawful discrimination or a serious 
invasion of dignity. 
 
185
 Soobramoney case, at para 29. 
 
 
 
 
 
An assessment of the current approach 
 208 
resources and that the obligations imposed by them can only be analysed 
in the light of the resources allocated to those rights.186 It is in light of 
this, and as can be deduced from the Constitution,187 that the CC is of the 
view that the reasonableness of the measures undertaken to realise the 
rights are governed by the available resources.188 What is evidently 
lacking, however, is a clear definition of the relationship between 
resources and the reasonableness test. The Court leaves unanswered the 
question whether there is need to analyse the reasonableness of the 
resources allocated to a specific programme and how this would be done. 
The closest that the CC has come to doing this is in the finding that a 
reasonable programme must ‘ensure that the appropriate financial and 
human resources are available’.189 What it does not do, however, is to set 
out clear guidelines for determining whether the resources allocated to the 
programme are themselves reasonable. In those cases where the state has 
argued that it does not have sufficient resources to realise the rights, the 
CC has declined to enquire whether there have been attempts on the part 
of the state to raise more resources.190 This has the potential of allowing 
                                                 
186
 Soobramoney case, at para 11 and Grootboom case, at para 46. 
 
187
 Sections 26(2) and 27(2). 
 
188
 Grootboom case, at para 46. According to the Court, there could be circumstances in 
which the state may focus on the broader needs of society instead of the specific needs of 
particular individuals. Striking a balance between equally valid and competing claims, 
holds the Court, would not be considered a limitation of rights; instead, it amounts to 
defining the circumstances in which the rights may most fairly and effectively be 
enjoyed. See Soobramoney case, at paras 31 and 54. 
 
189
 Grootboom case, at para 39. 
 
190
  In the Soobramoney case, the Court did not question whether there had been any 
attempts on the part of the provincial authorities to solicit more funding to enhance the 
health budget. Instead, the Court hastily accepts that the ‘Department of Health in 
KwaZulu-Natal does not have sufficient funds to cover the cost of the services which are 
being provided to the public’, para 24. In its opinion, to provide dialysis treatment to all 
those in need would require a dramatic increase of the health budget ‘to the prejudice of 
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the state to withdraw from its responsibilities by allocating only minimal 
resources for the purposes of realising socio-economic rights.191 
 
Requiring the state to demonstrate the steps it has undertaken to provide 
more resources would not amount to interfering in resource allocation 
matters. Instead, it would amount to imposing a burden on the state to 
demonstrate that it is doing whatever is reasonable to improve its 
resources directed at a specific programme. This is in addition to 
justifying the manner in which the resources already allocated to the 
programme are being used. As mentioned above, the concept of acting 
within the available resources imposes an obligation to take reasonable 
steps to solicit for more resources where the existing ones are inadequate 
and using the available resources efficiently. In light of this, it would not 
be overstepping the boundaries of separation to adopt this approach. All 
that this approach requires is that an evidential burden be imposed on the 
state to justify the allocation of resources to a programme or policy. 
 
Furthermore, it is only fair that the burden of proof in relation to resource 
allocation and use be placed on the state instead of requiring the litigant to 
prove that the resources are inadequate or have not been employed 
                                                                                                                                            
other needs which the State has to meet’ (para 28). And on this basis, the Court uses 
section 27(2) to justify the exclusion of the applicant from dialysis treatment. What the 
Court fails to do is to require the provincial authorities to prove that they are not only 
aware of their budgetary constraints but that steps were being taken to alleviate them. It, 
therefore, is not surprising that eight years after the judgment the state has not done 
much to boost the resources needed to take care of kidney patients at public hospitals. In 
August 2005, a newspaper report brought to light the acute nature of the problem of 
scarcity of dialysis machines at public hospitals. It reported that every week, public 
hospitals send away dozens of patients with kidney failure to die; one public hospital, 
Baragwanath, had about 150 people on dialysis, while some 5000 patients required it. 
Keeton, C., ‘Kidney patients are sent home to die’ Sunday Times, 28 August 2005, at p 
13. 
 
191
 See Pieterse: 2005, at p 91.  
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properly. The state is in a better position to adduce evidence relating to 
the available resources and to show how they have been allocated.192 The 
court, for instance, should be entitled to presume that any reduction in 
public spending on a specific right is prima facie a violation. The burden 
then would be on the state to justify such reduction.193  As has already 
been indicated above,194 this threshold of justification is also necessary in 
justifying failure to provide a minimum core on the ground of limited 
resources.195 The approach is also important because it enforces the value 
of accountability as a consideration in the application of the 
reasonableness test. In Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v 
Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail (Rail Commuters case),196 the CC alluded to 
                                                 
192
 Liebenberg: 2005a, at pp 33-53 — 33-54.  
 
193
 The Committee has said that any retrogressive measures would need careful 
consideration and have to be fully justified by reference to the totality of the rights 
provided for in the Covenant and in the context of the full use of the maximum available 
resources (General Comment No. 3, para 9). In its concluding observations, after 
considering Canada’s 3rd Periodic Report, the Committee raised concerns about cuts of 
10 percent of social assistance rates for single people. The Committee said that these cuts 
appeared to have a significantly adverse impact on vulnerable groups and could increase 
homelessness and hunger. See Concluding Observations adopted by the Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights at its 57th meeting (nineteenth session) held on 4 
December 1998, para 21 in Holmström, L., (ed.) Concluding Observations of the UN 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: Eighth to Twenty-seventh sessions 
(1993-2000) (2003) Martinus Nijhoff Publishers pp 97 – 107, at p 101. See also Scott: 
1998, at p 107. 
 
194
 Section 4.2.1 above.  
 
195
 Section 4.2.1.2 above. Liebenberg: 2005c, at p 18, submits that ‘[u]rgent needs and 
severe deprivations demand a strong, immediate response’, that ‘[w]e give expression to 
the value of human dignity in our constitutional jurisprudence by placing the state under 
a stringent burden of justification in claims involving a deprivation of basic needs’. 
 
196
 2005 (4) BCLR 301 (CC). 
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the importance of accountability in justifying resource allocations. The 
Court held that: 
 
[A]n organ of State will not be held to have reasonably performed a duty 
simply on the basis of a bald assertion of resource constraints. Details of 
the precise character of the resources, whether human or financial, in the 
context of the overall resourcing of the organ of state will need to be 
provided. The standard of reasonableness so understood conforms to the 
constitutional principles of accountability, on the one hand, in that it 
requires decision-makers to disclose their reasons for their conduct, and 
the principle of effectiveness on the other, for it does not unduly hamper 
the decision-maker’s authority to determine what are reasonable and 
appropriate measures in the overall context of activities.197 
 
As stated by the CC above, the approach I suggest here still leaves room 
for the state to carry out its resource allocation obligations without 
interference from the courts. The mandate to determine resources 
allocation would still vest in the state. All that the courts would demand is 
justification, which requires a clear indication of the basis upon which 
particular resources have been allocated and employed.   
 
The problem with the CC’s approach in both the Grootboom and TAC 
cases, is that it places on the applicant the burden to prove not only the 
unreasonableness of the measures undertaken, but also whether the state 
has acted within its available resources. Discharging this burden is ‘a 
matter of great factual and legal complexity which will often be beyond 
the capacity of indigent and vulnerable groups’.198 Moreover, this burden 
is made more onerous by the CC’s failure to determine any meaningful 
standards of measuring the available resources and whether they have 
been employed effectively. It only would be fair and just if the 
presumptive standard employed by the CESCR in applying the minimum 
                                                 
197
 At para 88. 
 
198
 Liebenberg: 2005c, at p 23. Liebenberg: 2005a, at pp 33-53 — 33-54, contends that it 
would be unreasonable to expect ordinary litigants to identify and to quantify all the 
resources available to the state for the realisation of a particular socio-economic right. 
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core obligations approach is employed here.199 This standard could be 
extended not only to the examination of the nature of the available 
resources but also the manner of their employment.200 It would be for the 
state to prove that it is employing the available resources efficiently. This 
is in addition to proving that it has undertaken reasonable measures to 
enhance its resources pool.   
 
Recent jurisprudence from the CC shows a move towards demanding for 
justification from the state regarding the way resources have been 
allocated. Although the Khosa case is distinguishable from other cases in 
the sense that it dealt with exclusion from an existing service, the 
principles it enunciates could still be applied to other socio-economic 
rights cases not involving such exclusion. In this case, the CC held that in 
constitutional cases, the burden was on the state to put all the necessary 
evidence before the Court. Moreover, this was imperative especially in 
cases in which court orders ‘could have significant budgetary and 
administrative implications for the state’.201 While the Court talks 
generally about evidence, one could interpret this to mean evidence on 
resources as well. This means that the state bears the burden of proof 
whenever it contends that it does not have enough resources or that it has 
used the available resources effectively. One could stretch this further to 
mean that the state has a duty to convince the court why only so much has 
been spent and how providing a service would affect the state’s budget 
negatively. All the court would do is to assess the evidence of the state 
and decide whether it was justified in limiting the existing service on the 
                                                 
199
 General Comment No. 3, para 10. 
 
200
 This presumption could also be extended to other aspects of the reasonableness 
review approach as well. Prima facie unreasonableness would be established when a 
litigant proves that he/she lacks access to social goods and services that are required for 
life sustenance. See Liebenberg: 2005c, at p 23. 
 
201
 Para 19. 
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ground of resources. For instance, in the Khosa case, the CC said that 
exclusion of the applicants from the social assistance scheme on the 
ground of lack of resources is not justified. This is because their inclusion 
would lead to a very small proportional increment, two percent, in the 
entire social grants budget.202 The Court based this conclusion on very 
scanty and speculative evidence adduced by the state on the impact that 
inclusion of the applicants would have on the budget.203 The state 
estimated that extending the benefits to qualifying permanent residents 
would lead to an increase of between R 240 million and R 672 million in 
the social assistance budget.204 The CC applied a proportionality test to 
conclude that the rights of the applicants were very important; such a 
minimal increment in the budget could not justify their exclusion. The 
Court also based its decision on the fact that there was anticipated 
increment of expenditure on social grants by R 18.4 billion over the next 
three years without making provision for permanent residents. 
 
It is important that the approach in the Khosa case be carried to future 
cases in which resources are implicated. There is no doubt that it is the 
state that controls all public resources and is in possession of all the 
information relating to their use. It, therefore, makes sense that the state 
be required to put information relating to the existing resources and their 
use before the courts. This makes the work of the courts much easier and, 
                                                 
202
 Para 62. A similar decision was made by the Canadian Supreme Court in Eldridge 
and Others v. British Columbia (Attorney General) and Others [1997] 3 SCR 624, 151 
D.L.R. (4th) 577. This was a case of unfair discrimination brought by a deaf patient who 
contended that the failure of the province of British Columbia to provide interpretation 
services for deaf patients in public hospitals was discriminatory as it denied deaf patients 
access to health services. The Court rejected the defence of lack of resources because the 
proportional increment brought about by the provision of sign language interpretation to 
the entire health budget of the province was negligible, it was only 0.0025 percent. 
 
203
 Para 61. 
 
204
 Para 62. 
 
 
 
 
 
An assessment of the current approach 
 214 
to a large extent, saves them from getting entangled in complex resource 
issues without adequate information. All that the courts would have to do 
is demand for justification from the state. In doing this, the courts would 
be guided by principles such as reasonableness, proportionality and the 
content of the rights.205 This is in addition to the promotion of the 
constitutional values of accountability, openness and responsiveness. 
 
 
4.3 CONCLUSION 
 
In this chapter I have shown that while the reasonableness review 
approach has the potential to lead to the realisation of socio-economic 
rights, it has a number of loopholes that have to be plugged. The Court 
must appreciate the fact that resources play a role in determining whether 
the minimum core obligation has been discharged and provides the state 
with a possible defence. This, though, would shift the burden to the state 
to show that every effort is being made to provide for basic needs in the 
circumstances. This approach would compel the state to be more 
responsive to the needs of the poor, by directing resources to those living 
below the minimum core standard. It is true that the minimum core 
approach poses a danger of defining socio-economic rights rigidly and a-
contextually, which means imposing rigid standards irrespective of the 
context. Nonetheless, this danger can be obviated by defining the 
minimum core using broad parameters which are then made applicable on 
a case-by-case basis. This is in addition to giving a margin of discretion to 
the state to choose the most effective means of realising the minimum 
core in each context.   
 
                                                 
205
 This is consistent with the values of accountability, responsiveness and openness, as 
well as with the spirit of the Constitution as a bridge from a culture of authoritarianism to 
a culture of justification; a culture in which all exercise of public power has to be 
justified. See Mureinik: 1994. 
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The CC’s reasonableness review approach has also failed to give content 
to the rights, most especially as guaranteed by section 26(1) and 27(1). 
Without any analysis of the content of the rights, the CC rushes to 
consider the obligation to take reasonable measures to progressively 
realise the rights within the available resources as stipulated in sections 
26(2) and 27(2). This has left the beneficiaries of the rights without any 
clue as to the nature of the services to which they are entitled. Going by 
the approach of the CC, all that the claimants can demand from the state is 
a reasonable programme undertaken within available resources to 
progressively realise the rights. This poses the danger of the 
reasonableness review approach degenerating into ‘a weak and toothless 
standard’.206  The CC’s approach has also left it without any tools that 
could be used to interrogate the effectiveness of the means that have been 
chosen to realise the rights. The means cannot be assessed without an 
understanding of the goal to be realised, which is the content of the rights. 
It is only when the Court has given content to the rights that it will then be 
able to subject the state’s measures to a proportionality and rational 
connection test as suggested in this chapter.207 
 
This chapter has shown how useful a proportionality test, similar to the 
one applied under the general limitation clause, can be to socio-economic 
rights litigation. In socio-economic rights litigation, courts would have to 
weigh up the competing interests as brought to the fore by the state’s 
assertions that providing a particular service would prejudice certain 
legitimate interests. This is in addition to questioning whether there is a 
rational connection between the means chosen by the state to realise the 
rights and the goal to be realised. The courts would also have to be 
convinced that there are no less damaging means by which the rights 
could have been limited. This approach imposes a higher burden of 
justification on the state and puts the government under pressure to adopt 
                                                 
206
 Liebenberg, S., ‘Making a pro-poor Constitution’ newspaper article in Mail & 
Guardian 12 – 18 May 2006, pp 26 – 27.   
 
207
 Section 4.2.3.2 above. 
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the most appropriate means of realising the rights in each case. It is only 
such an approach that can translate socio-economic rights from mere 
abstract paper rights to concrete rights capable of improving the 
conditions of the vulnerable. This approach will compel the courts to 
reflect on their remedial approach and to grant those remedies that 
guarantee the concrete nature of the rights. The adoption of this approach 
does not suggest in any manner that the court is being disrespectful to the 
elected branches of the state; rather, it reinforces the constitutional values 
of accountability, responsiveness and openness.  
 
A similar standard of justification would be used to enable the courts to 
effectively interrogate the reasonableness of the resources allocated to the 
realisation of socio-economic rights. At the moment, the CC’s approach 
to the issue of resources is still deficient. The Court mostly has deferred to 
the state to decide the most appropriate way of using resources. However, 
while courts cannot assume the role of appropriating budgets and 
resources, they may require the state to justify its budgetary allocations.208 
A burden would be imposed on the state to prove not only that its 
resources are limited but also that the existing resources have been 
applied appropriately.209 In certain circumstances, the state would have to 
justify its failure to allocate more resources towards realisation of the 
rights or its failure to appropriate monies towards a commissioned 
programme. This approach places the duty of justification on the state and 
gives the courts an entry point to determine whether the state has indeed 
justified its actions with regard to resources. If not satisfied, the courts 
will be able to grant relief which compels the state either to allocate more 
resources towards realisation of the rights or to use the available resources 
                                                 
208
 Fredman: 2005, at p 182, has argued that existence of a right does not mean that 
courts need to make primary decisions about the allocation of resources; instead, it 
requires the courts to insist that decision makers take responsibility for the decisions ‘by 
providing open, transparent, and reasonable reasons, based on proper evidence  rather 
than generalisation or assumptions’..  
 
209
 See Russell: 2002, at p 16. 
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more efficiently. The Khosa case provides an indication of the CC’s 
preparedness to move in this direction, but it remains to be seen how the 
Court is going to apply the Khosa approach in future cases.  
 
It is only with such an approach that the courts will be able to use their 
wide constitutional remedial mandate to grant remedies that translate the 
rights from mere abstract paper to concrete rights. The CC’s failure to 
grant appropriate remedies in socio-economic rights litigations, thus far, is 
associated with its conception of the socio-economic rights obligations. 
Most importantly, the Court has been deferential to the executive and 
legislative branches of the state and has been reluctant to grant remedies 
that would, in its opinion, lead to overstepping the separation of powers 
divide. For instance, the Court thought that had it endorsed the minimum 
core it would have been forced to grant individually focused remedies. 
This would be achieved by ordering the state to provide socio-economic 
goods and services immediately to all in need. The Court thought that this 
would have put it into direct confrontation with the executive and 
legislative branches of the state. 
 
This chapter has discussed the CC’s approach to the primary theory, 
which is the nature of the obligations engendered by socio-economic 
rights. It is now safe to move to the secondary theory, which is the nature 
of the remedies that may be provided by violation of socio-economic 
rights. The discussion of the approach of the CC in this respect, however, 
will be guided by two theories: corrective and distributive justice. These 
two theories of justice have had a very big impact on the nature of judicial 
remedies in the areas of both public and private law. The theories are 
discussed in the next chapter.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
RECONCILING CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE 
FORMS OF JUSTICE AND THEIR IMPACT ON 
REMEDY SELECTION 
 
 
 
5.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
In chapters three and four I have demonstrated that in construing the 
obligations engendered by the socio-economic rights in the South African 
Constitution the CC has, among others, been influenced first by the 
doctrine of separation of powers. Secondly, the Court has been influenced 
by concerns regarding its institutional competence to adjudicate social 
justice matters and to consider issues related to resource allocation. In 
addition to the above considerations, however, the CC has also implicitly 
been influenced by the form of justice that it is inclined toward. This has 
greatly impacted on the kinds of remedies that the CC has granted which, 
by their nature, have guaranteed socio-economic rights as collective rather 
than individual rights. This is because the Court is inclined toward 
distributive justice as opposed to corrective justice.  
 
The Constitution itself is implicitly encrusted with distributive justice. 
Even where the Constitution guarantees what appear to be individual 
rights, their enforcement is subject to the values that promote the public 
good and common interests. Besides, the social and economic context 
within which the Constitution is enforced dictates that even seemingly 
individualised socio-economic rights, for instance, be enforced as group 
rights.  
 
The purpose of this chapter is to set out a theoretical platform for an 
understanding of how different notions of justice influence the remedies 
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that courts grant. The two theories of justice to be discussed here derive 
from the philosophies of corrective and distributive forms of justice. The 
corrective justice philosophy demands that victims be put in the position 
they would have been in but for the violation of their rights. On the other 
hand, the distributive justice philosophy is based on a recognition of the 
constraints of putting victims in the same position they would have been 
in had the violation not occurred. The distributive justice philosophy does 
not focus solely on the interests of the victim. A court basing its decision 
on distributive justice will decline to put the victim in the position he/she 
would have been in but for the violation if this would have a negative 
impact on other legitimate interests.1  
 
These theories of justice influence a host of other factors such as the 
relationship attached to rights and remedies, the form and procedures of 
litigation, and the manner of implementing the remedies. They also 
influence the liability rules adopted by the courts to determine whether or 
not there is a wrong and whether the plaintiff has suffered as a result. 
Additionally, the liability rules are used to identify the wrongdoer and the 
extent of his/her remedial obligations. All these factors have a bearing on 
the kinds of remedies that a court may grant. Traditionally, damages and 
restitution as used—especially in private law, have strong roots in the 
corrective justice philosophy. The main objective of damages, pecuniary 
damages in particular, is to restore the position of the victim. The court 
strives as much as possible to compensate the victim for the harm that was 
brought upon him/her as a result of the violation. In contrast, injunctive 
relief has played a dual role by serving the objects of both corrective and 
distributive forms of justice.  It is in the area of using injunctive relief that 
the distinction between corrective and distributive justice is most visible. 
On the one hand, courts dispensing distributive justice, unlike those 
dispensing corrective justice, have embraced the injunction as a tool of 
                                                 
1
 Roach, K., ‘The limits of corrective justice and the potential of equity in constitutional 
remedies’ (1991) 33 Arizona Law Review pp 859 – 909 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Roach: 1991], at p 859.  
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eliminating system violations and have used it without much restraint.2 
On the other hand, the corrective justice philosophy does not consider the 
injunction as a remedy of first resort. It is only used where damages are 
considered inadequate because of the irreparable nature of the harm 
caused.  
 
In this chapter I will examine the manner in which both corrective and 
distributive theories of justice have influenced the kinds of remedies that 
the courts grant in constitutional litigation. The impact of these theories of 
justice is also felt when one explores the relationship between rights and 
remedies. This chapter, therefore, discusses this relationship and its 
impact on the remedy selection process. The chapter sets a theoretical 
framework for discussion in chapter six of the South African courts’ 
approach to granting remedies. Chapter six analyses the impact that the 
notions of both corrective and distributive justice have had on the South 
African Courts. As already mentioned, the CC, for instance, has its 
inclination toward the distributive justice theory as seen through its 
definition of an ‘appropriate, just and equitable relief’. The Court has 
chosen to be guided by the ethos of distributive justice and on occasion 
has treated rights and remedies as two different phenomena.3  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 See chapter seven, section 7.3. 
 
3
 See Chapter six, section 6.3. 
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5.2 CORRECTIVE AND DISTRIBUTIVE FORMS OF 
JUSTICE DISTINGUISHED 
 
In order to understand issues related to constitutional remedies, one needs 
to understand the goals that the courts seek to achieve when they enforce 
particular types of remedies.4 Amongst other factors, the remedies that a 
court chooses will be determined by the kind of justice to which the court 
is inclined, either generally or in a particular case: 
 
[E]xperience teaches that the rules governing the choice of remedy—
procedural rules, if you will—cannot and should not be fashioned apart 
from and independent of one’s belief about the nature and justice of the 
underlying claim.5 
 
It is, therefore, important that one understands the different forms of 
justice that the courts pursue, as defined either by ethos of corrective 
justice or those of distributive justice. 
 
5.2.1 The ethos of corrective justice  
The traditional conception of litigation as guided by corrective justice 
reflects the 19th century vision of society, which promoted the individual 
as an autonomous entity.6 The corrective justice theory is also guided by 
the vision of libertarianism. It is this vision that distinguishes corrective 
justice from distributive justice. Libertarians are of the view that each 
person has the right to live his/her life in anyway he/she chooses, so long 
as the person respects the equal rights of others. The government exists 
                                                 
4
 Wells, M., and Eaton, T., Constitutional remedies: A reference book for the United 
States Constitution (2002) Praeger Publishing [Hereinafter referred to as Wells & Eaton: 
2002], at p xxv. 
 
5
 Fiss, O., The Civil rights injunction (1978) Indiana University Press [Hereinafter 
referred to as Fiss: 1978], at p 91. 
 
6
 Chayes, A., ‘The role of the judge in public law litigation’ (1979) 89 Harvard Law 
Review pp 1281 – 1316 [Hereinafter referred to as Chayes: 1979], at p 1285 
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only to protect people from the use of force by others.7 From this 
perspective, individual freedom cannot be sacrificed for the sake of the 
common good: 
 
Each person possesses an inviolability founded on justice that even the 
welfare of society as a whole cannot override. For this reason justice 
denies that the loss of freedom for some is made right by a greater 
good shared by others. It does not allow that the sacrifices placed on a 
few are outweighed by the larger sum of advantages enjoyed by 
many.8 
 
 In terms of this view, the primary function of the court is resolution of 
disputes in order to achieve fair results from human interaction and to 
maintain individual autonomy.9 Libertarians define human rights in a 
negative manner; all that we need are those rights that guarantee non-
interference from others in our enterprise of seeking autonomy.10 In terms 
of this philosophy, litigation is viewed as a vehicle to restore the 
autonomy of those whose rights have been interfered with. Libertarianism 
places much emphasis on the concept of property and the unfairness of 
the distribution of property gained through individual efforts. It, therefore, 
rejects the welfare state in favour of a liberal non-intervention state that 
respects people’s property rights.11 The libertarian philosophy is the 
                                                 
7
 Boaz, D., ‘The coming of libertarian age’ (1997) 19 CATO Policy Report, sourced at 
<http://www.heartland.org/pdf/63011a.pdf> (accessed on 25 June 2006).    
 
8
 Sandel, M., Liberalism and the limits of justice (1998) Cambridge University Press 
[Hereinafter referred to as Sandel: 1998], at p 16. See also Rawls, J., A theory of 
justice (1999) Oxford University Press, at p 3.  
 
9
 Chayes: 1979, at p 1285. 
 
10
 Garret, J., The limits of libertarianism and the promise of a qualified care ethic (2004), 
sourced at <http://www.wku.edu/~jan.garrett/ethics/libcrit.htm> (accessed on 25 June 
2006). 
 
11
 See Wellman, C., ‘Justice’ in Simon L., (ed.) The Blackwell Guide to social and 
political philosophy (2002) Blackwell Publishers Ltd pp 60 – 84 [Hereinafter referred to 
as Wellman: 2002], at p 70. See also generally Ryan, A., ‘Liberalism’ in Goodin, E., and 
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premise of the notion of corrective justice, which is considered to be the 
most ideal form of justice to pursue the agenda of libertarianism. 
 
The philosophy of corrective justice recognises the fact that stopping legal 
wrongs completely is impossible. It, however, perceives the law as a tool 
for restoring those who have been wronged to the position they would 
have been in but for the wrong.12 Aristotle defined corrective justice as 
‘that which plays a rectifying role in a transaction between man and 
man’.13 Aristotle favoured corrective as opposed to distributive justice; he 
contended that judges must posses the moral virtue of corrective justice 
and the intellectual virtue of practical wisdom in order to determine the 
just result in all cases.14 Corrective justice has also been described as 
compensatory justice and associated with three essential features: (1) the 
parties are treated as equal; (2) there must be damage inflicted by one 
party on another; and (3) the remedy granted must seek to restore the 
victim to the condition they were in before the violation.15 Once a 
                                                                                                                                            
Pettit, P., (eds.) A companion to contemporary political philosophy (1995) Blackwell 
Publishing Ltd pp 291 – 311.   
 
12
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-17, describes corrective justice as a powerful remedial theory 
which demands that wrongs be corrected. Though it empowers the courts to correct the 
wrong, the remedies are also limited to the harm that a wrongdoer has caused (at p 3-18). 
 
13
 Aristotle, Nicomachean ethics, V, 2-5 [Hereinafter referred to as Aristotle: 2-5], as 
quoted by Modak-Truran, M., ‘Corrective justice and the revival of judicial virtue’ 
(2000) 12 Yale Journal of Law & Humanities pp 249 – 298 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Modak: 2000], at p 250. Roach, K., Constitutional remedies in Canada (1994) Law 
Book Inc [Hereinafter referred to as Roach: 1994], at pp 3-17 – 3-18. Aristotle 
distinguished corrective justice from distributive justice when he said that distributive 
justice is that ‘which is manifested in distributions of honour or money or other things 
that fall to be divided among those who have a share in the constitution’. 
 
14
 See Modak: 2000, at p 250.  
 
15
 Shelton, D., Remedies in international human rights law (1999) Oxford University 
Press [Hereinafter referred to as Shelton: 1999], at p 38. Shelton contends that in all legal 
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violation is proven, the judge has to insist on full correction without 
attempting ‘either to balance the affected interests or changing … 
behaviour in the future’;16 the judge will focus on restoration of the status 
quo.  
 
In modern private law, corrective justice is not only most prominent in 
tort (delict) law, but obtains also in property and contract law.17 When 
parties enter into a contract it is assumed that they begin as equals who 
assume corresponding rights and duties. Omissions by one party to 
discharge his/her duties, for example by not paying the price or delivering 
the goods, destabilises the equality of the parties. It leads to an 
unjustifiable gain by one party and a corresponding loss to the other party. 
The effect of such conduct is that it changes the position of both parties, 
unfairly advantaging one and disadvantaging the other. This is what is 
meant by destabilisation of the parties’ equality. The purpose of the law in 
this case becomes one of restoring this equality.18 The same equality 
could be assumed with respect to delictual wrongs because of the 
                                                                                                                                            
systems the principle that a wrongdoer has an obligation to make good the injury caused 
is prominently enforced, together with the restitution of property wrongly taken (at p 60). 
 
16
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-2. He contends further that if a court focuses on correcting harms 
caused by a proven violation, it will not have to worry about infringing the role of other 
branches of government to pursue distributive justice. This means that corrective justice 
is intrusive in nature as it looks at the outcome of the case and its impact from the 
perspective of the plaintiff. 
 
17
 See Bridgeman, C., Strict liability and the fault standard in comparative justice 
accounts of contract, Public Law and Legal Theory Working Paper No. 146, Florida 
State University College of Law, sourced at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=669504> 
(accessed on 22 June 2006). 
 
18
 Weinrib, E., ‘Corrective justice in a nutshell’ (2002) 52 University of Toronto Law 
Journal, sourced at <http://www.utpjournals.com/product/utlj/524/524_weinrib.html>, 
(accessed on 22 June 2006) [Hereinafter referred to as Weinrib: 2002]. See also Modak: 
2000, at p 252. 
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alteration of the victim’s position as a consequence of the wrongdoer’s 
conduct. The victim will have to endure physical, emotional, financial or 
other loss which would not have occurred if the wrong was not 
committed. According to Aristotle: 
 
Corrective justice is the intermediate between an involuntary gain and 
loss. According to the corrective justice understanding of legal 
adjudication, the law looks only to the distinctive character of the injury, 
and treats the parties as equal, if one is in the wrong and the other is being 
wronged, and if one inflicted injury and the other has received it. 
Therefore, this kind of injustice being an inequality, the judge tries to 
equalise it.19 [Emphasis mine] 
 
The purpose of the law, from the above perspective, becomes one of 
looking back to the position of the parties before the wrong was 
committed and assessing the impact of the wrong on this status quo. It is 
for this reason that corrective justice has been described as backward 
looking, it tends to focus backwards on the particular events that affected 
a particular individual.20 Corrective justice is best suited for the 
rectification of discrete harms suffered by an individual at the hands of a 
clearly identifiable defendant.21 It is not, however, enough that the 
victim’s status has been altered, there must be proof that the alteration has 
resulted from the defendant’s wrong, liability on the part of the defendant 
must be established. The question posed by corrective justice, therefore, is 
                                                 
19
 Aristotle, as quoted by Modak: 2000, at p 256. According to Aristotle, corrective 
justice takes the form of an arithmetical progression: If there are two equal parties, A and 
B and after a transaction, A has injured B to the extent of C, and their relation is A+C, B 
- C. To restore the balance, the judge takes C from A and gives it to B, creating a new 
relationship. A C - C = B - C + C, an arithmetical mean between gain and loss in which 
the relative positions of the parties is once again the same. 
 
20
 Cooper-Stephenson, K., ‘Principle and pragmatism in the law of remedies’ in 
Berryman, J., (ed.) Remedies, issues and perspectives (1991) Thomson Professional 
Publishing Canada pp 1 – 48 [Hereinafter referred to as Cooper-Stephenson: 1991], at p 
21. 
 
21
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-19. See also Roach: 1991, at pp 865, 868 and 872. 
 
 
 
 
 
Reconciling corrective and distributive justice 
 226 
whether the plaintiff has suffered an injustice at the hands of the 
defendant.22  
 
A judge is required to look only at the distinctive character of the injury 
rather than at the virtue of the parties and must determine which party 
inflicted the injury and which party received it.23 Corrective justice is, 
therefore, not concerned with the character of the parties. According to 
Aristotle, an injury is an injury: ‘it makes no difference whether a good 
man has defrauded a bad man or a bad man a good one’.24 As long as fault 
is established, for instance, it does not matter whether the defendant is a 
government or a private individual. However, as is submitted later,25 the 
character of the defendant cannot be ignored and brushed aside as it may 
determine the potential remedies available.26  
 
The discretionary space of a judge under corrective justice is very limited; 
the judge has to live up to the demands of causation and restoration.27 In 
remedial terms, the catalogue of remedies from which the judge can 
choose is also very limited. He/she is limited to those remedies that, as 
much as possible, restore victims to their previous position. The court 
                                                 
22
 Weinrib, E., ‘Restitutionary damages as corrective Justice’ (2000) 1 Theoretical 
Inquiries in Law (Online Edition): No. 1, Article 1, at p 3, sourced at 
<http://www.bepress.com/til/voll/iss1/art1> (accessed on 24 June 2006) [Hereinafter 
referred to as Weinrib 2000]. 
 
23
 Modak: 2000, at p 252. 
 
24
 Aristotle, as quoted by Modak: 2000, at p 257. 
 
25
 Section 5.2.2.1 below.  
 
26
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 12. Cooper-Stephenson gives the example of an errant 
quasi-judicial tribunal as requiring an order of hearing or mandamus and not an award of 
damages. 
 
27
 Roach: 1991, at p 859. 
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focuses on establishing liability which must be linked to the wrongful 
conduct of the defendant as guided by the principles of liability and 
causation.28 The wrong is an essential element because it is the right 
infringing wrong which forms the subject of the claim.29 It is unjust for a 
defendant to be required to remedy that for which fault has not been 
proven on their part, and yet if fault is proven, it is unjust if the victim is 
not restored to the position he/she was in before the wrong: 
 
[I]njuries issuing from faultless conduct ought to be viewed more as 
misfortune than mischief, asserting or implying that it would be 
normatively wrong to hold injurers financially responsible for non-
negligent injuries that they inflict. The idea here seems to be that the 
harms occasioned by blameless human agency are morally equivalent to 
those caused by natural forces. Responsibility for rectifying injuries that 
arise out of pure natural misfortune—out of floods, fire, earthquakes and 
other natural disasters are neither caused nor aggravated by deliberate or 
careless human actions—does not fall on particular persons, because no 
particular persons stand in any “normatively important” relationship to the 
injuries at hand.30 
 
Corrective justice is also not concerned with the impact that its remedies 
may impose, not only on the defendant, but also on third parties. All that 
the court focuses on are the interests of the plaintiff. An example of this 
view can be found in a Canadian case where in ordering compensation 
against a university, a dissenting judge was not concerned with whether or 
not the order would negatively impact on the University’s already 
strapped finances. Justice Wilson in McKinney v University of Guelph 
(Mckinney case)31 observed that: 
                                                 
28
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-17. 
 
29
 Shelton: 1999, at p 39. 
 
30
 Keating, G., ‘Distributive and corrective justice in tort law of accidents’ (2000) 74 
Southern California Law Review pp 193 – 226, at p 198. Shelton: 1999, at p 39, submits 
that, otherwise, a person’s loss due to a falling tree would be legally equivalent to  injury 
resulting from torture and that even rights violating conduct which causes no 
compensable harm or that brings an economic benefit to the victim would be a cause of 
complaint. 
 
31
 (1990), 76 D.L.R. (4th) 545, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 229 
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I recognize that the enforced retirement of the appellants was not 
motivated by unconstitutional animus but rather by the severe fiscal 
restraints under which the universities have been forced to operate. I also 
appreciate that an award of damages in addition to reinstatement will place 
an additional monetary burden on these already financially strapped 
institutions. Impecuniosity and good faith are not, however, a proper basis 
on which to deny an award of compensatory damages. Such damages are 
clearly part of the web of remedies that go to make an injured party 
whole.32  
 
As is illustrated later,33 the majority disagreed, taking into consideration 
the financial impact that compensation would have on the university. 
According to the majority, in addition to the interests of the aggrieved 
staff the interest that the public has in the operation of universities had to 
be considered. 
 
5.2.1.1 Corrective justice and traditional litigation processes 
Corrective justice has played a very important role in defining and 
modelling traditional private law litigation processes. Traditional 
litigation procedures are primarily aimed at establishing the liability of the 
defendant, if any. Traditional litigation is also adversarial in nature. In 
such litigation it is assumed that the judge is an independent and neutral 
participant with a passive role to play.34 The role of the judge is simply to 
determine liability, and once this is done, to restore the parties to the 
position they were in before the wrong leading to liability occurred. The 
judge is supposed to be independent and impartial, which is the reason 
why he/she is excluded from any partisan role and reserves judgment until 
presentation of the facts and arguments.35 A judge cannot answer any 
                                                                                                                                            
 
32
 See case at <http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1990/1990rcs3-229/1990rcs3-229.html> 
(accessed on 18 September 2006). 
 
33
 Section 5.2.2 below.  
 
34
 See generally, Sturm, P., ‘A normative theory of public law remedies’ (1991) 79 
George Town Law Journal pp 1355 – 1446 [Hereinafter referred to as Sturm: 1991], at p 
1360. 
 
35
 Sturm: 1991, at p 1383. 
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questions unless they are put to him by the appropriate party, who must 
also follow the appropriate procedure.36 
 
In traditional litigation, the remedial process begins only after the 
establishment by the plaintiff of the defendant’s liability. It is very 
important to identify, with precision, not only the victim but also the 
perpetrator of the wrong. The victim in this form of litigation is identified 
using very strict rules of standing—the plaintiff must establish his/her 
standing by proving that he/she had a right whose enjoyment was brought 
to an end by the actions of the defendant. The plaintiff has to stand not 
only in the position of a victim but also as a beneficiary of any relief that 
may be claimed from the court.  
 
Traditionally, the victim of a violation was identified as an individual 
litigating for him/herself. However, the growing awareness that some 
transactions could no longer be viewed as bilateral gave birth to the class 
or representative action.37 A multilateral transaction can lead to 
multilateral damage, and it may be convenient that the claims of all those 
who have suffered at the hands of the same defendant or defendants be 
heard in the same suit. In spite of this, the element of damage and 
victimhood still has to be established on behalf of each individual 
plaintiff. The group is just an aggregation of a collection of identifiable 
individuals who have the same interests and have suffered the same 
harm,38 sometimes at the hands of the same defendant. 
                                                                                                                                            
 
36
 Chayes: 1979, at 1283. 
 
37
 Chayes: 1979, at p 1291. Chayes also perceives the class suit as a response to the 
proliferation of more or less well organised groups in society and also as a result of 
perception of some interests as group interests. 
 
38
 The class action has come under increasing scrutiny especially in the United States of 
America where it has mostly been used. In most cases, it has been used not as a vehicle 
of justice but as a means of making huge sums in legal fees for lawyers representing a 
wide range of victims. Class actions have also been criticised in the United States for 
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The litigation process focuses on the wrong that is alleged to have been 
committed, and the incidents leading up to the wrong are very important 
as determinants of liability. Once the wrong has been established, the 
remedy is deemed to flow naturally and smoothly from this process.39 The 
remedies that the courts grant after finding of a violation must be 
connected to the rights and duties of the parties and must be intended to 
restore those duties and rights. This requires that a close relationship be 
maintained between rights and remedies; the nature of the remedy is 
determined by the nature of the liability and the harm done. 
  
This form of litigation, as supported by corrective justice, is not suited to 
structural or systemic violations arising from organisational behaviour. 
This is because of the complexities of proving causal responsibility for the 
harms that are caused by such violations.40 Systemic violations are those 
violations that establish themselves and endure in a sustained manner as 
part of an institution’s behaviour. Most times the violation may not be the 
product of actions of identifiable officials, instead it may arise from a web 
of institutional practices entrenched in an ad hoc manner as part of the 
operational system. The violation is but a symptom of a bigger problem 
requiring a systemic approach to tackle.  However, this does not mean 
                                                                                                                                            
straining judicial resources especially in localised areas where class suits are mostly filed 
in search of sympathetic juries. These suits also allow cases that raise interstate issues to 
be conducted outside the jurisdiction of federal courts. It is because of these and other 
reasons that the United States Congress in 2005 passed the Class Action Fairness Act, an 
Act which redefines the jurisdiction of the federal and state courts in class actions. 
 
39
 Eisenberg, T., and Yeazell, T., ‘The ordinary and the extraordinary in institutional 
litigation’ (1980) 93 Harvard Law Review pp 465 – 517 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Eisenberg & Yeazell: 1980], at p 474. 
 
40
 Roach: 1991, at pp 865. Roach contends that the causal requirement encourages a lack 
of candour and forces plaintiffs and defendants to make moralistic bluffs that do not 
capture the complex and ambiguous nature of the structural problem to be remedied (at p 
875). 
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that corrective justice should be discarded completely where violations 
result from organisational behaviour. It may, for instance, be used to 
address discrete wrongs suffered by individuals at the hands of state 
officials. Where a constitutional violation arises from a ‘one-shot’ wrong 
and is suffered by an identifiable victim at the hands of an identifiable 
wrongdoer, corrective justice can be used to correct such harm.41  
 
It is important to note, however, that corrective justice’s insistence on full 
correction sometimes places unrealistic demands on the courts and fetters 
their ability to do justice. This is especially so where a number of interests 
are implicated by a case: ‘[corrective justice] cannot guide a court’s sense 
of priorities in responding to patterns and practices of violations in 
institutions or in accommodating social interests in devising remedies’.42 
With this model of justice there is a fusion of rights and remedies as the 
purpose of the latter is to realise the former. A remedy is not suited for the 
right if it cannot restore the position of the victim. On the other hand, 
distributive justice suggests that, where necessary, rights and remedies 
can be treated as two separate things. The needs of justice may demand 
that the remedy adopted should not necessarily be that which leads to the 
full realisation of the rights. It is this difference between corrective and 
distributive justice that runs through the debate on the relationship 
between rights and remedies. 
 
5.2.2 The ethos of distributive justice  
Distributive justice is that domain of justice concerned with the 
distribution of benefits and burdens among members of a given group, 
who enjoy the relevant benefits and shoulder the relevant burdens.43 The 
benefits may come to such members either simply by virtue of their 
                                                 
41
 Roach: 1991, at p 870. 
 
42
 Roach: 1991, at p 861. 
 
43
 See Aristotle: 2-5. 
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membership of the group or as a result of some entitlement.44 The concept 
of distributive justice, unlike corrective justice based on the philosophy of 
libertarianism, is supported by utilitarianism. The philosophy of 
utilitarianism is based on the belief in an individual’s wellbeing but also 
lays emphasis on the common good of society and the wellbeing of all its 
members. An act is just only if it maximises the wellbeing of everyone 
else.45 Utilitarian justice is supported by what John Rawls describes as the 
idea of social co-operation arising from his conception of justice.46 Rawls 
has described the elements of social co-operation as follows: 
 
A conception of political justice characterizes the fair terms of 
cooperation. Since the primary subject is the basic structure of society, 
these fair terms are expressed by principles that specify basic rights 
and duties within its main institutions to regulate the arrangements of 
background justice over time, so that the benefits produced by 
everyone’s efforts are fairly distributed and shared from one 
generation to the next.47   
 
 From a utilitarian perspective, the law and the courts have very important 
roles to play in the enterprise of realising social co-operation. In terms of 
this view, courts have to consider interests other than those of the parties 
before them. In this context, actions, policies, and institutions are judged 
in terms of the extent to which they maximise overall happiness and 
                                                 
44
 Klimchuk, D., ‘On the autonomy of corrective justice’ (2003) 23 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies pp 49 – 64, at p 50. 
 
45
 See Vallentyne, P., Distributive Justice at <http://www.missouri.edu/~klinechair/on-
line%20papers/distributive%20justice%20(handbook).doc> (accessed on 24 June 2006) 
[Hereinafter referred to as Vallentyne: 2006]. 
 
46
 Rawls, J., Political liberalism (1993) Columbia University Press [Hereinafter 
referred to as Rawls: 1993], at p 16. See also Scheffler, S., ‘Rawls and utilitarianism’ in 
Freeman, S., (ed.) The Cambridge companion to Rawls (2003) Cambridge University 
Press pp 426 – 459. 
 
47
 Rawls: 1993, at p 16. 
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wellbeing.48 It is this form of justice that persons such as Jeremy Bentham 
and John Stuart fought to entrench in England in the 19th century. They 
viewed the laws that existed then as morally atrocious because they 
prevented rather than promoted overall happiness.49 Utilitarianism also 
represents itself in the form of what has been described as 
communitarianism, a concept which challenges libertarianism on the 
ground that an individual is not an end, but exists together with others 
with whom he/she pursues a common end.50 Communitarians submit that 
an ideal society is one that defines the individual in terms of what they are 
and the values that they have.51    
 
Unlike bilateral corrective justice, distributive justice is, therefore, 
multilateral. Justice from this perspective is the standard by which 
conflicting values are reconciled and competing conceptions of good 
accommodated or resolved.52 Though a court case may have only two 
parties, distributive justice views it as having community wide 
implications. As a result, the court focuses on what Cooper-Stephenson 
has described as collateral interests that need secondary consideration.53 
This has arisen from the recognition that not all interested persons may be 
party to a suit, and yet their interests may be affected by the outcome of 
                                                 
48
 Wellman: 2002], at p 60. 
 
49
 Wellman: 2002, at p 61. 
 
50
 See Mulhall, S., and Swift, A., Liberals & communitarians (1996) Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd [Hereinafter referred to as Mulhall & Swift: 1996], at p 10. See also 
generally Kymlicka, W., ‘Community’ in Ryan, A., in Goodin, E., and Pettit, P., (eds.) A 
companion to contemporary political philosophy (1995) Blackwell Publishing Ltd pp 
366 – 378; and Scanlon, M., What we owe each other (2000) Harvard University Press. 
 
51
 Mulhall & Swift: 1996, at p 13. 
 
52
 Sandel: 1998, at p 16 
 
53
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 19 
 
 
 
 
 
Reconciling corrective and distributive justice 
 234 
that suit.54 While corrective justice seeks to explain why ‘this defendant is 
liable to this plaintiff’;55 distributive justice focuses on the broader 
societal interests.56  
 
Distributive justice is based on an acknowledgement that it is not possible 
in all cases to put the victim of a wrong in the position they would have 
been in but for the violation. In the modern context it is not always 
possible to identify discrete wrongs and the wrongdoer with precision.57 
Harm may be inflicted on groups of people, and not only an individual 
victim, and may arise from conduct that cannot be associated, in liability 
terms, with a specific defendant. Where the state is the obligation bearer 
                                                 
54
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 19, submits that it has also arisen from the increased 
focus which is being given to the deterrent effect of remedies, which requires 
consideration of the interests of the future community of persons who will find 
themselves in a like situation as the plaintiff and defendant. 
 
55
 Smith, L., ‘Restitution: The heart of corrective justice’ (2001) 79 Texas Law Review 
pp 215 – 275, at p 216. 
 
56
 It is not true, as is suggested by Horowitz, that all forms of adjudication focus on 
ascertaining whether one party has a right and another a duty, and it is not true that the 
question of what alternatives are available for a problem are deterred by this approach. 
See Horowitz, D., The courts and social policy (1977) The Brookings Institution 
[Hereinafter referred to as Horowitz: 1977], at p 34. While this may be true of traditional 
litigation based on corrective justice, it is not true of modern litigation based on 
distributive justice. The question of alternatives is very central to distributive justice as it 
helps the court find solutions that address, as much as is possible, the interests that need 
to be balanced. It is also not true, again as suggested by Horowitz (at p 35), that 
adjudication is piecemeal and that judges are restricted to issues that are presented before 
them  Chapter seven (section 7.3) will show that actually structural litigation has been 
protracted and has involved judges in issues that were not raised by the parties. Even in 
the South African context, the courts have rejected proposed out of court settlements for 
the sake of making judgments that address the wider issues of constitutionality. See 
chapter six (section 6.2).  
 
57
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-19. 
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in this context, it may be necessary for the court to look at the wider 
obligations of the state and not just liability in the case at hand. Without 
asking whether or not government is guilty, the court could, in some 
circumstances, dedicate its efforts to getting solutions that may do away 
with the harm. In this context, therefore, the liability rules of corrective 
justice will be of very limited application.  
 
The remedies arising from administration of distributive justice have their 
roots in the law of equity, whose application began in England as a 
response to the inadequacies of the common law in remedying certain 
violations. The common law has historically been a very rigid body of 
law. It has recognised only specific causes of action through the writ 
system and granted very rigid remedies to fit the specific writ. What 
equity has done is to introduce a sense of flexibility into the law and to 
soften the common law and make it fairer.58 It is this form of flexibility 
that has been embraced by the proponents of distributive justice. Equity 
has been described as a complex theory and doctrine which requires 
balancing of the affected interests before intrusive remedies are ordered.59 
This is in addition to affirming the judge’s broad and flexible remedial 
discretion.60 This balancing and wide discretion has allowed courts to 
award remedies that may be short of full correction. This is because ‘[t]he 
disengagement of right and remedy in equity allows judges to provide less 
than rectification demands’.61 In addition, equity allows the court to focus 
                                                 
58
 Berryman. J., The law of equitable remedies (2000) Irwin Law [Hereinafter referred to 
as Berryman: 2000], at p 2. 
 
59
 See Chayes: 1979, at pp 1292 – 1293. 
 
60
 Roach: 1991, at p 887. 
 
61
 Roach: 1991, at p 860. Roach submits that the flexibility of equity provides judges 
with an opportunity to address the present needs of plaintiffs and defendants without 
concentrating on their past rights and wrongs as corrective justice requires. In his 
opinion, courts have generally been reluctant to use the language of needs to justify 
‘enriched’ remedies, but they have used it to recognise the necessity of granting delayed 
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not only on the needs of the parties but also to consider third party 
interests implicated by the case. While equity is not explicitly part of 
South African law, its principles are implicitly enforced by the courts 
through such principles as those that require fairness. 
 
Unlike the case with corrective justice, a judge dispensing distributive 
justice will, therefore, rely on the breadth and flexibility of the equitable 
remedial powers without careful attention to the demands of causation 
and restoration.62 Rather than be guided by strict rules of procedure, and 
be bound by the existing causes of action and remedies, distributive 
justice allows the court very wide discretion to fashion causes of action 
and remedies as the needs of justice demand. Distributive justice puts 
equity in its right place by treating it as a primary source of law. Courts, 
for instance, are not bound by the requirement that equitable remedies 
will only be available where common law remedies are proven to be 
inadequate. This has enabled the courts to embrace the full breadth of 
equity and its benefits:  
 
It may act so as to adjust and reconcile competing claims and so as to 
accord full justice to all the real parties …; if necessary, persons not 
originally connected with the litigation may be brought before the court so 
that their rights in the subject matter may be determined and enforced. In 
addition, the court may go beyond the matters immediately underlying its 
equitable jurisdiction and decide whatever other issues and give whatever 
other relief may be necessary under the circumstances. Only in that way 
can equity do complete rather than truncated justice.63 
 
                                                                                                                                            
and imperfect remedies. Roach submits further that the displacement of the dominance 
of the corrective theory will encourage courts to develop remedies tied to victims’ needs 
as a counterbalance to the inevitability that remedies cannot fully correct structural 
wrongs but will often recognise society's needs for delayed or imperfect remedies (at p 
864). 
 
62
 Roach: 1991, at p 859. 
 
63
 Murphy J in Porter v Warner Co. 328 U.S. 395 (1946), at p 398. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter five 
 237 
Unlike corrective justice, distributive justice does not emphasise liability 
but effects of one’s activities. Its multilateral nature compels a court to 
ascertain how its remedial measures, irrespective of whether or not 
liability has been declared, will impact on the interests of other people. 
The backward looking nature of corrective justice, geared towards 
ascertaining liability, may not be suitable to address current legal 
problems. Legal problems and disputes are no longer bilateral. The world 
we live in now has complex and interdependent interests, a reality which 
the courts must acknowledge when they choose remedies.64 All the 
interests implicated by the case must be considered and the impact of the 
remedy on them assessed. 
 
Due to the need to avoid repetition of the same conduct, distributive 
justice allows remedies to have a future direction and focuses on the 
needs of the community as a whole. This should be contrasted with 
corrective justice, which is backward looking and focuses on the 
individual claimant in order to address past wrongs. It is true that the 
process of administering distributive justice may begin with a 
pronouncement on the legal consequences of past actions. However, 
unlike the backward looking liability rules of corrective justice, 
distributive justice will use such past actions as a basis to determine future 
actions.65 In this setting, the role of the remedial stage is not to determine 
where fault lies. Rather, it is to develop a plan that fairly and effectively 
realises the rights not only at the time of the case but in future as well.66  
The court will identify the needs that have to be addressed, and select 
remedies in response to them. This is important because remedies based 
                                                 
64
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-19. 
 
65
 See Chayes: 1979, at p 1294. 
 
66
 Sturm: 1991, at 1393. 
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on needs are more directly relevant to the future of those who have been 
wronged in the past.67   
 
The remedy guaranteed will not necessarily be one that flows from the 
wrong. It must be a remedy that satisfies all the interests concerned. 
Emphasis is not on correction of the wrong, complete correction may be 
ignored for the sake of addressing other interests. Both corrective and 
distributive forms of justice demand that where a state agency is found to 
have violated constitutional rights, the violation must be stopped. 
However, where distributive justice differs from corrective justice is that 
it will insist on full correction of the violation ‘absent special 
circumstances’.68 ‘Special circumstances’ means those circumstances 
which may impact on the remedy. This may, for instance, include the 
costs associated with the implementation of the remedy.69 Special 
circumstances also include factors that may affect interests other than 
those of the parties in the court case. Such other interests have to be 
balanced against those of the parties. Balancing of these interests may not 
be possible where a judge insists on full correction of the wrong: 
 
[O]nce a … violation has been found, remedial options should not be 
constrained by the corrective requirements of causation and restoration. 
All of the victim's needs should be considered in the practical balancing of 
interests that equity demands. Once the constraints of corrective justice are 
abandoned, I can imagine a justice system in which the needs of the 
plaintiffs, of affected interests and of society are placed directly on the 
remedial agenda of courts. Victims will not have to concentrate on tracing 
the harms which can be attributed to past wrongs, but rather can educate 
the court about their present needs. Likewise, governmental defendants 
will not have to channel their energies into claims of innocence and lack of 
responsibility for harms. They can directly educate courts about the 
resource constraints they face. For their part, judges could be directly 
                                                 
67
 Roach: 1991, at p 864. 
 
68
 Wells & Eaton, at p xxv. 
 
69
 Wells & Eaton: 2002, at p xxv give the example of an injunction that would be 
especially disruptive to legitimate state goals as in the case of an employee who is fired 
and whose reinstatement would produce turmoil in the office. The injunction would be 
denied in that case.  
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concerned with the practical prospects for genuine reform and 
reconciliation. They would not have to pretend that the remedies they 
order inexorably follow, fit and repair the extent of wrongdoing.70 
 
The approach described above requires the court to consider the costs and 
benefits of a particular remedy. For instance, as seen in chapter six,71 
damages in socio-economic rights litigation deplete the already limited 
state resources, which may affect the state’s capacity to deliver socio-
economic goods and services.  In the Canadian case of McKinney, for 
example, the majority thought that requiring the university to stick to the 
statutory state retirement age requirements would adversely affect the 
University’s already strapped finances and would impact on the public 
interest. Dickson CJ, for the majority, held that: 
 
In assessing whether there has been minimal impairment of a constitutional 
right, consideration must be given not only to the reconciliation of claims of 
competing individuals or groups but also to the proper distribution of scarce 
resources, here access to the valuable research and other facilities of 
universities. The universities had a reasonable basis for concluding that 
mandatory retirement impaired the relevant right as little as possible given 
their pressing and substantial objectives.  Against the detriment to those 
affected must be weighed the benefit of the universities' policies to society.72 
[Underline in original] 
 
It should be noted that the various remedies come with a number of costs, 
not only financial but such other costs as forbearance of benefits, 
limitation of rights and burdens. Some of these costs are not only relevant 
at the remedial stage but may even, on occasion, override remedying a 
violation.73 While a court’s approach in granting remedies may be 
intended to realise full protection of the infringed rights, it may come with 
unreasonable costs on the part of the defendant. This is in addition to 
                                                 
70
 Roach: 1991, at p 864. 
 
71
 Section 6.3.2.  
 
72
 See case at <http://scc.lexum.umontreal.ca/en/1990/1990rcs3-229/1990rcs3-229.html> 
(accessed on 18 September 2006). 
 
73
 Shelton: 1999, at p 54. Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 36.  
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imposing burdens on third parties not before the court. Though the grant 
of remedies should not be deterred on the ground that they impose 
burdens on the defendant, these burdens cannot be ignored as they may 
affect the effectiveness of the remedy itself.74 It is sometimes very 
difficult to design an effective remedy without imposing costs on third 
parties to the suit who may not even be violators.75 The courts should, 
however, be careful not to impose on such third parties costs which may 
be viewed as unjust or unduly burdensome.76 Such perceptions have the 
potential of creating resistance which undermines the implementation of 
the selected remedy. Ignoring the costs on third parties would amount to a 
                                                 
74
 In the Canadian case of Lavoie v Nova Scotia (Attorney-General) (Lavioe case) 47 
D.L.R (4th) 586; 1988 D.L.R LEXIS 1108 the Court declined to make an order that the 
defendant establish facilities for francophone students. The Court said that it would not 
make such order until it was satisfied that the number of enrolled students was sufficient 
to justify the cost. The Court observed that the defendant’s interests in terms of costs had 
to be considered as well:  
To put the defendants by order of this court to the expense of providing a 
separate facility for say, 200 plus children from Grades P to VIII, and then 
to find only 50 actually enrolled is an order that I am not prepared to make 
on the evidence before me (47 D.L.R. (4th) 586, at p 594). 
 
It has been submitted that the burden is on the defendant to persuade the court that the 
remedy is unreasonable and imposes undue hardship. Roach: 1994, at p 13-50. This does 
not mean though that the court cannot detect the hardships on its own, and it is even 
more necessary for the court to do so in respect of third parties who may even not be 
before the court. 
 
75
 Shelton: 1999, at p 54. 
 
76
 In this regard, the courts have been urged to try to limit the consequences of decisions 
on persons or processes extraneous to the litigation to a minimum. Pieterse, M., ‘Coming 
to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights’ (2004) 20 South African 
Journal on Human Rights pp 383 – 417 [Hereinafter referred to as Pieterse: 2004], at p 
412.  
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failure to acknowledge the polycentric nature of constitutional disputes as 
discussed in chapter three.77  
 
Consideration of the costs of the remedies is the essence of the notion of 
‘remedial cost internalisation’. According to this notion, the remedy 
should limit the autonomy and choices of as few innocent individuals and 
institutions as possible.78 The risk of non-compliance with the remedy 
should itself be weighed as a cost that needs to be traded off against the 
effectiveness of the remedy.79 A less effective remedy may be selected 
where a more effective one heightens the risk of non-compliance. 
Gewirtz, for instance, contends that: 
 
The intellectual and practical problem posed in each situation is whether 
and how the law should adjust its remedial aspiration in the face of a 
resistant reality, in particular, under what conditions and premises, if any, 
public opposition to a legal rule may properly be the basis for limiting 
judicial remedies for its violation. It may at first seem wholly illegitimate 
for courts to take account of resistance, since doing so appears to deny the 
very right that the court has affirmed. But, as I argue in this essay, 
resistance cannot be ignored. Among the difficulties, indeed, the anguish, 
necessarily endured by those seeking to produce change in the world is 
that at times they must cede ground because of opposition. Remedies for 
violations of constitutional rights are not immune from that reality.80 
 
 
                                                 
77
 At section 3.4.2. See also Cassels, J., ‘An inconvenient balance: The injunction as a 
Charter remedy’ in Berryman, J., (ed.) Remedies, issues and perspectives (1991) 
Thomson Professional Publishing Canada pp 272 – 311 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Cassels: 1991], at pp 300 – 303, and also Pieterse: 2004, at p 412. 
 
78
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 36. 
 
79
 Currie, I., and De Waal, J., The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) Juta & Co [Hereinafter 
referred to as Currie & De Waal: 2005], at p 198. Currie & De Waal contend that it 
would be unrealistic for a court not to take the possibility of the unsuccessful execution 
of its order into account when considering the appropriateness of a remedy. 
 
80
  Gewirtz, P., ‘Remedies and resistance’ (1983) 92 Yale Law Journal pp 585 – 680 
[Hereinafter referred to as Gewirtz: 1983], at p 588. 
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The resistance encountered in the implementation of judicial decrees in 
the United States school desegregation cases supports the above 
submission.81 In some cases it was feared that immediate implementation 
of the court decrees would have exacerbated the resistance.82 All that the 
Court did at the beginning was to demand that the state desegregates the 
schools with all deliberate speed. It was only after resistance had been 
overcome that the courts started giving concrete directions, in clear and 
precise terms, as to what was to be done to rectify the violation.  
 
An effective remedy is, therefore, one that embraces and considers the 
problems that are likely to be encountered at the implementation stage. 
The court should look at the end results of its remedy and consider its 
long term effectiveness. Remedies which, for instance, impose high 
resource burdens on the state may force the state to adopt long term 
strategies that will lead to the withdrawal of the challenged social 
                                                 
81
 In the 1950s opposition to racial discrimination in public schools in the United States 
reached its peak, culminating in a series of judicial decisions from both the state and 
federal courts. The most significant decision in this direction was the 1955 United States 
Supreme Court case of Brown v Board of Education 349 US 294 (1955) ( Brown case). 
In this case, the Supreme Court upheld decisions of several lower courts to the effect that 
racial discrimination in public education was unconstitutional which had to be remedied. 
This ruling did not, however, go down well with some sections of American society, 
resulting in resistance that affected implementation of the court decrees. The resistance 
manifested itself in the form of violence, flight by white people from public schools, 
boycotts, hostility and incitement, and foot-dragging by public officials. Gewirtz: 1983, 
at p 589. In fact, in some cases the Federal government had to enlist the services of the 
US marshal to ensure that black learners are enrolled in educational institutions. This 
impacted greatly on the remedies and the means of enforcement chosen by the courts to 
vindicate the right to equality. Some of the remedies and means of implementation did 
not present themselves as the most effective available, they seemed minimalist in 
objective. 
 
82
 Shelton: 1999, at p 54. See also Davis, D., ‘Adjudicating the socio-economic rights in 
the South African Constitution: Towards “deference lite”?’ (2006) 22 South African 
Journal on Human Rights pp 301 – 327 [Hereinafter referred to as Davis: 2006], at p 
322. 
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programs.83 A remedy may be ignored simply because it is impossible to 
carry out, with the resultant effect that the ideal it protects is hypothesised 
as unrealistic. It is important to note that competing interests that are 
considered insufficient to override the purposes of the rights at the rights 
determination stage could be relevant and used at the remedial stage to 
limit the scope of the remedy. It is, therefore, not correct, as has been 
contended,84 that an effective remedy is one that is capable of having an 
immediate effect. 
 
In the school desegregation cases, for instance, white resistance could not 
have been used to limit the right to equality and freedom from 
discrimination; yet it was considered as limiting the scope of the remedies 
the courts were willing to grant. This may have, in the short run, appeared 
to be a limitation of the rights; yet it was calculated to give the courts time 
to devise means of countering the resistance.85 It also served to preserve 
the legitimacy of the courts and to allow them to assert their remedial 
powers in a gradual and acceptable manner. The courts were merely 
taking cognisance of the fact that changing strongly held convictions 
cannot be done immediately.86  
                                                 
83
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 32. 
 
84
 See Swart, M., ‘Left out in the cold? Grafting constitutional remedies for the poorest 
of the poor’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 215 – 240 
[Hereinafter referred to as Swart: 2005], at p 217. 
 
85
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 38, has submitted that the argument may be made that 
the highly prized human rights might be reformulated in the face of defendant 
recalcitrance. He submits that whether a ‘rights maximising’ approach to remedies, or an 
‘interest balancing’ approach is used, the courts must recognise that resistance can 
weaken victims' rights and consider strong measures to defeat that resistance. They must 
sometimes limit remedies in light of resistance because to do so ultimately provides the 
most effective remedy. It may indeed maximise the plaintiff's rights in the long term to 
interest-balance in the short term, and a court should be candid when that is done. 
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5.2.2.1 Focus on character of violator under distributive justice 
With distributive justice, the court does not focus solely on the nature of 
the injury but also on the distinctive character of the parties in the court 
case. This is in addition to focusing on the character of persons that may 
not necessary be parties in the case yet would be affected by its results. 
Those before the court are, therefore, considered images of sociological 
entities, which though composed of individuals and must be represented 
by particular individuals, are not reducible to the people who speak for 
them.87 Focus on the nature of the wrong while ignoring the character of 
the violator has serious implications, especially where government is 
implicated as the wrongdoer. The character of the violator is not only 
relevant to a determination of how to apply the constitution; it may also 
influence the efficacy or availability of certain remedies.88  
 
Though they may inflict the same kind of harm, violations perpetrated by 
private individuals and those perpetrated by government are generally of a 
                                                                                                                                            
86
 Roach: 1991, at p 882. See also Special Project, ‘The remedial process in institutional 
reform litigation’ (1978) Columbia Law Review pp 784 – 929 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Special Report: 1978]. 
 
87
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 20. Horowitz: 1977, at pp 7 and 9, has condemned this 
approach as a dubious assumption that the litigants before the court typify a bigger 
problem. In his opinion, what this signifies is the increasing subordination of the 
individual case in judicial policy making, which has led to the individual fading away 
into the background.  This has resulted in less care being devoted by the lawyers and the 
judge to the appropriateness of particular plaintiffs and to the details of the grievance. He 
describes the new judicial approach as a process that has superimposed itself on the 
judicial structure that evolved primarily to decide individual cases (at p 23). 
 
88
 Currie & De Waal: 2005, at p 192. Currie & De Waal argue that the deterrent effect of 
some remedies may differ considerably depending on whether the violator is a public or 
private institution. They also argue that when an institution is responsible for the 
violation, it may be possible to remit a decision for reconsideration; this is not possible 
where the violator is an individual (at p 197). 
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differentiated nature.89 The reasons that lead to such violations are usually 
also quite different. So are the benefits that may be obtained by the 
violator. According to Schucks, in respect of public officials ‘the returns 
for accepting risk are far more intangible and remote than the potential 
returns that motivate private risk taking’.90 It, therefore, makes sense to 
identify the violator because the motive of the violator, if deterrence is to 
be achieved, becomes a relevant consideration. A violator who perceives 
his/her motive to be legitimate may not be deterred by certain remedies, 
or may continue the violation if he/she values the benefits of the violation 
highly. Cooper-Stephenson describes the process of considering the 
character of the defendant as ‘remedial targeting’, which involves an 
analysis of the types of official misconduct.91 The nature of the remedies 
needed to deter violations by the state may be different from those that 
deter private violations.92 Damages may be effective in respect of private 
wrongdoers because of the dent they make on private funds. Yet damages 
against government, paid from public coffers, may be an ineffective 
deterrence measure.93  
                                                 
89
 Pilkington has argued that one acting in the name of the government has potential 
ability to bring about substantially greater harm than the ordinary person. Pilkington, M., 
‘Damages as a remedy for infringement of the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms’ (1984) Canadian Bar Review pp 517 – 576 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Pilkington: 1984], at p 536. 
 
90
 Schuck. P., Suing government: Citizen remedies for official wrongs (1983) Yale 
University Press, at pp 16 – 25 as reviewed by Sunstein, C., (1983) 92 Yale Law Journal 
pp 749 – 761 [Hereinafter referred to as Schuck: 1983 and Sunstein: 1983, respectively], 
at pp 751 – 752. It is for this reason that Schucks thinks that damages may not be an 
effective means of deterring public officials from violating rights.  
 
91
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 12. 
 
92
 Shelton: 1991, at p 51. 
 
93
 Shelton: 1991, at p 51. Damages are not effective against government because they 
must be substantial enough for a dent to be felt and to prevent government from 
purchasing an option to continue violating human rights. Yet substantial damages may 
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Government is perceived as the guardian of human rights and the 
protector of all citizens; violations by the same institution go to the very 
root of protection and need to be dealt with severely.94 At the same time 
one must consider the motives behind violations of human rights. In most 
cases private wrongdoers are motivated by selfish interests such as 
accumulation of wealth and amassing power.95 In contrast, violations by 
government may arise out of sheer negligence on the part of public 
officials, and sometimes in the belief that the public interest is being 
served.96 Violation by government could also result from failure of 
comprehension, failure of motivation or systemic failure.97 Yet remedies 
that work for a government that is merely inattentive to constitutional 
standards may not work for a government that is either incompetent, or 
intransigent. The latter may call for strong remedies, including contempt 
of court sanctions if necessary.98  
                                                                                                                                            
have an impact on the government’s capacity to discharge all its constitutional 
commitments as they deplete the resources needed for this purpose. See Fose v Minister 
of Safety and Security (Fose case) 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC), at para 72. See also chapter 
six, section 6.3 
 
94
 Shelton: 1999, at p 50. He submits that the remedies afforded should reflect the breach 
of trust involved; the more outrageous the wrongdoer’s conduct, the more outraged and 
distressed the victim will be, and the harm that will be suffered. 
 
95
 This is not to suggest that all private violations are motivated by a desire for wealth 
and power; some result from sheer negligence, while others may be committed in good 
faith because of ignorance. 
 
96
 Again, this is not to suggest that there are no cases where public officials are motivated 
by personal and selfish interests or even by the need to satisfy political needs.  
 
97
 These are the reasons that have been identified by Peter Schuck as explaining the 
motives behind the commission of wrongs by government. See Schuck: 1983 as referred 
to by Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at pp 14 – 18.  
 
98
 Roach, K., and Budlender, G., ‘Mandatory relief and supervisory jurisdiction: When is 
it appropriate, just and equitable’ (2005) 122 South African Law Journal pp 325 – 351 
[Hereinafter referred as Roach & Budlender: 2005], at p 345. The identification of the 
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5.3 RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN RIGHTS AND REMEDIES  
 
The relationship of rights and remedies has been the subject of 
controversy between scholars for quite some time. While some scholars 
believe that rights and remedies are interlinked, others insist that the two 
should be de-linked and considered separately. It is worthwhile exploring 
this debate because of its impact on the kinds of remedies that a court may 
grant and its relationship with the ethos of justice. The relationship that 
different scholars ascribe to rights and remedies has, amongst others, been 
determined by the notion of justice to which they subscribe. Linkage 
between rights and remedies makes sense from the perspective of the 
theory of corrective justice. This is because remedies under this theory of 
justice are supposed to restore the right in its entirety. 
 
 A judge who believes in the linkage between rights and remedies will, 
therefore, restrict him/herself to those remedies that maximise the right 
and will not pay attention to considerations not connected to the right, 
even if these impact on the implementation of the remedy. This is the 
basis of the theory that the only reason remedies exist is to serve to 
implement substantive rights, and that the remedy should, as far as 
possible, serve to vindicate the right in issue.99 This approach is in 
                                                                                                                                            
character of the violator in the case of government defendants is also important because 
it allows the court to ascertain the specific government entity bearing the remedial 
obligation. This is particularly relevant within the context of the semi-federal structure of 
the South African government. The Constitution designates the Republic of South Africa 
as consisting of the national, provincial and local government spheres which are distinct 
but also interdependent and interrelated (see sections 40 and 41). Through this structure 
the Constitution has imposed different socio-economic rights obligations on different 
levels of government. It is important that any remedy to redress violation of these rights 
be directed at the level of government that bears the obligation that has been violated. 
This is not possible where the court ignores the character of the defendant and the nature 
of the obligations of that defendant.  
 
99
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 5. 
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accordance with the concept of rights maximisation which requires that 
the only question that a court asks after finding that there is a violation is 
one of which remedies will be most effective to the victims.100 
Considerations such as the costs of the remedy, unless they impact on the 
effectiveness of the remedy, are irrelevant. 
 
Distributive justice on the other hand supports de-linking of right and 
remedy. This is because this form of justice allows judges when choosing 
a remedy to take into account factors that may not necessary relate to the 
nature or objects of the rights. This view is supported by a number of 
scholars;101 it is contended by some scholars that rights are idealistic and 
can exist on their own. However, they need to be transformed into reality 
by the use of remedies. According to Fiss: 
 
Rights and remedies are but two phases of a single social process of trying 
to give meaning to our public values. Rights operate in the realm of 
abstraction, remedies in the world of practical reality. A right is a 
particularized and authoritative declaration of meaning. It can exist 
without a remedy, the right to racial equality … can exist even if the court 
gave no relief (other than the mere declaration). The right would then exist 
as a standard of criticism, a standard for evaluating present social 
practices. A remedy, on the other hand, is an effort of the court to give 
meaning to a public value in practice. A remedy is more specific, more 
concrete, and more coercive than the mere declaration of right; it 
constitutes the actualization of the right.102 
 
In some cases the considerations bearing on what remedies are available 
may be different from the principles that determine the existence of 
                                                 
100
 See generally Gewirtz: 1983. 
 
101
 See Fiss, O., ‘Foreword: The forms of justice’ (1979) 93 Harvard Law Review pp 1 – 
58 [Hereinafter referred to as Fiss: 1979]; Sager, F., ‘Fair measure: The legal status of 
underenforced constitutional norms’ (1978) 91 Harvard Law Review pp 1212 – 1264 
[Hereinafter referred to as Sager: 1978]; Walker, D., The law of civil remedies in 
Scotland (1974) Green & Sons [Hereinafter referred to as Walker: 1974]; and Sturm: 
1991. 
 
102
 Fiss: 1979, at p 52. 
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liability.103 Remedies from this perspective are conceptualised as being 
pragmatic, discretionary and political.104 This approach to remedies is in 
accord with the concept of interests balancing which requires that 
remedial effectiveness for the victims is only one of the considerations; 
other social interests are also relevant.105  
 
The theories that de-link right and remedy have been particularly 
attractive in litigation challenging systemic violations arising from 
organisational or institutional behaviour. It has been submitted that the 
character of litigation challenging systemic violations precludes the 
possibility of deducing the remedy for the violation from the right.106 This 
is because in litigation of this nature it may be hard to establish concrete 
responsibility for a violation. And even more pertinent is the fact that 
remedial burdens may be borne by persons not party to the litigation. It is 
from these two perspectives, as based on the theories of corrective and 
distributive justice, that the relationship between rights and remedies 
should be discussed.  
 
Scholars, such as Gewirtz, perceive remedies as having an impact on the 
content of the rights themselves. For this reason, it is submitted that rights 
and remedies cannot be looked at separately: 
 
There is a permeable wall between rights and remedies. The prospect of 
actualizing rights through a remedy — the recognition that rights are for 
actual people in an actual world — makes it inevitable that thoughts of 
                                                 
103
 Wells & Eaton: 2002, at pp xviii and xx. 
 
104
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 5. 
 
105
 Gewirtz: 1983, at p 183, adds that under rights maximising an incompletely effective 
remedy is acceptable only if a more effective remedy is impossible to achieve. In his 
opinion, under interest balancing, an imperfect remedy is also permissible when a more 
effective remedy is deemed too costly to interests other than those of the victims. 
 
106
 See Sturm: 1991, at p 1390. 
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remedy will affect thoughts of right, that judges' minds will shuttle back 
and forth between right and remedy.107 
 
On the basis of the above it has been submitted that rights and remedies 
are inextricably linked as parts of an integral whole and that determination 
of neither rights nor remedies can be done in isolation.108 And that the so-
called rights would have no meaning unless the remedial consequences of 
their non-recognition are incorporated in their definition.109 Selecting an 
appropriate remedy is, therefore, considered to be an integral part of 
defining the right.110 To illustrate this point, Cassels uses the example of 
the right to property: it would be unrecognisable if it were not for the fact 
that courts are willing to grant injunctions instead of damages for 
trespass.111 In the same line, it is submitted that historically, the law has 
moved from remedies to rights, rather than from rights to remedies and 
that a right is only a right if it has a corresponding remedy.112  
 
Using a concept called ‘remedial equilibration’, it has been submitted that 
‘rights are dependent on remedies, not just for their application to the real 
world, but for their scope, shape, and very existence’.113 This is contrasted 
                                                 
107
 Gewirtz: 1983, at pp 678 – 679. 
 
108
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 6. 
 
109
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 9.  
 
110
 Cassels: 1991, at p 288.  
 
111
 Cassels: 1991, at p 288, contends  further that remedial consequences have a habit of 
flowing backwards to affect the definition of the rights themselves; that the law of 
negligence would not be as defined as it is today if the only available remedy was an 
award of damages. 
 
112
 Kercher, B., and Noone. M., Remedies (1990) The Law Book Company Limited 
[Hereinafter referred to as Kercher & Noone: 1990], at p 1. 
 
113
 Levinson, D., Rights essentialism and remedial equilibration (1999) Working paper 
No. 99-5, Legal Studies Working Paper Series, University of Virginia School of Law, at 
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with the concept of ‘rights essentialism’, a way of thinking that assumes 
that the process of interpreting constitutional rights begins with judicial 
identification of a constitutional value and then moves into the operational 
rule, which is the remedy.114 Remedial equilibration requires that rights 
are often shaped by the nature of the remedies that will follow if the rights 
are violated.115 In this respect, systemic violation cases have been used to 
show that, in causal terms, rights essentialism avers that causation runs 
from rights to remedies, yet these cases show that it is the reverse.116 
 
                                                                                                                                            
p 3, sourced at SSRN: <http://ssrn.com/abstract=155564> (accessed on 25 June 2006), 
also published in (1999) 99 Columbia Law Review pp 857 – 940 [Hereinafter referred to 
as Levinson: 1999]. 
 
114
 Levinson: 1999, at p 2. Levinson contends that constitutional rights do not in fact 
emerge from abstract interpretations of constitutional texts, structure and history, or from 
philosophising about constitutional rights. In his opinion, constitutional rights are 
inevitably shaped by, and incorporate, remedial concerns (at p 16).  
 
115
 Levinson: 1999, at p 17. According to Levinson, the cash value of any rights is the 
function of the remedial consequences attached to its violation. See also Wells & Eaton: 
2002, at p xx, where they argue that the courts’ actual practice appears to depart from the 
view that rights and remedies are different, that whether or not a right exists in a given 
situation may depend on the remedy sought by whoever is asserting the right. 
 
116
 Levison: 1999, at p 27. This approach, which sees rights and remedies as being 
inseparable, has been described as a ‘monistic view’. See Berryman: 2000, at p 9. Other 
scholars who believe in the relationship between rights and remedies include Lawson, 
H., Remedies of English law (1980) Butterworths [Hereinafter referred to as Lawson: 
1980].  Lawson’s point of departure is that the phrase ubi jus remedium [‘where there is 
a right there is a remedy’] can be followed in realistic terms by ubi remedium ibi jus 
[‘where there is a remedy there is a right’] (at p 1). He goes on to contend that the rights 
that are recognised by the law have crystallised around the remedies—‘a remediless right 
is not regarded by lawyers as a right’ (at pp 1 – 2).  Again, here Lawson differs from 
scholars in his school of thought when he distils his discussion to the relationship, not of 
rights and remedies, but of wrongs and remedies. It is not very clear why Lawson prefers 
the term wrong to right.  
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Criticism is, however, directed to the fact that the functions of idealisation 
and actualisation are in some cases performed by the same person, the 
judge. ‘Even though the meaning-giving process may require a unity of 
functions, the risk is always present that the performance of one function 
may interfere with the other’.117 It is submitted that though judges may 
use their shrewdness to devise strategies that achieve structural reforms, 
for instance, their independence is likely to be lost in this process. The 
need to work through these strategies will force the judge to compromise 
on some of his/her principles and lead to sacrifice of the people’s 
interests.118 Some scholars, therefore, believe that rights and remedies 
represent the ideal and the actualised yet judges are not in a position to 
perform both functions.119 On the basis of this it is contended that the 
courts lack the legitimacy to make policy decisions that may be necessary 
in the process of actualisation.120  
 
The distinction between rights and remedies has also been supported by 
the submissions that describe the intellectual fabric of constitutional law. 
This intellectual fabric is believed to draw a distinction between 
statements which describe an ideal that is embodied in the constitution, 
and a statement which attempts to translate such an ideal into a workable 
standard for the decision of concrete issues. The defining statement has 
been described as a ‘concept’ and the application statement a 
‘conception’: 
 
                                                 
117
 Fiss: 1979, at p 53. He submits also that actualisation of a structural variety creates a 
network of relationships and outlook which threatens the independence of the judge and 
the integrity of the judicial process as a whole.  
 
118
 Fiss: 1979, at pp 53 – 54. 
 
119
 It is, however, demonstrated in chapter seven, section 7.6.3, that judges could still 
perform this function and maintain their impartiality and independence.   
 
120
 See Sager: 1978, at p 1213. 
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The distinction between a conception and its parent concept can explain 
and justify some norms of apparent “slippage” between a constitutional 
norm and its enforcement. Thus, for example, it is possible for persons to 
agree as to the abstract meaning — the concept — of a norm, yet disagree 
markedly over the conception which ought to be adopted to realize that 
concept. Likewise, it is possible to remain faithful to an [sic] historical 
understanding of the concept embodied in a constitutional norm and yet, 
over time, to revise drastically the conception through which it enjoys 
enforcement. But in any of these circumstances, the concept governs the 
conception, for the very purpose of the conception is the realization or 
understanding of the concept. From this observation it follows that a valid 
conception should “exhaust” its parent concept.121 [Emphasis mine] 
 
Though situations are envisioned in which people may disagree on the 
remedies accompanying violations of a right, it is contended that all the 
remedies will be intended to realise the right, which is the purpose of the 
remedies. Remedial theory should, therefore, be developed with the 
right(s) it protects in mind.122  
 
In contrast, judges are urged not attempt to deduce remedies from the 
nature of the violation, but rather to fashion them to achieve compliance 
with the constitution in the future.123 Courts can invoke the breadth of 
                                                 
121
 Sager: 1978, at pp 1213 – 1214. One could submit that this explains why people may 
agree on the need for the protection and advancement of people’s socio-economic 
wellbeing and yet disagree on whether or not this should be done through justiciable 
rights enforceable through the judicial process. 
 
122
 In Sanderson v Attorney General, Eastern Cape, 1998 (2) SA 38 (CC); 1997 (12) 
BCLR 1675 (EZ) Kriegler J stated that ‘our flexibility in providing remedies may affect 
our understanding of rights’ (para 27). In their comment on this case, Currie & De Waal: 
2005, at p 192 contend that when the courts have wide remedial discretion to fashion an 
appropriate remedy they will be less likely be deterred from finding a violation than 
would be the case if their discretion is narrow. While Currie and De Waal immediately 
suggest that deciding on a remedy requires a much more pragmatic approach than that 
adopted in any other stages of bill of rights litigation, they mention that many relevant 
factors at the remedial stage are also relevant at other stages of the litigation. 
 
123
 Walker, for instance, argues that:  
In modern times more thorough analysis of legal concepts … justifies 
distinctions between on the one hand the rights and duties attaching to 
particular relationships and the consequences of their not being 
implemented, and on the other between the remedies which the legal 
system may grant, and the procedural forms and machinery whereby those 
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their remedial powers to justify ordering remedies that respond to harms 
and conditions that may not be casually connected to proven violations, 
and also to balance all interests affected by the remedy.124 It has, for 
instance, been submitted that ‘[f]actors not considered in determining 
liability play an important role in formulating the public law 
injunction’.125 It is, therefore, important that: 
 
Both the consequences of the wrongful conduct and the steps necessary to 
remedy them are mediated through a complex set of formal and informal 
relationships that may be irrelevant to establishing the legal violation but 
critical to the development of a remedy adequate to eliminate that 
violation. The task of correcting the defendants' wrongful conduct raises 
factual and normative issues that do not arise in the course of determining 
liability, such as the effectiveness and practicability of various remedial 
options.126  
 
5.3.1 Synchronisation of the rights and remedies debate  
While one may be inclined toward the view that rights and remedies are 
two different notions, it is, in my view, impossible to understand remedies 
without understanding the constitutional rights themselves.127 Though 
rights and remedies may be kept separate, it is not true that they are 
governed by fundamentally different considerations. ‘Fundamentally 
different’ is too extreme in my opinion. It is submitted that the first 
                                                                                                                                            
remedies may be sought and, if the court is satisfied, granted. Remedies, in 
short, can, and should be, studied separately both from the obligations, 
breaches of which call for remedies, and from the rules of procedure 
whereby rights and duties are stated and declared, and remedies awarded 
for infringement of rights and non-implementation of duties.  
 
Walker: 1974, at p 4. 
 
124
 Roach: 1994, at pp 3-2 — 3-3. 
 
125
 Roach: 1991, at p 888. 
 
126
 Sturm: 1991, at p 1364. Sturm submits further that the court cannot simply rely upon 
the processes used to generate a liability decision to formulate a structural remedy, 
because the trial on the merits does not provide a sufficient legal or factual basis for 
adopting a particular remedy.  
 
127
 Wells & Eaton: 2002, at p xix. 
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objective of any court adjudicating constitutional rights should be to craft 
remedies that realise the right in full. However, there could be 
circumstances where the remedial approach that realises the rights fully 
adversely affects other legitimate interests, imposes burdens that are 
impossible to discharge, or undermines the right(s) in the long run. In 
such circumstances the court is justified to consider the issue of the most 
appropriate remedy separately from the right in issue.128 The court should 
confront the practicalities on ground and assess their impact on the 
remedy.129 The prevailing circumstances, if not considered, may have the 
potential of undermining or even making it impossible to implement the 
selected remedy.130 This is very important as it is one of the factors that 
define what is meant by an ‘appropriate, just and equitable relief’.131 A 
                                                 
128
 In Milliken v Bradley, 433 US 267 (1977), for instance, the United States Supreme 
Court observed that the nature of remedies is determined by the nature and scope of the 
constitutional violation; the remedy must, therefore, be related to the condition alleged to 
offend the Constitution. According to the Court, the decree must be designed as nearly as 
possible to restore the victim to the condition they would have occupied in the absence 
of the wrong. But the courts must take into account the interests of the state and local 
authorities in managing their own affairs, consistent with the Constitution (at p 281). 
 
129
 According to Shelton: 1999, at p 53, the question of possible non-compliance is very 
important; it may be necessary for the ideal to adjust to the reality of popular opposition 
to the legal rule. 
 
130
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at pp 2 and 3, has submitted that an analysis of the law of 
remedies which accommodates the practicalities of implementation contributes to the 
very understanding of the very nature of law. He contends that the taxonomy of remedies 
should move from a realistic appraisal of the defendant target of the remedy, through a 
purposive analysis of the goal of the remedy, to matters of legal principle and procedural 
regulation, and back to implementation considerations involving a realistic analysis of 
remedial functioning. Schucks has described as ‘pure rights’ conception an approach that 
concentrates on the role of the court in identifying individual rights while downplaying 
their implementation. Schucks describes this approach as unrealistic and naïve. See 
Sunstein: 1983, at p 754.  
 
131
 In Modder East Squatters v Moddeklip Boerdery; v President of the Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA) (Modderklip case no. 1), while 
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remedy that is impossible to implement, however beautifully crafted, does 
not answer to the needs of an ‘appropriate, just and equitable’ remedy. 
This though does not mean that the right disappears completely from 
consideration; instead, the right has to be kept in mind by the court. The 
remedy and enforcement procedures chosen by the court must be those 
that lead to the realisation of the right, if not in the short run, at least in the 
long run.  
 
The process above should not be viewed as a way of limiting a right; 
rather it is a process of ascertaining the best way of enjoying the right in 
the prevailing circumstances. This exercise, therefore, differs from the 
process of limiting rights as envisaged by section 36 of the 
Constitution.132 Limitation of the right once proclaimed, on the one hand, 
devalues the right to the extent of the limitation. In contrast, interest 
balancing may be preceded by full recognition of the rights followed by 
what is seemingly a weak remedy. The weak remedy may be the best way 
of recognising the right in the circumstances.133 As is submitted above,134 
the school desegregation cases provide a good example of how weak 
remedies may actually be intended to protect the rights themselves. 
However, as already stated,135 this is not to suggest that the remedies will 
                                                                                                                                            
quoting the dicta of Justice Kriegler in the Fose case at para 94, Harms JA noted that 
courts should not be overawed by practical problems, they should attempt to synchronise 
the real world with the ideal construct of a constitutional world and mould an order that 
will provide effective relief (at para 42). 
 
132
 See chapter four, section 4.2.3.2 for a detailed discussion of the section 36 approach. 
 
133
 On the meaning of weak remedies and their usefulness, see generally Tushnet, M., 
‘Enforcing socio-economic rights: Lessons from South Africa’ (2005) 6 ESR Review pp 
2 – 6 and Tushnet, M, ‘Social welfare rights and the forms of judicial review’ (2004) 82 
Texas Law Review pp 1895 – 1919. 
 
134
 Section 5.2.2. 
 
135
 Section 5.3 above. 
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not in any way impact on the nature of the right.136 This, though, may be 
circumstantial and arise on a case-by-case basis. Yet the impact, though 
negative, is always considered the best way of enjoying the right in the 
circumstances.  
  
Furthermore, I am of the view that there is no need for the courts to adopt 
one line of thought, either believing in a causal relationship between 
rights and remedies or in rights and remedies as two different phenomena. 
The line that the court follows should be shaped by the circumstances of 
each case and the demands of justice in that particular case. The court 
should apply relationship theories, not as two separate concepts from 
which it must choose one, but as two points at the opposite ends of a 
sliding scale. The position of the court on this sliding scale should be 
determined by the demands of every case. Discussion in chapter seven 
will show that in structural reform litigation, for instance, the demands of 
justice have always required that the courts incline more to the side of the 
scale which disentangles rights from remedies. The context within which 
the constitution is enforced, therefore, matters.137  
                                                                                                                                            
 
136
 In this respect, one would agree with Cassels: 1991, at pp 288 and 291 that remedial 
definition is inextricably interwoven with substantive definition and maintaining 
flexibility at both levels allows the courts to take a far more subtle approach to its task. 
Cassels contends that the assumption that interest balancing can be fully accommodated 
when defining the right, and that once defined the rights must be fully vindicated, is 
misconceived. In his opinion, this would undermine the need to approach constitutional 
rights issues with the necessary delicacy and subtlety. One understands Cassels to mean 
that the process of balancing the interests that delicacy may demand should be continued 
to the level of selecting an appropriate remedy. 
 
137
 The CC has adopted a contextual approach to interpretation of the Constitution. The 
Court has, amongst others, used the historical and textual context to give meaning to the 
rights in the Bill of Rights. See Brink v Kitshoff NO 1996 (2) SA 197 (CC), at para 40; 
and S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA (CC), at paras 17 – 18. The content of the rights and 
the obligations they engender are, among other, dictated by the context leading to the 
adoption of the Constitution. This is in addition to the socio-economic and political 
context in which they are enforced. Yet every right has to be read in the context of other 
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5.4 CONCLUSION  
 
This chapter has laid down the theoretical foundation for understanding 
how the philosophy of justice to which a court is inclined influences its 
approach to granting remedies. What is clear from this discussion is that it 
is important for courts to appreciate that practical considerations play a 
role in deciding the notion of justice to which a court should incline. The 
notion of corrective justice is presented as an attractive way of doing 
justice for the benefit of persons whose rights have been infringed. This is 
done by putting such persons in the position they would have been in but 
for the violation. However, restoring the position of the victim may in 
some cases present practical problems. It may, for instance, impose 
burdens on third parties to the litigation or impose unfairly high costs on 
the defendant. This is in addition to having a negative impact on the 
public interest.  
 
Sticking to corrective justice will also make the realisation of the rights 
dependant on a person’s capacity to access courts and enforce their rights. 
In other words, justice will be a preserve of those with ‘the sharpest 
elbows’. However, this is problematic, not so many people, because of 
poverty and ignorance, have the capacity to access courts This is in 
addition to the potential of opening the floodgates and overburdening the 
courts arising from the impression that rights can only be realised through 
judicial processes.  
 
It is at this point that the theory of distributive justice becomes most 
relevant. The theory of distributive justice may be used to engage a 
process of interest balancing which requires consideration of interests 
other than those of the plaintiff. The distributive justice theory is more 
flexible and bent towards a practical consideration of the impact of the 
                                                                                                                                            
rights and provisions of the Constitution. See Government of the Republic of South 
Africa and Others v Grootboom and Others 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC), at para 83. 
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remedy. This theory of justice, as I submit in the next chapter, is relevant 
to situations that require a re-distribution of resources like is the case for 
South Africa.138 The notion of distributive justice places an individual as 
part of his community and whose welfare is dependent on the welfare of 
everybody else.  It is important that this situation be reflected in the 
remedies that courts grant for the infringement of rights.     
 
However, this does not mean that corrective justice is completely 
irrelevant. In respect of those cases which are discrete and where the 
victims have suffered at the hands of identifiable government officials, 
they should be put in the position they would have been in but for the 
violation. For instance, it is submitted in chapter six that under such 
circumstances, compensatory damages may become an appropriate 
remedy.139 This should be so especially in those cases which do not give 
rise to structural problems that require structural reform as is discussed in 
chapter seven. 
 
It is also important for the courts to consider the remedies differently from 
the relevant rights by separating the two processes. This is because 
linking the remedies to rights determination may make it hard for the 
courts to factor in the interests of third parties, if this is considered to have 
a negative impact on maximisation of the right. This, however, does not 
mean that the right is completely irrelevant at the remedy determination 
stage. It has been submitted in this chapter that a court’s first objective 
should be to maximise the right.140 This should, however, be done only 
where the case is of such a nature that maximising the right will not be at 
the cost of other legitimate interests. In addition to this, it should be clear 
to the court that the maximisation of the right will not create 
insurmountable obstacles at the remedy implementation stage.  
 
                                                 
138
 Section 6.2. 
 
139
 See chapter six, at section 5.3.1.  
 
140
 See section section 5.4.2 above.  
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What remains to be seen is how the South African courts have been 
influenced by the theories of both corrective and distributive justice. This 
is what the next chapter sets out to investigate.  
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CHAPTER SIX  
 
REMEDIES FOR INFRINGEMENTS OF SOCIO-
ECONOMIC RIGHTS IN SOUTH AFRICA: 
DISTRIBUTIVE OR CORRECTIVE JUSTICE?  
 
 
 
6.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
In this chapter I discuss the impact that the notions of both corrective and 
distributive forms of justice have had on South Africa’s approach to 
constitutional remedies. The South African courts have sought to focus 
their remedies beyond the individual litigant and to grant remedies that 
advance constitutional rights as extending collective/group benefits. 
Though vindication and compensation of the victim has been 
acknowledged as a fundamental objective of constitutional litigation, it is 
not the only objective that is to be achieved. The interest that society has 
in the protection of the rights in the Constitution, and the protection of the 
values of an open and democratic society based on equality, freedom and 
human dignity, too are precepts that the courts wish to advance. The 
courts have also considered the impact of proposed remedies on the 
defendant and how the relationship between the defendant and the 
plaintiff would be affected.  
 
To protect the constitutional values, the courts have, in some cases, 
awarded plaintiffs relief in circumstances where they may have not 
deserved it.1 The CC has in some cases been inclined towards putting 
                                                 
1
 In Police and Prisons Civil Rights Union and Others v Minister of Correctional 
Services and Others Case 603/05 [unreported], the High Court showed a determination 
to protect the rights in the Constitution even if this would benefit litigants that had 
themselves been found guilty of disregarding the Constitution. Plasket J stated that 
although the applicants had displayed a lack of respect for, and undermined, the 
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victims of a constitutional violations in the position they would have been 
in had the violation not occurred. But in the same cases, the interests of 
the community and the interests of the defendant too have featured in 
what the court has called ‘a balancing process’.2  
 
This chapter is divided into two sections; the first section illustrates the 
Constitution’s inclination towards the notion of distributive justice. 
Distributive justice is implicit in the provisions of the Constitution that 
protect what may be construed as rights conferring collective benefits and 
the protection it accords to collective values upon which South Africa is 
founded. The second section illustrates the inclination of the South 
African courts, especially the CC, towards the notion of distributive 
justice. This is reflected in the CC’s understanding of what it considers to 
be ‘appropriate, just and equitable relief’. This section discusses the 
different remedies that the courts have granted so far and illustrates how 
these have been influenced by the notion of distributive justice. However, 
the injunction is reserved for detailed consideration in chapter seven. This 
is due in part to its high potential to promote the notion of distributive 
justice and also because of the controversies surrounding this remedy. 
There is, therefore, much to say about the injunction and the structural 
injunction in particular; the discussion of which may not fit into the 
current chapter. In fact, chapter seven proposes a set of norms and 
principles that could be used to determine when the structural injunction 
constitutes ‘appropriate, just and equitable relief’ in any given context.3  
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                            
Constitution and its democratic processes and institutions, he considered it necessary, in 
order to vindicate the Constitution, to grant the bulk of the relief sought (paras 82 and 
83). 
 
2
 Hoffman v South African Airways 2000 (11) BCLR 1211 (CC) (Hoffman case). 
 
3
 See chapter seven, section 7.6. 
 
 
 
 
Remedies for infringement of socio-economic rights in South Africa 
 
 263 
6.2 THE 1996 CONSTITUTION AND DISTRIBUTIVE 
JUSTICE 
 
Though the South African Constitution does not, in express terms, 
prescribe distributive justice, it is implicit in its provisions that this is the 
ideal form of justice that is envisioned. In terms of social justice, the 
Constitution is premised on the need to realise an orderly and fair 
redistribution of resources.4 The Constitution in this respect demonstrates 
a commitment to the establishment of a society based, amongst others, on 
social justice.5 In addition to protecting individual rights, the Constitution 
guarantees a number of socio-economic rights directly linked to social 
justice.6 While socio-economic rights have elements that are capable of 
extending individual entitlements they also make provision for elements 
that can only be enjoyed in a group.7 This is especially in respect of the 
                                                 
4
 See Davis, D., ‘Adjudicating the socio-economic rights in the South African 
Constitution: Towards “deference lite”?’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human 
Rights pp 301 – 327 [Hereinafter referred to as Davis: 2006], at p 304. 
 
5
 Preamble. 
 
6
 Gloppen, S., South Africa: The battle over the constitution (1997) Dartmouth 
Publishing Company Limited, at p 58. This is the kind of justice that Gloppen interpreted 
the precursors of the Constitution as having advocated. He came to this conclusion after 
examining, a number of writings by Albie Sachs, such as Sachs, A., ‘Towards 
constitutional reconstruction of  South Africa’ (1986) Lesotho Law Journal;  Sachs, A., 
‘Post-apartheid South Africa, a constitutional framework’ (1989) 6 World Policy Journal 
pp 503 – 529;  Sachs, A., Protecting human rights in a new South Africa (1990) Oxford 
University Press; Sachs, A., ‘The future constitutional position of white South Africans 
in a democratic South Africa’ (1990) African Studies Seminar Paper No. 281 ; Sachs, A., 
Advancing human rights in South Africa (1992) Oxford University Press; and Sachs, A., 
‘Affirmative action and good government’ in Hugo, P., (ed.) Redistribution and 
affirmative action. Working South Africa on the South African political economy (1992) 
Southern Book Publishes.  
 
7
 Examples include elements of such rights as a clean and healthy environment and also 
ingredients of such rights as housing and health that can be put in place for the benefit of 
a number of people or groups of people.  
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positive elements of these rights which compel government to undertake 
affirmative action to realise the rights. Obligations of this nature compel 
government to provide goods and services directed at all members of 
society or groups of people and not at specific individuals.  
 
It would do little to advance the developmental objectives of the 
Constitution if the full spectrum of rights of an individual or groups of 
individuals is met while the rest of the community suffers. It also makes it 
difficult, if not impossible, to sustain such levels of services for the 
individual or the community. Consider the right of access to water,8 for 
instance, it requires the government to put in place water services 
provisions systems that are accessible to everyone.9 The right of access to 
health care services is not different.10 Hospitals and other health care 
facilities have to be established for the benefit of all.  
 
 It is especially in respect of socio-economic rights that the transformative 
nature of the Constitution has been underscored. The Constitution is 
perceived as an instrument to transform South African society, among 
others, from a society based on socio-economic deprivation to one based 
on equal distribution of resources.11 The provision of services that were so 
drastically skewed by the apartheid system is, therefore, considered to be 
                                                                                                                                            
 
8
 Section 27(1) of the Constitution.  
 
9
 See the Water Services Act, No. 108 of 1997. See also Mbazira, C., ‘Privatisation and 
the right of access to sufficient water in South Africa: The case of Lukhanji and 
Amahlati’ in De Visser, J., and Mbazira, C., (eds.) Water delivery: Public or private 
(2006) Centre for Environmental Law and Policy pp 57 – 85. 
 
10
 Section 27(1) of the Constitution.  
 
11
 See generally Klare, K., ‘Legal culture and transformative constitutionalism’ (1998) 
14 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 147 – 188.  
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central to the transformative project of the Constitution.12 However, the 
enforcement of socio-economic rights has generated much controversy 
arising from arguments about the need to maintain the separation of 
powers. This is in addition to questioning the institutional competence of 
the courts to enforce these rights.13 However, even when socio-economic 
rights are accepted as justiciable, there is always the question of whether 
they should be enforced as conferring individual benefits or as conferring 
group benefits.14 In the Constitution itself, most socio-economic rights are 
crafted as individual rights, thus: ‘everyone has the right to…’15 and 
‘every child has the right to ….’16 Nonetheless, the question remains 
whether the prevailing social and economic context allows for the 
enforcement of these rights as conferring individual benefits on demand 
in which case corrective justice would be applicable.17  
 
There is a need, therefore, to understand the existing socio-economic 
context and its impact on the enforcement of socio-economic rights. It is 
                                                 
12
 Langa, P., ‘Transformative constitutionalism’ (2006) 17 Stellenbosch Law Review pp 
351 – 360 [Hereinafter referred to as Langa: 2006], at p 352.   
 
13
 See chapter 3 for a detailed discussion of separation of powers and institutional 
competence concerns.  
 
14
 Roach, K., ‘Crafting remedies for violations of economic, social and cultural rights’ 
in Squires, J., Langford, M., and Thiele, B., (eds.) The road to a remedy: Current issues 
in the litigation of economic, social and cultural rights (2005) Australian Human 
Rights Centre and Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction pp 111 – 126 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Roach: 2005], at p 111. 
 
15
 Sections 26(1) and 27(1).  
 
16
 Section 28(1) (c) of the Constitution. 
 
17
 The courts would have to enforce the individual rights by putting victims in the 
position they would have been in had their individual rights not been violated. See 
chapter five, section 5.2.1. 
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only after appreciating the historical, social, political and economic 
settings that one can appreciate the challenges of enforcing socio-
economic as conferring individual rather than collective benefits.18 
According to De Vos:  
 
[I]t is not only the constitutional text that forms the context within which 
the rights in the Bill of Rights must be viewed. In order to trace the 
direction in which the transformative project is supposed to move it is 
necessary to come to grips with the larger context within which the text of 
the Bill of Rights is to be interpreted. Thus, the Constitutional Court has 
often stated that the historical, social and economic context must be taken 
into account when interpreting the provisions of the Bill of Rights.19 
[Emphasis in original, footnote omitted].  
 
In South Africa, socio-economic rights assume their importance from a 
context which is characterised by not only racially institutionalised 
poverty but also by a commitment to alleviate or eradicate such poverty.20 
The majority of South Africans live under extreme poverty as an offshoot 
of apartheid. It is on the basis of this context that the Constitution ‘sets as 
one of its primary aims the transformation of society into a more just and 
equitable place’.21 One of the obstacles to the realisation of this objective, 
however, is limited financial resources. The available resources are not 
adequate to facilitate immediate provision of socio-economic goods and 
services to everyone on demand as individual rights. Holistic approaches, 
of providing socio-economic goods and services, that focus beyond the 
individual are the most practical to implement. This is what the existing 
                                                 
18
 Van der Walt, AJ., ‘The State’s duty to protect owners v The State’s duty to provide 
housing: Thoughts on the Modderklip case’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human 
Rights pp 144 – 161 [Hereinafter referred to as Van der Walt: 2005], at p 148.  
 
19
 De Vos, P., ‘Grootboom, the right of access to housing and substantive equality as 
contextual fairness’ (2001) 17 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 258 – 276 
[Hereinafter referred to as De Vos: 2001], at p 262. 
 
20
 Van der Walt, AJ., ‘A South African reading of Frank Michelman’s theory of social 
justice’ (2004) 19 SA Public Law pp 253 – 307, at p 255.  
 
21
 De Vos: 2001, at p 260.  
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social and economic conditions dictate. One, therefore, has to rethink the 
traditional idea that remedies must be immediate and that the courts can 
order one shot remedies that achieve corrective justice.22 Remedies of this 
nature may not be practicable where rights have to be enforced in ways 
that provide collective benefits. This is particularly so in a context where 
scarce financial resources dictate how government fulfils its socio-
economic rights obligations. 
 
The realisation of socio-economic rights in contexts of scarce resources 
requires careful redistribution of the resources to benefit all in need of 
them. It is at this stage that the notion of distributive justice becomes most 
relevant. The courts have to focus beyond the needs of the individual and 
to consider the interests of society or groups of people at large. Individual 
rights, therefore, have to be balanced against collective welfare.23 It has 
been submitted, for instance, that it would have been senseless to extend 
expensive treatment to Mr. Soobramoney ‘at a time when many poor 
people … had little or no access to any form of even primary health care 
services’.24 The CC had to leave it up to the hospital to decide how best to 
utilise scarce medical resources in a distributive manner without 
prioritising individual needs at the expense of others who may need such 
resources.  
 
It is on the basis of this approach that the CC, as seen in chapter four,25 
has rejected the submission that the socio-economic rights provisions in 
the Constitution confer individual entitlements on demand. The Court has 
rejected the submission that the Constitution be interpreted as establishing 
                                                 
           
22
 Roach: 2005, at p 111.  
 
23
 Motala, Z., and Ramaphosa, C., Constitutional Law: Analysis and cases (2002) Oxford 
University Press, at p 34. 
 
24
 De Vos: 2001, at pp 259 – 260.  
 
25
 See section 4.2.2. 
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a minimum core which entitles every individual to a minimum level of 
goods and services on demand.26 The Court has also rejected the 
submission that section 28 of the Constitution guarantees every child 
access to basic nutrition, shelter, and health services irrespective of 
available resources. Instead, the CC has chosen to locate the claims of all 
individuals, adults and children, within the broader dimension of society’s 
needs. As seen in chapter four, the CC has held that all that the state is 
obligated to do is to put in place a reasonable programme, reasonably 
implemented to achieve the progressive realisation of socio-economic 
rights, subject to the available resources.27 The programme must be 
inclusive of the needs of all people and must address short, medium and 
long term needs. 
 
The Constitution is also encrusted with what are considered to be the 
values upon which democratic South Africa is based.28 Indeed, the courts 
are constitutionally obliged to promote these values whenever interpreting 
the Bill of Rights.29 Though some of the values may be used to promote 
individual welfare, the CC has used the concept of values to advance the 
common good of society. Even when protecting individual rights the CC 
                                                 
26
 See Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others (Grootboom 
case) 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC), at para 32. See also Minister of 
Health and Others v. Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 (CC). See chapter 
four at section 4.2.2.2 for a detailed discussion of these cases.  
 
27
 See section 4.2. of chapter four. 
 
28
 Section 1. The values include human dignity, the achievement of equality and 
advancement of human rights and freedoms; non-racialism and non-sexism; supremacy 
of the Constitution; and universal adult suffrage, a national common voter’s roll, regular 
elections and a multi-party system of democratic government, to ensure accountability, 
responsiveness and openness. 
 
29
 Section 39(1)(a). 
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has on some occasions used values that promote general welfare to justify 
such individualised protection.30  
 
The Constitution itself, however, does not describe in an exhaustive 
manner the values upon which it is based. This has forced the courts on 
some occasions to look outside the Constitution for the values that should 
guide constitutional interpretation.31 To effectively use these external 
values not necessarily found in the Constitution, the CC has freed itself 
from textualism as the only method of constitutional interpretation. The 
Court has used such other methods as purposive interpretation32 to give 
effect the values underlying the Constitution.33 In the Makwanyane case, 
for instance, the CC used this method of interpretation to read into the 
Constitution the value of ubuntu, a concept encrusted with notions of 
distributive justice.34  
 
                                                 
30
 An example of this, and as discussed later, is use of the concept of ubuntu to advance 
the individual’s right to life. The individual has, therefore, been placed as part of society 
and cannot be singled out for protection irrespective of the needs of others. See S v 
Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) [Hereinafter referred to as Makwanyane case]. 
 
31
 See Kroeze, I., ‘Doing things with values: The role of constitutional values in 
constitutional interpretation’ (2001) 11 Stellenbosch Law Review pp 265 – 276, at pp 267 
– 268.  
 
32
 Also referred to as ‘value oriented’ or ‘teleological’ interpretation; see De Waal, J., 
and Erasmus, G., ‘The constitutional jurisprudence of South African courts on the 
application, interpretation and limitation of fundamental rights during the transition’ 
(1996) 7 Stellenbosch Law Review pp 179 – 209, at p 181 ft 8. 
 
33
 Makwanyane case, at para 9. See also S v Zuma, 1995 (4) BCLR 401 (CC), at para 15.  
 
34
 See generally Kroeze, I., ‘Doing things with values II: The case of ubuntu’ (2002) 13 
Stellenbosch Law Review pp 252 – 264 [Hereinafter referred to as Kroeze: 2002].  
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It has been submitted that although ubuntu is not mentioned in the 
Constitution it coincides with some of the values expressly mentioned.35 
The CC has indeed found no problem using ubuntu to promote 
distributive justice.36 As will been seen later, the Court has used the value 
of ubuntu as the basis for setting aside an order of excessive damages 
against the defendant in a case of defamation.37 The Court has held that 
ubuntu requires that in cases of defamation the remedy granted should 
aim to restore a harmonious human and social relationship: ‘Historically 
… [ubuntu] was foundational to the spirit of reconciliation and bridge-
building that enabled our deeply traumatised society to overcome and 
transcend the division of the past’.38 According to the Court, today ubuntu 
represents the element of human solidarity that binds together liberty and 
equality and creates an affirmative and mutually supportive triad of 
central constitutional values.39 
                                                 
35
 Kroeze: 2002, at p 256. 
 
36
 Makwanyane case, at para 224, the CC described ubuntu as follows: 
 It is a culture which places some emphasis on communality and on 
interdependence of members of a community. It recognises a person’s 
status as a human being, entitled to unconditional respect, dignity, value 
and acceptance from the members of the community such person happens 
to be part of. It also entails the converse, however. The person has a 
corresponding duty to give the same respect, dignity, value and acceptance 
to each member of the community. More importantly, it regulates the 
exercise of rights by the emphasis it lays on sharing and co-responsibility 
and the mutual enjoyment of rights by all. See also para 263.  
 
37
 In Dikoko v Mokhatla 2007(1) BCLR 1 (CC) (Mokhatla case). This case arose from a 
purely private law delictual claim in defamation. R 110 000 had been awarded by the 
High Court as compensation for the defendant’s defamatory statement. The defendant’s 
appeal to the SCA was dismissed, which prompted him to approach the CC. On appeal 
the defendant contested, amongst others, the quantum of damages as excessively 
disproportionate or unreasonable (para 24). The CC, however, widened this issue; it 
questioned whether an award of damages was the most appropriate remedy to vindicate 
the constitutional right to human dignity.  
 
38
 At para 113 [footnote omitted]. 
 
39
 As above. 
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Promotion of the constitutional values has, therefore, been central in the 
transformative enterprise of the CC. In constitutional litigation, protection 
has been accorded to individual needs only if they do not negatively 
impact on collective interests. This is reflected not only in interpreting the 
substantive content of the rights but also in determining the kinds of 
remedies that their violation demands. This approach has made inclination 
toward the notion of distributive justice inevitable in the conception of an 
‘appropriate, just and equitable’ remedy as discussed in the next section.    
 
 
6.3 ‘APPROPRIATE, JUST AND EQUITABLE RELIEF’ 
 
Other than merely enforce the values that promote commonality, the CC’s 
resort to the ethos of distributive justice is reflected in its approach to 
granting remedies for infringement of constitutional rights. The 
Constitution gives courts very wide remedial powers to ‘grant appropriate 
relief, including a declaration of rights’40 and to make ‘any order that is 
just and equitable’.41 The test for the effectiveness of the courts’ remedies, 
therefore, is whether the remedy is ‘appropriate, just and equitable’. It is 
important to note, however, that a court’s definition of what is an 
‘appropriate, just and equitable’ remedy will be determined, among 
others, by the notion of justice favoured by the court. In this respect, the 
phrase ‘appropriate, just and equitable’ remedy could assume two 
meanings: It could refer to a remedy that is required by an individual 
whose rights have been violated in order to put him/her in the position 
he/she would have been in but for the violation. It could also mean a 
remedy that focuses on all interests implicated by the case and balances 
these interests against those of the individual plaintiff in the case.42  
                                                 
40
 Section 38 of the Constitution. 
 
41
 Section 172(1)(b) of the Constitution. 
 
42
 Roach, K., Constitutional remedies in Canada (1994) Law Book Inc [Hereinafter 
referred to as Roach: 1994], at p 3-4.  
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As seen in chapter five,43 because of the bipolar nature of the theory of 
corrective justice, the burdens imposed by a remedy on third parties are 
not a factor to consider when choosing remedies.44 In contrast, 
distributive justice pays attention to the interests of not only the parties 
but also of third parties. The remedy should also be intended not only for 
the benefit of the plaintiff but for other similarly situated persons. This is 
in addition to protecting the interests of society at large.  
 
It is on the basis of the above that the CC has taken cognisance of the fact 
that when constitutional rights are violated, though the victim may be an 
individual, society as a whole is injured.45 If any remedies are to be 
obtained for such violation, they should be aimed at vindicating not only 
the victim but also advancing the interests of society as a whole.46 Even 
where an individual victim is clearly identifiable, any subsequent remedy 
is likely to have an impact on other persons and on society at large.47 It is 
                                                                                                                                            
 
43
 Section  5.2.1 above.  
 
44
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-21. 
 
45
 In the Hoffman case the CC observed that: 
Fairness requires a consideration of the interests of all those who might be 
affected by the order. In the context of employment, this will require a 
consideration not only of the interests of the prospective employee but also 
the interests of the employer. In other cases, the interests of the 
community may have to be taken into consideration. [Footnote omitted] 
 
At para 43 
 
46
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-30. 
 
47
 Shelton, D., Remedies in international human rights law (1999) Oxford University 
Press 
[Hereinafter referred to as Shelton: 1999], at p 52. Shelton submits that actions against 
the state test the reasonableness of the state’s activity in its context, the need to protect 
society, and the fairness of allowing the victim’s damage not to go without redress. See 
also Cassels: 1991, at p 290. 
 
 
 
 
 
Remedies for infringement of socio-economic rights in South Africa 
 
 273 
for this reason that the notion of distributive justice requires that courts be 
considerate not only to the interests of the parties but also the interests of 
society at large.48 It is on the basis of this that the CC has adopted an 
approach that spreads the benefits of constitutional litigation beyond the 
parties in a particular case. This explains why, for instance, the CC has on 
some occasions rejected proposed out of court settlements between the 
parties if it would result in a benefit of a constitutional right only to the 
parties.49 The Court has held that an offer to settle a dispute made by the 
litigant to the other, even if accepted, cannot cure the ensuing legal 
uncertainty as it would settle the dispute only between litigants. 
According to the Court, this would not resolve the unconstitutionality of 
the impugned provisions and the interests that they have on the broader 
group of persons who may qualify for a similar benefit.50 The Court has 
also on occasion declined to award remedies even where a violation of a 
constitutional right has been proved if the interests of good governance 
require this.51 
 
                                                 
48
 Currie, I., and De Waal, J., The new constitutional and administrative law Volume 1 
(2001) Juta & Company [Hereinafter referred to as Currie & De Waal: 2001], at p 195. 
 
49
 See Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule and Another v 
Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) BCLR 596 (CC) (Khosa case). For 
a detailed discussion of this case, see chapter four at section 4.2.3.2. During the course of 
hearing this case the respondents indicated their willingness to enter into a settlement 
that would have extended the definition of ‘South African’ citizen to accommodate the 
specific applicants and thereby extend social benefits to them only which would have 
extinguished the case. This settlement would have had little impact on others similarly 
situated. 
 
50
 Khosa case, at para 35. 
 
51
 See East Zulu Motors (Pty) v Empangeni/Ngwlezane Transitional Local Council and 
Others 1998 (2) SA 61 (CC); 1998 (2) BCLR 1 (CC); and Steyn v The State 2001 (1) 
BCLR 52 (CC); 2001 (1) SA 1146 (CC). 
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To consider the interests of all those who may be affected by the outcome 
of the case requires a balancing of all the affected interests. The CC has 
observed that the balancing process must be guided by the objective, first, 
to address the wrong occasioned by the infringement of the constitutional 
right; second, to deter violations; and third, to make an order that can be 
complied with. This is in addition to ensuring fairness to all those who 
might be affected by the relief.52 Accordingly, successful litigants should 
obtain the relief they seek only when the interests of good government do 
not demand otherwise. The position of the CC, therefore, is that litigants 
before the court should not be singled out for the grant of relief, but relief 
should be afforded to all people who are in the same situation as the 
litigants.53 This is important because despite the fact that South Africa has 
an advanced constitutional system courts are still not easily accessible to 
all.54 Any remedies granted in constitutional litigation should, therefore, 
extend the constitutional benefits to those without easy access to courts. 
 
As noted above,55 in the Mokhatla case, for instance, the CC held that the 
principal objective of culture and the law is ‘restoration of harmonious 
human and social relationships where they have been ruptured by an 
infraction of community norms’.56 The Court held that instead of 
                                                 
52
 Hoffman case, at para 45. 
 
53
 S v Bhulwana 1995 (12) BCLR 1579 (CC), at para 32. Cited with approval in Minister 
of Home Affairs v National Institute for Crime Prevention (Nicro) and others 2004(5) 
BCLR 445 (CC), at para 74.  
 
54
 Dugard, J., ‘Court of first instance? Towards a pro-poor jurisdiction for the South 
African Constitutional Court’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 261 
– 282, at p 266. 
 
55
 Section 6.2.  
 
56
 Para 68. The judge does not elucidate on what she means by ‘community norms’, but, 
in the context of her judgment, one could conclude that these are the values that we share 
as a society. This would mean that their infraction affects all members of society who 
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awarding damages that merely put a hole in the defendant’s pocket, the 
law of defamation should strive to re-establish harmony between the 
parties.57 This is because an award of excessive damages would have 
implications on free expression, which is the lifeblood of a democratic 
society.58 What this means is that vindicating the plaintiff’s injury by 
awarding excessive damages would be foregone for the sake of 
maintaining society’s right to freedom of expression. The Court in the 
Mokhatla case suggested that consideration should also be given to the 
impact the remedy has on the defendant. According to the Court, if the 
plaintiff’s rights can be vindicated and restoration achieved using 
remedies less burdensome to the defendant, this approach should be 
adopted.59  
 
The CC’s approach is in accord with the notion of cost internalisation 
which, as discussed in chapter five,60 requires the court to consider the 
costs which any remedy it may grant will have on the defendant. 
Prohibitive costs increase the risk of non-compliance with the remedy. 
The CC has pushed this further by considering the effect of the cost not 
only from the perspective of non-compliance but also from the 
perspective of the benefit that society may derive. This explains why the 
Court has been reluctant to award damages if these would, for instance, 
have a negative impact on freedom of expression. As is discussed later,61 
                                                                                                                                            
share in the maintenance of these norms. This, as seen in chapter five (section 5.2.2), is 
part of the essence of the ethos of distributive justice.   
 
57
 As above. 
 
58
 See paras 54 and 92. 
 
59
 Paras 64, 67, 112 and 113. 
 
60
 Section 5.2. 
 
61
 Section 6.3.1 below. 
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the Court has indeed doubted the appropriateness of damages as a public 
law remedy and as the most appropriate method to enforce constitutional 
rights.62  
 
In the context of socio-economic rights litigation, one cannot use only the 
situation of the litigants to judge whether the remedy of the court is an 
‘appropriate, just and equitable’ remedy as is suggested by some 
authors.63 Instead, one should assess the overall impact of the remedy on 
the state’s policy or policies touching on the right in issue. One should 
ask, for instance, whether the state has overhauled its policy to reflect the 
elements of a reasonable policy as defined by the CC. Taking the example 
of the case of Government of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & 
Others64 (Grootboom case); the judgment may not have resulted in 
tangible goods and services for the Grootboom community. Generally, 
however, the decision has forced government to shift its housing 
programme to have regard to the needs of people in intolerable conditions 
and those threatened with eviction.65 The government has adopted an 
emergency housing policy to cater for people who may find themselves in 
                                                 
62
 See generally Rail Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 
2005 (4) BCLR 301 (CC) [Hereinafter referred to as Rail Commuters case].  
 
63
 See Swart, M., ‘Left out in the cold? Grafting constitutional remedies for the poorest 
of the poor’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 215 – 240 
[Hereinafter referred to as Swart: 2005], at p 216. 
 
64
 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) (Grootboom case). This case is 
discussed in detail in chapter four at section 4.2. 
 
65
 Budlender, G., ‘Justiciability of socio-economic rights: Some South African 
experiences’ in Ghai, Y., and Cottrell, J., (eds.) Economic, social and cultural rights 
(2004) INTERIGHTS pp 33 – 41 [Hereinafter referred to as Budlender: 2004], at p 41. 
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situations similar to that of the Grootboom community.66 Whether such 
policy is being implemented, though relevant, is another issue. 
 
There are, however, cases in which a remedy though directed at the 
individual has the potential to advance the interests of society as a whole. 
This is especially so where the remedy has the potential to play an 
effective deterrent role and to benefit similarly situated people. In the 
Hoffman case, though the remedy appeared to be directed at the individual 
victim, the CC was convinced that it would benefit similarly situated 
people.67 In this case, the Court considered instatement to be the most 
appropriate relief in the case of a prospective employee who had been 
denied employment on the basis of unconstitutional grounds.68 The CC 
held that: 
                                                 
66
 National Department of Housing, Part 3: National Housing Programme: Housing 
Assistance in Emergency Circumstances April 2, available at 
<http://www.housing.gov.za/Content/legislation_policies/Emergency%20%20Housing%
20Policy.pdf> (accessed on 12 April 2006). 
 
67
 Mr. Hoffman had successfully applied for a job with South African Airways (SAA) as 
a cabin attendant. He had passed all the pre-employment tests save for the medical test, 
which revealed that he was HIV positive. On this ground he was rejected by SAA, which 
argued that he posed a health risk since he would not respond to the yellow fever 
vaccination. SAA also argued that his life span was limited which made it worthless to 
spend so much on his training. SAA contended further that it is the practice of airlines to 
reject HIV positive people as cabin attendants and that if SAA did not do so, they would 
be prejudiced in the context of business competition as it would scare away clients. The 
CC rejected all these arguments. It emphasised the vulnerability of HIV positive people 
and earmarked them as a disadvantaged group that should be protected by the equality 
clause (para 28). It rejected the submission based on the practice of other airlines as a 
disguise for prejudice against HIV positive persons (para 34). The CC accepted the 
medical evidence to suggest that some HIV positive persons would respond to the yellow 
fever vaccine and are fit to work as cabin attendants. It stated that though some HIV 
positive people would not respond to the vaccination and would be unfit for cabin work, 
this was no justification for discrimination against all HIV positive people (para 30). 
 
68
 At para 50.  
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[Instatement] is an expression of the general rule that where a wrong has 
been committed, the aggrieved person should, as a general matter, and as 
far as is possible, be placed in the same position the person would have 
been but for the wrong suffered.69 
 
However, the Court was quick to add that the remedy would have wider 
application beyond the individual victim and would only be granted 
where practicable.70 It observed that instatement would serve a general 
deterrent role as it strikes effectively at unfair discrimination. This is 
because ‘[i]t sends a message that under our Constitution discrimination 
will not be tolerated and thus ensures future compliance’.71 It could, for 
example, be argued that large corporations may have been willing to pay 
extensive financial compensation in lieu of employing HIV/AIDS positive 
persons. 
 
The approach in the Hoffman case shows that courts should not be 
dismissive of an individualised remedy in its entirety if there is evidence 
that it would have wide implications by, for instance, promoting 
deterrence. This is because deterrence forestalls future violation of the 
rights which benefits society as a whole. However, this does not mean 
that the court should completely disregard the impact that individual 
remedies, such as damages, may have on other legitimate interests.  
 
6.3.1 Purpose of damages—distributive or corrective justice?  
The awarding of damages is the oldest kind of remedy recognised and 
enforced by the common law to redress legal wrongs. Their award, 
especially as compensatory damages, has for a long time been used to 
promote the notion of corrective justice. Compensatory damages serve the 
objectives of corrective justice by making the victim of a violation 
‘whole’ again. This is by putting the victim, as much is possible, in the 
                                                 
69
 At para 50. 
 
70
 At para 53. 
 
71
 Para 52.  
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position that he/she would have been in but for the violation.72 
Compensatory damages may be awarded either as ‘pecuniary’ or ‘non-
pecuniary’.73 The award of pecuniary damages purports to represent what 
the plaintiff has suffered directly in monetary terms as a result of the 
wrong. The plaintiff could have expended quantified monies on medical 
fees, on replacement of lost property or lost wages resulting from physical 
incapacity, for instance, because of a tortuous injury.  
 
Non-pecuniary damages do not make up for the money that has been lost 
by the plaintiff. Instead, they compensate him/her for the pain and 
suffering caused by the harm.74 Such pain and suffering may not always 
be easily reduced to loss of monetary value; it may include anxiety, 
depression, embarrassment and humiliation. Non-pecuniary damages are 
very important because in some cases the pecuniary damage suffered may 
either be nominal or non-existent.75 Some forms of injuries, especially in 
the human rights arena, are hard to assess in monetary terms. It may be 
hard for someone to express, in monetary terms, for instance, the injury 
suffered by a gag that violates his/her freedom of speech if what he/she 
was going to say is not part of his trade and would not have generated 
money. The same may be said in respect of violation of one’s freedom of 
association and freedom to vote or exercise of religion. However, 
                                                 
72
 Wells, M., and Eaton. T., Constitutional remedies: A reference book for the United 
States Constitution (2002) Praeger Publishing [Hereinafter referred to as Wells & Eaton: 
2002], at p 170. In this respect the awarding of damages presents itself as backward 
looking. It focuses on past events, mainly the harm that has been suffered and the extent 
of the defendant’s contribution in liability terms.  
 
73
 Wells & Eaton: 2002, at p 172. 
 
74
 See McGregor, H., Mayne and McGregor on damages (1961) The Common Law 
Library No. 9 Sweet & Maxwell Limited [Hereinafter referred to as McGregor: 1961], at 
p 6. 
 
75
 Shelton: 1999, at p 73. 
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although the violation of these rights may not result in monetary loss, it 
may be so egregious so as to warrant the payment of non-pecuniary 
damages.76  
 
The award of non-pecuniary damages serves not only to vindicate the 
rights of the individual but also to deter future infringements. In this 
respect, one could submit that such an award serves the notion of 
distributive justice. It protects not only the victim in a particular court 
case but other persons that would have, in future, become victims of the 
conduct of the defendant. Such an award sends out a message to persons 
planning to engage in conduct similar to that of the defendant that they 
will suffer the same loss as the defendant.  
 
The deterrent effect of damages awards as described above is founded on 
law and economics theory type arguments. These arguments postulate that 
individuals will engage in a cost benefit analysis before undertaking any 
activity:  
 
                                                 
76
 See, for instance, the Sri Lanka case of Deshapriya and Another v Municipal Council, 
Nuwara Elye and Others [1996] 1 CHRD 115 sourced from the University of Minnesota 
Human Rights Library, at 
<http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/research/srilanka/caselaw/Speech/Deshapriya_v_Muni
cipal_Council_Nuwara_Eliya.htm> (accessed on 3 August 2006). The Sri Lanka 
Supreme Court, after finding a violation of the right of free speech, awarded substantial 
non-pecuniary damages even if no substantial monetary loss had been suffered. The 
Court justified this award on the ground that it would not be right to assess compensation 
at a few thousand rupees, simply because the newspaper was sold for seven rupees a 
copy; that this would only be the pecuniary loss caused by the violation of the 
petitioners' rights of property under ordinary law. The Court said that it was concerned 
with a fundamental right, which not only transcends property rights but which is 
guaranteed by the Constitution; and with an infringement which darkens the climate of 
freedom in which the peaceful clash of ideas and the exchange of information must take 
place in a democratic society. ‘Compensation must therefore be measured by the 
yardstick of liberty, and not weighed in the scales of commerce’ (at p 371). 
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The reasoning begins with a hypothetical world in which there are no 
penalties for committing wrongs. Given a choice between acting as one 
pleases and doing what is required by some legal norm, many people will 
do as they please, including committing constitutional violations. In order 
to counter this tendency to pursue our own preferences rather than to obey 
the law, it is necessary to attach sanctions to the breach of legal norms, 
including violations of constitutional rights. If actors know that doing as 
they please without regard for others will have bad consequences for their 
own welfare, through litigation that will extract money from their bank 
accounts, then they will be dissuaded from illegal conduct. A premise of 
this reasoning is that people are generally rational; they will prefer a state 
of affairs in which they are better off to one in which they are worse off. 
Thus, they will prefer to obey the law and keep their money rather than 
violate the law and hand it over to the victim of the wrong.77 
 
This economic theory argument is based on three assumptions: (1) that 
conditions of scarcity preclude the fulfilment of every human desire; (2) 
that in a condition of scarcity most individuals behave rationally most of 
the time in pursuit of their desires; and (3) that individuals are the best 
judges of their own preference.78 On the basis of these assumptions, it is 
believed that individuals will only engage in certain activities where the 
benefit to be obtained exceeds the costs that may be incurred if caught.79 
The law, therefore, best stops wrongful conduct by imposing costs by way 
of damages as a consequence of engaging in prohibited activities. In this 
respect, the amount of damages need not be compensatory as this would 
denote some direct relationship between the damages paid and the 
victim’s loss and its magnitude. Instead, damages are set at an appropriate 
level to deter future infringement;80 as submitted above, if damages are 
minimal and ‘affordable’ to certain actors, it may fall within their 
accepted cost-benefit analysis.  
                                                 
77
 Wells & Eaton: 2002, at p 176. 
 
78
 Shelton: 1999, at p 41. 
 
79
 Polinsky, M., and Shavell, S., The economic theory of public enforcement of law John 
M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper 159 (1998), sourced at 
<http://papers.ssrn.com/paper.taf?abstract_id=93709> (accessed on 28 July 2006), at p 4. 
See also Shelton: 1999, at p 41. 
 
80
 Shelton: 1999, at p 41. 
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6.3.1.1 Weaknesses with the deterrence (distributive) effect of damages 
There are, however, a number of weaknesses in the deterrence effect as 
based on the concept of law and economics. First, sometimes damages are 
not calculated on the basis of the gains that the violator may derive from 
the infringements. This is because in some cases it may be impossible to 
express the gains in monetary terms. This makes it hard to calculate, with 
precision, the amount of damages that outweigh the benefits to be derived 
from the violation. The damages awarded may, therefore, be less than 
what would lead to deterrence or may be overly excessive. In the same 
line, when government infringes rights, for instance, it may not view the 
benefits of such infringement in monetary terms. Yet the political gains 
derived may in the government’s opinion outweigh any damages likely to 
arise from a finding of a violation. The government may, therefore, be 
prepared to embark on such conduct irrespective of the possibility of 
damages being awarded against it. Any damages awarded, irrespective of 
the amount, may, therefore, not deter government as government would 
be prepared to pay its way out.  
 
Secondly, there is always no guarantee that the award of damages against 
the defendant will deter other potential defendants.81 Persons engaging, or 
intending to engage, in similar conduct may be much wealthier or 
deriving much more in terms of gains than the defendant. They may, 
therefore, not suffer as a result of an award of damages if caught. This is 
in addition to the conviction on the part such other violators that they will 
never be caught or dragged to court. Indeed, the greatest deterrent is the 
likelihood that offenders will be apprehended, convicted and 
punishment.82 If the offenders do not anticipate being caught and 
convicted, they will not be deterred by damages awarded against 
                                                 
81
 Park, J., ‘The constitutional tort action as individual remedy’ (2003) 38 Harvard Civil 
Rights-Civil Liberties Review pp 393 – 453 [Hereinafter referred to as Park: 2003], at p 
400.  
 
82
 Per Chaskalson CJ in the Makwanyane case, at para 122. 
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defendants who have been caught and convicted. Additionally, amongst 
others, whether or not the possibility of being dragged to court is high is 
also dependent on the character and status of the victims of the violation. 
Poor, uneducated and vulnerable victims may not have the capacity to sue 
the wrongdoers for damages. Persons violating the rights of such victims 
will, therefore, continue to do so with impunity as they will not anticipate 
any conviction or apprehension at the very least.  
 
Another weakness of awarding damages is that it offers only general 
deterrence because it leaves it to the government (defendant) to determine 
how to eradicate the violation. General deterrent remedies of this nature 
are appropriate when society is not concerned with the exact steps 
government will take to comply with its obligations.83 However, where 
the public is concerned with the exact steps that have to be undertaken to 
implement and realise the rights, damages will be of limited use. The 
public may be interested in seeing the government adopt practical steps 
and measures, in affirmative terms, to end the violation. It could 
sometimes be through such measures where real assurance that the 
violation will not re-occur is obtained. Also, an award of compensatory 
damages, consistent with the principles of corrective justice, is directed at 
past events. The award does not address the threat of existing and ongoing 
violations posed, for instance, by a delinquent state institution.84  
 
An award of compensatory damages may also be limited as relief for the 
violation of socio-economic rights. This is because of the diffuse and 
amorphous nature of socio-economic rights claims.85 Socio-economic 
rights litigation seldom involves individualised claims. Instead, it is 
                                                 
83
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-29. 
 
84
 Trengove, W., ‘Judicial Remedies for violations of socio-economic rights’ (1999) 1 
ESR Review pp 8 – 10 [Hereinafter referred to as Trengove: 1999], at p 8. 
 
85
 Trengove: 1999, at p 9. 
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always undertaken in the interest of communities and groups of people. 
This applies to litigation arising either from negative but most especially 
positive violations. The litigants usually take action to enforce a benefit 
that is not directed at them alone but at a multitude of people. In this kind 
of litigation, it may be impossible to identify all the individual victims and 
to determine the harm that they have suffered as a result of the positive 
infringement of a right.86 The case of Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) Ltd v 
President of the RSA and Others (Modderklip case),87discussed in detail 
below, is an example of a case where it was impossible to identify all the 
victims because of the transient nature of the population.88  
                                                 
86
 Trengove: 1999, at p 6, gives the example of violation of the right to education 
resulting from discrimination perpetrated over a long period of time. He contends that it 
is hard to determine how such victims would be compensated; it is even harder where the 
victims have received some form of inferior education. Trengove submits that 
identification of such victims would be a logistical nightmare which would devour 
valuable resources in a hopelessly, yet inadequate, attempt to determine who should get 
what. It is for this reason that socio-economic rights litigation has mainly been pursued 
under the banner of public interest litigation. In the case of People’s Union for 
Democratic Rights and Others v Union of India and Others (1982) 3 SCC 235, the 
Indian Supreme Court underscored the special character of public interest litigation 
brought for the benefit of the poor. Bhagwati J observed that: 
[P]ublic interest litigation which is a strategic arm of the legal aid 
movement and which is intended to bring justice within the reach of the 
poor masses, who constitute the low visibility area of humanity, is a totally 
different kind of litigation from the ordinary traditional litigation which is 
essentially of an adversary character where there is a dispute between two 
litigating parties, one making claim or seeking relief against the other and 
that other opposing such claim or resisting such relief. Public interests 
litigation is brought before the court not for the purpose of enforcing the 
right of one individual against another as happens in the case of ordinary 
litigation, but it is intended to promote and vindicate public interest which 
demands that violations of constitutional or legal rights of large numbers 
of people who are poor, ignorant or in a socially or economically 
disadvantaged position should not go unnoticed or unredressed. [At p 240] 
 
 
87
 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA). 
 
88
 As will be seen later (section 6.3.1.2 below), when the case was first instituted in the 
High Court, the estimated number of occupants of the land in issue was about 18,000 but 
by the time the case got the CC the figure had arisen to over 45,000.  
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However, there could be cases where only an individual or few 
individuals are targeted by the violation. This is common in respect of 
negative infringements that interfere with the enjoyment of an individual 
right. In such case, although a number of individuals may be involved, it 
may not be a problem to litigate as an individual. Nonetheless, a violation 
could be of a negative nature yet involving a multitude of people. 
Consider a case, for instance, where a municipality, without due process, 
disconnects water from a multitude of residents.89 The same practical 
problems of determining who suffered what damage may arise as is the 
case with positive violations.  
 
It is for the above weaknesses, among others, that courts have doubts 
about the appropriateness of damages in constitutional litigation. This 
doubt is reflected in the approach of the CC towards award of damages as 
discussed below.  
 
6.3.1.2 The approach of the South African courts  
It is my opinion that the position adopted by the South African courts as 
regards the award of damages in constitutional litigation is similar in 
many respects to the US and Canadian courts’ approach. In all these 
jurisdictions constitutional damages have been awarded only where 
damages for injury cannot be obtained under delictual or other law. 
Though the courts have not rejected the award of punitive damages, the 
cases show that there is often a reluctance to award them. The US 
Supreme Court has, for instance, rejected submissions that damages can 
be paid for the violation of a constitutional right for its abstract value 
without proof of actual physical injury or loss. However, the Court has 
left open the possibility of awarding punitive damages if it is necessary to 
deter and punish malicious violation of rights.90  
                                                 
89
 See, for instance, Residents of Bon Vista v Southern Metropolitan Council 2002 (6) 
BCLR 625 (W) 
 
90
 In Carey v Piphus (Carey case) 435 US 247 (1978), the Court held that: 
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The US Supreme Court has placed much weight on the principles of tort 
(delict) law governing the awarding of damages, which it has recognised 
as applicable in constitutional litigation.91 Emphasis has been placed on 
the common law principle that ‘a person should be compensated fairly for 
the injuries caused by the violation of his legal rights’.92 The Court has 
added, however, that the common law rules may not provide a complete 
solution to damages for a deprivation of constitutional rights. Where the 
interests protected by the constitutional rights are not protected by the 
common law, there will be a need to adapt the common law in order to 
provide fair compensation.93  
 
                                                                                                                                            
[I]t remains true … that substantial damages should be awarded only to 
compensate actual injury or, in the case of exemplary or punitive damages, 
to deter or punish malicious deprivations [at p 266]. 
 
The Carey case was followed by another case, Memphis Community School District V 
Stachura  477 US 299 (1986), where the Supreme Court held that there is no room for 
non-compensatory damages measured by the jury’s perception of the abstract importance 
of a constitutional right. 
 
91
 Carey case, at p 255. 
 
92
 Carey case, at p 255. 
 
93
 This approach was applied in the case of Bivens v Six unknown Federal Narcotics 
Agents 430 U.S. 388 (1971), a case arising from false arrest and imprisonment. The 
majority of the Court held that although the Constitution did not provide for the 
enforcement of constitutional rights by an award of damages, there was nothing 
precluding the courts from vindicating the rights with such awards. It has been submitted 
that if Bivens had not been permitted to sue in damages he would have had no means of 
redressing the violation of his rights. An injunction would have been useless to him 
because he had been arrested and then released, and yet no recurrence of the conduct had 
been anticipated. Pilkington, M., ‘Damages as a remedy for infringement of the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ (1984) Canadian Bar Review pp 517 – 576 
[Hereinafter referred to as Pilkington: 1984], at p 525. The Court has also held that in the 
absence of such alternative relief the court would exclude the claim only if there are 
special factors counseling hesitation in the absence of affirmative action by Congress. 
See Carlson v Green 447 U.S. 14 (1980). 
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The Canadian courts’ approach has not been much different from the one 
adopted in the US. In fact the Canadian approach has very much been 
influenced by the US approach. The Canadian courts have embraced 
damages for compensatory purposes and have declined to award them as a 
means of vindicating constitutional rights and deterring future 
violations.94 The Canadian Supreme Court has declined to award punitive 
damages because it considers such damages to be a fine accomplished 
without procedural protections as those available in criminal law. Instead, 
the fine is imposed on a balance of probabilities and does not follow the 
standard of proof beyond reasonable doubt.95   
 
In South Africa, the CC has acknowledged the fact that damages may be 
an appropriate remedy in some circumstances: 
 
[T]here is no reason in principle why “appropriate relief” should not 
include an award of damages, where such an award is necessary to protect 
and enforce Chapter 3 rights [of the Interim Constitution]. Such awards 
are made to compensate persons who have suffered loss as a result of the 
breach of a statutory right if, on a proper construction of the statute in 
question, it was the legislature’s intention that such damages should be 
payable, and it would be strange if damages could not be claimed, at least 
for loss occasioned by the breach of a right vested in the claimant by the 
Supreme law. When it would be appropriate to do so, and what the 
measure of damages should be, will depend on the circumstances of each 
case and the particular right which has been infringed. [Footnotes omitted] 
96
 
                                                 
94
 Roach: 1994, at p 11-3. 
 
95
 Vorvis v ICBC (1989) 58 DLR (4th) 193 (SCC) (Vorvis case), at p 205 – 206. 
 
96
 Fose v Minister of Safety, 1997 (7) BCLR 851 (CC) (Fose case), at para 60. In the 
Fose case the plaintiff claimed damages arising from a series of assaults alleged to have 
been perpetrated by members of the South African Police Services (SAPS) on the 
plaintiff while in detention (para 11). In addition to compensatory damages, the plaintiff 
claimed punitive damages. He contended that torture was a wide-spread and persistent 
infringement by members of the SAPS (para 12). The CC, however, rejected the claim of 
punitive damages. It approved submissions that although punitive damages may lead to 
systemic change, the process might be a slow one and requiring a substantial number of 
such awards before change is induced. Yet, such change could be achieved using such 
equitable relief as the injunction, which is far cheaper and faster (para 65(d)).  
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However, like the US and Canadian courts, the CC has rejected an award 
of damages as appropriate in a case of an infringement of the Constitution 
that does not cause loss.97 The Court is only prepared to use damages for 
compensatory purposes where loss is proved. It is on the basis of this that 
the Court has declined to award punitive damages as a response to 
infringements of constitutional rights. Accordingly, the Court has held 
that compensatory damages, once proved, would serve a vindictive role 
without the need for further damages in the form of punitive constitutional 
damages.98 The Court is of the view that the award of damages should not 
serve to punish but to compensate for the damage caused.99 Like the 
Canadian Supreme Court in the Vorvis case, the CC has alluded to a 
historical anomaly that has allowed punitive damages, equitable to fines 
in criminal law, to be awarded against a person without the safeguards 
afforded by the criminal law. ‘[I]t becomes even more unacceptable in a 
country … in which extensive criminal procedural rights are 
entrenched’.100  
 
The CC is also of the view that there is no real evidence that awarding 
punitive damages will serve as a significant deterrent against individual or 
systemic repetition of infringements.101 According to the CC, an award of 
punitive damages, if it is to have a deterrent effect on the government, 
should be substantial. The problem, in the CC’s opinion, is that this will 
bring a windfall to a single plaintiff and yet similarly situated victims 
would not be entitled to similar awards.102 In addition, substantial awards 
                                                 
97
 Fose case, at para 67. 
 
98
 Fose case, at para 67. 
 
99
 Mokhatla case, at para 78. 
 
100
 Para 70. 
 
101
 Fose case, at para 71.  
 
102
 Fose case, para 71. 
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made against government will significantly impact on the revenue of 
government and would arguably impinge on the executive’s ability to 
function effectively. Though the Court has acknowledged the fact that 
punitive damages may lead to systemic change, it is of the view that the 
process might be a slow one and requiring a substantial number of such 
awards before change is induced. Yet, such change could be achieved 
using equitable relief which is far cheaper and faster.103  
 
In addition to the above, the Court considers damages as having a 
retrospective effect because they seek to remedy loss caused rather than 
prevent loss in the future. ‘Moreover, the use of private law remedies to 
claim damages to vindicate public law rights may place heavy financial 
burdens on the State’.104 Furthermore, the CC has held that the award of 
damages to vindicate human rights violations would amount to measuring 
something intrinsic to human beings as if these were market-place 
commodities.105 The Court has, therefore, concluded that constitutional 
damages will be awarded only where no relief can be obtained in 
litigation other than constitutional litigation. This is the basis upon which 
the Court declined to award damages in the Fose case. The applicant had 
already secured compensatory damages under delictual law.  
 
The Supreme Court of Appeal (the SCA) has adopted the same approach 
as can be seen, for instance, in Jayiya v MEC for Welfare, Eastern 
Cape.106 In this case, the SCA declined to uphold an order that 
                                                                                                                                            
 
103
 Fose case, at para 65(d). 
 
104
 Rail Commuters’ case, at para 80. The Court observed further that although there 
could be circumstances when delictual relief may be appropriate for constitutional 
violations, the fact that public law remedies may be as effective and appropriate should 
not be overlooked (at para 81). 
 
105
 Mokhatla case, at para 109. 
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 2004(2) SA 611, [2003] 2 All SA 223 (SCA). 
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‘constitutional damages’ be paid arising from the State’s failure to 
approve the applicant’s social assistance grant in time. The High Court 
had awarded compensatory damages including back pay and interest to be 
paid to the plaintiff in a lump sum. The SCA, relying on the Fose case, 
held that constitutional damages could only have been awarded if there 
was no provision for either statutory or common law remedies.107 The 
case was brought under the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 
(PAJA)108 which made provision for a statutory remedy. According to the 
SCA: ‘Where the lawgiver has legislated statutory mechanisms for 
securing constitutional rights, and provided, of course, that they are 
constitutionally unobjectionable, they must be used’.109 An award of 
damages would, therefore, have been construed as disregarding the 
express intent of the legislature as reflected in PAJA. Since no 
constitutional challenge had been mounted challenging the remedies 
provided by PAJA there was no reason to disregard this Act.  
 
The Modderklip case is a good example of a case where an award of 
damages was appropriate because compensatory relief could not be 
obtained elsewhere other than in the constitutional case. The facts leading 
to this case are as follows: During the 1990s, some 400 persons who had 
been evicted by the Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality from Chris 
Hani Township moved onto a portion of farmland belonging to 
Modderklip and erected about 50 shacks. By October 2000 there were 
about 4 000 residential units inhabited by some 18 000 persons. On 18 
October 2000 Modderklip launched an application for the eviction of the 
occupiers under the Prevention of Illegal Eviction and Unlawful 
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 Act No. 3 of 2000. 
 
109
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Occupation of Land Act (PIE).110 The application succeeded and the High 
Court issued an eviction order on 12 April 2001. A writ of execution was 
issued and the sheriff requested to execute. The sheriff, however, 
responded by insisting on a deposit of R1,8m in order to cover the 
estimated costs of a security firm which she intended to engage to assist 
her in evicting the occupiers and demolishing their shacks. This amount 
by far exceeded the value of the part of the property occupied.  
 
The landowner was unwilling and unable to spend this kind of money on 
executing its judgment and lodged an application against the state to force 
the sheriff to carry out the eviction order. Modderklip’s case against the 
state was that failure on the part of the state to carry out the eviction order 
undermined its right to property as guaranteed by section 25 of the 
Constitution. The occupants, who had by this time swelled to 40,000, also 
resisted the eviction and argued that they could not be evicted from 
Modderklip’s property without provision of alternative accommodation. It 
was contended on their behalf that this would undermine their right of 
access to adequate housing as guaranteed by section 26(1) of the 
Constitution.  
 
The Modderklip case is very significant from the perspective of the notion 
of distributive justice. Other than merely protect Modderklip’s individual 
right to property, the Court was called upon to consider the impact of an 
eviction order on the occupants’ right of access to adequate housing. The 
case also indicates that in certain circumstances the award of 
individualised compensatory damages may produce a distributive effect. 
The SCA found in favour of both Modderklip and the occupants. The 
Court ruled that the occupiers could not be evicted without alternative 
accommodation as this would undermine their right of access to adequate 
housing. Yet there was need to protect Modderklip’s right to property and 
to compensate it for the loss suffered by past and future use of the 
property. This loss was deemed to arise from the state’s failure to provide 
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housing to the occupiers. The Court held that this was a burden that could 
not be placed on Modderklip because it is a constitutional obligation 
which falls squarely on the shoulders of the state and not on private 
persons. 
 
The SCA ruled, a ruling that was upheld by the CC,111 that the only 
appropriate relief in the circumstances was constitutional damages to 
Modderklip:  
 
Ordering the State to pay damages to Modderklip has the advantage that 
the Gabon occupiers can remain where they are while Modderklip will be 
recompensed for that which it has lost and the State has gained by not 
having to provide alternative land [immediately].112  
 
The distributive effect of this order does not lie in the monetary benefits 
deriving from the award of damages as these went to Modderklip. Instead, 
the distributive effect lies in the fact that the award produced a benefit for 
persons other than Modderklip. The award made it possible for 
Mooderklip’s right to property to be protected and also averted a danger 
of violation of the occupier’s right of access to housing. At the same time, 
the award was in the interest of the government. Government was saved 
the burden of having to provide 40 000 people with immediate alternative 
accommodation. Indeed, the SCA described its order as an aversion of a 
social problem: ‘the immediate social problem is solved while the 
medium and long-term problems can be solved as and when the State can 
afford’.113  
 
The outcome of this case was a win-win solution for all the parties 
involved. The Court managed to balance the competing proprietary rights 
of a landowner and the socio-economic rights of unlawful occupiers in the 
                                                 
111
 At para 20. 
 
112
 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA), at p 839.   
 
113
 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA), at p 839. 
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context of evictions.114  The order in this case has been described as 
reflecting a quintessentially post -1994 perspective on eviction: ‘the 
applicant is entitled to implementation of his eviction order, but for it to 
be carried out provision has to be made for the future accommodation of 
the unlawful occupiers’.115 The case is important also because it shows 
how determination of the most appropriate remedy is highly dependent on 
the context and circumstances of a particular case. Where rights of a 
number of people, including applicants and respondents, have been 
violated, practical considerations may dictate a win-win situation for all 
the parties involved. This requires the court to be very creative and to 
develop existing public and private law remedies to protect the infringed 
rights.    
 
6.3.1.3 Exhausting the full potential of damages  
As seen above,116 the CC has been cognisant of the fact that damages 
awards may deplete the already strapped state resources. In socio-
economic rights terms, for instance, damages may be fatal because they 
direct monies that would have been used for the common good into the 
pockets of the very few who make it to court. Rather than place money in 
the pockets of individuals, it may be wise to adopt remedies with broader 
social benefits, such as injunctions.117 I do subscribe to the submission 
that when funds are limited it may make more sense to require that any 
available money be used directly to improve the conditions which caused 
the problems and which may potentially continue to give rise to future 
                                                 
114
 Christmas, A., ‘Property rights of landowners vs socio-economic rights of occupiers’ 
(2004) 5 ESR Review pp 11 – 13, at p 13. 
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 Van der Walt: 2005, at p 150.  
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wrongs. This approach is preferable to repaying a particular victim who 
has had the resources and power to bring and win a law suit: 
 
In a country where there is a great demand generally on scarce resources, 
where the government has various constitutionally prescribed 
commitments which have substantial economic implications and where 
there are “multifarious demands on the public purse and the machinery of 
government that flow from the urgent need for economic and social 
reform”, it seems to me to be inappropriate to use these scarce resources to 
pay punitive constitutional damages to plaintiffs who are readily 
compensated for the injuries done to them with no real assurance that such 
payment will have any deterrent or preventive effect . It would seem that 
funds of this nature could be better employed in structural and systemic 
ways to eliminate or substantially reduce the cause of the infringement.118 
[Footnote omitted] 
 
It could be argued that the award of substantial punitive damages against 
government may induce change. Nonetheless, it is also true that other 
remedies such as injunctions may lead to such change without substantial 
cost on the part of the state.119 This does not mean, though, that the award 
of damages should be ruled out completely as means of redressing 
systemic violations. The award of damages could still be used in creative 
ways that eliminate systemic violations and lead to structural reforms.  
 
There is, therefore, a need for the CC to be more creative and to explore 
the full potential of damages to advance the notion of distributive justice. 
In socio-economic rights litigation it may be possible for damages awards 
to be channelled to causes that advance the realisation of these rights 
without necessarily putting money in the pockets of individuals.120 The 
                                                 
118
 Fose case, at para 72. See also Cooper-Stephenson, K., ‘Principle and pragmatism in 
the law of remedies’ in Berryman, J., (ed.) Remedies, issues and perspectives (1991) 
Thomson Professional Publishing pp 1 – 48 [Hereinafter referred to as Cooper-
Stephenson: 1991], at p 32. 
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 Whitman, C., ‘Constitutional torts’ (1980) 79 Michigan Law Review pp 5 – 71 
[Hereinafter referred to as Whitman: 1980], at p 50, as quoted by Pilkington: 1984, at p 
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Court has been urged to explore the possibility of awarding what has been 
described as preventive damages in order to counter widespread and 
persistent violations.121 Preventive damages are damages awards that 
should go not to the individual victim but to bodies carrying out activities 
designed to deter future infringements of specific rights. The award 
should be accompanied by directions to such bodies to use the damages in 
stepping up their activities in the affected area.122  
 
Such damages, it is contended, ‘would not be determined or calculated by 
the extent of the infringement or suffering of the victim but by the cost of 
deterrence’.123 This would require evidence on the likely contribution of 
the award in ending the infringement. This could be based on the nature 
of the identified organisation and the intended outcomes of its activities. 
This is in addition to the funding needs of such an organisation. There 
should be proof that the organisation is engaged in activities aimed at 
ending the violation. This is in addition to evidence that the funds arising 
from the damages award will be used for activities that advance the object 
of ending the violation. The organisation receiving the award may be 
required by the court to report on how the monies are being used in 
preventing future infringements.124  
                                                 
121
 Varney, H., ‘Forging new tools: A note on Fose v Minister of Safety and Security 
CCT 14/96’ (1998) 14 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 336 – 349 
[Hereinafter referred to as Varney: 1998], at p 343. 
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 Varney: 1998, at p 343. Varney has submitted that such awards would be appropriate 
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In socio-economic rights litigation, preventive damages would serve a 
good purpose when directed at causes that advance provision of the 
denied goods and services to society as a whole, without targeting specific 
individuals. Consider, for instance, a case of violation of the right of 
access to adequate housing. Substantial preventive damages could be 
directed towards organisations that assist homeless people to get access to 
housing, or those that provide humanitarian assistance to the victims of 
disaster. This is in addition to organisations that engage in advocacy and 
research activities aimed at promoting the rights. In awarding such 
damages, however, care should be taken to ensure that it does not 
interfere with the budgetary plans of government and which may lead to 
delay in delivering socio-economic services. However, where the 
damages are well directed and properly applied, they will go a long way 
in enhancing the delivery of socio-economic goods and services.  
  
6.3.2 Declarations  
 
6.3.2.1 Nature and purpose of declarations 
A declaratory order is a legal statement of the legal relationship between 
the parties.125 It is primarily used to declare whether or not a particular 
decision or conduct is a nullity.126 This is in addition to determining the 
scope of public powers and the obligations and the ambit of the rights 
protected by the law. The Constitution explicitly mandates courts to issue 
orders of declarations of rights;127 it allows persons listed as having locus 
                                                 
125
 Aldous, G., and Alder, J., Application for judicial review: Law and practice of the 
Crown Office (1993) Butterworths [Hereinafter referred to as Aldous & Alder: 1993], at 
p 66. 
 
126
 Lewis, C., Judicial remedies in public law (1992) Sweet & Maxwell [Hereinafter 
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to seek declarations of rights from the courts.128 The courts are also 
obliged to declare as invalid any law or conduct that is inconsistent with 
the Constitution.129 Declaratory orders are traceable as a common law 
remedy predating the Constitution; they serve the role of clarifying legal 
and constitutional obligations. Such clarification helps to enforce the 
constitution and the values upon which the Constitution is based.130  
 
A declaratory order is the most commonly and widely used non-intrusive 
remedy used by the courts to pronounce on legal rights and their 
infringement. The non-intrusive nature of a declaratory order arises from 
the fact that it does not give directions as to how a violation should be 
remedied. It leaves it to the state to determine how, and when to remedy 
the violation.131 This flexibility contributes to an appropriate institutional 
division of labour between the courts and government.132 By making 
declaratory orders, courts signal respect and show due deference to the 
executive and legislative branches of the state. In the Rail Commuters 
case the CC observed that: 
 
It should be borne in mind that declaratory relief is of particular value in a 
constitutional democracy which enables courts to declare the law, on the 
one hand, but leave to the other arms of government, the executive and the 
                                                 
128
 Section 38 of the Constitution provides that the following persons may approach the 
courts alleging the violation of their rights: (a) anyone acting in their own interests; (b) 
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legislature, the decision as to how best the law, once stated, should be 
observed.133 
 
In this respect, declaratory orders can be very effective especially in those 
cases where there are several ways available to the state for remedying the 
violation. The court thus saves itself from the agonising task of having to 
assess the pros and cons of each option, and passes this task on to the 
state. This is a task which may require consideration of political factors 
which are often beyond the easy comprehension of the court.   
 
Declaratory orders provide the government with adequate guidance about 
the standards that ought to be maintained to comply with the constitution. 
They are, therefore, very useful in those cases where the violation of 
rights arises from mere inattentiveness to the constitutional standards, 
sometimes on the pretext of (or actual) lack of clarity. Such clarity of the 
legal standards will expose any violation that may have occurred thereby 
compelling government to fix it.134 Declarations have also proved very 
effective in cases where a violation has not yet occurred but there is a 
threat of it occurring. This is especially so in cases where the threat of 
infringement arises from uncertainty about the law.135 The litigant need 
not prove that a right has been violated, and there is no need to prove that 
actual harm has been suffered as a consequence.136 All that a litigant has 
to prove is that his fear is not hypothetical but is based on a reasonable 
apprehension of harm. It is also not necessary to demonstrate who exactly 
would suffer as a result of the violation: ‘As long as there is reason to 
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believe that the declaration could prevent future … violation, the court 
should consider issuing declaratory relief’.137  
 
It is important to note, however, that while declaratory relief should not 
be prescriptive as regards the options that are available to the state in 
remedying the violation, it should be crafted in a manner that clarifies all 
the legal uncertainties. Where the obligation to remedy the violation falls 
on more than one person, it is important that what has to be done by every 
person to remedy the violation be detailed in clear and certain terms. This 
is very important in contexts such as those where there are, for instance, 
several spheres of government that bear obligations similar to the ones 
under contestation. For example, in the South African context, the 
obligations to implement socio-economic rights are spread between 
national, provincial government and local spheres of government.138  
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 Roach: 1994, at p 12-8. A declaration is also appropriate to past violations where 
there is no longer a feasible remedy available. In President of RSA v Hugo 1998(2) SA 
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future, to the prejudice of certain sections of society. 
 
138
 See schedules 4 and 5 of the Constitution. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter six 
 300 
The failure to declare, in clear terms, the obligations of the different levels 
of government is one of the weaknesses cited in the declaratory order 
emanating from the Grootboom case. This failure is perceived as one of 
the reasons why the order has not effectively been implemented as regards 
the Grootboom community.139 Pillay contends that: 
 
Despite a clear allocation of roles in the Housing Act, the lack of 
specificity in the Grootboom order with regard to the allocation of 
responsibilities between the three spheres of government has been blamed 
for the discord and uncertainty among them with regard to their 
obligations under the Grootboom judgement. 140 
 
However, one could argue that it was not necessary for the CC to be 
specific as regards the Grootboom community. The order applicable to the 
Grootboom community, as suggested by Pillay, had been made as an 
interlocutory one arising out of the settlements between the parties.141 The 
final declaratory order was not intended by the Court to address the plight 
of the Grootboom community. Instead, the order was intended to have a 
distributive effect by addressing the general obligation of the state to 
ensure access to adequate housing under section 26(1) and (2). This is in 
addition to pronouncing on the duty to realise the children’s rights in 
section 28. Since the Housing Act clearly set out the obligations of the 
different levels of government, it was not necessary for the CC to 
pronounce on them as they were not in dispute. The different levels of 
government should, therefore, not have allowed themselves to be 
confused by the general order as regards the Grootboom community. 
They were all bound by the terms of the interlocutory order, and only 
bound by the general order as regards their obligations towards all South 
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Africans. Yet the obligations of each sphere of government as regards the 
right of access to adequate housing are clearly detailed in the National 
Housing Act.142 
 
6.3.2.2 Declaratory orders and the theory of distributive justice  
It should be noted that there are several ways through which declaratory 
orders promote the theory of distributive justice. It is true that a 
declaration will not be granted in respect of academic or hypothetical 
issues or where it would not serve any practical purpose.143 However, 
unlike other forms of relief, such as damages awards, there is no need for 
injury to be proved before a declaratory order issues. This is 
distinguishable from the theory of corrective justice which, as discussed 
in chapter five,144 puts much stress on the existence of an injury and 
liability in respect of such injury. Indeed, the applicant of a declaratory 
order need not even prove that he/she has a cause of action or that there is 
a dispute. In South Africa, for instance, section 19(1)(a)(i) of the Supreme 
Courts Act145 provides that a court may, at its discretion, and at the 
instance of any interested person, enquire into and determine any existing, 
future or contingent right or obligation. This is notwithstanding that such 
person cannot claim any relief consequential upon the determination.  
 
The importance of the above from the perspective of distributive justice is 
two-fold. First, it enables persons other than the victim of an actual or 
threatened violation to apply for relief in court. Such applicants may, in 
some cases, be persons that are acting in the public interest as 
contemplated by section 38(d) of the Constitution. Indeed, it is on the 
                                                 
142
 Act No. 107 of 1997. See sections 9 and 10.  
 
143
 Aldous & Alder: 1993, at p 68. See also Gibb v Nedcor Limited 
[1997] 12 BLLR 1580 (LC). 
 
144
 See Chapter five, section 5.2.1  
 
145
 Act 59 of 1959. 
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basis of section 19 of the Supreme Courts Act that the courts have taken 
cognisance of the fact it is not necessary to have an interest in the 
outcome of a case challenging infringement of constitutional rights. The 
section has been construed as being very flexible in nature as regards the 
principles of locus standi.146 Even where the applicant has lost interest in 
the outcome of the case during the course of the proceedings the CC has 
proceeded and made a declaration for the benefit of persons other than the 
applicant. The Grootboom case, as discussed above,147 is an example of 
such a scenario. The CC proceeded and made a declaratory order in 
respect of the government’s housing programme. This was regardless of 
the fact that the parties had settled their dispute through a settlement 
leading to an interlocutory order.  
 
Secondly, allowing persons that would not claim any relief consequential 
upon the determination makes it possible to obtain relief in respect of 
future or threatened infringement of rights. This is in circumstances where 
no remedy would be obtainable under the corrective justice theory. There 
is in fact no need on the part of the applicant to prove that there is an 
actual dispute.148 This is a course that the corrective justice theory would 
not condone; as indicated in chapter five,149 due to its backward-looking 
                                                 
146
 See TAU v Minister of Agriculture & Land Affairs & others 
[2003] JOL 10697 (LCC), at para 7. See also Ferreira v Levin NO, (1996) 1 SA 984 
(CC).  
 
147
 Section 6.3.2.1 above.  
 
148
 In Ex Parte Nell 1963 (1) SA 754 (A) the Appellate Division held that an existing 
dispute was not a prerequisite for the exercise by the Court of its discretion to make a 
declaratory order:   
The need for such an order can pre-eminently arise where the person 
concerned wished to arrange his affairs in a manner which could affect 
other interested parties and where an uncertain legal position could be 
contested by one or all of them. It is more practical, and the interests of all 
are better served, if the legal question can be laid before a court even 
without there being an already existing dispute. (759G–H in translation)  
 
149
 Section 5.2.1. 
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nature, corrective justice deals with past events and from which actual 
injury has arisen. Declaratory orders also embrace the remedial flexibility 
which the notion of distributive justice demands. They allow the courts, in 
their own words, to identify and particularise what may be objectionable 
in legal terms and the measures that ought to be taken to remedy the 
infringement. Ancillary to this is the fact that given their flexibility, 
declaratory orders are not closed as regards the situations in which they 
may issue.150 They are a remedy that is open to court in all situations and 
is not constrained by the principles of the substantive law in issue.  
 
The above, though, does not mean that declaratory relief provides the 
redress necessary for all violations in all contexts. The biggest 
shortcoming of declaratory orders is the enforcement problems associated 
with them. It has been submitted that, in practice, there is no difference 
today between declaratory judgments and injunctions because they are 
both effective.151 However, this is not true because failure to comply with 
an injunctive order will attract penalties, including orders of contempt of 
court. In contrast, a failure to comply with a declaratory order does not 
attract such a penalty. Indeed, declaratory orders have been defined as a 
non-constitutive remedy: ‘it records only existing legal rights and cannot 
change the legal position in any way’.152 The courts have in fact held that 
no execution can issue as arising from a declaratory order.153 Though, as 
                                                                                                                                            
 
150
 Lewis: 1992, at p 177.  
 
151
 See Wells & Eaton: 2002, at p 186. 
 
152
 Aldous & Alder: 1993, at p 66. However, it is important to note that this may not be 
true in respect of the declaration of invalidity provided for under section 172(1)(a) which 
must be granted whenever legislation or conduct is found to be inconsistent with the 
Constitution. The effect of this declaration, unlike its common law counterpart under 
consideration, is that it nullifies conduct or legislation.  
 
153
 See Burman and Others v Davis (1920) 41 NPD 273. 
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suggested by Wells and Eaton,154 the holder of a declaratory order could 
still go back to court and seek injunctive relief, what will be enforced then 
is the injunctive order and not the declaration. What this brings to light, 
therefore, is that where there is evidence that a government will not 
comply, in good faith, with a declaratory order, the court would be well 
advised to issue a mandatory injunction instead of a declaratory order.155  
 
Hence, declaratory orders are only successful against states that are 
committed to the rule of law,156 and, therefore, responsive to the decisions 
of the courts. It is because of such responsiveness that declaratory 
judgments have found favour with the European Court of Human 
Rights,157 and with Canadian courts. In Canada a constitutional 
convention has developed by which the government has responded 
positively to the directions of the courts.158 However, even in cases with 
evidence of non-compliance, the Canadian courts have been very 
reluctant to move beyond declaratory relief. This is because of the high 
degree of judicial deference that the courts accord to the other organs of 
                                                 
154
 Wells & Eaton: 2002, at p 186. 
 
155
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-24 and 12-5. 
 
156
 Shelton: 1999, at p 199. See also Roach: 2005, at p 113. 
 
157
 Shelton: 1999, at p 201. There is evidence that in the overwhelming majority of cases, 
states have reported to the Council of Ministers of the European Union on positive steps 
they have taken to remedy the violations highlighted in the declaratory judgments.   
 
158
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-38 and 12-2. See also Borchand, E., Declaratory judgements 
(1941) Banks-Baldwin Law Publishing Co, at p 876. This is in contrast with the United 
States where preference for declaratory relief broke down because of the resistance 
exhibited by some states especially in the school desegregation cases but also in many 
civil rights cases. The courts were left with no option but to use the injunction and to 
invoke contempt of court citations in order to induce change. See Roach: 1994, at p 12-1. 
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state owing to separation of powers concerns. In Mahe v Alberta,159 for 
instance, the Canadian Supreme Court observed that: 
 
Once the Court has declared what is required in Edmonton, then the 
government can and must do whatever is necessary to ensure that these 
appellants, and other parents in their situation, receive what they are due 
under s. 23.  Section 23 of the Charter imposes on provincial legislatures 
the positive obligation of enacting precise legislative schemes providing 
for minority language instruction and educational facilities where numbers 
warrant.  To date, the legislature of Alberta has failed to discharge that 
obligation.  It must delay no longer in putting into place the appropriate 
minority language education scheme.160 
 
Thus in cases where it is clear that the state would not comply with the 
court orders in good faith; the Canadian courts have combined declaratory 
with mandatory relief. An example of such case is Marchand v Simcoe 
County Board of Education.161 Convinced that the defendant board 
continued to demonstrate a negative attitude towards the plaintiff’s 
minority language rights,162 the Court concluded that it was appropriate 
and just in the circumstances that ‘there be a declaration … coupled with 
a mandatory injunction to implement the constitutional rights’.163  
 
In the South African context, the government’s response to court orders in 
some cases brings it very close to fitting the description of a recalcitrant 
government.164 The recent decision regarding the rights of prisoners to 
                                                 
159
 (1985), 22 D.L.R. (4th) 24, 39 Alta. L.R. (2d) 215 (Q.B.) 
 
160
 [1990] 1 SCR 342. 
 
161
 (1989) 55 O.R (2d) 638 (Marchand case). 
 
162
 At p 660. 
 
163
 At p 662. 
 
164
 See South Africa justice sector and the rule of law, Report by AfriMAP and Open 
Society Foundation for South Africa, sourced at 
<http://www.soros.org/resources/articles_publications/publications/sajustice_20060223/a
frimapreport_20060223.pdf> (accessed on 18 October 2006). This report discusses a 
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access antiretroviral drugs presents clear evidence of such recalcitrance.165 
While publicly proclaiming its willingness to abide by court orders,166 
there was evidence of foot dragging on the part of government in this 
case. This is irrespective of the fact that the courts applied the most 
intrusive relief in the form of the structural interdict. This means that 
declaratory orders alone in this case would have gone unnoticed. The 
government was keen to exploit procedural, yet untenable legal 
technicalities, to delay the implementation of the orders of courts by filing 
appeals in a serial manner. 
 
 
6.4 CONCLUSION  
 
Inclination by the South African courts toward the notion of distributive 
justice is an indication of the context in which the courts enforce human 
rights. Constitutional provisions, including those on socio-economic 
rights, cannot be construed outside the social, economic and political 
context in which the Constitution operates. The current South African 
context characterised by high levels of poverty and constrained state 
resources makes it impossible to grant everyone individual socio-
economic goods and services on demand. There are wide societal interests 
that have to be considered which may dictate the negation of the 
individual interests of the litigant. This is where distributive justice 
becomes very useful in the remedial approach of the courts. 
 
                                                                                                                                            
number of cases where government has, in a recalcitrant manner, declined to implement 
court orders (at pp 29 – 31).  
 
165
 EN and Others v Government of RSA and Others 2007 (1) BCLR 84 (D) (Westville 
case) See chapter seven at section 7.4 for a detailed discussion of this case.  
 
166
 See, for instance, Stolley, G., ‘Prisons dept reveals plan for Aids drugs’ Mail & 
Guardian online, 11 September 2006. 
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Criticisms of the failure of the remedies of the CC to extend 
individualised entitlements in socio-economic rights litigation could 
wrongly be based on the perception of the corrective role of remedies. At 
a seminar held at the end of May in 2006167 a participant questioned the 
usefulness of the Grootboom case if the plight of the people of the 
Grootboom community has not changed positively. This criticism, and 
others of a similar nature,168 stress the corrective role of litigation and 
negate its distributive justice effect. The Grootboom community may not 
have obtained the individual goods and services they demanded, yet the 
judgment has played a very important distributive role. Indeed, the CC 
observed that the case was a reminder of the intolerable conditions under 
which many people are living and that the respondents were but a fraction 
of them.169 What this called for was a judgment that would benefit 
similarly situated people. This explains why the order was generally 
worded; it was addressed for the benefit of ‘people who have no access to 
land, no roof over their heads, and who are living in intolerable conditions 
or crisis situations’.170 There is agreement by many scholars in the area of 
socio-economic rights that the Grootboom case has helped to positively 
influence policy and legislation to realise socio-economic rights.171  
                                                 
167
 Strengthening strategies for promoting socio-economic rights in South Africa, held in 
Cape Town 29 – 30 May 2006, organised by the Community Law Centre, University of 
the Western Cape and the Norwegian Centre for Human Rights, University of Oslo. 
 
168
 See also Cohen, M., How supervisory jurisdiction can save socio-economic rights in 
South Africa, LLM dissertation [unpublished] University of Cape Town, February 2005 
[on file with author], at p 20; and generally Swart: 2005.  
 
169
 Para 2. 
 
170
 Para 99(2)(b). 
 
171
 See Liebenberg, S., ‘South Africa’s evolving jurisprudence on socio-economic rights: 
An effective tool in challenging poverty’ (2002) 2 Law, Democracy and Development, 
pp 159 – 191, at pp 177 – 180. See also Pillay: 2002, at pp 256 – 257; and Budlender: 
2004, at p 41.  
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The TAC case is not much different. In this case, government was ordered 
to remove the restrictions that prevented Nevirapine from being made 
available for the purpose of reducing the risk of mother-to-child 
transmission of HIV at public hospitals and clinics that where not research 
and training sites.172 The CC observed, however, that the judgment did 
not mean that everyone could immediately claim access to nevirapine 
treatment. All that the government had to do was to make every effort as 
soon as was reasonably possible to make the treatment available.173  
 
As mentioned in chapter two,174 while civil and political rights too have 
resource implications, socio-economic rights require far more resources. 
It has been submitted that even the economically resource endowed 
nations are yet to realise all these rights. This is partly because of the 
immense amounts of resources required to match the dynamic standards 
of human development. It would, therefore, be unrealistic to apply the 
ethos of corrective justice to socio-economic rights by demanding that 
successful litigants be put immediately in the position they would have 
been in but for the violation.  
 
In South Africa, inclination towards the theory of distributive justice is 
also reflected in the CC’s reluctance to award constitutional damages. 
Though damages present themselves as an attractive remedy to vindicate 
constitutional violations they suffer from a number of defects. Damages 
paid to an individual will deprive the state of resources that would have 
been used to provide services for the general good of society as a whole. 
Consider a case where damages are paid to an individual after a finding 
that his housing rights have been violated. An award of compensatory 
damages would demand that a enough be made available to build a house 
for that individual and punitive damages would take large amounts from 
                                                 
172
 Para 135(3)(a). 
 
173
 Para 125. 
 
174
 At section 2.3.1.1.  
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the state in order to deter future violations of the same kind. These funds 
may be taken from an already existing general housing budget thereby 
creating a deficit. This deficit, if substantial, will cripple the housing 
programme and delay the provision of housing to all members of society 
in need of it.175  
 
Declaratory relief very well presents itself as appropriate in some 
circumstances and may promote distributive justice. Its strength lies in its 
deferential nature, which gives the state latitude to choose what it 
considers to be the most appropriate way of undoing a constitutional 
violation. This is very important in those cases where there are various 
equally effective ways of undoing a violation.176 The court would very 
well save itself from the tantalising task of having to make choice, which 
may some times require extra-legal considerations. However, as this 
chapter has demonstrated, the declaration is only effective if the 
government is committed to the rule of law and accords court orders the 
respect they deserve. The South African government is yet to prove itself 
as matching such a description. Recalcitrance towards court orders has 
been detected in a number of cases, which makes the declaration an 
inappropriate remedy in those cases. One should, therefore, explore the 
appropriateness of such other remedies as the injunction/interdict as 
discussed in the next section.  
 
 
 
                                                 
175
 According to Pilkington: 1984, at p 540, rather than award damages in class actions, 
in which damages may be hard to assess for every individual, a court might think it 
appropriate to direct the expenditure of public funds to restructuring the institution so 
that future infringements will be avoided. 
 
176
 See Eldridge case, at para 96. 
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CHAPTER SEVEN 
 
THE STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION: NATURE, ROLE 
APPROPRIATENESS AND THE SOUTH AFRICAN 
APPROACH  
 
 
7.1 INTRODUCTION 
 
The purpose of this chapter is to discuss the injunction and particularly 
the structural injunction especially as used in socio-economic rights 
litigation against government.1 This form of relief has been reserved for 
detailed consideration in this chapter because it is a true reflection of the 
judicial flexibility required by the notion of distributive justice. This is in 
addition to the controversies that it has generated. The structural 
injunction has been used by the courts in a manner that goes against 
traditional perceptions of the role of the courts as envisioned under the 
theory of corrective justice. It has enabled judges to discard their position 
as mere umpires and to assume positions which make them active 
participants in the dispute. The courts have made not only extensive 
judicial decrees but have also overseen their implementation.  This has 
generated much controversy and objection to the structural injunction as 
an appropriate relief. This is because it forces courts to do things that they 
are ordinarily not expected to do.  
 
This chapter delineates the circumstances under which grant of a 
structural injunction may be considered appropriate. The approach of the 
                                                 
1
 The chapter does not discuss structural injunctions that may be granted in such other 
forms of litigation as bankruptcy, receivership, estates and trusts. It should also be noted 
that in South African legal jargon the term ‘interdict’ is used in the place of ‘injunction’; 
the terms ‘injunction/structural injunction’ and ‘interdict/structural interdict’ are in this 
chapter, therefore, used to mean one and the same thing.  
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South African courts towards this form of relief, especially in socio-
economic rights litigation, is discussed. The approaches of the High 
Court,2 on one hand, and the CC on the other have differed markedly. The 
High Court has readily availed itself of this remedy while the CC has 
emphasised the need to defer to the executive and legislative branches and 
not to get embroiled in what it considers to be policy issues.3 In spite of 
this, the CC has used the structural injunction in a number of cases. What 
is clear, however, is that all these cases deal with the enforcement of civil 
and political rights. The reluctance to use the structural injunction by the 
CC in socio-economic rights cases reflects the cautiousness with which 
the Court has enforced these rights. As a result, the CC’s approach to the 
structural injunction is ambivalent and lacks clear norms and principles.   
 
This chapter gives an exposition of some of the norms and principles that 
could guide the courts in deciding whether or not a structural injunction is 
appropriate in a specific case dealing with socio-economic rights. The 
norms and principles also help to guide the courts on how they should 
proceed should they deem a structural injunction appropriate. The 
structural injunction should be used as of last resort, and when used, 
should be used with flexibility and in a graduated manner which also 
ensures participation of all the affected stakeholders. In addition, reasoned 
decision making should be preserved, and remediation and protection of 
                                                 
2
 In this chapter I use the term High Court to describe all the provincial divisions of the 
High Court as I deem all these divisions to be part of a single level with in the judicial 
hierarchy. 
 
3
 Davis, D., ‘Adjudicating the socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution: 
Towards “deference lite”?’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 301 – 
327 [Hereinafter referred to as Davis: 2006], at p 304. As submitted in chapter three 
(section 3.1), the CC has avoided approaches that would put it in direct confrontation 
with the executive and legislative branches of state as regards matters considered to be 
within the domain of these branches. See also Roux, T., ‘Legitimating transformation: 
Political resource allocation in the South African Constitutional Court’ (2003) 10 
Democratization pp 92 – 111, at p 96. 
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the substantive norms should be promoted as much as possible. 
Furthermore, courts should ensure that they maintain their independence 
and impartiality. 
 
The chapter is divided into four sections; the first section prefaces 
discussion of the structural injunction with discussion of the general 
injunction as a remedy in constitutional litigation. This section discussion 
the different types of injunctions and their relevance to socio-economic 
rights litigation. This section is followed by discussion of the nature of the 
structural injunction and the different forms it could take. The third 
section discusses the arguments that have been advanced both to support 
and oppose the structural injunction. The opposition is based both on 
separation of powers and corrective justice type arguments. The fourth 
section discuses the approach of the South African courts in using the 
structural injunction as ‘appropriate, just and equitable relief’ for 
violations of especially socio-economic rights. The last section is 
dedicated to a discussion of the norms and principles that could guide the 
courts in determining when a structural injunction is appropriate.  
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7.2 THE INJUNCTION AS A CONSTITUTIONAL REMEDY 
  
The injunction is an order of the court requiring the person to whom it is 
directed to do or to refrain from doing a particular thing.4 The injunction 
can be used both as relief for those whose rights have been violated and as 
a remedy to deter violations of a similar nature in future. The injunction 
was initially developed exclusively as a remedy to protect private 
property. Later, however, it evolved into an instrument for the protection 
of commercial interests other than property.5 These interests, for instance, 
included confidential business information, technology and production 
techniques, copy rights and patents. The injunction now finds its way in 
all kinds of litigation and has found scope for application in such fields as 
labour and industrial relations, protection of privacy, intellectual property, 
electronic data and protection of human rights, among others.  
 
Historically, the injunction has been used as a remedy of last resort, used 
only when other remedies are considered inadequate. In procedural terms, 
this means that the plaintiff would be granted an injunction only if there is 
no other common law remedy capable of adequately repairing the injury.6 
It should be noted, however, that there are not many remedies that provide 
an alternative to the injunction other than damages. Remedies such as 
                                                 
4
 See Jones, T., and Buckle., H., The civil practice of the magistrates' courts in South 
Africa vol I (1988 – 1991) Juta & Co [Hereinafter referred to as Jones & Buckle: 1988 
– 1991], at p 87; and Berryman. J., The law of equitable remedies (2000) Irwin Law 
[Hereinafter referred to as Berryman: 2000], at p 12. 
 
5
 Cassels, J., ‘An inconvenient balance: The injunction as a Charter remedy’ in 
Berryman, J., (ed.) Remedies, issues and perspectives (1991) Thomas Professional 
Publishing pp 272 – 311 [Hereinafter referred to as Cassels: 1991], at p 272. 
 
6
 Fiss, O., The Civil rights injunction (1978) Indiana University Press [Hereinafter 
referred to as Fiss: 1978], at p 38. 
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restitution and rectification still harbour some elements of injunctive relief 
and derive from equity, the same source for the injunction.7    
 
In South Africa, the injunction or interdict finds its source principally in 
the Roman-Dutch law. Nonetheless, the law on interdicts has also been 
influenced to a great extent by English law and particularly by the English 
law principles of equity.8 The conditions for the grant of an interdict in 
South Africa were made clear in Setlogelo v Setlogelo:9 there must be a 
clear right,10 injury actually committed or apprehended, and the absence 
                                                 
7
 The only problem, as seen in chapter six (section 6.3.1), is that the appropriateness of 
damages in some cases is doubtful. This raises questions about the appropriateness of 
placing the injunction at the bottom of the remedy hierarchy as has been the common 
law practice. It also explains why public law has embraced the injunction as a tool of 
first resort where appropriate. See Cooper-Stephenson, K., ‘Principle and pragmatism in 
the law of remedies’ in Berryman, J., (ed.) Remedies, issues and perspectives (1991) 
Thomson Professional Publishing pp 1 – 48 [Hereinafter referred to as Cooper: 1991], at 
p 22. In the United States, for instance, this transplant can be traced to the 1894 Debs 
case arising from disruption of rail services by striking workers demanding better 
working conditions. The Supreme Court parted with the tradition that the injunction was 
only available as a measure of last resort. The Court issued an injunction preventing the 
leaders of the strike from ‘compelling or inducing by threats, intimidation, persuasion, 
force or violence, railway employees to refuse or fail to perform duties’. This was 
motivated both by the need to protect the commercial interests of the rail operator and 
the need to make public transport available. An award of damages would not have 
protected these interests. It would have protected the interests of the rail operator but not 
the public interest of having public transport. 
 
8
 Prest, B., The law and practice of interdicts (1996) Juta & Co [Hereinafter referred to 
as Prest: 1996], at pp 9 and 28. See also Struben & ors v Cape Town District 
Waterworks Co (1892) 9 SC 68 as discussed by Prest at p 30.  
 
9
 1914 AD 221 (Setlogelo case), an excerpt of decision is in Van der Walt, A., Law of 
property casebook for students (2002) Juta & Co, pp 257 – 258. 
 
10
 See Nienaber v Stuckey 1946 AD 1049 and Bankorp Trust Bpk v Pienaar 1993 (4) 
SA 215 (N). It has been submitted by Prest: 1996, at p 43 that the existence of a right 
is a matter of substantive law and that whether that right is clearly established is a 
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of similar protection by any other ordinary remedy.11 Additionally, it has 
also been held that the grant or refusal of an interdict is a matter within 
the discretion of the court and depends on the facts of each case and the 
right being enforced.12 The other requirement is that the applicant for an 
injunction must have locus standi in accordance with the civil procedure 
law.13 But this rule does not appear to have application in respect of 
enforcement of the rights in the Bill of Rights. As mentioned in chapter 
six,14 locus standi, as regards Bill of Rights litigation is governed by 
section 38 of the Constitution. This section gives locus to persons who 
would not otherwise have had it under civil procedure law.15 Just like with 
the declaratory order, this enables persons other than the direct victims of 
an infringement of a right to seek relief in the form of an injunction. In 
fact, the first socio-economic rights case in which the CC issued a 
mandatory injunction was brought to the Court by persons who were 
                                                                                                                                            
matter of evidence. This requires proof by the plaintiff, on a balance of probability, of 
the right which he seeks to protect. 
 
11
 Setlogelo case 1914 AD 221, at p 227. See Fourie v Uys 1957 (2) SA 125 (C) where 
it was held that a court will not grant an interdict when an applicant can obtain 
adequate redress by an award of damages (at p 128). See also SAPU & another v 
National Commissioner, SAPS & another [2005] JOL 16030 (LC). The basis for the 
requirement that the interdict will be granted only if there is no other remedy is that 
the interdict is a very drastic remedy which ought to be granted only in deserving 
cases. See Prest: 1996, at p 45.  
 
12
 See Candid Electronics (PTY) LTD v Merchandise Buying Syndicate (PTY) LTD 
1992 (2) SA 459 (C) (Candid case). 
 
13
 Harms, L., ‘Interdicts’ in Joubert, W., and Faris, J., (eds.) The law of South Africa 
(1998) Butterworths pp 285 – 306 [Hereinafter referred to as Harms: 1998], at p 287.  
 
14
 Section 6.3.2. 
 
15
 See Ngxuza and others v Permanent Secretary, Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 
2001(2) SA 609 (E). See also Ferreira v Levin NO (1996) 1 SA 984 (CC). 
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themselves not direct victims of the infringement of the right of access to 
health care services.16   
 
The power of the courts to follow up injunctive orders with contempt of 
court sanctions has enhanced the power of the injunction as a deterrent 
remedy.17 Failure to comply with an injunction could attract sanctions 
ranging from mere warnings to orders that the defendant be imprisoned 
until he/she assures the judge of his or her intention to comply.18 Indeed, 
contempt of court, even arising from a civil case, is treated as a criminal 
offence.19 This is what makes injunctive relief far more powerful than 
declaratory relief as contempt sanctions cannot issue in respect of the 
latter.20  
 
                                                 
16
 See Minister of Health and Others v Treatment Action Campaign 2002 (5) SA 721 
(CC).  
 
17
 See Kate v MEC Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape [2005] 1 All SA 745; 
Mahambehelala v MEC Department of Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 (1) SA 342 (SE); 
and Mbanga v MEC for Welfare, Eastern Cape 2002 (1) SA 359.  
18
 Fiss: 1978, at p 76. Fiss has elevated the injunction above criminal rules as a deterrent 
on the basis of what he calls its individuated nature. He contends that while a criminal 
liability rule is directed to the general public, the injunction is directed at a specific 
person. The individuated nature of the injunction also contributes to the higher degree of 
its specificity and proper specification of the intended beneficiaries. This makes 
compliance much easier in comparison to a criminal liability rule (at p 12). He also 
submits that the injunction puts to rest fears of potential victims in comparison to 
compensatory relief. While a potential victim will know that he will get compensation 
once a wrong is committed on him/her, he/she still lives with the fear that the 
compensation may not be adequate. Fiss adds that yet, the guarantee of compensation 
does not still allay the fear of being a victim. Injunctions allay these fears because one 
will know that the possibility of being a victim has been allayed.  
 
19
 S v Beyers 1968 3 SA 70 (A). 
 
20
 See chapter six, section 6.3.2. 
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7.2.1 Types of injunctions and appropriateness in socio-economic 
rights litigation   
There are two broad types of injunctions: prohibitory injunctions on one 
hand, and mandatory (sometimes called reparative) injunctions on the 
other. Both the prohibitory and mandatory injunction can be issued either 
as perpetual or as interim injunctions (interlocutory).21 The perpetual 
injunction is the final order of the court and is deemed to signal the final 
determination of the issues in the case. In contrast, the interim injunction 
is issued to protect the interests of the applicant by maintaining the status 
quo pending the final determination of the case. The distinction between 
the perpetual and the interim injunction is very important because the 
prerequisites for issuing the two differ.22 The requirements enumerated 
above apply to the perpetual injunction.23  
 
7.2.1.1 Prohibitory injunctions 
A prohibitory injunction is negative in form—it prohibits the person(s) to 
whom it is directed doing something proclaimed as a violation.24 Its role 
is, therefore, to proscribe what may be considered unlawful conduct. In 
socio-economic rights cases, the prohibitory injunction is most 
appropriate as a remedy for infringements of the negative obligations that 
these rights give rise to. It could be obtained to stop either the 
government, or any other person, from taking away the existing socio-
                                                 
21
 See Jordan v Penmill Investments CC 1991(2) SA 430 (E), at p 436D.  
 
22
 Jones & Buckle: 1988 – 1991, at p 89. 
 
23
 The interim injunction will be discussed in detail in this section because of its 
importance in protecting human rights. 
 
24
 The prohibitory injunction has been granted in a variety of contexts and for a variety 
of reasons to prohibit the commission of a delict, to restrain interference with a property 
owner’s right of enjoyment, to restrain the breach of a statutory provision, to restrain the 
infringement of a copy right, to restrain the passing on of trade secrets and to restrain 
acts of family violence, amongst others. See Jones & Buckle: 1988 – 1991, at p 91. 
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economic rights vested in the applicants and similarly situated people.  
The prohibitive injunction is also very effective in preventing future 
infringements where the plaintiff shows a likelihood of violating protected 
rights. In this case, it becomes a preventative injunction. For this type of 
injunction to be granted, the plaintiff must show a reasonable 
apprehension of injury. This is apprehension a reasonable man might 
entertain on being faced with the facts. The test is objective and the 
applicant need not prove on a balance of probability that injury will 
follow.25 However, the apprehension must be induced by some action of 
the respondent or authorised to be performed by his/her agent or servant.26 
 
The distinction between the prohibitory and mandatory injunction appears 
to be of no practical value. In fact the prerequisite for the issuance of the 
two are the same. However, the importance of the distinction lies in the 
manner of enforcement of each of them.27 This is because the prohibitory 
injunction does not require the state to undertake any positive action, it 
involves less costs to the defendant, few problems with supervision and is 
easier to formulate.28 All the court has to do is to pronounce that 
government should not engage in certain activities. For this reason, the 
prohibitory injunction is considered to be less intrusive in separation of 
powers terms. 
                                                 
25
 Harms: 1998, at p 289. This should be distinguished with the approach of the Canadian 
courts which requires the plaintiff to prove that there is a strong probability, upon the 
facts, that grave damage will accrue from the violation. See Operation Dismantle Inc. v 
Canada [1985] 1 S.C.R. 441. However, ‘strong probability’ and ‘grave damage’ appear 
to put the requirements at an unreasonably high level. It should be enough that the 
contemplated harm amounts to violation of the constitution and is based on reasonable 
apprehension. 
 
26
 Jones & Buckle: 1988 – 1991, at p 94. 
 
27
 Harms: 1998, at p 286.  
 
28
 Berryman: 2000, at p 40. 
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7.2.1.2 Mandatory injunctions 
A mandatory injunction is expressed in positive terms; it requires the 
person to whom it is directed to undertake positive steps to remedy a 
wrongful state of affairs for which he/she is responsible. It could also 
require such person to do something which he/she ought to do if the 
complainant is to enjoy his/her rights.29 The mandatory injunction is 
appropriate as a means of enforcing both the negative and positive 
obligations engendered by socio-economic rights. But what has made the 
mandatory injunction most suited for the enforcement of socio-economic 
rights is its potential to enforce positive obligations. This is because in the 
majority of socio-economic rights cases the emphasis is always more on 
ensuring compliance with the obligations in the future than on repairing 
past wrongs.30 In such cases what are needed are those remedies that have 
an affirmative element and which can be used to demand positive 
provision of socio-economic goods and services. 
 
The mandatory injunction could also pass as a corrective remedy when it 
is aimed at correcting past wrongs, thereby becoming a reparative 
injunction which compels the defendant to repair a wrong.31 Such 
compulsion is also deterrent as it becomes clear to the defendant that if 
he/she engages in wrongful conduct in the future, he/she will be 
compelled to undo the wrong. So are other potential defendants who, 
                                                 
29
 Jones & Buckle: 1988 – 1991, at p 90. See also Sikuza v Minister of Water Affairs and 
Agriculture and another [2001] JOL 8486 (Tk), at p 2. 
 
30
 Roach, K., ‘Crafting remedies for violations of economic, social and cultural rights’ 
in Squires, J., Langford, M., and Thiele, B., (eds.) The road to a remedy: Current 
issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural rights (2005) Australian 
Human Rights Centre and Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions pp 111 – 126 
[Hereinafter referred to as Roach: 2005], at p 111. See also chapter two, section 
2.3.1.1. 
 
31
 Roach, K., Constitutional remedies in Canada (1994) Law Book Inc [Hereinafter 
referred to as Roach: 1994], at p 13-20. 
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though not party to the suit, will be deterred once they become aware of 
the courts’ powers of compulsion.32 
 
It would not be appropriate to award a mandatory injunction where there 
is evidence that the state will respond positively, in good faith, to the 
orders of the court. In such cases, as seen in chapter six,33 a declaratory 
judgment would suffice.34 But where there is evidence of likely non-
compliance it would be appropriate for the court to make a mandatory 
injunction. This could be in a case where a government official, for 
instance, states on public television that the government is not prepared to 
abide by any order against it in a pending case compelling government to 
provide Nevirapine.35 
                                                 
32
 See Fiss: 1978, at p 33. 
 
33
 Section 6.2.2.   
 
34
 This is because the mandatory injunction is said to be more intrusive as it compels the 
state to act and involves displacement of the state’s judgment for that of the court. It 
should, therefore, be avoided if this is possible. See Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 35. 
In the Canadian case of Société des Acadiens v Association of Parents, [1986] 1 S.C.R. 
549 (Société des Acadiens case); (1984), 8 D.L.R. (4th) 238; (1983), 48 N.B.R. (2d) 361, 
with evidence that the state was likely to comply with the court orders in good faith, the 
Supreme Court of Canada was reluctant to award a mandatory injunction. The Court held 
that considering the impression given off by the character of the defendant throughout 
the trial, and in light of all the testimony, the court was convinced that it was not 
necessary to order a mandatory injunction: ‘Put simply, the court is confident that this 
decision will be respected by the defendant’ (1983), 48 N.B.R (2d), at p 409). In spite of 
this, however, the Court deemed it necessary to retain jurisdiction over the case and 
remain open to the parties. This proved very useful at a future stage because the state did 
not honour its promise to implement the order in good faith, which compelled the Court 
to deploy the mandatory injunction at a latter stage.  
 
35
 This was the situation in the TAC case where the minister of health stated, on public 
television, that the government would not abide by the judgment of the Court. See 
Bilchitz, D., ‘Towards a reasonable approach to the minimum core: Laying the 
foundations for a future socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2003) 19 South African 
Journal on Human Rights pp 1 – 26 [Hereinafter referred to as Bilchitz: 2003], at pp 23 – 
 
 
 
 
Chapter seven 
 321 
The CC has asserted its powers to grant mandatory injunctions as part of 
‘appropriate, just and equitable relief’. The Court has rejected 
submissions that the only order it could make against the government in 
constitutional litigation was a declaratory order. It had been submitted that 
the Court was prevented by the doctrine of separation of powers from 
granting a mandatory injunction as this would amount to requiring the 
executive to pursue a particular policy.36 According to the CC, there is no 
distinction between a mandatory order and a declaratory order because 
they both affect state policy and may have budgetary implications. This is 
because the government is constitutionally bound to give effect to both 
mandatory and declaratory orders.37 
 
I do endorse the holding that government is constitutionally bound to 
carry out declaratory orders in the same way as mandatory orders. In my 
opinion, however, the distinction between declaratory and mandatory 
order becomes clear when government disregards its constitutional 
obligations. As mentioned in chapter six,38 declaratory orders once 
                                                                                                                                            
24. Though at the end of the case evidence had emerged that the government was 
prepared to abide by the judgment of the court, the commitment was too fluid to merit a 
declaratory order alone. The CC, therefore, made a mandatory order, compelling the 
government to remove, without delay, the restrictions that prevented nevirapine from 
being made available at public hospitals and clinics that had not been designated 
research and training sites. Indeed, subsequent events proved the usefulness of the 
mandatory injunction as some provinces had to be threatened with contempt of court 
order citations to extract an undertaking from them to abide by the order. See TAC v 
MEC for Health, Mpumalanga and Minister of Health, TPD, Case No: 35272/02 
[unreported] (TAC Mpumalanga case). See also Heywood, M., ‘Contempt or 
compliance? The TAC case after the Constitutional Court judgment’ (2003) 4 ESR 
Review pp 7 – 10 [Hereinafter referred to as Heywood: 2003].  
 
36
 TAC case, at paras 97 – 98. 
 
37
 TAC case, at para 99. 
 
38
 Section 6.3.2.  
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disobeyed cannot be enforced in the same way as the injunction. The 
injunction can be followed by contempt of court proceedings to secure 
compliance from the state. This explains why it was easy for those 
dissatisfied with implementation of the TAC case order in some provinces 
to secure compliance.39 This should be contrasted with the position of 
those dissatisfied with the implementation of the judgment in Government 
of the Republic of South Africa v Grootboom & Others40  (Grootboom 
case) whose only access to the Court is through fresh litigation.41 It, 
therefore, remains that the power of a mandatory order cannot be 
compared to that of a declaratory order.  
 
7.2.1.3 Interim injunctions 
The injunction has gained prominence as an interim remedy because of 
the impossibility of using the traditional public law remedies as a means 
of interim relief. In this respect, the interim injunction, granted on an 
interim basis, becomes handy. The interim injunction can be granted at 
any time of the proceedings if the circumstances warrant. It can even be 
granted without notice to the defendant.42 The interim injunction, just as 
other interlocutory remedies, provides one possible way to combine 
individual and distributive or systemic relief.43 The interim injunction can 
be used to accord individual protection to litigants in the case while 
                                                 
39
 See TAC Mpumalanga case and Heywood: 2003.  
 
40
 2000 (11) BCLR 1169 (CC); 2001 (1) SA 46 (CC) 
 
41
 See Bilchitz, D., Poverty and fundamental rights: The justification and enforcement of 
socio-economic rights (2007) Oxford University Press [Hereinafter referred to as 
Bilchizt: 2007], at p 150. 
 
 
42
  Berryman: 2000, at p 13. He also associates the popularity of the interim injunction to 
the ability to get a preliminary trial of the disputed merits, which may assist in reaching a 
settlement before the case goes to trial. 
 
43
 Roach: 2005, at 121.  
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seeking a remedy that may have a distributive effect as the final order of 
the case. However, this can only be done with respect to protection 
against negative and not positive violations. It is easily available in those 
cases where the applicants, for instance, require that government be 
restrained from taking away an existing right until a final decision is 
made. An example is an order sought in an eviction case to maintain the 
status quo and prevent irreparable harm that would result from the 
eviction.  This though does not mean that there could be no circumstances 
under which an interim order can be made to compel affirmative action 
such as the interim provision of services.  
 
 For an interim injunction to be granted in South Africa a litigant must 
prove the following: 
 
(a) that the right which is the subject matter of the main action and 
which he/she seeks to protect by means of interim relief is clear 
or, if not clear, is prima facie established, though open to some 
doubt; 
(b) that, if the right is only prima facie established, there is a well-
grounded apprehension of irreparable harm to the applicant if the 
interim relief is not granted and he[/she] ultimately succeeds in 
establishing his/[her] rights; 
(c) that the balance of convenience favours the granting of interim 
relief; and  
(d) that the applicant has no other satisfactory remedy.44 
  
The right that the applicant for an interim injunction seeks to enforce need 
not be shown on a balance of probabilities.45 All that a court has to do is 
to consider the facts as set out by the applicant together with any facts set 
out by the respondent. If with regard to the inherent probabilities the 
                                                 
44
 See L F Boshoff Investments (Pty) Ltd v Cape Town Municipality 1969 (2) SA 256 (C) 
at 267A-F. See also The National Gambling Board v Premier of Kwazulu-Natal and 
Others 2002 (2) SA 715 (CC). 
 
45
 Prest: 1996, at p 52. 
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applicant would obtain final relief then a prima facie case would have 
been proved.46  
 
Proving whether the balance of convenience is in the applicant’s favour 
requires the court to weigh the applicant’s interests against those of the 
defendant. The court must weigh the prejudice that the applicant will 
suffer if the interim injunction is not granted against the prejudice to the 
respondent if it is. If there is greater possible prejudice to the respondent 
the injunction will be refused.47  However, one of the factors to consider 
in the balancing process is the prospects of success in the main action. 
‘[T]he stronger the prospects of success, the less the need for the balance 
of convenience to favour the applicant; the weaker the prospects of 
success, the greater the balance of convenience to favour him[/her]’.48 As 
with irreparable harm, third party interests too may have to be weighed in 
the balance of convenience. The court should focus beyond the interests 
of the parties in order to be able to consider not only the polycentric case 
but also the interest that society as a whole may have in the case as 
discussed in chapter three.49  
 
Traditionally, irreparable harm has been considered as harm that cannot 
be repaired with an award of damages. But as submitted in chapter six,50 
the inherent nature of human rights and the intrinsic values they protect 
                                                 
46
 Joubert & Faris: 1998, at p 292. This is ‘based on the unreliability of making 
determinations on conflicting … evidence of substantive claims without the benefit of 
detailed argument and in a climate of judicial haste’. Berryman: 2000, at pp 22 and 49.  
 
47
 Prest: 1996, at p 72. See also Eriksen Motors (Welkom) Ltd v Protea Motors & 
Another 1973 (3) SA 685 (A). 
 
48
 Jones & Buckle: 1988 – 1991, at p 98.  
 
49
 See section 3.4.1. 
 
50
 Section 6.3.1.  
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cannot be compensated for with damages.51 Indeed, it has been held that if 
the applicant can establish a clear right, there is no need to prove that 
irreparable harm would result if the interim injunction is not granted.52 It 
is only when the right is open to some doubts that irreparable harm would 
have to be proved.53 This is positive in the sense that it makes the interim 
injunction readily available in human rights litigation.  
 
It is indeed important that the requirements for the grant of an interim 
injunction be relaxed in human rights litigants in order to give these rights 
their full effect. In socio-economic rights litigation, for instance, it may be 
necessary to apply the balance of convenience in a way that is different 
from other forms of litigations. Due to the polycentric nature of socio-
economic rights litigation54 and the need to engage in interest balancing,55 
it may be necessary to assess harm, not only to the petitioners but on third 
parties as well. Such relaxation, as has been done, is consistent with the 
theory of distributive justice. 
 
 
 
                                                 
51
 Damages may not be equated to human dignity, to a lost opportunity to worship one’s 
God, or to a missed opportunity to vote. See Dikoko v Mokhatla 2007(1) BCLR 1 (CC) 
(Mokhatla case), at para 109. On this basis, one could submit that the requirement of 
proving that irreparable harm would be suffered where human rights are involved is not 
necessary.  
 
52
 Setlogelo case, at p 227. This is where South African law differs from English law, 
under English law irreparable harm would have to be proved irrespective of the nature 
of the right. See American Cyanamid v Ethicon [1975] 2 WLR 316 (American 
Cyanamid case). 
 
53
 Setlogelo case, at p 227.  
 
54
 Chapter three, section 3.4. 
 
55
 Chapter five, sections 5.2.2 and 5.3. See also chapter six, section 6.3.  
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7.3 NATURE, FUNCTIONS AND MODELS OF THE 
STRUCTURAL INJUNCTION  
 
The structural injunction is a complicated form of injunction. It involves 
continued participation of the court in the implementation of its orders. 
The functions of the structural injunction are various and determined by 
the circumstances and demands of each case. Unlike other forms of 
injunctions or remedies, such as damages, the purpose of a structural 
injunction is not deterrence or compensation as such. In broad terms, its 
purpose is the elimination of systemic violations existing especially in 
institutional or organisational settings.56  Rather than compensate for past 
wrongs it seeks to adjust future behaviour and is deliberately fashioned 
rather than logically deduced from the nature of the legal harm suffered.57 
Its most prominent feature is that it provides for a complex, on-going 
regime of performance and is not a one-shot and one-way approach of 
providing judicial remedies.58 Its on-going nature is facilitated by the 
court’s retention of jurisdiction, and sometimes by the court’s active 
participation in the implementation of the decree.  
 
The structural injunction is a response to the inadequacy of the traditional 
remedies in responding to systemic violations of a complex organisational 
nature.59 The traditional remedies may not be effective to eliminate 
                                                 
56
 See Liebenberg, S., ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic rights’ 
(2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 1 – 31 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Liebenberg: 2005], at p 30. 
 
57
 See the discussion in chapter five (section 5.3) regarding the relationship between 
rights and remedies. 
 
58
 Chayes, A., ‘The role of the judge in public law litigation’ (1979) 89 Harvard Law 
Review pp 1281 – 1316 [Hereinafter referred to as Chayes: 1979], at p 1298. 
 
59
 Sturm. S., ‘A normative theory of public law remedies’ (1991) 79 Georgetown Law 
Journal pp 1355 – 1446 [Hereinafter referred to as Sturm: 1991], at p 1357. 
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systemic violations because these may require negotiation, dialogue, ex 
parte communications and broad participation of parties not liable for the 
violation.60 The structural injunction has also been inspired by a 
recognition that some constitutional values cannot be fully secured 
without effecting changes in the structures of complex organisations 
especially in government bureaucracy settings.61  
 
In a setting of systemic violations, what would be most appropriate are 
those remedies that aim at achieving structural reforms and tackling the 
systemic problems at their root rather than redressing their impact. This 
may require development of on-going measures designed to eliminate the 
identified mischief,62 and to promote participation of not only the parties 
but also third parties in the remedy selection process. Dealing with 
systemic violations in institutional settings also requires a continued 
establishment of facts and the continual interplay between such facts and 
the legal consequences.63 This is important because in such cases the 
problems could have their roots in the structural characteristics of the 
institution itself.64 Facts that enhance the court’s understanding of the 
nature of the institution, therefore, become relevant at all stages of the 
                                                 
60
 Sturm: 1991, at p 1357. 
 
61
 Fiss, O., ‘Foreword: The forms of justice’ (1979) 93 Harvard Law Review pp 1 – 58 
[Hereinafter referred to as Fiss: 1979], at p 2. 
 
62
 Chayes: 1979, at p 1297. See also Special Project, ‘The remedial process in 
institutional reform litigation’ (1978) Columbia Law Review pp 784 – 929 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Special Project: 1978], at p 812. 
 
63
 Chayes: 1979, at 1297. 
 
64
 Note, ‘Implementation problems of institutional reform litigation’ (1998) 91 Harvard 
Law Review pp 428 – 463 [Hereinafter referred to as Note: 1998], at p 433. 
 
 
 
 
 
Nature, role and appropriateness of the structural injunction 
 328 
case.65 The cases may also require frequent re-determination of liability 
and reformulation of relief.66  
 
It is because of these factors that the structural injunction has become a 
preferred remedy in what have been described as structural or institutional 
suits.67 These suits challenge large scale government deficiencies, 
sometimes arising out of organisational or administrative failure. The 
causes of the failure are various: failure to use (or misuse of) discretion, 
negligence, failure to comprehend the law, administrative red tape, and 
deliberate disregard of rights. Usually these suits are preceded by political 
pressure and instituted only when this is unsuccessful. However, even 
when they are filed, political pressure may continue to be exerted on the 
government.68 The suits are usually multi-partied, with large numbers of 
plaintiffs, who may act in a representative capacity for known and 
unknown victims. The suits could also have amici and interveners, and 
may be instituted against a multitude of government departments and 
institutions.  
 
The facts in institutional or structural litigation are often complex, and 
much of the judge’s efforts are dedicated to finding an amicable solution 
                                                 
65
 It has been submitted that understanding the institution will permit the policy maker, 
whether administrative or judicial, to anticipate obstacles to implementation and develop 
strategies of surmounting the obstacles. Note: 1998, at p 435. 
 
66
 Special Project: 1978, at p 790. In fact, the Special Project has described the resulting 
decree as resembling a legislative or executive act (at p 791). 
 
67
 See Fletcher, W., ‘The discretionary constitution: Institutional remedies and judicial 
legitimacy’ (1982) Yale Law Journal pp 635 – 697 [Hereinafter referred to as Fletcher: 
1982], at p 637. See also Eisenberg, T., and Yeazell, S., ‘The ordinary and the 
extraordinary in institutional litigation’ (1980) Harvard Law Review pp 465 – 517 
[Hereinafter referred to as Eisenberg & Yeazell: 1980]. 
 
68
 Fletcher: 1982, at 637. 
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acceptable to all the parties and which will lead to structural reforms. 
Usually the remedial decree is perceived as the key to the success or 
failure of the litigation.69 The most common practice is for the court to 
push the parties to agree on a plan and to register that plan as a decree 
contained in a mandatory injunction. However, even after this is done the 
court does not let go— it retains jurisdiction over the case and, if need be, 
may supervise the implementation of the remedial plan.70  
 
The structural injunction as a remedy in constitutional litigation is traced 
back to the US school desegregation cases. The leading case in this 
respect is Brown v Board of Education.71 This case was propelled by the 
need to realise transformation of the dual school system, based on race, 
into a unitary non-racial school system. This required a great deal of 
organisational reforms to transform the entrenched racial segregation 
which had survived for hundreds of years. The courts were required to 
transform this entrenched status quo and to reconstruct the social reality 
in a very radical manner.72 There was just too much on the sleeves of the 
                                                 
69
 Fletcher: 1982, at pp 637 – 638. 
 
70
 Contrary to general perception, although there is no denying that their application in 
the realm of public law has been more controversial, structural injunctions are not 
exclusive to public law but have been applied in private law as well. In the realm of 
private law, courts have, for a very long time, undertaken managerial roles resulting 
either from judicial initiatives or from statutory powers. Courts have through receivers 
managed bankrupt or insolvent companies and supervised the administration of trusts, 
estates and wills. See Berryman: 2000, at p 110. See also Eisenberg & Yeazell: 1980, at 
p 474: they submit that the view that the traditional lawsuit ends almost amicably at a 
stage well before the administration of the remedy is artificial. They contend that in this 
‘old’ litigation, as in the public litigation that has engendered so much outcry, 
administering remedies often creates resistance and the courts must expend a great deal 
of energy and devise ingenious procedures to overcome such resistance (at p 481). See 
also Roach: 1994, at p 13-3.  
 
71
 349 US 294 (the Brown case). 
 
72
 Fiss: 1979, at pp 2 – 3. 
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judges: what was required included establishing new procedures for 
student assignments, new criteria for construction of schools, revision of 
transport routes, re-assignment of faculty, curricular modifications, 
reallocation of resources and above all, establishing equity in the school 
system. The question is whether this would have been achieved through 
the conventional one-stance traditional litigation and remedial 
procedures. The answer is a definite no; it required protracted and 
unusual methods of litigation and remediation.73  
 
It is in this context that the Supreme Court made its orders in Brown and 
similar cases. The Supreme Court recognised the fact that the school 
authorities were better placed to solve the problem of segregation. It 
noted, however, that there was need for the courts, especially the local 
courts, to consider whether the actions of the school authorities 
constituted good faith implementation of court orders. The Supreme 
Court advised that in discharging their roles the local courts had to be 
guided by the principles of equity ‘characterized by a practical flexibility 
in shaping the remedies and facility for adjusting and reconciling public 
and private needs’.74 The Court required that the defendants make ‘a 
prompt and reasonable start toward full compliance’ with the ruling of 
court.75 During what the court termed as a period of transition, the courts 
were advised to retain jurisdiction over the cases. This was to enable the 
courts to monitor the implementation of their decrees and to intervene or 
issue further orders if necessary. Indeed, this is what happened. Most 
                                                                                                                                            
 
73
 Fiss: 1979, at p 3, has submitted that ‘desegregation required a revision of familiar 
conceptions about party structure, new norms governing judicial behavior, and new ways 
of looking at the relationship between rights and remedies’.  
 
74
 347 U.S. 483, at p 496. 
 
75
 347 U.S. 483, at p 497. 
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school authorities did not implement the decrees, which forced the 
courts to intervene more intrusively and to give specific directions.  
 
7.3.1 The unusual features of the structural injunction 
   
7.3.1.1. Flexibility and gradualism  
The structural injunction is very flexible; its form at the beginning of the 
case may differ from its form when the case is concluded. Though this 
fluidity may present some problems of implementation, it is the kind of 
flexibility that contributes to the strengths of this kind of relief. It allows 
for the revisiting of the remedy without having to institute fresh litigation, 
and also for accommodation of changed circumstances.76  
 
The non-specificity of a structural injunction at the stage when it is first 
decreed is not by default but by design. The essence of a generally stated 
structural injunction is to give latitude to the executive, or some times the 
legislative branch of government, to choose the most appropriate remedy 
for the violation. Specificity should come as a matter of last resort. The 
remedy may be crafted in a very broad manner by merely requiring that a 
wrong be corrected. With time, however, the terms of the order may 
become more specific by detailing what ought to be done and within what 
time. This point is reverted to later.77 Unlike the other types of injunctions 
which are usually backed by contempt of court sanctions, recalcitrance in 
the case of a structural injunction is in most cases followed by 
supplementary decrees:78  
                                                 
76
 Revisiting of the remedy in this way may arise because of factors that were not 
anticipated when the remedy was designed. This is in addition to changes in the degree 
of recalcitrance and willingness on the part of the defendant to abide by the orders of 
court which may motivate the court to loosen some of the tough conditions in the decree.  
 
77
 See section 7.6.1 below. 
 
78
 This is not to suggest that there can be no stages at which contempt of court order 
sanctions become appropriate. 
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The usual scenario in the structural context is for the judge to issue a de-
cree (perhaps embodying a plan formulated by the defendant), to be 
confronted with disobedience, and then not to inflict contempt but to grant 
a motion for supplemental relief. Then the cycle repeats itself. In each 
cycle of the supplemental relief process the remedial obligation is defined 
with greater and greater specificity. Ultimately, after many cycles of 
supplemental decrees, the ordinary contempt sanctions may become 
realistically available, but the point to emphasize is that it is only then—
only at the end of a series—that the threat of contempt becomes credible.79 
[Emphasis in original]  
 
The factors propelling such specificity are discussed later in this chapter,80 
but it is mainly the inadequacy of the steps taken by the defendant, or 
even the degree of recalcitrance exhibited. Breaking down this 
recalcitrance may require many cycles of clarification of the obligations 
of the defendant. According to Fiss: 
 
The gradualism of the structural sanctioning system might be attributable 
to political considerations (such as a desire to “go slow” so as to build 
wide popular support for the remedial enterprise). In a similar vein, it 
might be said that it reflects an ambivalence toward the underlying decree. 
I suspect, however, that the gradualism has deeper roots—uncertainties in 
the goal to be achieved (e.g., what is a “unitary non-racial” school system) 
or shortcomings in our knowledge and ability to restructure ongoing 
institutions—and thus is less tractable. The gradualism stems from the 
very nature of the remedial enterprise.81 
  
Gradualism also helps the court juggle around a number of options in its 
search for the most effective way of remedying the violation. It is not 
until the court has decided on what it considers the most appropriate 
                                                                                                                                            
 
79
 Fiss: 1978, at p 36. Fiss attributes this to the fact that the purpose of a structural 
injunction is to serve a preventive role to deter future wrongs and is not a coercive act 
issuing a command. Instead, it is a declaration that the court will manage or direct the 
reconstruction of an institution in order to bring it into conformity with the constitution. 
He submits that this role requires the court to induce collaboration, and to give 
authoritative directives as a last resort (at p 37). 
 
80
 See section 7.6.1 below.  
 
81
 Fiss: 1978, at p 36. 
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means of remedying the violation that it concretises the decree.82 I discuss 
this point in detail below.83  
 
7.3.1.2    Retention of jurisdiction and its purpose 
The most peculiar feature of the structural injunction is the court’s 
retention of jurisdiction over the case even after judgment has been 
passed. The courts have disregarded the traditional functus officio 
doctrine, which requires that once a court has made a final determination 
of a matter, its jurisdiction over the case ceases and the case is closed.84 
Though the case can be reopened, conventional legal procedures put in 
place stringent legal requirements that have to be satisfied before this is 
done.  
 
Retention of jurisdiction by the court helps a party who thinks that the 
decree is not being complied with to bring this to the attention of the 
court. It also helps the persons to whom the order is directed, in certain 
circumstances, to seek clarity from the court as regards what the order 
entails. Courts have also retained jurisdiction to enable them participate 
sporadically in the administration of the institutions whose reform they 
seek to achieve.85 In such case, the retention will be accompanied by a 
stipulation of supervisory powers, thereby establishing supervisory 
jurisdiction on the part of the court. Supervisory jurisdiction is 
particularly necessary where a mandatory order has been issued in terms 
that are so general that it is not possible to define with precision what is 
                                                 
82
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 36. See also Fiss: 1978, at p 36.  
 
83
 Section 7.6.1.  
 
84
 For a detailed discussion of the functus officio doctrine see Pretorius, M., ‘The origins 
of the functus officio doctrine, with specific reference to its application in administrative 
law’ (2005) 122 South African Law Journal pp 832 – 864. See also Special Project: 
1978, at p 816. 
 
85
 Note: 1998, at p 428.  
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required of the defendant.86 The continued participation in the case by the 
court will enable it to make its order more precise as new facts and 
circumstances present themselves. 
 
Retention of jurisdiction also affords the successful litigant with an 
opportunity to be heard after the defendant has formulated his response to 
the court’s directions. In the case of government as the defendant, the 
successful litigant is given a second chance to be heard by a government 
whose initial failure could have been the cause of the litigation.87 The 
government would be compelled, this time round, to engage with the 
plaintiffs in meaningful dialogue because of the knowledge that the doors 
of the court are open to the plaintiffs. This is in addition to the reluctance 
to endure another wave of embarrassment arising from litigation and 
                                                 
86
 Roach, K., and Budlender, G., ‘Mandatory relief and supervisory jurisdiction: When is 
it appropriate, just and equitable’ (2005) 122 South African Law Journal pp 325 – 351 
[Hereinafter referred to as Roach & Budlender: 2005], at p 334. General orders may be 
made, either because of the nature of the duty, like the duty to act reasonably, or because 
the court is anxious to leave government with as much latitude as possible on how to 
comply. This may be based on the conviction that the government will comply with the 
order and carry it out in good faith. The retention of jurisdiction in this case helps the 
court to keep a watchful eye over the defendant, which is motivated by the fact that at 
this stage compliance is dependant on the defendant’s good faith. An example of this can 
be seen in the Canadian Société des Acadiens case.  In this case, the Court made a 
general declaration and initially declined to assume a supervisory role because it was 
convinced that the defendant would comply in good faith. However, because of the 
general nature of the order, the Court decided to retain jurisdiction. As it turned out, the 
defendants were in fact the first to make use of this jurisdiction when they sought clarity 
on the nature of their obligations. A few months down the road the order was 
transformed into a mandatory order because of evidence of non-compliance on the part 
of the defendants. If jurisdiction had not been retained, the plaintiffs would have had to 
commence fresh and possibly unwinding proceedings to secure compliance with the 
court order.  
 
87
 Davis, D., ‘Socio-economic rights in South Africa: The record of the Constitutional 
Court after ten years’ (2004) 5 ESR Review pp 3 – 7 [Hereinafter referred to as Davis: 
2004], at p 6. 
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which is easy to trigger.  This is very crucial for poor litigants who may 
not have the resources to institute another suit in case of non-compliance 
by the defendant.88 
 
Additionally, retention of jurisdiction enables the courts to work out a 
negotiated compromise between the parties in order to secure full 
implementation of the order. The period of retention may be used as a 
delaying tactic to allow parties a cooling off period before compromise is 
reached. This is one of the reasons why a court may be prepared to delay 
full implementation of its orders and to rely on negotiations between the 
affected parties in order to win their support and acceptance of the 
remedy.89 The court may also use the delay to assess the circumstances on 
the ground and to determine whether there are obstacles that may hamper 
effective implementation of the decree. Once any obstacles are identified, 
the court will be in a better position to devise what it considers to be the 
best means to confront them. This form of delay also allows the courts to 
assess the practicalities of the decree and the perspectives of the affected 
parties.90 This is important because it avoids imposing undue remedial 
burdens on the parties and sometimes on third parties. This is more 
effectively achieved if the parties themselves are allowed to devise the 
remedy and to present it for the court’s approval.91 I discuss this point in 
detail in the next section. 
 
                                                 
88
 Swart, M., ‘Left out in the cold? Grafting constitutional remedies for the poorest of the 
poor’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 215 – 240 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Swart: 2005], at p 228. 
 
89
 Roach: 1994, at p 3-3. 
 
90
 Roach, K., ‘The limits of corrective justice and the potential of equity in constitutional 
remedies’ (1991) 33 Arizona Law Review pp 859 – 909 [Hereinafter referred as Roach: 
1991], at p 893. 
 
91
 Roach: 1994, at p 13-50.  
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7.3.2 Models of structural injunctions  
Courts have adopted different models of the structural injunction, not only 
in different cases but at different levels of the same case. The most 
commonly used models include: the bargaining model, the legislative or 
administrative hearing model, the expert remedial formulation model, 
report back to court model and the consensual remedial formulation 
model.92 Each of these models is discussed in the sub-sections that follow. 
 
7.3.2.1 Bargaining model  
The bargaining model involves making remedial decisions through 
negotiation by the parties involved in the case, plaintiff(s) and 
defendant(s) or applicant(s) and respondent(s). The biggest advantage of 
this model is that it produces a remedy that is acceptable to all the parties, 
thereby easing implementation.93 The negotiation process will also bring 
to the fore facts and issues which may have been ignored by the court yet 
are relevant to having an effective remedy. Such facts and issues will 
emerge from the perspectives of all the parties. This is very important in 
as much as it allows parties to bring to light factors they think would 
affect the implementation of the remedy. 94  
 
The negotiation process also accords legitimacy to the remedy since the 
remedy becomes ‘self-imposed’, as opposed to one that is ‘court-
                                                 
92
 See Sturm: 1991, at pp 1368 – 1375. 
 
93
 Special Project: 1978, at p 810. 
 
94
 The best example of the bargaining model is the US case of  Liddle v Board of 
Education of the City of St. Louis 491 F. Supp. 351 (E.D.Mo.1980). In this case, after 
failure to extract from the defendants a voluntary school desegregation plan, a district 
court appointed a third party to oversee the remedial process. The third party, designated 
as a court master, met with the attorneys of all the parties, both individually and in 
groups, and shuttled back and forth between them with proposals and counter-proposals. 
Later the master arranged for direct negotiations between the attorneys. The negotiations 
were also supervised by amicus curiae until agreement was reached. 
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imposed’ and may be viewed by some of the parties as illegitimate. This 
is in addition to reducing the burden on the court to resolve some issues, 
as the parties may come to agreement on them. The parties then may only 
litigate on those issues where a deadlock has been reached. Nonetheless, 
when disagreement arises, the threat of a court imposed remedy may still 
force the parties to break the deadlock by coming to an agreement.95 
Regarding the doctrine of separation of powers, the ‘self-imposed’ 
remedy will shield the court from accusations of interfering in the affairs 
of other organs of state. In case of failure to abide by the remedy, the 
court will be able to enforce it without fears arising from any separation 
of powers concerns. This is because the court’s involvement will be 
viewed as justified and, therefore, legitimate.  
 
The process also saves time; it brings to a quick end the protracted court 
processes of resolving legal issues, sometimes only achieved after 
countless adjournments. The parties will be able to commit their time to 
the process, if the case means a lot to them. Even if it means a lot to only 
one party, he/she will mount pressure that agreement be reached. The 
other party will be forced to submit to the negotiations because of the fear 
that failure to reach agreement may provoke a court selected remedy 
which may not be as favourable.96 The bargaining model is also 
appropriate in cases involving governmental action. This is because such 
action is always, in large part, the product of bargaining and manoeuvring 
among public officials and departments or levels of government, each of 
which will have different goals and motives.97  
 
                                                 
95
 Special Project: 1978, at p 811. 
 
96
 Chayes: 1979, at p 1299. 
 
97
 Note: 1998, at p 434. 
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The model has been criticised as encouraging perpetuation of the case and 
indefinite involvement of the court. This is in addition to sacrificing 
reasoned decision making on the part of the court. According to Fiss,98 
 
The drive for settlement knows no bounds and can result in a consent 
decree even in … [structural litigation], that is, even when a court finds 
itself embroiled in a continuing struggle between the parties or must 
reform a bureaucratic organization. The parties may be ignorant of the 
difficulties ahead or optimistic about the future, or they may simply 
believe that they can get more favorable terms through a bargained-for 
agreement. Soon, however, the inevitable happens: One party returns to 
court and asks the judge to modify the decree, either to make it more 
effective or less stringent. But the judge is at a loss: He has no basis for 
assessing the request. He cannot, to use Cardozo's somewhat 
melodramatic formula, easily decide whether the "dangers, once 
substantial, have become attenuated to a shadow," because, by definition, 
he never knew the dangers.99 [Footnotes excluded] 
 
 
It should be noted, however, that Fiss’s criticism, is based on erroneous 
assumptions. The first assumption is motivated by the purpose of his 
article, viz, to criticise models of litigation that encourage alternative 
dispute resolution in the place of court determinations. Structural 
litigation does not, however, fall in this class of litigation. Structural 
litigation is conducted with clear appreciation of the fact that the litigation 
implicates interests beyond the interests of parties. This, too, is a fact that 
Fiss ignores: he trivialises litigation by reducing its social function ‘to one 
of resolving private disputes’.100 Fiss also ignores the fact that structural 
litigation is always opened up to persons not originally parties to the 
litigation and allows them to bring to the fore their interests. The judge 
remains conscious of these interests and reserves the right to reject 
settlements that sideline them. Fiss also does not understand that the 
continued involvement of the judge in the litigation is motivated by the 
                                                 
98
 Fiss, O., ‘Against settlement’ (1984) 93 Yale Law Journal pp 1073 – 1090 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Fiss: 1984].  
 
99
 Fiss: 1984, at p 1083. 
 
100
 Fiss: 1984, at p 1085. 
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desire to stop a systemic violation rather than the protection of the 
interests of the parties.  
 
Furthermore, Fiss assumes that the adversarial litigation process is the 
only possible method of preserving a reasoned decision making 
process.101 Reasoned decision making could still be preserved in non-
adversarial litigation; the judge could begin by laying down the normative 
standards implicated by the case. Later, at the remedial stage, the judge 
could then test the remedies agreed upon against these normative 
standards.102  
 
The above though does not mean that the model is without deficiencies, it 
may, for instance compromise the norm of participation.103 This is 
because there is always no guarantee that the full range of people and 
organisations with a stake in the case will be included in the 
negotiations.104 As I submit later,105 it is important that the norm of 
                                                 
101
 Sturm: 1991, at p 1400 – 1401. However, Sturm also concedes that sometimes 
deferring remedial selection to the parties may compromise the court’s impartiality, 
which may in turn undermine the court’s legitimacy. The court may fail to bring to bear 
perspectives other than those of the parties (at p 1412). 
 
102
 Sturm: 1991, at p 1401 – 1402, has submitted, and rightly so, that reasoned decision-
making need not proceed through traditional adjudication based solely on legal norms. 
He submits that other decision making methodologies, such as structured negotiation, 
may be better suited to generating reasoned public remedial decision making when legal 
norms alone provide an insufficient basis for choosing among possible remedies. In 
Sturm’s opinion, the court's discretion can be effectively structured through the 
development of norms of public remedial processes that can be articulated by the trial 
judge and reviewed by appellate courts. Moreover, the court's interpretive role may be 
preserved by a model of remedial decision-making premised on the view of the court as 
the enforcer of a deliberative process. 
 
103
 Discussed in section 7.6.2 below. 
 
104
 Sturm: 1991, at p 1414. 
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participation be promoted by ensuring that all affected parties participate 
in the remedy selection process. Also, remedies obtained from the 
negotiations by the parties should be subjected to scrutiny by the court to 
ensure that they do not negatively impact on third party interests.106 In 
fact, the court is not entirely relieved from the responsibility of fashioning 
a remedy.107 If the parties fail to agree, or if the agreement reached fails to 
conform to the requirements of the substantive law in issue or 
accommodate third party interests, the judge may intervene and fashion 
the remedy.108  
 
7.3.2.2 Legislative/ administrative hearing model  
The legislative/administrative hearing model resembles a legislative 
committee process providing for public hearings and direct informal 
participation by interested parties.109 This model allows persons not 
                                                                                                                                            
105
 Section 7.5.2 below. 
 
106
 The court’s function when presented with a negotiated remedy is to consider its terms 
carefully, without assuming that the involvement of all the parties ensured a fair and 
adequate result. A court should only adopt a proposed consent decree if it is reasonable. 
This is because the parties may not have adequately represented all interests affected by 
the remedy. The court must, therefore, avoid a decree which unnecessarily injures 
interests of non-participants. See Special Project: 1978, at p 812.     
 
107
 Chayes: 1979, at pp 1299 – 1300. 
 
108
 Sturm: 1991, at p 1415, submits that the bargaining model fails to provide for 
mechanisms for fostering the accountability of the participants in the negotiation process 
to those they represent. He contends that where lawyers are involved, the bargaining 
closely follows an adversarial model of presentation. Sturm also submits that usually the 
bargaining model tends to lay emphasis on reaching agreement and proceeds according 
to an adversary structure which narrows the terms of the discussion and inhibits 
meaningful exchange (at p 1416). The lawyers control the agenda and the process of 
negotiation. It is, therefore, important for the court to ensure the participation of those 
affected and accountability to them through, for example, the legislative and hearing 
model. 
 
109
 Sturm: 1991, at p 1370. 
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originally party to the litigation, but who may be interested in the case, to 
participate in the formulation of the remedy. It is an effective model in 
responding to polycentric interests that may be implicated by the case.  
 
An example of a case where this model was used is the US case of 
Pennsylvania Association for Retarded Children v Pennsylvania.110 In this 
case, in addition to conducting extensive informal public hearings, the 
Judge established an advisory committee composed of representatives of 
the various groups and organisations with a stake in the case. The 
mandate of the committee was to advise on an appropriate remedy,111 
which was deemed necessary because of the multitude of people 
interested in the outcome of the case. Their participation made it possible 
for the different views and divergences to be brought to the fore. 
However, as discussed below,112 participation should not be inflated to 
such an extent that the process becomes muddled making it hard for the 
Committee to make a decision. 
 
The openness of the process allows for a better understanding of the 
polycentric interests implicated by the case. The informal nature of the 
process also makes accessibility much easier especially for the weak and 
vulnerable. Such persons may not have the resources to initiate and 
sustain litigation.  
 
7.3.2.3   Expert remedial formulation model  
The expert remedial formulation model involves the appointment of either 
an individual expert or a panel of experts with a mandate to develop a 
remedial plan. Sometimes these experts are designated as court officials 
                                                                                                                                            
 
110
 334 F.Supp. 1257 (E.D. Pa. 1971) (PARC case). 
 
111
 See Sturm: 1991, at p 1370. 
 
112
 Section 7.6.2. 
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and have judicial powers.113 The court appointed experts in structural 
litigation differ from those in other forms of litigation. Experts in other 
forms of litigation are always restricted to fact finding mandates. In 
contrast, the experts in structural litigation are usually mandated to design 
and propose a remedial plan.114 The expert could even be designated as an 
administrator with a mandate to take over and manage the institution for 
the purposes of effecting reforms. The expert model is particularly 
relevant in those cases where specialised and technical skill is required to 
formulate an appropriate remedy. This could be in those cases where there 
is, for instance, a need to appreciate some social information facts before 
formulating the decree.115 The court may not have the expertise and skill 
to ascertain the social facts.  This does not, however, mean that the parties 
are left out of the remedy finding process. In spite of their skills, the 
experts may be obliged to consult with the parties in formulating the 
remedial plans.116 This, like the legislative hearing model, is intended to 
ensure that polycentric interests are considered and that the remedy is 
acceptable not only to the parties but to other members of the community 
who may play a role in its implementation.117 
 
                                                 
113
 A variety of terms have been used to refer to these experts and panels of experts. 
These include: receiver, monitor, human rights committee, administrator, advisory 
committee, ombudsman, committee, audit and review Committee, to mention but a few. 
See Special Project: 1978, at p 826. 
 
114
 See Special Project: 1991, at p 805. 
 
115
 See Special Project: 1991, at p 795. 
 
116
 An example of this is found in Hart v Community School Board 383 F.Supp. 699 
(E.D.N.Y. 1974). In this case, the order of reference required the expert to solicit views 
not only from the parties but also from community groups within the district.  
 
117
 Sturm: 1991, at p 1419 – 1420, contends that the expert model also encourages 
reasoned decision making and fosters the impartiality and independence of the court.  
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However, this model also has its disadvantages; first, it may detract from 
the need for participation of all stakeholders in the case. The expert, and 
not the stakeholders, gets the benefit of integrating the range of 
information and perspectives on the remedy. The parties’ limited 
involvement may make it difficult for the expert to justify particular 
remedial decisions. This is because in the course of developing specific 
approaches to realising the underlying legal principles, the expert must in 
some situations pursue goals and norms that are not dictated by those 
underlying principles. These choices can be justified only by the expert's 
view of the wisdom of those norms; and those who must live with the 
remedy may have a different perspective on the norms and how they 
should be implemented. In some cases there may be a reasoned basis for 
striking a particular balance among competing norms and applications in 
a particular context.  
 
Achieving and justifying this balance, however, requires a participatory 
process of exploring the interests of, and the factual bases and reasoned 
justifications offered by, the various participants.118 In my opinion, 
however, whether participation is fostered also depends on the expert’s 
mandate and how he/she carries it out. The court may foster participation 
by making consultation part of the expert’s mandate. The court may also 
leave its doors open to the stakeholders to express their dissatisfaction 
with the way the expert is conducting him/herself.119 The parties may also 
be afforded the opportunity to contradict the proposals of the expert or to 
present alternative plans. Additionally, the court may not be bound by the 
recommendations of the expert and may disregard them if found to be 
erroneous. 
 
 
                                                 
118
 See Special Project: 1991, at p 807. 
 
119
 This, though, should not be done in such a way that it undermines the expert’s 
authority and leads to entertainment of frivolous complaints. 
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7.3.2.4   Report back to court model  
This is the most commonly used model implemented by requiring the 
defendant to report back to the court with a plan on how he/she intends to 
remedy the violation. Usually a fixed date is set for the filing of the plan 
and the other party is given an opportunity to comment on the plan. It is 
only when the court is satisfied with the plan that it will concretise the 
plan as part of its decree. 
 
This model has a number of advantages. First, it allows the court to defer 
to the government (defendant) on the most effective way of eliminating 
the violation. This promotes the doctrine of separation of powers and 
shields the court from accusations that it has usurped functions reserved 
for the other organs of state. The model also enables the court to harness 
the expertise that may be in the hands of the defendant. This is especially 
relevant in the case of government because of the quality of expertise that 
may be at its disposal through its bureaucracy and public service.  
Secondly, it allows for a self imposed remedy from the defendant which 
makes implementation of the remedy much simpler. It is highly unlikely 
that the defendant will propose a plan that it cannot carry out. In the case 
of government, such plan will be calculated very well to cater for 
government’s budgetary and related needs. However, the process may not 
be left entirely to the defendant as both the court and the opposite party 
are afforded an opportunity to scrutinise the plan. In fact the court should 
reserve the right to reject the plan if considered inadequate.  
 
Another advantage of this model is that it allows the parties a cooling off 
period and, therefore, allows for the resolution of the disputes in a 
dispassionate manner. The parties may be compelled to work together in 
devising a plan and may be engaged in negotiations in this regard. This 
will lead to the same advantages of those of the bargaining model 
discussed above.120 
                                                 
120
 Section 7.3.2.1 above. 
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One disadvantage with this model is that it may lead to protracted 
litigation especially where the defendant is not willing to participate in the 
process in good faith. Nonetheless, the protracted litigation may in some 
cases be necessary to enable the court and the parties find the most 
appropriate way of stopping the violation. It may also be the only process 
through which long-term and enduring solutions are found. 
 
  7.3.2.5 Consensual remedial formulation model  
The consensual remedial formulation model also tries to secure the 
consensus of the parties and third parties in the formulation of the 
remedy.121 This model allows parties to exchange views and raise contests 
in a less formal manner. It also fosters a good working relationship 
between the parties and participation may be open to a variety of 
stakeholders. However, there is also a danger that has to be guarded 
against: the process should not be open to selected participants. This is 
important because of the negative impact that negotiated remedies 
sometimes bear. The most overt negative impact is the exclusion of 
persons who, though not parties to the suit, may be affected by its 
outcome.122 At the same time, it should not be opened unnecessarily to 
such an extent that reaching agreement becomes impossible because of 
                                                 
121
 An independent third party could be appointed to assist the parties to reach 
consensual agreement on the remedy. An example of this is United States v Michigan 
471 F.Supp. 192 (W.D. Mich. 1979), where a third party was appointed to assist the 
parties to come to an agreement on the allocation of fishing waters between tribes.  
 
122
 See  generally Schwarzschild, M., ‘Public law by private bargain: Title VII consent 
decrees and the fairness of negotiated institutional reform’ (1984) Duke Law Journal pp 
887 – 935. While Schwarzschild appreciates the advantages of negotiated decrees in 
structural reform litigation, he warns against their potential negative impact. On a 
positive note, however, he submits that they save the court’s time and secure the co-
operation of the parties in the remedial exercise. On the negative side they may exclude 
third party interests and may also dis-empower the court. The court will be denied the 
opportunity of deciding the case after a full hearing.  
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the wide range of interests. The process should be directed by a third 
party who is able to co-ordinate and ensure the participation of all 
stakeholders. The consensual remedial formulation model is in many 
respects similar to the bargaining model. The difference is that the 
consensual formulation model is less formalised and is readily opened to 
third party participants. The consensual public dispute resolution usually 
requires the assistance of a third party who acts as the keeper of the 
process and assumes responsibility for convening the deliberations, 
assisting groups in choosing spokespeople, helping to establish ground 
rules and an agenda and identifying and obtaining expert assistance. This 
is in addition to facilitating fact finding, co-ordinating subcommittees, 
facilitating the process of collaboration, assuring meaningful 
participation, preparing detailed minutes of the sessions, and helping to 
build consensus.123 
 
 
7.4 ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST THE STRUCTURAL 
INJUNCTION  
 
Objection to the structural injunction has been based on two broad 
arguments: separation of powers and institutional competence type 
arguments and arguments based on the notion of corrective justice. 
Although chapter three extensively discusses the separation of powers and 
institutional dimension objections to socio-economic rights, it is worth 
discussing them here again in the context of the structural injunction. This 
is because the dimension of the objections as regards the structural 
injunction is very specific and a discussion of the structural injunction 
without the separation of powers based objection would be incomplete. 
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 Sturm: 1991, at p 1423.  
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7.4.1 Separation of powers type arguments  
As discussed in chapters three and four,124 making budgetary allocations 
and making policy related choices are considered an exclusive domain of 
the legislative and executive branches of the state and not the courts. This 
is because the process of making budgetary allocations and policy choices 
gives rise to very difficult questions relating to the making of expenditure, 
policy and prioritisation. These questions are considered to be 
appropriately answered not in judicial but policy making processes. It is 
on this basis that structural litigation has been perceived as 
inappropriately moving the courts ‘from the byways onto the highways of 
policy-making.’125 Although all forms of constitutional litigation may 
                                                 
124
 Section 3.2.1 of chapter three and section 4.2.4 of chapter four.  
 
125
 Horowitz, D., The courts and social policy (1977) The Brookings Institution 
[Hereinafter referred to as Horowitz: 1977], at p 9. Referencing Alexander Bickel 
[Bickel, A., The least dangerous branch: The Supreme Court at the bar of politics 
(1962) Bobbs-Merill, Indianapolis], Horowitz submits that this has led to judges viewing 
themselves as roving commissions and as problem solvers charged with the duty to act 
when majoritarian institutions fail:  
What this means is that there is somewhat less institutional differ-
entiation today than two decades ago. There is now more overlap be-
tween the courts and Congress in formulating policy and between the 
courts and the executive in both formulating and carrying out 
programs. That is, the types of decisions being made by the various 
institutions— their scope and level of generality—seem to be 
converging somewhat, though the processes by which the decisions are 
made and the outcomes of those processes may be quite different—as 
different as the groups who manoeuvre to place an issue before one set 
of decisionmakers rather than another, or who, defeated in one forum, 
turn hopefully to the next, believe them to be. Thus, to say that there is 
convergence in the business of courts and other institutions is not 
tantamount to saying that it makes no difference who decides a 
question. On the contrary, it matters a good deal, for the institutions 
are differently composed and organized. The real possibility of 
overlapping responsibilities but opposite outcomes makes the policy 
process a more complex and drawn-out affair than it once was. [at p 
20]. 
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carry budgetary consequences, budget related questions in socio-
economic rights litigation requiring the structural injunction are always 
more pronounced.126 Litigation of this nature usually takes the form of 
restructuring large organisations to provide services that have in the past 
been neglected and which impact on a number of people. This may call 
for a great deal of money and other resources to be provided by the 
government. This is in addition to involving the courts in what may 
appear to be administrative and policy making matters. According to 
Frug: 
 
The orders in the institution cases, of course, do not deal directly with 
either the raising or the allocation of money. They simply require a 
specified level of services, leaving to the legislature the necessary revenue 
raising and allocation decisions that result from the order. But although the 
court does not specify the source of the money needed to comply with its 
order, it still is engaging in budget allocation.127 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
126
 Horowitz: 1977, at p 7. The structural injunction is also sometimes perceived as 
engaging what are considered to be purely political questions. It should be noted that 
court involvement in certain decision making processes has been rejected on the ground 
that certain decisions give rise to political questions and are reserved for political 
branches. See US case of Gilligan v Morgan, 413 U.S. 1 (1973).  
 
127
 Frug, G., ‘The judicial power of the purse’ (1978) University of Pennsylvania Law 
Review pp 715 – 794 [Hereinafter referred to as Frug: 1978], at pp 739 – 740. Nagel 
gives examples of United States cases in which government expenditure has been 
increased dramatically as a result of structural injunctions. In one mental institution case 
the operating and capital expenses increased by US $ 29 million in one year. Nagel, R., 
‘Controlling the structural injunction’ (1984) 7 Harvard Journal of Law and Public 
Policy pp 395 – 411 [Hereinafter referred to as Nagel: 1984], at p 397. In this regards, 
Horowitz: 1977, at p 6, gives the example of a case which led to an increment of the 
state’s annual expenditure on mental institutions from US$ 14 million when the suit was 
filed to US$ 58 after the decree was made. 
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However, as discussed in chapter three,128 courts possess characteristics 
that make them well suited to perform some tasks where there is evidence 
of either failure or neglect on the part of the other organs of state. These 
characteristics include: insulation from narrow political pressures, the 
ability to gather information within their non-bureaucratic structures and 
the willingness to encourage participation of affected interests.129 It is, 
therefore, important that competence of the courts in eliminating systemic 
violations be analysed not only in terms of institutional inappropriateness 
but also in terms of their advantages.130 The courts should, therefore, be 
mandated to use their special characteristics and intervene by way of a 
structural injunction where other organs have failed on neglected their 
duties.131 This point is canvassed later in discussing the norms and 
principles of the structural injunction.132   
 
Nonetheless, it should be acknowledged that the structural injunction may 
raise issues touching on the institutional capacity of the courts as the 
judges may carry out what may appear to be administrative functions for 
                                                 
128
 Section 3.3.2.  
 
129
 Sturm: 1991, at p 1408. 
 
130
 Note: 1998, at p 437. This is not to suggest that the institutional competence and 
separation of powers concerns are totally irrelevant. The courts have to be cautious and 
to refrain from overrunning the executive and legislative branches of the state unless this 
is absolutely necessary. It is submitted later in this chapter (section 7.6.1 below) that 
judicial supervision should only be justified when the political bodies that should 
exercise the necessary discretion are seriously and chronically in default. 
 
131
   Rycroft, A., ‘Judicial innovation and the delinquent state: A note on the State and 
Mfezeko Zuba and 23 Similar cases’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights 
pp 321 – 330 [Hereinafter referred to as Rycroft: 2004], at p 325. See also Davis: 2004. 
 
132
 Section 7.5 below. 
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which they are ill-suited.133 This is one of the factors that force courts to 
prefer procedures that provide final determinations to disputes. This is in 
contrast to those procedures that call for a multiplicity of actions and on-
going judicial supervision.134 The courts do not want to be entangled in 
the day-to-day running of government.135 Fiss has submitted that such 
entanglement may compromise the judge’s independence and may act as 
an entry point for the judge into the world of politics.136  
 
In my opinion, however, the relevant issue is whether or not such entry is 
justified in the circumstances of a particular case and whether respect for 
other organs of state could still be maintained. Respect for the executive 
and legislative branches of the state could still be realised by crafting the 
structural injunction with a degree of deference to the other organs. This 
is especially at the initial stages of the remedial process.137 The court may 
have to begin by acknowledging the competence and expertise at the 
                                                 
133
 Sunstein, C., ‘Suing government: Citizen remedies for official wrongs. By Peter 
Schuck’ Book review (1983) 92 Yale Law Journal pp 749 – 761 [Hereinafter referred to 
as Sunstein: 1983], at p 753. See also Special Project: 1978, at p 813. 
 
134
 Cassels: 1991, at p 289. Horowitz: 1977, at p 19, attributes the institutional challenges 
faced by the courts to the shift from the traditional nature of judicial review which 
merely required forbidding of state action by the judiciary saying no to other branches. 
The approach has been changed to one of requiring affirmative action on the part of 
other branches, which may constrain the resources of the judiciary to manage the task of 
commanding.  
 
135
 Currie, I., & De Waal, J., The Bill of Rights handbook (2005) Juta & Company 
[Hereinafter referred to as Currie & De Waal: 2005], at pp 218 – 219. Currie and De 
Waal have suggested that it is, therefore, important that the terms of the order be devised 
in a flexible manner that does not result in supervision becoming too intrusive and result 
in a blurring of the distinction between executive and judicial functions (at p 219). 
 
136
 Fiss: 1979, at p 46. 
 
137
 Cooper-Stephenson: 1991, at p 34. 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter seven 
 351 
disposal of the state. The court should seek to harness this expertise by 
requiring the government to come up with a plan detailing how it intends 
to remedy the proclaimed violation. This approach, if successful, will 
heighten the chances of the remedy being implemented as it may do away 
with resistance from the other organs. This is because of the involvement 
of those responsible for its implementation in its formulation. Though the 
court may choose to be intrusive, it could still, in the formulation of the 
remedy, involve the state institution which is at fault. The court could, for 
instance, appoint an expert who is mandated to assist the parties to 
themselves find a solution to the problem. A more intrusive approach 
would require the expert to find a solution, with or without the 
contribution of the parties. An even more intrusive approach would force 
the court itself to come up with a solution and to ask the government, for 
instance, to implement its order within a stated time and to report on the 
same. However, as is noted below,138 the court should gravitate towards 
such intrusiveness only when it is absolutely necessary to do so.139 The 
circumstances that determine the level of intervention are detailed under 
the discussion of norms and principles below.140 
 
In conclusion, therefore, the separation of powers objection is not totally 
unfounded. Courts should not use the structural injunction to assume 
functions of other organs of state as of first resort. I submit in this chapter 
that using the structural injunction should be a matter of last resort and 
                                                 
138
 Section 7.6. 
 
139
 Horowitz: 1977, at p 24 concedes that where there is reticence on the part of other 
branches as regards policy decision making, however imperfect a judicial remedy is, it 
may be the best available due to the absence of performance by other branches. Horowitz 
could be read as suggesting that in a situation of a recalcitrant government, the courts 
have to use all kinds of creative means to protect the values and rights guaranteed by the 
constitution. The structural injunction is an example of such creative remedies used to 
achieve compliance with court orders.  
 
140
 Section 7.6.1. 
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only where there is evidence of failure on the part of government to 
exercise its discretion.141 It is this degree of failure and extent of 
government recalcitrance that should dictate the level of judicial intrusion.  
 
7.4.2 Corrective justice type arguments  
As seen in chapter five,142 the theory of corrective justice requires that 
victims of violations be put in the position they were in before the 
violation occurred. It is on the basis of this principle that the structural 
injunction has been condemned for its failure to put victims in the 
position they would have been but for the violations. Nagel, for instance, 
refers to the United States school desegregation cases and submits that 
these cases did not benefit the students who had been illegally segregated 
and who instituted the actions.143 The decrees were instead directed at 
making structural reforms that would only bring about change in the long 
run.  
 
The structural injunction also contravenes the notion of corrective justice 
by adopting unconventional mechanisms of adjudication. As seen 
above,144 for instance, the structural injunction may force judges to ignore 
the principle of functus officio by allowing courts to retain jurisdiction. It 
is, for example, on the basis of the functus officio principle that an 
appellate court in Canada set aside a decision by a lower court to retain 
supervisory jurisdiction in Doucet-Boudreau v Nova Scotia.145 The Nova 
                                                 
141
 See section 7.6.1.  
 
142
 Section 5.2.1.  
 
143
 Nagel: 1984, at p 402. 
 
144
 Section 7.3.1.  
 
145
 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3 (Doucet-Boudreau case). For a detailed discussion of this case see 
McAllister, D., ‘Doucet-Boudreau and the development of effective section 24(1) 
remedies: Confrontation or cooperation?’ (2004) National Journal of Constitutional Law 
pp 153 – 173. The main issue in this case was whether a trial judge had powers, after 
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Scotia Court of Appeal found the retention of supervisory jurisdiction to 
be out of order; it held that the principles of functus offico ought to be 
preserved even in Charter rights litigation. But as will be seen later, the 
Supreme Court of Canada set aside this holding and approved the 
approach of the trial judge. 
 
Additionally, the structural injunction goes against the theory of 
corrective justice by allowing judges to abandon their role as independent 
umpires who act only on evidence and proof presented to them in an 
adversarial manner. In structural litigation challenging systemic violations 
and requiring a structural injunction, judges are sometimes forced to 
intervene proactively by, for instance, seeking evidence themselves 
without waiting for presentations from the parties. The judges may also be 
actively involved in the implementation of their orders and may assume 
administrative roles.  
 
It is important to note, however, that corrective justice is inappropriate to 
cases challenging systemic violations in an institutional or organisational 
setting.146 This is because of the multitude of interests that these cases 
implicate beyond the interests of the individual plaintiffs and defendants. 
If these interests are to be considered, in most cases, full correction of the 
wrong becomes impossible and the plaintiff’s interests may have to be 
sacrificed partially because of the need to protect other equally legitimate 
interests.147 Because of the structural nature of such a suit, the court is 
                                                                                                                                            
making a mandatory order, to retain jurisdiction in order to hear reports from the 
defendants regarding the progress in the implementation of his order. The trial judge had 
adopted this approach and presided over several reporting sessions for a period of about 
nine months. The judge required affidavits to be filed prior to every reporting session 
detailing the measures adopted. The respondents were on every such occasion afforded 
chance to adduce rebuttal evidence ([2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para 8). 
 
146
 See generally Chayes: 1979. 
 
147
 See Roach: 1991, at p 877. The remedies also ignore the causal link that is alleged to 
exist between rights and remedies. This is because full remediation of all the interests 
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required to adopt orders that not only reflect the interests of the parties but 
also public policy and treat fairly interests not adequately represented.  
 
Traditional procedures of litigation may not be able to provide social 
information or legislative facts which may be necessary in designing an 
appropriate remedy. The use of such information is necessary because of 
the frequent legislative nature of the order. Without such information, the 
court may not understand the nature of the remedial problem. The court 
cannot rely on the parties, as is the case in the adversarial procedure, to 
produce all the legislative facts required.148 In this setting, therefore, 
corrective justice principles ‘offer unstable foundation for structural 
remedies because of their limitation as principles best suited for 
rectification of discrete wrongs committed by one individual against 
another’.149 In structural settings, the finding of an appropriate remedy 
                                                                                                                                            
cannot be achieved if the remedies are pegged to the establishment of liability. See 
Roach: 1991, at p 874. 
 
148
 Special Project: 1978, at pp 792 – 793.  
 
149
 Roach: 1991, at pp 874 – 875. He submits that corrective justice’s presumption of 
causation encourages an absolutist approach to remedial decision making by ignoring the 
socio-economic background of the violation, the involvement of other parties and 
interests, and the possibility that intervening forces will work against the court’s remedy. 
In his opinion, causation discourages open balancing of interests or addressing 
intervening factors that can threaten a remedial ambition (at p 875). Fiss: 1979, at p 18 – 
32, follows the same line of thought and identifies a number of distinctions between the 
structural suit and the traditional suit. These distinctions, although this is not mentioned 
by Fiss, are structured along the lines of the notions of corrective and distributive justice. 
Fiss describes the traditional suit as challenging a legal wrong as opposed to a structural 
suit which opposes a social condition that threatens the constitutional values. While the 
victim of a traditional suit is deemed to speak for him/herself, the victim of a structural 
suit is not an individual but a group of people. The suit could have been triggered by an 
individual but it remains representative of a group interest. The same may be said to 
apply to the defendant who may be perceived as the wrongdoer. Fiss submits that in 
structural suits the defendant may not even be a wrongdoer, and yet has other interested 
parties behind him who may not be defendants.  
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may require the courts to depart from the traditional process of litigation 
built around individualised litigation which seeks to enforce corrective 
justice.  The evidence on the court record at what would ordinarily be the 
conclusion of traditional litigation may, for instance, be inadequate for 
choosing an appropriate remedy. It may be necessary for the court to 
retain its jurisdiction in order to adjust its remedies in response to the 
factual discoveries that may emerge later. The court may also have to 
involve parties who were not part of the original litigation in its factual 
inquiries.150 The traditional adversarial presentation of proof and evidence 
may also prove inadequate because of the need for information on facts 
that do not necessarily inform the disputes between the parties.  
 
Additionally, such common law principles as functus officio, if 
considered, may impair the capacity of the courts to administer justice in a 
more flexible manner. The courts will be barred from retaining 
jurisdiction to ensure that the remedial orders are implemented to their 
final end. In the Canadian Doucet-Boudreau case, for instance, the 
majority in the Supreme Court held that some of the common law 
principles such as functus officio, as found outside Charter jurisprudence, 
are overly vague and inapplicable to orders made under section 24(1) of 
the Charter.151 They held that there was need for creative remedies in 
enforcing Charter rights to meet the challenges and circumstances 
presented by the cases under the Charter. The majority held that tradition 
and history should not present themselves as barriers to this enterprise; the 
judicial approach must be flexible and responsive to the needs of a given 
case.152 The circumstances of the case, according to the majority, 
disclosed delay on the part of the defendants, yet the protected rights were 
                                                 
150
 Sturm: 1991, at p 1367. 
 
151
 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para 54. 
 
152
 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para 59. 
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imperilled.153 The traditional procedures of litigation would have but 
furthered these delays. The order of the trial judge was found to have been 
flexible and sufficient to address unforeseen difficulties.154  
 
It, therefore, remains true that the structural injunction has a very 
important role to play in uprooting systemic violations especially in 
institutional or organisational settings. What remains to be explored is 
whether (and how) the South African courts have made use of this very 
important remedy. The next section will show the circumstances under 
which the South Africa courts have deemed the structural injunction 
appropriate.  
 
 
7.5 SOUTH AFRICA: WHICH WAY?  
 
The South African experience shows a willingness and frequent use of the 
structural interdict in the High Court but reluctance on the part of the CC 
to use this form of relief. In spite of this, the CC has acknowledged that it 
is within its powers to grant structural remedies including the structural 
interdict. In this section I contrast the approaches of these two courts and 
the reasons for this.  
 
7.5.1 The approach of the High Court  
The High Court has rejected the view that a declaratory order would be 
the only sufficient remedy for the government to implement orders from 
the courts. The Court considers a declaratory order without injunctive 
relief to lack practical content.155 Most importantly, however, the High 
                                                 
153
 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para 60. 
 
154
 [2003] 3 S.C.R. 3, at para 68. 
 
155
 See Grootboom v Oostenberg Municipality and Others 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C) 
(Grootboom Oostenberg case). In this case the High Court found that the state was 
obliged by section 28(1)(c) of the Constitution to provide shelter for children. The Court 
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Court considers the structural injunction to be of practical importance 
both to the applicants and the government. This is especially in those 
cases where there is insufficient information before the court to determine 
the most appropriate relief that would redress the violation. The practical 
advantages arise particularly from the court’s retention of jurisdiction 
over the case; the applicants, on one hand, would not be bothered by filing 
new papers when more information emerges. On the other hand, it would 
be fair to the respondent government which may need more time to come 
up with solutions: 
 
In fairness to the respondents, who now know where their duty lies, they 
should be given an opportunity of proposing a practical solution. In 
fairness to the applicants, now that they know where their rights lie, 
respondents should be directed to make such proposals within a reasonable 
time. The applicants should furthermore have the opportunity of 
commenting on the proposal, and the respondents should be allowed to 
respond to such comment.156 
 
The High Court has also underlined the structural injunction as an 
appropriate response to systemic violations. The Court has observed that 
other remedies, ‘such as declarator, the prohibitory interdict, mandamus, 
and awards of damages’, are inappropriate to remedy ‘systemic failures or 
the inadequate compliance with constitutional obligations, particularly 
when one is dealing with … rights of a programmatic nature’.157  
                                                                                                                                            
ordered the state to provide the children with shelter until such time as their parents are 
able to shelter them. The government was also ordered to report to the Court, under oath, 
within a period of three months from the date of the order on how it was planning to 
eradicate the violation. The applicants were also given a right to deliver a commentary 
on the government report within a period of one month after the state report. 
 
156
 Grootbom Oostenberg case 2000 (3) BCLR 277 (C), at p 292. One of the issues that 
the Court thought needed clarification was the question of on which sphere of 
government would the remedial obligations in the case lie, the Oostenberg Municipality 
or the Cape Metropolitan Council. The judge hoped that this would be clarified in the 
plan to be filed (at p 293). 
 
157
 S v Zuba and 23 similar cases 2004 (4) BCLR 410 (E) (Zuba case), at para 36. This 
case arose from the absence of juvenile reform schools in the Eastern Cape. It had been 
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Additionally, the High Court has been motivated to grant structural 
injunctions by the need to protect and promote the doctrine of separation 
of powers. The structural injunction has enabled the Court to give latitude 
to the executive branch of government by deferring to it on the most 
appropriate solutions to address unconstitutional conditions. In this 
respect ‘[t]he structural injunction is not intended to substitute the 
judiciary for the administration, but to relieve the judge from framing 
relief in a way that would constitute democracy by judicial decree.’158 
This, as seen above, is what the Court has described as the opportunity 
given to the respondent to propose a practical solution. According to 
Budlender, ‘structural interdicts can be deeply democratising. They create 
spaces for dialogue between the court, the government and civil society 
actors. In this way, they strengthen and deepen accountability and 
participation – the key elements of democracy’.159 Rather than violate the 
doctrine of separation of powers, the High Court, therefore, views the 
structural injunction as a means of preserving the doctrine. The latitude 
given to the government to fashion the remedy indicates that the High 
Court is not prepared to assume functions that are preserved for the 
executive organ of the state. The executive branch is, therefore, required 
to execute self imposed rather than judicially imposed remedies.  
                                                                                                                                            
established in evidence that the provincial government had just embarked on what was to 
be a long planning process of establishing a reform school in the province. After 
reviewing the problems as regards the establishment and maintenance of reform schools 
in the province, the Court ordered the Department of Education to file a report disclosing 
its short, medium and long term plans for the incarceration of juvenile offenders. It was 
also ordered that a task team, to work on the establishment of a reform school, be 
identified, and its reports be submitted on a regular basis to the inspecting judge as 
regards progress until the school is established. 
 
158
 Davis: 2004, at p 6.  
 
159
 Budlender, G., ‘The role of the courts in achieving the transformative potential of 
socio-economic rights’ (2007) 8 ESR Review pp 9 – 11 [Hereinafter referred to as 
Budlender: 2007], at p 11.  
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It appears, however, that the main reason the Court has resorted to the 
structural injunction is to counter recalcitrance by government towards 
court orders.160 This is in addition to ‘the dilatory and lackadaisical 
approach taken’ by the state in some cases.161 The recent case of EN and 
Others v Government of RSA and Others162 is evidence of this. The degree 
of recalcitrance exhibited by the government in this case makes it 
worthwhile discussing the case in detail. The case was commenced by the 
AIDS Law Project (ALP), the Treatment Action Campaign (TAC) and 15 
HIV/AIDS positive prisoners from the Westville correctional facility in 
Kwazulu-Natal. The applicants sought orders to compel the government 
                                                 
160
 In City of Cape Town v Rudolph and Others 2003 (11) BCLR 1236 (C) (Rudolph 
case), for instance, the Court justified the structural injunction by the circumstances of 
the case, in particular the attitude of denial expressed by government. The government 
had deliberately failed to recognise the plight of the respondents, thereby ignoring the 
Grootboom judgment to the effect that those in desperate need should not be ignored (at 
p 1279). In this case, on the basis of the Grootboom case, the Court had found that Cape 
Town’s housing programme was unreasonable in as much as it failed to make provision 
for short term needs—the needs of those in desperate or crisis like situations. 
  
161
 Centre for Child Law and Others v MEC for Education and Others, Case No. 
19559/06 [Unreported] (the Luckhoff case), High Court Transvaal Provincial Division, at 
p 11, lines 7 – 9 of the unreported judgment. In this case the respondents contested the 
conditions under which children placed at JW Luckhoff High School under section 
15(1)(d) of the Child Care Act of 1983 lived. The physical conditions in the hostels were 
pathetic: there were poor sleeping facilities, the hostels did not have access control 
systems, and psychological support and therapeutic services were absent. The applicants 
contended that these features, among others, amounted to an infringement of the 
children’s socio-economic rights under section 28. The children had been removed from 
the care of their parents or families which imposed a direct duty on the state to provide 
for their socio-economic needs. Murphy J agreed with the applicants that the school 
needed a quality assurance programme, immediate provision of sleeping bags for the 
children, and putting in place of a plan for construction of a perimeter wall and access 
control system. 
 
162
 2007 (1) BCLR 84 (D) (Westville case). For a discussion of this case see Muntingh, 
L., and Mbazira, C., ‘Prisoners’ right of access to anti-retroviral treatment’  (2006) 7 
ESR Review pp 14 – 16.  
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to remove all obstacles preventing the 15 and other similarly placed 
prisoners from accessing anti-retroviral treatment (ARV treatment). They 
also sought an order that the government provides the 15 and other 
similarly situated prisoners with ARV treatment in accordance with the 
existing government Operational Plan for Comprehensive HIV and AIDS 
Care, Management and Treatment (Operational Plan).163 The applicants 
argued that the Operational Plan had not been implemented with 
reasonable speed and urgency.  
 
The Court found implementation of the Operational Plan to be 
unreasonable and inflexible in its disregard of the needs of prisoners. The 
respondents were ordered to remove the obstacles that prevented prisoners 
from accessing ARVs under the Operational Plan.164 The Court found the 
respondents to have acted with dilatoriness and a lack of commitment on 
their part.165 Even when some agreements had been reached between the 
parties outside court, these agreements had not been honoured by the 
respondents who instead chose to engage in adversarial litigation. This 
behaviour motivated the judge to retain jurisdiction and to order that the 
respondents file a plan within two weeks on how they intended to 
implement the court order.166  
 
Rather than implement the court order in good faith, the respondents 
instead pursued a technicality-based appeal arising from the judge’s 
rejection of a recusal request on the ground that one of the counsel for the 
applicants was his daughter. They also failed to file the plan on the due 
                                                 
163
 Available at <http://www.info.gov.za/otherdocs/2003/aidsoperationalplan.pdf> 
(accessed on 10 March 2007). 
 
164
 See para 35. 
 
165
 See para 24, the judge found ‘a singular lack of commitment to appreciate the 
seriousness and urgency of the situation’. 
 
166
 See paras 32 – 33. 
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date and instead sought to set aside an interim order made for the 
implementation of the orders of the Court pending the appeal. This 
application to stay the order came before Nicholson J167 who found that 
irreparable harm would be suffered by the prisoners if the interim order 
were set aside. The harm that the prisoners would suffer was not 
comparable to the inconvenience likely to be suffered by the state.168 
Nicholson castigated the state for creating a constitutional crisis: 
 
If the government of the Republic of South Africa has given such an 
instruction [to disobey the Court order] then we face a grave constitutional 
crisis involving a threat to the doctrine of separation of powers. Should 
that continue the members of the judiciary will have to consider whether 
their oath of office requires them to continue on the bench.169 
 
This case demonstrates how government recalcitrance can break down 
dialogue in a constitutional dialogue, and the struggles by the judiciary to 
restore this dialogue. The case also shows the minimal appreciation, if not 
misunderstanding, on the part of the executive of their constitutional 
obligations, and the role of the judiciary in reasserting these obligations 
through means such as the structural injunction. Rather than lead to a 
break down of the relationship between the judiciary and the executive, 
the structural injunction should be viewed as promoting a dynamic 
dialogue between these two branches. This is dialogue on the intricacies 
of implementing court orders and actualising constitutional rights.170   It is 
clear from this case that, rather than be deferential, in some cases where 
there is evidence of recalcitrance from the start, use of a structural 
injunction as a remedy of first resort may be justified. The South African 
                                                 
167
 Also recorded as EN and Others v Government of RSA and Others Case No. 4576/06 
[Unreported]. 
 
168
 Para 42 of Nicholson’s ruling.  
 
169
 Para 32 of Nichoson’s judgment. 
 
170
 See Pieterse, M., ‘Coming to terms with judicial enforcement of socio-economic 
rights’ (2004) 20 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 383 – 417, at p 414. 
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government has in the past exhibited inconsistence and incoherence 
towards the HIV/AIDS problem.171 This leaves the courts with no option 
but to demand, on those occasions when cases are filed, concrete plans 
detailing the intended response to the problem. The persistence of the 
court in this case forced the government to give in and file a plan as 
earlier directed.172 
 
7.5.1.1 Analysis of the High Court approach  
Although the High Court has readily availed itself of the structural 
injunction and used it consistently, it has not devised clear principles that 
could determine when such remedy is appropriate. While the Court has 
deemed the remedy appropriate whenever there is recalcitrance on the part 
of government, this does not detail all the relevant principles needed to 
determine appropriateness and use of the structural injunction. In addition 
to clear principles that may be used to determine when the remedy is 
appropriate, there should also be principles on how the remedy should be 
applied. The High Court has, for instance, not determined the level of 
recalcitrance that would justify use of the remedy, let alone the causes of 
such recalcitrance. It is this lack of clear principles in respect of 
application of the structural injunction that has motivated me to craft a set 
of norms and principles applicable to this remedy. These norms and 
principles are detailed in section 7.6 of this chapter.  
 
One should, however, underline some of the important principles that may 
be deduced from the High Court’s approach. These principles, though not 
exhaustive, are relevant in designing more comprehensive norms and 
principles as I do later. First, the High Court has made it clear that the 
court should retain jurisdiction were the evidence before it is inadequate 
for the purpose of determining the most appropriate relief. In such case, 
                                                 
171
 See ‘Aids criticism: Manto hits back’ Mail & Guardian online 11 September 2006. 
 
172
 See Stolley, G., ‘Prisons dept reveals plan for Aids drugs’ Mail & Guardian online 11 
September 2006. See also Bilchitz: 2003, at p 24.  
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the parties should be saved the trouble of having to institute fresh 
litigation when new evidence or facts come to the fore. Secondly, the 
structural injunction should be used as a means of paying due deference to 
the other branches of the state. This is especially so where the court is not 
clear on the most appropriate way of remedying the violation. The 
executive and legislative branches should be given the latitude to devise 
what they consider the best means of remedying the violation. The means 
should, however, be subject to scrutiny by the court and the opposite 
party. Lastly, the structural injunction should be resorted to in the face of 
government recalcitrance. Where there is evidence that the government 
will not comply, in good faith, with the orders of the court the structural 
injunction is appropriate.  
 
7.5.2 The approach of the CC  
The CC has emphatically asserted its powers to grant all forms of relief 
including a structural injunction and to exercise supervisory jurisdiction if 
need be. According to the Court, ‘[t]he power to grant mandatory relief 
includes the power where it is appropriate to exercise some form of 
supervisory jurisdiction to ensure that the order is implemented’.173 The 
CC also views the structural injunction as a practical remedy which would 
eradicate conduct giving rise to violation of constitutional rights.174 Like 
the High Court, the CC has deemed the structural injunction appropriate 
in those cases where the information before the Court is inadequate for 
the purposes of making a final order. This is in addition to the lack of 
expertise on the part of the Court to make appropriate arrangements for 
the eradication of the violation.175 The Court has thus allowed those with 
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information and expertise the time to devise and submit to the Court plans 
on how they intend to eradicate the violation.  
 
Again, like the High Courts, the CC has used the structural injunction in 
those cases where there is evidence of lackadaisical conduct on the part of 
the government. In Sibiya and Others v DPP,176 for instance, the Court 
was concerned that the process of substitution of death sentences in 
accordance with the Makwanyane case177 had taken far too long.178 The 
Court, therefore, deemed the structural injunction appropriate in the 
circumstances. Government was ordered to take immediate steps to 
ensure that all sentences of death imposed before 5 June 1995 are set 
aside and replaced by an appropriate alternative sentence. The 
government was also required to report to the Court not later than 15 
August 2005 on all the steps taken to comply with the order above. 
 
The Sibiya case is important in a number of respects. First, it shows the 
extent to which the CC is prepared to go to ensure compliance with its 
orders in the face of lackadaisical conduct. It is evidence of the fact that 
where the government fails to act in a timely manner in the face of a 
structural injunction the Court is prepared to continue to engage the 
government until full compliance is obtained. This is because, as argued 
above,179 in some cases it is only after several rounds of engagement that 
government may fully comply. In this case, instead of filing the report 
before the 15 August 2005, the government on 12 August 2005 filed an 
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application for extension of the time of filing the report.180 The CC 
allowed the application and extended the time to 15 September 2005. 
Thereafter, however, even with the defects detected in the report filed on 
15 September 2005, the CC still granted the government more time to 
rectify the defects and file another report by 7 November 2005. But the 
November report was also not impressive to the extent that the sentences 
of some 28 people had not been substituted. A further extension was 
given to the government to file an additional report by 15 February 2006. 
Yet the February report still had names of persons whose sentences had 
not been substituted which attracted a further extension to 15 May 2006. 
The May report was also not fully compliant as the sentence of one person 
had not been substituted. This led to a further extension of up to 1 
September 2006. But before 1 September 2006 the government reported 
that all sentences had been substituted.  
 
This case shows how a structural injunction can lead to rounds of 
engagement between the court and the government. This is because, as 
mentioned above,181 full compliance may be achieved only after a series 
of engagements. The court and interested parties must, therefore, be 
patient and be prepared to engage the government on more than one 
occasion. The case is also important because at the end the CC made 
some observations that could inform the procedures that ought to be 
followed when courts deem supervisory jurisdiction appropriate. These 
procedures are also relevant in developing a comprehensive set of norms 
and principles for the structural injunction. The Court observed that the 
supervisory process in the case had shown the following:  
 
(a) Successful supervision requires that detailed information be placed at 
the disposal of a court; 
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(b) Supervision entails a careful analysis and evaluation of the details 
provided; 
(c) Supervision cannot succeed without the full co-operation of others in 
the process; and  
(d) Courts should exercise flexibility in the supervisory process.182 
  
7.5.2.1 The CC and structural injunctions  in socio-economic rights 
cases 
The willingness on the part of the CC to exercise supervisory jurisdiction 
contrasts in civil and political rights cases and socio-economic rights 
cases. The CC has been very reluctant to use this form of relief to enforce 
socio-economic rights. This reluctance has been inspired by what the CC 
considers to be a need to maintain the divide between itself and the other 
branches of the state as dictated by the doctrine of separation of powers. 
For the sake of maintaining the boundaries of separation of powers, the 
CC has conceptualised the structural injunction as a remedy that should be 
used as a last resort. The Court has also been sceptical about the structural 
interdict in socio-economic rights cases because of its reluctance to be 
involved in protracted litigation and implementation of its orders. The 
Court does not want to be dragged into long and unending battles for 
socio-economic rights. According to one commentator, the CC would like 
to be ‘a “one-stop shop” in resolving these cases – they do not want to 
look at a case again once they have decided on it’.183  
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According to Davis, ‘[t]he less the burden on the Constitutional Court to 
exercise supervision over the executive, the more comfortable it feels’.184 
There is an indication that the remedy has been reserved for those cases 
where there is recalcitrance on the part of government to implement the 
directions of the Court. However, the CC has been ambivalent in 
determining existence of such recalcitrance in socio-economic rights 
cases. Some members of the Court hold the view that if the political will 
is lacking, there is no guarantee that even structural injunctions will be 
effective. According to the former Chief Justice, Arthur Chaskalson:  
 
If there is not the political will, supervisory orders are not likely to be 
effective and may drag courts into long drawn battles that could more 
appropriately and more effectively be fought on the political terrain. Those 
battles should be fought first, and if successful, the results are likely to be 
more effective than attempts to secure compliance through court 
supervision. A structural interdict may be necessary in a particular case to 
ensure that relief granted is effective relief; for instance if there is 
deliberate failure to heed a declaratory order or other relief granted by a 
court. But it should be a last resort and not a routine response to claims 
for the enforcement of socio-economic rights.185 [Emphasis mine] 
 
This appears to be the basis upon which the CC rejected and set aside 
structural interdicts granted by the High Court in the Grootboom and TAC 
cases. The Court also declined to comment on the structural injunction 
that had been granted by the High Court in Modderklip Boerdery (Pty) 
Ltd and Others v President of RSA and Another (Modderklip case).186 
 
The CC’s reluctance to use the structural injunction in socio-economic 
rights cases has generated condemnation and castigation of the Court as 
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undermining the socio-economic rights in the Constitution.187 This is 
because it has left court orders powerless in the face of government 
recalcitrance. According to Davis:  
 
[T]he Court’s … refusal to grant structural relief that would empower 
courts to supervise the implementation of their own orders has produced 
unfortunate results. Litigants have won cases and government has done 
little to produce the tangible benefits that these litigants were entitled to 
expect from their success. The Court, in effect, has surrendered its powers 
to sanction government inertia and, as a direct result, litigants have not 
obtained the shelter or drugs that even a cursory reading of the judgments 
promised.188 
 
It has also been submitted that exercising supervisory jurisdiction in 
socio-economic rights cases would have saved the time and expenses that 
parties would have to endure to challenge state action through filing fresh 
suits.189  
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The CC’s reluctance to exercise supervisory jurisdiction in socio-
economic rights cases, just like its rejection of the minimum core 
obligations approach, appears to be rooted in the need to preserve the 
boundaries of the separation of powers. The Court has been particularly 
cautious to defer to the executive branch as regards issues of budgetary 
allocation.190 On those occasions when it has risen to the occasion to 
interpret the rights, it has also been keen to push the cases out of its doors 
as soon as possible. This would not be possible if jurisdiction were 
retained as the Court would have to engage in budgetary issues in the 
course of its supervision. This could be one of the factors that explain the 
ambivalent approach of the CC, which also explains its differentiated 
approach as regards civil and political rights litigation when compared to 
socio-economic rights litigation. For instance, while affirming its powers 
to make a structural injunction in the TAC case the Court cautioned that 
due regard must be paid to the roles of the legislature and the executive in 
a democracy.191 
 
In order to show what it deems due deference to the other branches of 
state, the CC has, even in the face of government recalcitrance, struggled 
to convince itself that government would comply with its orders in good 
faith. In the TAC case, for instance, the Court declined to grant the 
structural injunction because in its opinion ‘the government has always 
respected and executed orders of this Court’ and that there was ‘no reason 
to believe that it will not do so’.192 This conclusion appears to have been 
motivated by evidence that emerged during the hearing that the 
government had ‘made substantial additional funds available for the 
treatment of HIV, including the reduction of mother to child 
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transmission’.193 However, this evidence blinded the CC to the high 
degree of recalcitrance demonstrated by the state during the hearing of the 
case, particularly the declaration by the Minister of Health that the 
government would not respect the judgment of the Court.194 Recalcitrance 
in addition to the seriousness of the matter in issue, saving innocent 
babies from a deadly disease, was justification for the issuance of a 
structural injunction.195 This matter was especially serious because of the 
lackadaisical approach of the government in tackling the problem of 
HIV/AIDS. As already observed above,196 the policy of the government in 
relation to HIV has been notable for its very slow progress in coming to 
terms with the health crisis facing the country. There had indeed been a 
tremendous amount of bungling and a high degree of reluctance expressed 
to provide nevirapine.197  
 
At the very least, the CC should have retained jurisdiction, without 
requiring that a report be filed by a stated date. The Court could have left 
itself open to whichever party wanting to contest the manner in which the 
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order was being implemented.198 The mere fact that the Court retained 
jurisdiction over the case could have propelled the government to act 
more cautiously because of the knowledge that any deleteriousness would 
easily be brought to the attention of the Court and might also spark media 
frenzy.199  
 
The Court would have only graduated into more specific and detailed 
directions on the basis of the evidence brought to it by those who would 
have come back to it, and by the attitude of the government. Though this 
may have exposed the CC to protracted litigation, a thing that the Court 
wanted to avoid, it would have been beneficial in many respects. It would 
have demonstrated that in cases dealing with serious matters and where 
recalcitrance is detected, the CC would engage with a case until its orders 
are implemented. The retention of jurisdiction would have further enabled 
the CC to continue to engage in dialogue with the state as regards the 
mechanisms of policy implementation.200 There is no better way than this 
approach in which the court could have engaged the government in a 
constitutional dialogue. Indeed, the courts can only engage in dialogue 
between themselves and the other organs of state in litigation before them. 
Once the litigation is closed the dialogue is also automatically closed.  
Dialogue between the government and the courts is justified, among 
others, by the fact that not so many cases have been filed before the CC 
since the Constitution was adopted. It is, therefore, important that the 
Court takes full advantage of those cases before it to engage in full 
dialogue with the other organs of state. This can only be done effectively 
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if supervisory jurisdiction is retained. Another opportunity to engage in 
such dialogue may arise only after a considerably long time. It is, for 
instance, almost eight years since the TAC case was heard. Yet, in spite of 
the contentions surrounding the problem of HIV/AIDS, the Court has not 
had another opportunity to engage in dialogue on this problem.  
 
In my opinion, the CC’s ambivalence has arisen partly because of absence 
of clear norms and principles governing the issuance of the structural 
injunction. However, the Sibiya case shows that the Court is willing to be 
guided by some norms and principles on how to exercise supervisory 
jurisdiction. The principles in this case, however, need to be developed 
and applied consistently and in a broader manner. This is in addition to 
the fact the principles thus far address only one aspect of the structural 
injunction: the supervision process. There is need for a comprehensive list 
of norms and principles that address not only the supervision process but 
also the process of determining when the relief is appropriate. The 
principles deduced from the Sibiya case could be developed together with 
those deduced from the approach of the High Court into a comprehensive 
list of structural relief norms and principles. This is what the next section 
sets out to do.  
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7.6         NORMS AND PRINCIPLES FOR THE STRUCTURAL  
INJUNCTION 
 
It is important that the structural remedial process adheres to certain 
norms and principles if it is going to achieve its purpose and meet some of 
the criticisms that have been directed at it. These norms should, by their 
nature, be capable of application in a number of contexts. The norms 
include: utilisation of the structural injunction in a graduated manner as a 
remedy of last resort; participation of all stakeholders; impartiality and 
independence; reasoned decision making; remediation which complies 
with the substantive norms;201 and flexibility.  
 
Roach and Budlender should be commended for defining some of the 
principles that could guide the courts in determining when a structural 
interdict is an appropriate remedy.202 They argue that the remedy should 
be granted where there is evidence to believe that the government may not 
comply promptly. The same applies to those cases where the violation 
arises from ‘neglect, inadequate budgets and inadequate training of public 
officials’.203 This is in addition to those cases where the consequences of 
‘even a good-faith failure to comply with a court order are so serious that 
the court should be at pains to ensure effective compliance’.204 The other 
circumstance Roach and Budlender reckon a structural interdict 
appropriate is where there is evidence of government’s incompetence or 
lack of capacity to provide for the rights: ‘[t]he greater the degree of the 
government’s incompetence or lack of capacity to provide for the rights, 
the stronger the case for supervisory jurisdiction including requirements 
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that government submit a plan and progress reports for the court’s 
approval’.205 While I find Roach and Budlender’s article very useful in 
defining principles guiding the grant of a structural interdict I find it 
incomprehensive in this regard. There are a host of other norms and 
principles that could guide the court in using the structural interdict as 
discussed below.  
 
7.6.1 Utilisation as a remedy of last resort in a graduated manner    
Execution by the courts of administrative functions deemed to be the 
preserve of the executive organ of the state amounts to substitution of 
executive with judicial discretion. Fletcher has submitted that such 
substitution becomes legitimate only when the political bodies that should 
exercise that discretion are ‘seriously and chronically in default’. He 
contends that as long as those political bodies remain in default, judicial 
discretion may be a necessary and legitimate substitute for political 
discretion.206 On a similar note, Eisenberg and Yeazell submit that courts 
usually intervene in institutional cases not so much to take affirmative 
action in conflict with the other branches of government. In their opinion, 
such intervention is justified by the need to fill a vacuum which the other 
branches have created due to inaction or neglect.207  
 
The above is the determinant of whether or not the court should intervene 
in what may be considered administrative or policy matters. Greater 
judicial intrusion is, therefore, only warranted if there is a failure by the 
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other organs.208 This notwithstanding, the courts should ascertain in the 
first place whether there is still any chance of using the executive or 
legislative discretion to eliminate the constitutional violation and to fill 
the vacuum. If this is still possible, intervention by substitution of 
discretion will not be justified. The court’s initial response should be 
aimed at procuring the government to exercise its discretion in a manner 
that eliminates the violation. The government should be given an 
opportunity to demonstrate the plans it intends to follow to eliminate the 
violation. The court could also require the parties to negotiate a plan and 
report back to it. It is only when all these attempts fail that the court 
should intervene by taking administrative decisions.209  
 
The courts should, therefore, exercise what has been described as 
‘remedial absentation’.210 A court exercising remedial absentation merely 
retains jurisdiction to stop the infringement while allowing the state to 
formulate a remedial plan indicating how it intends to end the 
infringement. At this stage, the court should only order the defendant to 
produce a plan for judicial evaluation. The order may be accompanied by 
guidelines suggested by the court. This is important because a defendant 
making a good faith attempt may need guidance, but also a recalcitrant 
defendant will produce an inadequate plan unless closely instructed.211 As 
mentioned above,212 this approach is important because it limits judicial 
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involvement in what may be viewed as policy matters. Additionally, it 
allows the court to harvest the special expertise of the defendant and to 
secure co-operation in this regard. Remedial absentation should be 
contrasted with judicially imposed remedies, which are formulated 
without the benefit of the expertise or skills of the parties and may be 
considered to be intrusive.213  
 
It should be noted, however, that there could be circumstances where a 
judicially imposed remedy is needed. This occurs in those cases where it 
is necessary to immediately alleviate an intolerable condition or where the 
case implicates non-systemic aspects susceptible to immediate relief. 
Even then, the court may be forced to combine judicial imposition with 
remedial absentation. The Westville case is an example of this: the Court 
ordered that the applicants be provided with ARVs immediately in 
addition to the state filing a plan on how it intended to comply with the 
Court’s order. Immediate relief was provided to the applicants and a long 
term remedy was sought for similarly situated people. This was made 
possible for the benefits to be provided even when an appeal had been 
lodged. 
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7.6.2 Participation 
Whatever the form taken by structural litigation, the court must ensure 
that those affected by the litigation participate in the remedy formulation 
process. Such participation has many advantages especially as regards the 
implementation of the remedy and attendance to polycentric interests 
implicated by the case.  Abram Chayes has submitted that:  
 
Public law litigation, because of its widespread impact, seems to call for 
adequate representation in the proceedings of the range of interests that 
will be affected by them. At the stage of relief in particular, if the decree is 
to be quasinegotiated and party participation is to be relied upon to ensure 
its viability, representation at the bargaining table assumes very great 
importance, not only from the point of view of the affected interests but 
from that of the system itself.214 
 
The participation should focus on individuals, groups or organisations 
whose interest may be affected by the case.215 In the context of 
government as the defendant, it may be necessary to ascertain the interests 
of other spheres or departments of government. In the semi-federal nature 
of South Africa, national, provincial and local government interests may 
be invoked in the case. The case may also implicate constitutional 
competences of these spheres of government as regards the provision of 
social goods and services.216 Ignoring these interests and competences 
may affect the efficacy of the remedy obtained and may lead to 
imposition of remedial burdens that fall outside a government sphere’s 
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constitutional mandates. Involvement of a wide range of stakeholders is 
also necessary in securing collaboration between the different spheres or 
departments of government and the different stakeholders in the remedial 
process. It is also important to note that government programs often 
consist of partially co-ordinated outputs of a number of departments and 
organs of state.217 In addition to the state actors there could be non-state 
actors such as trade unions and organised groups that influence the 
direction of the government programme.218  It is prudent that these actors 
be consulted if practicable.  
 
Sturm has suggested that the forms of interaction used in the decision 
making process should promote involvement, co-operation and consensus. 
He suggests further that the process should also mitigate the unequal 
power, resources, and sophistication of participants.219 This is important 
because it establishes equality of participation in the process and 
encourages parties to bring to the fore their interests without fear. It is 
particularly important with regard to socio-economic rights because of the 
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imbalance of power which usually exists between poor and marginalised 
communities and powerful government or other artificial entities.  
 
It is also vital that institutional reform includes identification of the 
various groups and entities whose co-operation is necessary. This is in 
addition to ascertainment of the needs and interests of those groups and 
entities, and assessment of the likely impact of any proposed reforms on 
their interests.220 The involvement of a wide variety of participants 
increases the number of alternative remedial proposals before the court.221 
Participation will also allow all the stakeholders to be educated on the 
nature of the case, the remedial plan, and its likely impact. If crucial 
stakeholders misunderstand the remedy, implementation may be grounded 
simply because they do not know both what to do and the objectives to be 
realised:222  
 
When those excluded complain, often justifiably, that their position has 
not received a fair hearing, political as well as bureaucratic obstacles to 
implementation are often created. Thus, in order to minimize opposition to 
implementation, it is advisable to invite the participation at the decree 
formulation stage of relevant non-parties ... Participation by such 
nonparties may have another advantage: they may raise policy and 
implementation factors overlooked by the plaintiffs and defendant 
administrators yet pertinent to the shaping of the decree. The court can 
employ various procedural devices to promote this expanded participation, 
such as inviting groups whose interests may be affected by the decree to 
file amicus briefs or, if necessary, to intervene at the remedial stage.223  
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However, the remedial process should not be diluted by participation to 
the extent that effective remediation and reasoned decision making are 
lost. As discussed below,224 reasoned decision making is another norm 
that has to be promoted by structural litigation.225 So too is effective 
remediation. The consensual remedial model, as discussed above,226 
appears to be the most suitable for realising the norm of participation. 
This model may, however, sacrifice reasoned decision making and 
effective remediation. Nonetheless, this depends on how the process is 
conducted and the oversight role played by the court. The court could 
direct the parties on agreements that are based on reason and may reject 
those that do not realise effective remediation. Participation should also 
not be allowed to unnecessarily slow down the remedial process.227  
 
7.6.3 Impartiality and judicial independence  
Impartiality and judicial independence is a norm to be preserved in all 
forms of judicial process. The need for impartiality accords legitimacy to 
the judicial process and plays a very important role in producing remedies 
that are acceptable not only to the parties but to the public at large. 
However, the need for impartiality and independence in structural 
litigation is not only relevant but also complex. This is because of the 
active role played by the judge, not only in formulating the remedy but 
also in its implementation. Impartiality and judicial independence are also 
heightened by the administrative nature of the tasks that the judge has to 
discharge and his continued involvement in the reformation process. This 
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225
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is because such participation may threaten the judge’s independence and 
impartiality. Fiss has thus warned that:   
 
To some extent this threat is tied to a peculiar characteristic of the 
structural remedy, it places the judge in an architectural relationship with 
the newly reconstituted state bureaucracy. A judge deeply involved in the 
reconstruction of a school system or prison is likely to lose much of his 
distance from the organization. He is likely to identify with the 
organization he is reconstructing, and this process of identification is 
likely to deepen as the enterprise of organizational reform moves through 
several cycles of supplemental relief, drawn out over a number of years. 
There is, however, a deeper and more pervasive threat to judicial 
independence, one that turns not on the peculiar reconstructive character 
of the structural remedy, but on the desire of the judge represented by the 
very attempt to give a remedy, any remedy, the desire to be efficacious.228 
 
However, Fiss’s statement should be qualified. It is only true in those 
cases where the same judge has been involved with an institution for a 
considerably long time and has discharged functions that place him/her in 
an adminstrative position in that institution. Yet the judge could still use 
his/her judicial training to distance him/herself from the institution. This 
may not be easy though; the judge must strive to ensure that his/her 
decisions are fair, unbiased and supported by facts that are related to the 
legal problem in issue.229 Judicial independence would also allow the 
judge to make judicial orders, without interference, on the basis of legal 
standards and norms. It, therefore, remains the duty of the court not only 
to assert its independence but to avoid being unnecessarily involved in 
tasks that would undermine this independence. Where remedial decisions 
can be made by a political organ, this should be considered as a measure 
of first resort, and judicial usurpation of the process as a matter of last 
resort. This is not to ignore the fact that in some cases it may be plainly 
clear that the political processes have failed and court assumption of the 
task is the only reasonable thing to do. Even then, the political process 
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should be given a second chance though under the supervision of the 
court.230 
 
The expert model serves the norm of judicial impartiality and 
independence.231 So does the consensual remedial formulation model.232 
The expert model enables the court to maintain a disinterested posture 
with respect to the remedy ultimately proposed. Fiss contends that the 
expert is used as an intermediate structure that stands between the judge 
and the institution on one hand, and on the other hand between the judge 
and the body politic.233 Nevertheless, it is not necessary for the court to 
give itself a posture of complete disinterest considering the fact that it is 
the bearer of the ultimate obligation to devise an effective remedy. Even 
when it delegates the obligation to an expert, the expert, is for all intents 
and purposes, deemed to be a representative of the court.234 The court 
must ensure that the remedy, whether devised by the expert or by the 
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court itself, enforces the substantive legal norms. And also, as seen 
above,235 the expert model inherently exposes the expert to perceptions of 
partiality on his/her part, especially where participation is not guaranteed 
to its fullest. According to Nagel: 
 
Judges have appointed masters, monitors, and receivers to help design 
injunctions and to oversee their implementation. These appointees are not 
judges and therefore neither their training nor role necessarily assures the 
habits and capacities required for the kind of disciplined impartiality we 
expect of judges. Judges have appointed individuals whose associational 
ties (for example, mental health reform organizations) would suggest bias; 
in fact, judges have appointed members of the plaintiff class to supervise 
defendants' efforts at compliance.236  
 
Nagel contends further that judges cannot be counted on to correct any 
bias in the formulation of the decree because the facts in the expert’s 
report are traditionally only alterable if clearly erroneous.237 In my 
opinion, however, the possibility of bias can be overcome if the judge 
keeps a close eye on the expert and requires periodic updates. The courts 
should also take care not to appoint experts that are close to the interests 
of one of the parties. In some cases, it may serve the interests of justice if 
more than one expert is appointed; a panel of experts as opposed to an 
individual expert is less likely to be biased. But this does not mean that all 
cases merit the appointment of a panel. The magnitude of the task to be 
accomplished should also be a factor to consider in deciding whether or 
not a panel as opposed to an individual expert should be appointed.  
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7.6.4 Reasoned decision making  
One of the criticisms levied against structural litigation is that it sacrifices 
reasoned decision making and exalts remedies reached by consent.238 
There is, therefore, a need for structural remedies to be based on reasoned 
decision making. Structural litigation should be conducted with open 
awareness of the fact that the litigation implicates interests beyond those 
of the parties. The court should determine whether the case negatively 
impacts on interests other than those of the parties. In addition to this, 
however, the court should support its decisions with legal norms and 
standards in the form of normative standards established, for instance, in 
the Bill of Rights.239 This is where reasoned decision making becomes 
relevant as reflected in the way the judge interprets and applies the 
normative standards in issue.  
 
The judge has to justify his/her decision as based on the law. This 
forestalls accusation that the judge has applied his/her own value 
judgement to decide the case. Reasoned decision making in structural 
litigation terms, therefore, gives legitimacy to judicial intervention as 
being based on legal norms and the need to solve systemic problems. 
When remedies are based on reasoned decision making, they accord 
legitimacy to the process, which translates into acceptance of the 
directions issued by the court.  
 
The expert remedial formulation model240 is more capable of realising 
reasoned decision making in comparison to the bargaining and legislative 
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hearing models.241 Usually, the court appointed experts come with 
technical expertise and a capacity to gather and assess large quantities of 
information.242 In spite of this, whether a case requires an expert model of 
remediation should depend on the circumstances of each case. If a case 
has many technical aspects which need to be assessed before an effective 
remedy is crafted, it will definitely need expert help. But if a case merely 
requires ascertainment of some factual aspects, the hearing model and not 
the expert model may be the most appropriate. Reasoned decision making 
should, therefore, not be exalted blindly by appointing an expert without 
first considering the circumstances of the case. 
 
Finally, it should be noted that reasoned decision making also promotes 
the principle that aims at ensuring that remediation complies with the 
substantive norm as discussed in the next sub-section. The substantive 
norm is the law that protects the right(s) in issue.  
 
7.6.5 Remedy that complies with substantive norms 
The reason why people litigate is to enforce their rights. The remedies 
must, therefore, as much as possible, be intended to realise the rights. 
However, as mentioned in chapter five,243 in certain cases the interests of 
justice may require that the remedy granted is not one that is necessarily 
capable of realising the right in full.244 This does not mean, however, that 
the court should completely abandon the need to develop the substantive 
rights as protected.245 
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It is advisable that the court begins by detailing the normative standards 
implicated by the right. In the context of socio-economic rights, this 
approach would help to give content to the rights. This is important 
because, as I have submitted in chapter four,246 the CC is yet to give 
substantive content to the socio-economic rights in the Constitution. 
Giving substantive content to the rights will help the court and the parties 
to understand what they are working towards. The remedies will also be 
structured with these objectives in mind. The normative content also 
provides a basis upon which the efficacy of the remedies selected can be 
criticised and evaluated.  The court will also use these normative 
standards to ensure that its model of supervision is the most effective in 
terms of realising the objectives of the substantive norms. 
 
7.6.6 Flexibility, monitoring and supervision  
In litigation challenging systemic violations the court usually may embark 
on a remedial process without full knowledge of the requisite facts, 
interests and obstacles that may impact on the implementation of its 
decree.247 The necessarily speculative nature of this enterprise, therefore, 
means that no single order can be regarded as final. Additionally, 
implementation of the remedy may continue for a long time.248 According 
to Fiss: 
 
The judge must search for the "best" remedy, but since his judgment must 
incorporate such open-ended considerations as effectiveness and fairness, 
and since the threat and constitutional value that occasions the intervention 
can never be defined with great precision, the particular choice of remedy 
can never be defended with any certitude. It must always be open to 
revision, even without the strong showing traditionally required for 
modification of a decree, namely, that the first choice is causing grievous 
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hardship. A revision is justified if the remedy is not working effectively or 
is unnecessarily burdensome.249 
 
It is, therefore, important that the court proceeds with flexibility and crafts 
its decree in a manner that allows easy adjustment should the need to do 
so arise.250 The need to revise the order is also made inevitable because of 
the detailed nature of structural orders and sometimes because of the lack 
of judicial expertise in drafting some of them, since some are drafted by 
experts with no judicial background.251   
 
The court may also have to closely monitor the implementation of its 
decree and obtain information that may be needed to make adjustments in 
the remedial standards should the need to do so arise.252 This can only be 
achieved if the court retains jurisdiction and assumes an active oversight 
role.253 The court should, however, be careful not to interfere with the 
implementation process if it is not necessary to do so. Though the parties 
should be relied on for information and the need for adjustments, the court 
should be careful not to be distracted by parties who may be interested in 
protecting their interests at the expense of other equally important 
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interests. Plaintiffs may underplay the degree of compliance, while the 
defendants may exaggerate it. All this may distract the remedial process.  
 
The need to adjust the order may also arise, for instance, when it 
transpires during the implementation period that the defendant cannot 
successfully implement the decree without the co-operation of persons or 
departments not party to the original suit.254 Other participants whose co-
operation is needed may include, for instance, different spheres of 
government. In such event, notice should be served on the third party 
participants, with a view of determining whether they are opposed to the 
order and the likely impact that it may have on their activities. In other 
cases it may be merely necessary to widen the geographical scope of the 
order. Yet in some adjustments of the order may be motivated by changed 
legal standards, especially following decisions of higher courts or even 
legislative enactments.  
 
 
7.7 CONCLUSION   
 
There is no doubt that the structural injunction is the most creative of the 
remedies that have been designed in constitutional litigation. The 
structural injunction is especially useful as a response to violations that 
arise from structural settings and are caused by systemic problems.255 The 
structural injunction is inspired by the ethos of distributive justice and 
seeks to adjust future behaviour and to tackle systemic violation at their 
root. The most prominent feature of this form of relief is the court’s 
retention of jurisdiction and the provision of a complex regime of ongoing 
supervision of compliance with the court’s order.256 In spite of this, the 
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structural injunction has not been without controversy. The biggest 
controversy arises from criticism that it amounts to a breach of the 
doctrine of separation of powers, because it allows courts to interfere in 
policy matters and to make decisions that have direct budgetary allocation 
implications.257 However, it has been demonstrated that the judiciary has 
characteristics that may make it well suited for the task of enforcing 
constitutional standards, including such means as the structural 
injunction.258 These include insulation from political pressures, capacity 
to gather information through non-bureaucratic processes and willingness 
to engage all affected parties.259  
 
In spite of this, I have submitted in this chapter260 that while separation of 
powers and institutional competence concerns do not vitiate the legality of 
the structural injunction they are a cause of concern and should not be 
ignored completely. The courts should, where appropriate, defer to the 
executive and legislative branches of government. They should only 
intervene by way of a structural injunction where the other branches are 
‘seriously and chronically in default’ as regards the exercise of their 
discretion.261 Even then, intervention should be graduated,262 choosing 
first to merely retain jurisdiction and allow the state to tackle the 
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constitutional violation. This could be followed by a requirement to 
submit a report to the court and to the opposite party detailing the plan to 
eradicate the violation. Where necessary, the court may more intrusively 
devise the plan and supervise its implementation. It has been cautioned 
though that there could be cases that are of a very serious nature that a 
high degree of intervention is immediately necessary.263  
 
In all these processes the court should ensure that all persons whose 
interests may be affected by the litigation process participate in the 
remedial formulation process to the extent that this is necessary and 
practicable.264 The courts could use various models of the structural 
injunction including the expert model and the legislative hearing model to 
realise this. The remedy should be flexible and the court should be 
prepared, if need be, to adjust it at any time.265 The adjustments also allow 
the judge to find what is considered to be the most appropriate means of 
responding to the constitutional violation. This is because usually the 
structural injunction may begin as experimentation of several remedies, 
and perfection may only come after a number of adjustments.266  
 
Sometimes the main issue is not when a violation is going to be uprooted. 
Rather the issue is what steps are being undertaken to begin the uprooting 
process. In such a context, it is the direction and rate of change that may 
be important and not the final outcomes, as these may still be too far 
away.267 Sometimes reform may be slow and almost viewed as amounting 
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to failure, but this may be necessary to accommodate the unforeseen 
obstacles. A slow but steady process of uprooting the violation is far 
better than short run artificial measures that may not overcome all the 
obstacles ahead. In this regard a structural interdict is ‘a process for 
setting ambitious but achievable targets and monitoring the achievement 
of those targets’.268 Artificial or ‘quick fix’ like measures, though 
dramatic, may stall or disappear in the long run. It is important that the 
court takes its time to study all the obstacles so that it is able fashion long 
term solutions to them. It is because of this that the US Supreme Court in 
the Brown case, for instance, initially merely ordered that the states act 
with all deliberate speed, and, as seen above,269 advised the local courts to 
act with flexibility in their remedial exercise.  This provided both the state 
and the courts with time to study the obstacles and to find solutions to 
them. It also illustrates the concern of a court to provide space for public 
authorities to implement a far reaching and contentious order in a gradual 
way.270    
 
Finally, it is important that the court does not act in a way that would 
threaten its impartiality and independence, and reasoned decision-making 
must be promoted as much as possible. This is important to enable the 
courts to weaken criticism that the structural injunction compromises the 
impartiality and independence of the judge because of his/her direct 
involvement in the administration of the institution that needs to be 
reformed. 271 The court may need to maintain reasoned decision making 
                                                 
268
 Budlender: 2007, at p 11. 
 
269
 See section 7.3. 
 
270
 Davis: 2006, at p 322. Davis has likened this approach to the reasonableness review 
approach in Grootboom and TAC cases which appears to accord deference to the 
executive. However, the distinction, he submits, is that the South African socio-
economic rights cases were not as controversial as the Brown case. 
 
271
 Fiss: 1979, at p 53.  
 
 
 
 
 
Nature, role and appropriateness of the structural injunction 
 392 
by basing its decisions on legal principles and established facts.272 
Reliance on established legal substantive norms will also help to advance 
the normative content of the rights that are being assessed. 
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CHAPTER EIGHT 
 
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
 
 
8.1 INTRODUCTION  
 
Although the South African Constitution protects socio-economic rights 
as justiciable, their enforcement is still controversial. This is evident in 
defining the nature of the obligations these rights engender, and in finding 
and implementing relief to remedy their violation. I have demonstrated in 
this thesis the sources of some of these controversies, which include the 
normative (real and perceived) nature of socio-economic rights.1 In 
addition, there is the separation of powers based concern.2 Normatively, 
the realisation of socio-economic rights requires far more resources and 
yet, procedurally, the courts may not have the institutional capacity to 
deal with some of the issues to which the enforcement of these rights 
gives rise.3 These factors explain not only the approach of the South 
African courts in interpreting the obligations engendered by these rights, 
but also in determining the remedies that follow their violation. However, 
other than the nature of the rights, the approach of the courts, and 
particularly the CC, also has been influenced by the notion of justice to 
which the courts are inclined.4 The CC has inclined more towards the 
theory of distributive justice as opposed to corrective justice.5  
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The purpose of this chapter is to draw conclusions emerging from the 
discussions of the factors as identified above. It also makes 
recommendations on how best the socio-economic rights in the 
Constitution can be enforced, and appropriate remedies found for their 
violation. The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section 
draws conclusions on the way the normative nature of the rights has 
influenced the remedies for their violation. The second section draws 
conclusions on the impact of separation of powers based concerns and 
how these could be overcome. The last section discusses the influence of 
the theories of justice in defining ‘appropriate, just and equitable relief’.  
 
 
8.2 INFLUENCE OF THE NORMATIVE NATURE OF THE 
RIGHTS ON REMEDIES  
 
The difficulties that courts face in devising remedies for socio-economic 
rights violations should be studied in relation to the normative nature of 
these rights. Some scholars, as seen in chapter five,6 submit that rights and 
remedies must be kept separate, as the considerations in determining the 
nature of the two differ. In my opinion, however, rights and remedies are 
not two fundamentally different notions that have to be determined 
independently of each other. In developing appropriate, equitable and just 
remedies, the rights intended to be protected must constantly be had in 
mind.7 It is, therefore, not possible to study or critique remedies for socio-
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economic rights violations without understanding the normative nature of 
these rights and the obligations they engender.8 
 
There is no doubt that, just like civil and political rights, socio-economic 
rights are justiciable. Both categories of rights engender both positive and 
negative obligations and have budgetary implications.9 In spite of this, as 
seen in chapter two,10 it cannot be denied that the enforcement of socio-
economic rights poses more difficulties in comparison to the enforcement 
of civil and political rights.11 This is especially so as regards the 
enforcement of the positive obligations that socio-economic rights 
engender. These positive obligations call for substantial resources to 
realise, and give rise to separation of powers based concerns. 
Additionally, socio-economic needs also require to be prioritised since the 
available resources may not be adequate to meet all the needs.12  
 
The fundamentally positive nature of socio-economic rights explains why 
the courts have not been as robust in finding remedies for these rights as 
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they have been with regard to civil and political rights.13 Civil and 
political rights are believed to require less positive action than socio-
economic rights.14 Expressed in terms of a sliding scale reflecting positive 
and negative dimensions, one would conclude that both categories of 
rights fit on this scale. The difference, however, is that socio-economic 
rights slide more towards the positive dimension side of the scale. In 
contrast, civil and political rights slide more towards the negative side.15 
 
It should be noted that courts are more comfortable enjoining states by 
prohibiting certain conduct than by requiring that positive action be 
taken.16 Enforcing negative obligations is believed to result in less 
interference in the spheres of the other organs of state,17 and the questions 
raised when enforcing negative obligations are not as complicated as 
those raised in the case of positive obligations. The budgetary 
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(1991) Thomson Professional  Publishing Canada pp 1 – 48, at p 35; and Horowitz, D., 
The courts and social policy (1977) The Brookings Institution, at p 19. See also chapter 
seven, section 7.2.1. 
 
17
 Brand, D., ‘Introduction to socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution’ in 
Brand, D., and Heyns, C., (eds.) Socio-economic rights in South Africa (2005) Pretoria 
University Law Press pp 1 – 56, at p 26. 
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implications of enforcing positive obligations are, for instance, far more 
severe than those of enforcing negative obligations.18 This explains why 
the courts have readily used prohibitive remedies, such as the prohibitory 
injunction, and been reluctant to use such positive remedies as the 
mandatory or structural injunctions.19  
 
However, in some contexts the enforcement of negative obligations in 
socio-economic rights terms may be as complicated as enforcing positive 
obligations.20 It is also true that enforcing negative obligations may 
require substantial resources. A prohibitory injunction, for instance, 
proscribing an eviction without alternative accommodation, may require 
government to spend money on providing alternative accommodation. 
This is in addition to paying compensation for the continued use of 
private land from which an eviction cannot occur without alternative 
accommodation.21 Another example relates to the enforcement of the 
section 9 negative right not to be unfairly discriminated against. In some 
cases a finding that the applicants have been unfairly excluded from 
socio-economic benefits must be followed by provision of such benefits 
to them. This may require an enhancement of the resources committed to 
                                                 
18
 Lenta, P., ‘Judicial restraint and overreach’ (2004) 20 South Africa Journal on Human 
Rights pp 544 – 615, at p 567. See also Wells, M., and Eaton. T., Constitutional 
remedies: A reference book for the United States Constitution (2002), Praeger 
Publishing, at p xxv.  
 
19
 See chapter seven, at section 7.2.1. 
 
20
 See chapter two, at section 2.3.3.  
 
21
 See Modder East Squatters v Moddeklip Boerdery v President of Republic of South 
Africa v Modderklip Boerdery 2004 (8) BCLR 821 (SCA); and Modderklip Boerdery 
(Pty) Ltd and Others v President of RSA and Another  2005 (8) BCLR 786 (CC). For 
detailed discussion of this case see chapter six at section 6.3.1.2.  
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the programme under which the benefits are provided.22 Nonetheless, it 
cannot be denied that in enforcing negative obligations the budgetary 
consequences are more occasional than when enforcing positive 
obligations. It is this that has made litigation invoking positive obligations 
more controversial when compared to enforcement of negative 
obligations. Enforcing positive obligations is also perceived as giving the 
courts leeway to interfere with functions reserved for the executive and 
legislative branches of state, as discussed below.23  
 
Socio-economic rights also continue to be perceived as vague and devoid 
of any normative content.24 In normative terms, socio-economic rights 
have not been as developed as civil and political rights. Socio-economic 
rights have been neglected and have not been the subject of as much 
judicial interpretation as civil and political rights.25 This has left the 
normative content of socio-economic rights relatively undeveloped. 
However, continued recognition of socio-economic rights as justiciable is 
likely to lead to increased clarification of the nature of the obligations 
they engender.26 The rights have been recognised as justiciable not only at 
                                                 
22
 See Khosa and Others v Minister of Social Development; Mahlaule and Another v 
Minister of Social Development and Others 2004 (6) BCLR 596 (CC) (Khosa case). For 
a detailed discussion of this case see chapter four at section 4.2.4.  
 
23
 Section 8.3. 
 
24
 See Munoz, C., ‘Stand up for your rights’ The Economist 22 March 2007. See also 
Neier, A., ‘Social and economic rights: A critique’ (2006) 13 Human Rights Brief pp 1 – 
3.  
 
25
 See chapter two, section 2.3.4.1.  
 
26
 See Alston, P., ‘No right to complain about being poor: the need for an optional 
protocol to the economic rights Covenant’ in Eide, A., & Helgesen, J., (eds.) The future 
of human rights protection in a changing world: fifty years since the four freedoms 
address: Essays in honour of Torkel Opsahl (1991) Norwegian University Press pp 79 – 
100 
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the international and regional levels, but also in several domestic 
jurisdictions.27 It is important, however, that courts involved in socio-
economic rights litigation should not be complacent but should rather 
strive to develop the normative content of these rights. This is why I have 
suggested that courts should observe the norm of reasoned decision 
making whenever they deem the structural interdict to be the most 
appropriate remedy.28 In addition, it is necessary to ensure that the remedy 
complies with the substantive norm in issue.29 In developing the 
normative content of the rights courts should use international 
jurisprudence, particularly the General Comments of the UN Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (Committee), as the starting 
point.30 The duties on the state to respect, protect, promote and fulfil the 
rights provide a viable mechanism for the clarification of the obligations 
engendered by the rights.31 Yet this mechanism applies to both civil and 
political rights and socio-economics and blurs the distinction between 
them.  
 
Thus far, the CC has not adequately developed the substantive content of 
the rights protected in the Constitution.32 The Court has not only rejected 
the notion of minimum core, but has also failed to describe the 
components of the various socio-economic rights. Furthermore, the Court 
has failed to develop a proper approach to determining the effectiveness 
                                                 
27
 See generally Coomans, F., (ed.) Justiciability of economic and social rights: 
Experiences from domestic systems (2006) Intersentia. 
 
28
 Chapter seven, at section 7.6.4.  
 
29
 See chapter seven, at section 7.6.4. 
 
30
 See chapter four, at section 4.2.1 for examples of these General Comments.  
 
31
 See chapter two, section 2.3.4.2. 
 
32
 See chapter four, at section 4.2.2. 
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of the means chosen by the state to realise the rights.33 Many 
commentators have approved the CC’s rejection of the minimum core 
approach and its resort to the reasonableness review approach as the most 
appropriate to enforce socio-economic rights contextually.34 What the CC 
and these commentators have failed to appreciate, however, is the fact that 
the minimum core approach is not necessarily inflexible. As a result, both 
the CC and the commentators have closed down space for pragmatic 
approaches that could be used in defining the minimum core of the socio-
economic rights in the Constitution.35  
 
The flexibility of the notion of minimum core is reflected in the manner in 
which it has been constructed by the Committee. The Committee has 
recognised the fact that in some situations it may not be possible to 
provide everyone with a minimum level of goods and services. The 
Committee is of the view that a state can justify its failure to provide a 
minimum core, for instance, on the ground of inadequate resources: 
‘[A]ny assessment as to whether a State has discharged its minimum core 
obligation must also take account of resource constraints applying within 
                                                 
33
 See chapter four, at section 4.2.3. 
 
34
 See Liebenberg, S., ‘Enforcing positive socio-economic rights claims: The South 
African model of reasonableness’ in Squires, J., Langford, M., and Thiele, B., (eds.) The 
road to a remedy: Current issues in the litigation of economic, social and cultural rights 
(2005) Australian Human Rights Centre and Centre on Housing Rights and Eviction pp 
73 – 88; Liebenberg, S., ‘The value of human dignity in interpreting socio-economic 
rights’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 1 – 31 [Hereinafter referred 
to as Liebenberg: 2005c], at p 24; Pieterse, M., ‘Resuscitating socio-economic rights: 
Constitutional entitlement to health services’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human 
Rights pp 473 – 502, at 491; and Steinberg, C., ‘Can reasonableness protect the poor? A 
review of South Africa’s socio-economic rights jurisprudence’ (2006) 123 South Africa 
Law Journal pp 264 – 284, at pp 273 – 274 and 275. 
 
35
 For examples of how the minimum core can be defined pragmatically see Bilchitz, D., 
‘The right to health care services and the minimum core: Disentangling the principled 
and pragmatic strands’ (2006) 7 ESR Review pp 2 – 6.  
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the country concerned’.36 A very important qualification of this, however, 
is the requirement that the state ‘demonstrate that every effort has been 
made to use all resources that are at its disposition in an effort to satisfy, 
as a matter of priority, those minimum obligations’.37 This is important 
because, unlike the reasonableness review approach, it casts the burden on 
the state to prove that it is doing whatever is reasonable to ensure 
maximum enjoyment of the rights. Nonetheless, the government need not 
prove that a minimum core is being provided; rather it has to show that a 
reasonable level of goods and services is being provided as is permitted 
by the available resources. This, however, does not mean that the court is 
absolved from any form of responsibility. It has to interrogate the state in 
order to determine whether the available resources have been applied 
appropriately. This is something which the CC has ignored in its 
reasonableness review approach; under the CC’s approach the burden to 
prove unreasonableness is cast on the applicant who may not be in 
possession of adequate government information necessary for this 
purpose.   
 
The CC has also not developed a clear practice of interrogating the 
reasonableness of budgetary allocations. The CC has been circumspect in 
scrutinising budgetary allocations made by the executive and legislative 
branches of the state;38 it has chosen, in some cases, to completely defer 
                                                 
36
 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 3, The nature 
of States parties' obligations (Fifth session, 1990), U.N. Doc. E/1991/23, annex III at 86 
(1991), reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations 
Adopted by Human Rights Treaty Bodies, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.6 at 14 (2003), at 
para 10.  
 
37
 As above. The Committee has also said that even where the available resources are 
demonstrably inadequate, the obligation remains for a State party to strive to ensure the 
widest possible enjoyment of the relevant rights under the prevailing circumstances (para 
11). 
 
38
 Brand, D., ‘Socio-economic rights and courts in South Africa: Justiciability on a 
sliding scale’ in Coomans, F., (ed.) Justiciability of economic and social rights: 
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to the executive and legislative organs of state on issues of budgetary 
allocations.39 It should be noted, however, that there is hope as there is 
evidence that the Court is moving in the direction of requiring the 
government to justify its budgetary allocations as reasonable. The Khosa 
case40 is evidence of this. However, this case could be distinguished from 
other cases because it dealt with exclusion from a service, and therefore 
invoked a negative duty. This notwithstanding, the principles it enunciates 
as regards the burden on the state to justify its budgetary allocations could 
be extended to cases dealing with purely positive obligations.41 The CC’s 
emphasis in this judgement that it is the responsibility of the government 
to put all evidence relating to the resource implications of a case cannot 
be overlooked. Indeed, rather than hurriedly reject the minimum core this 
approach could have been used by the CC to require the government to 
adduce evidence that it cannot afford a minimum core.42 Even where there 
is evidence that the resources are inadequate, it would have to be 
demonstrated that government is working towards achieving a minimum 
core as soon as resources become available.  
 
The reasonableness review approach is also inadequate, to the extent that 
it does not interrogate the means chosen by the state to determine whether 
they are capable of realising the rights.43 It is indeed doubtful whether the 
                                                                                                                                            
Experiences from domestic systems (2006) INTERSENTIA pp 207 – 236 [Hereinafter 
referred to as Brand: 2006], at p 223.  
 
39
 See Soobramoney v Minister of Health (KwaZulu-Natal) 1998 (1) SA 765 (CC), 
discussed in detail in chapter four at section 4.2.1.  
 
40
 For a detailed discussion of this case see chapter four, at section 4.2.5. See also Rail 
Commuters Action Group and Others v Transnet Ltd t/a Metrorail 2005 (4) BCLR 301 
(CC), at para 88.  
 
41
 See chapter four, section 4.2.4. 
 
42
 See chapter four, section 4.2.1.2. 
 
43
 See chapter four, section 4.2.4.  
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reasonableness review approach can be described as ‘a means-end-test’, 
as has been suggested by some authors.44 The approach does not require a 
court to question whether state action is rationally connected to the 
purpose for which it was taken. The government is not required to 
demonstrate that its programme, policy or legislation is capable of 
realising the targeted right(s).45 It is because of this shortcoming that I 
have suggested the use of a rational connection test similar in some 
respects to the one used in the section 36 general limitations inquiry.46 
The burden would be cast on the government to prove not only that the 
intended measures would realise the rights, but also that they are the least 
restrictive. Measures not reasonably capable of realising the rights, or 
which are not the least restrictive, would be condemned by the court. To 
avoid separation of powers based criticisms, however, the court would not 
immediately substitute its own measures for the government’s condemned 
measures. Instead, the court would defer to the government on the most 
appropriate means, while giving guidance on the basic contents of any 
selected measures.  
 
The need to prove a rational connection between the measures and the 
rights is also important, because it would force the courts to give content 
to the rights. This is because the rights represent the goal to be attained; 
unless the goal (which is realisation of the right) is defined with precision, 
it may not be possible to assess the means selected for this.47   
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
44
 See Brand: 2006, at p 221. See also Brand, D., ‘The proceduralisation of South 
African socio-economic rights jurisprudence, or “what are socio-economic rights for”’ in 
Botha, H., Van der Walt, A., and Van der Walt, J., (eds.) Rights and democracy in a 
transformative Constitution (2003) Sun Press Stellenbosch pp 33 – 56 
 
45
 See chapter four, section 4.2.3.1. 
 
46
 See chapter four, section 4.2.3.2.  
47
 See chapter four, section 4.2.2. 
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8.3 OVERCOMING SEPARATION OF POWERS BASED 
OBJECTIONS  
 
Other than the normative nature of the rights, as discussed above, the 
CC’s approach in adjudicating socio-economic rights could be explained 
by the need to maintain the doctrine of separation of powers. The Court 
has avoided constructions that would lead to confrontation with other 
organs of state. This includes constructions that would, for instance, 
impose what may be perceived by the government to be unreasonable 
resource burdens.  
 
Objection to judicial enforcement of socio-economic rights on the basis of 
the separation of powers has assumed two dimensions. First, it is 
contended that socio-economic rights litigation allows an undemocratic 
judiciary to make judgments on matters that require democratic 
deliberation.48 Secondly, the judiciary is institutionally deficient, and is 
not able to deal with some of the issues to which the enforcement of 
socio-economic rights gives rise. This includes issues such as making 
budgetary and policy choices.49 It has also been contended that the courts 
are ill-suited to adjudicate socio-economic rights because litigation of 
these rights is polycentric.50 
 
While the CC has rejected the separation of powers doctrine as a reason 
for keeping courts away from socio-economic rights, it has not escaped 
from the influence of this doctrine. The need on the part of the Court to 
uphold the doctrine of separation of powers is reflected in the way it has 
construed the obligations engendered by socio-economic rights. The CC 
                                                 
48
 See section 3.3.1 of chapter three.   
 
49
 Section 3.4.1 of chapter three.  
 
50
 See Chapter three, section 3.4.1. 
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has been very careful not to construe the rights in ways that would result 
in courts assuming what appear to be legislative or executive functions.51 
The courts have respected the fact that functions such as making 
budgetary and policy related choices are reserved for the legislative and 
executive organs of state: ‘[A court may] disagree with the allocation of 
resources … and one may justifiably debate priorities but … [the CC] has 
not sanctioned the reallocation of public funds by courts’.52 The doctrine 
of separation of powers and awareness of the courts’ institutional 
limitations has also influenced the approach of the courts in dealing with 
remedies for violation of socio-economic rights. The courts have been 
very careful not to grant remedies that their institutional capacity does not 
allow them to grant or enforce. This partly explains why the CC has been 
very reluctant to use the structural interdict as a readily available 
remedy.53 
 
The separation of powers concerns cannot be dismissed simply on the 
basis that the courts are mandated by the principles of checks and 
balances and the doctrine of constitutionalism to enforce the rights.54 
There is no doubt that the judiciary may have some features that make it 
qualified to adjudicate socio-economic rights.55 This notwithstanding, the 
judiciary is also constrained in a number of respects; the courts are 
technically handicapped and may have to rely on the judgment of other 
                                                 
51
 See Du Plessis and Others v De Klerk and Another 1996 (3) SA 850 (CC), 1996 (5) 
BCLR 658 (CC), at para 181. 
 
52
 The City of Johannesburg v Rand Properties (PTY) LTD and Others Case No. 253/06 
(Supreme Court of Appeal) [Unreported], at para 45.  
 
53
 See chapter seven, section 7.5.2. 
 
54
 See chapter three, section 3.3.1.  
 
55
 See chapter three, section 3.4.2. See also chapter seven, section 7.4.1. 
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organs of state.56 This is especially so in dealing with, for instance, 
budgetary issues or policy questions that need technical skills or 
democratic deliberation. Budgetary considerations may give rise to 
questions that are hard for the judiciary to answer because some of them 
may relate to priority setting.57 The courts may have to defer these 
questions to the executive and legislative organs of state. This, though, 
does not mean that judicial deference should be adopted as a general 
rule.58 It is something that the court ought to have in mind and apply on a 
case-by-case basis depending on the demands of every case. In essence 
the issue relates to the necessity of maintaining a fine balance between, on 
the one hand, the need to protect rights and, on the other hand, the danger 
of too great an interference in the affairs of the executive and legislative 
branches of government.59 The question then becomes one of determining 
the stage at which judicial intervention would be justified. 
 
There is no doubt that some functions are preserved for the executive and 
legislative branches of government. However, when these branches ignore 
their constitutional obligations the judiciary is empowered to step in and 
enforce them.60 This interference is mandated by the Constitution.61 Most 
importantly, however, the extent of what may appear to be interference 
should be determined by the degree of failure or neglect on the part of the 
executive and legislative organs to discharge their constitutional 
                                                 
56
 See Steinberg: 2006, at p 270. See also chapter three, section 3.3.1.  
 
57
 See chapter four, section 4.2.4. 
 
58
 Chapter three, sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.2.  
 
59
 Corbett, M., ‘Human rights: The road ahead’ in Forsyth, C, and Schiller, J., (eds.) 
Human rights: The Cape Town conference (1979) Juta & Company pp 1 – 9, at p 6.  
 
60
 See chapter thee, section 3.3.3, and chapter seven, section 7.4.1. 
 
61
 See chapter three, at section 3.2.3. 
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obligations.62 In remedial terms, the level of intrusiveness in response to 
failure or neglect should be determined by the level of recalcitrance 
exhibited by the government. Where there is evidence that the 
government will not respect the court order, the court is justified to issue 
highly intrusive remedies such as mandatory or structural interdicts.63 
This, though, should come as a last resort after all efforts have been 
exhausted to secure the co-operation of government in implementing the 
court orders. The courts should, for instance, acknowledge and make use 
of the expertise at the disposal of the executive and legislative organs of 
state before displacing these organs.64 This notwithstanding, there could 
be cases in which intervention as a matter of first resort is justified. This 
could be in those cases where there is no chance of procuring co-
operation, or where the seriousness of the matter at stake demands 
immediate intervention.  
 
It should also be noted that it is not prudent for the courts to overlook the 
fact that socio-economic rights litigation is essentially polycentric. The 
courts may not be able to appreciate and attend to all the polycentric 
interests implicated by a case. In spite of this, the courts should strive as 
much as possible to appreciate and attend to these interests. It is for this 
reason that I have suggested that, when using the structural interdict, 
courts should try, as much as possible, to secure the participation of 
persons who may be affected by the outcome of a case.65 The courts 
should also ensure that the remedies they grant bring benefits to a wide 
section of people in need of such benefits and not just to the litigants in 
                                                 
62
 See chapter seven, at section 7.6.1. See also Fletcher, W., ‘The Discretionary 
Constitution: Institutional remedies and judicial legitimacy’ (1982) Yale Law Journal pp 
635 – 697.  
 
63
 See chapter seven, at sections 7.2 and 7.5. 
 
64
 See chapter seven, at section 7.4.2. 
 
65
 Chapter seven, at section 7.6.2.  
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court. It is only possible for a court to do this if it inclines more towards 
the notion of distributive justice and less towards the notion of corrective 
justice, as discussed below.  
 
 
8.4 APPROPRIATE, JUST AND EQUITABLE REMEDIES: 
ROLE OF DISTRIBUTIVE FORMS OF JUSTICE  
 
The notions of corrective and distributive justice provide an important 
theoretical framework that could be used to assess the kinds of remedies 
granted by the courts. The remedies that are granted by a court inclined 
towards the notion of corrective justice will differ from those granted by a 
court inclined towards distributive justice.66 However, the appropriateness 
of each of these remedies will depend on the perspective from which one 
assesses them. To those who view socio-economic rights, for instance, as 
establishing individual entitlements, corrective justice based remedies will 
be the most appropriate. In contrast, those who view these rights as 
establishing collective entitlements will consider distributive justice based 
remedies as the most appropriate. The question that ought to be answered 
before one examines the remedies granted in respect of socio-economic 
rights, however, is whether it is ideal to enforce these rights, either as 
individual or collective rights.  
 
I have demonstrated in this thesis that socio-economic rights cannot be 
enforced outside the social and economic context in which they are 
protected.67 The majority of South Africans are poor and in dire need of 
socio-economic goods and services; but, as observed in chapter two,68 
                                                 
66
 See chapter five.  
 
67
 See chapter six, at section 6.2. See also De Vos, P., ‘Grootboom, the right of access to 
housing and substantive equality as contextual fairness’ (2001) 17 South African Journal 
on Human Rights pp 258 – 276, at p 262. 
 
68
 Section 2.3.1.1.  
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these goods and services require a great deal of resources to realise. Yet 
the state may not have all the resources required to provide every 
individual with the goods and services he/she needs even at a very basic 
level. This is something that the Constitution acknowledges by requiring 
the progressive realisation of socio-economic rights within the available 
resources.69 In this context, it is only reasonable that the rights be 
enforced as collective rather than as individual ones, because this is what 
the socio-economic context dictates. The realisation of collective rights 
requires careful redistribution of resources in order to benefit all in need 
of them. Redistribution of this nature is most appropriately realised 
through litigation that is guided by the ethos of distributive justice.  
 
It is on the basis of the above that the appropriateness of remedies for 
socio-economic rights violations should be assessed. The success or 
failure of a remedy should not be assessed solely on the basis of its impact 
on the litigants such as the Grootboom community. This is so because it is 
important that in dealing with socio-economic claims the courts should 
consider the interests of persons other than the litigant(s). It is also 
important for the courts to appreciate the fact that providing for the socio-
economic needs of an individual or groups of individuals may have 
repercussions for similarly situated persons.70 The remedies that the 
courts grant therefore should be aimed at maximising the socio-economic 
benefits implicated by the case for the benefit of all similarly situated 
persons. In this context it may be impossible to put the victims of a 
violation in the position they would have been in but for the violation as 
demanded by those who support corrective justice.71  
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 Sections 26(2) and 27(1). 
 
70
 See Sachs: 2005, at p 144.  
 
71
 See chapter five, section 5.2.2.  
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The Grootboom case has been used by many commentators to 
demonstrate the weaknesses of the remedies granted by the CC in socio-
economic rights litigation.72 It has been argued that the situation of the 
Grootboom community has not changed dramatically even with judgment 
in their favour. However, this case could also be used to demonstrate the 
distributive benefits that socio-economic rights litigation can bring about. 
The case has set standards to be used to assess the reasonableness of 
government conduct, and has resulted in programmes and policies that 
advance the socio-economic rights of all in need as presented by the 
context.73 Although the case has not resulted in a dramatic improvement 
of the conditions of the Grootboom community, it has resulted in benefits 
for a wide range of poor and vulnerable people. 
 
However, the fact that the socio-economic context dictates that socio-
economic rights can only be realised as collective rights should not be 
interpreted to mean that the rights cannot result in individual entitlements. 
The ultimate outcome of any programme for the realisation of these rights 
should aim at maximisation of individual wellbeing, if not in the short run 
at least in the long run. The socio-economic context as characterised, 
amongst others, by inadequacy of resources should not be viewed as a 
permanent and unalterable state of affairs. As seen in chapter four,74 it is 
incumbent upon the government to put in place measures that enable it to 
enhance the level of resources at its disposal. This means that the rights 
may be enforced as individual entitlements as soon as resources needed 
                                                 
72
 See Swart, M., ‘Left out in the cold? Grafting constitutional remedies for the poorest 
of the poor’ (2005) 21 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 215 – 240; Pillay, K., 
‘Implementation of Grootboom: Implications for the enforcement of socio-economic 
rights’ (2002) 2 Law, Democracy and Development pp 225 – 277; and Davis, D., 
‘Adjudicating the socio-economic rights in the South African Constitution: Towards 
“deference lite”?’ (2006) 22 South African Journal on Human Rights pp 301 – 327.  
 
73
 See chapter six, at section 6.3.  
 
74
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for this purpose become available. Ancillary to this is the fact that while 
the non-provision of a minimum core may be justified in the present 
context on the basis of limited resources, this does not mean that the 
concept be discarded completely. It should be incumbent upon the 
government to provide everyone with a minimum level of goods and 
services as soon as resources for this purpose become available.  
 
 
8.5 CONCLUDING REMARKS  
 
While a lot has been written on the subject of the judicial enforcement of 
socio-economic rights in South Africa, no research has focused on a 
comprehensive examination of the subject of remedies as this study has 
done. This study has engaged the description and analysis of the factors 
that courts consider, or should consider, when deciding to grant certain 
remedies. This analysis is intended to give a proper foundation for any 
critique of the appropriateness of judicial remedies in constitutional 
litigation generally and socio-economic rights litigation in particular. It is 
contended that while socio-economic rights are as justiciable as civil and 
political rights, they have characteristics that make their enforcement 
much more controversial. Generally, they require far more affirmative 
action and resources, and the remedies resulting from violation of these 
rights are distributive in nature. It is upon this basis that the theoretical 
foundations of judicial remedies have been discussed.   
 
Great emphasis has been laid on the effect of the form of justice that the 
courts choose to pursue. The study has shown that the nature and 
objectives of remedies arising from corrective justice are quite different 
from those that arise from distributive justice. It has been demonstrated 
that any critique of judicial remedies without an understanding of the 
form of justice that one considers ideal is a parochial and arid exercise. It 
is on this basis that the appropriateness of the different remedies available 
in constitutional litigation, such as declarations, damages and injunctions, 
has been analysed.  
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This thesis has also been able to examine in detail the most controversial 
of the remedies, the structural injunction; as a result thereof, the study has 
formulated guiding norms and principles that may be used by the courts 
when considering this form of relief. These norms and principles should 
not only guide the courts in deciding whether the structural injunction is 
appropriate, but also indicate its use in a particular case. It should be used 
as of necessity, and, when used, it should be flexible and graduated. This 
is in addition to ensuring the widest participation of all stakeholders, 
ensuring reasoned decision-making, developing the substantive norms, 
and maintaining independence and impartiality.   
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